diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'source4/kdc/hdb-samba4.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | source4/kdc/hdb-samba4.c | 1558 |
1 files changed, 1558 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source4/kdc/hdb-samba4.c b/source4/kdc/hdb-samba4.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b6a48e79d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/source4/kdc/hdb-samba4.c @@ -0,0 +1,1558 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999-2001, 2003, PADL Software Pty Ltd. + * Copyright (c) 2004, Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>. + * Copyright (c) 2004, Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of PADL Software nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY PADL SOFTWARE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL PADL SOFTWARE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +#include "system/time.h" +#include "dsdb/common/flags.h" +#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h" +#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb_errors.h" +#include "librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h" +#include "auth/auth.h" +#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h" +#include "auth/auth_sam.h" +#include "../lib/util/util_ldb.h" +#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h" +#include "librpc/ndr/libndr.h" +#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h" +#include "librpc/gen_ndr/lsa.h" +#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h" +#include "param/param.h" +#include "events/events.h" +#include "kdc/kdc.h" +#include "../lib/crypto/md4.h" + +enum hdb_ldb_ent_type +{ HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_SERVER, + HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY }; + +enum trust_direction { + UNKNOWN = 0, + INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND, + OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND +}; + +static const char *realm_ref_attrs[] = { + "nCName", + "dnsRoot", + NULL +}; + +static const char *trust_attrs[] = { + "trustPartner", + "trustAuthIncoming", + "trustAuthOutgoing", + "whenCreated", + "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes", + "trustAttributes", + "trustDirection", + "trustType", + NULL +}; + +static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val) +{ + const char *tmp; + const char *gentime; + struct tm tm; + + gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL); + if (!gentime) + return default_val; + + tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm); + if (tmp == NULL) { + return default_val; + } + + return timegm(&tm); +} + +static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, int userAccountControl, enum hdb_ldb_ent_type ent_type) +{ + HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0); + + /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */ + flags.immutable = 1; + + /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */ + flags.invalid = 1; + + flags.renewable = 1; + + /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */ + flags.server = 1; + + /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */ + if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) { + if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY) { + flags.client = 1; + } + flags.invalid = 0; + } + + if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) { + if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY) { + flags.client = 1; + } + flags.invalid = 0; + } + if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) { + if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY) { + flags.client = 1; + } + flags.invalid = 0; + } + if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) { + if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY) { + flags.client = 1; + } + flags.invalid = 0; + } + + /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */ + if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) { + flags.client = 0; + } + if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) { + flags.invalid = 1; + } +/* + if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) { + flags.invalid = 1; + } +*/ +/* + UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent +*/ + if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) { + flags.invalid = 1; + } + +/* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in LDB_message2entry() */ + +/* + if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) { + flags.invalid = 1; + } +*/ + if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) { + flags.require_hwauth = 1; + } + if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) { + flags.ok_as_delegate = 1; + } + if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) { + flags.forwardable = 1; + flags.proxiable = 1; + } + + if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) { + flags.require_preauth = 0; + } else { + flags.require_preauth = 1; + + } + return flags; +} + +static int hdb_ldb_destructor(struct hdb_ldb_private *private) +{ + hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = private->entry_ex; + free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry); + return 0; +} + +static void hdb_ldb_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) +{ + talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx); +} + +static krb5_error_code LDB_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context, + struct smb_iconv_convenience *iconv_convenience, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct ldb_message *msg, + unsigned int userAccountControl, + hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + enum ndr_err_code ndr_err; + struct samr_Password *hash; + const struct ldb_val *sc_val; + struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb; + struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL; + bool newer_keys = false; + struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb; + struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL; + struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL; + uint32_t i; + uint32_t allocated_keys = 0; + + entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL; + entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0; + + entry_ex->entry.kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0); + + /* Get keys from the db */ + + hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd"); + sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials"); + + /* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */ + if (hash) { + allocated_keys++; + } + + /* supplementalCredentials if present */ + if (sc_val) { + ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, iconv_convenience, &scb, + (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob); + if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { + dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length); + ret = EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) { + NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb); + ret = EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) { + if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) { + scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i]; + if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) { + scpk = NULL; + continue; + } + newer_keys = true; + break; + } else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) { + scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i]; + if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) { + scpk = NULL; + } + /* + * we don't break here in hope to find + * a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package + */ + } + } + } + /* + * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element + * of supplementalCredentials + */ + if (scpk) { + DATA_BLOB blob; + + blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data); + if (!blob.data) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */ + ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, iconv_convenience, &_pkb, + (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob); + if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob"); + krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob"); + ret = EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4"); + krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4"); + ret = EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3"); + krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3"); + ret = EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + if (_pkb.version == 4) { + pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4; + allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys; + } else if (_pkb.version == 3) { + pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3; + allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys; + } + } + + if (allocated_keys == 0) { + /* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in + * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this + * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */ + return 0; + } + + /* allocate space to decode into */ + entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0; + entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key)); + if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + if (hash && !(userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY)) { + Key key; + + key.mkvno = 0; + key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */ + + ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context, + ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5, + hash->hash, sizeof(hash->hash), + &key.key); + if (ret) { + goto out; + } + + entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key; + entry_ex->entry.keys.len++; + } + + if (pkb4) { + for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) { + bool use = true; + Key key; + + if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue; + + if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) { + switch (pkb4->keys[i].keytype) { + case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC: + case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5: + break; + default: + use = false; + break; + } + } + + if (!use) continue; + + key.mkvno = 0; + key.salt = NULL; + + if (pkb4->salt.string) { + DATA_BLOB salt; + + salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string); + + key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt)); + if (key.salt == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt; + + ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length); + if (ret) { + free(key.salt); + key.salt = NULL; + goto out; + } + } + + /* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */ + + ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context, + pkb4->keys[i].keytype, + pkb4->keys[i].value->data, + pkb4->keys[i].value->length, + &key.key); + if (ret) { + if (key.salt) { + free_Salt(key.salt); + free(key.salt); + key.salt = NULL; + } + goto out; + } + + entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key; + entry_ex->entry.keys.len++; + } + } else if (pkb3) { + for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) { + bool use = true; + Key key; + + if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue; + + if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) { + switch (pkb3->keys[i].keytype) { + case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC: + case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5: + break; + default: + use = false; + break; + } + } + + if (!use) continue; + + key.mkvno = 0; + key.salt = NULL; + + if (pkb3->salt.string) { + DATA_BLOB salt; + + salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string); + + key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt)); + if (key.salt == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt; + + ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length); + if (ret) { + free(key.salt); + key.salt = NULL; + goto out; + } + } + + ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context, + pkb3->keys[i].keytype, + pkb3->keys[i].value->data, + pkb3->keys[i].value->length, + &key.key); + if (ret) { + if (key.salt) { + free_Salt(key.salt); + free(key.salt); + key.salt = NULL; + } + goto out; + } + + entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key; + entry_ex->entry.keys.len++; + } + } + +out: + if (ret != 0) { + entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0; + } + if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) { + free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val); + entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL; + } + return ret; +} + +/* + * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry. + */ +static krb5_error_code LDB_message2entry(krb5_context context, HDB *db, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal, + enum hdb_ldb_ent_type ent_type, + struct ldb_message *msg, + struct ldb_message *realm_ref_msg, + hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) +{ + unsigned int userAccountControl; + int i; + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE; + const char *dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(realm_ref_msg, "dnsRoot", NULL); + char *realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain); + struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = ldb_get_opaque((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, "loadparm"); + struct ldb_dn *domain_dn = samdb_result_dn((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, + mem_ctx, + realm_ref_msg, + "nCName", + ldb_dn_new(mem_ctx, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, NULL)); + + struct hdb_ldb_private *private; + NTTIME acct_expiry; + + struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses; + struct ldb_val computer_val; + computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer"); + computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data); + + objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass"); + + if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) { + is_computer = TRUE; + } + + memset(entry_ex, 0, sizeof(*entry_ex)); + + if (!realm) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "talloc_strdup: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + private = talloc(mem_ctx, struct hdb_ldb_private); + if (!private) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + private->entry_ex = entry_ex; + private->iconv_convenience = lp_iconv_convenience(lp_ctx); + private->netbios_name = lp_netbios_name(lp_ctx); + + talloc_set_destructor(private, hdb_ldb_destructor); + + entry_ex->ctx = private; + entry_ex->free_entry = hdb_ldb_free_entry; + + userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0); + + + entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal))); + if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) { + const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL); + if (!samAccountName) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_message2entry: no samAccountName present"); + ret = ENOENT; + goto out; + } + samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL); + krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, realm, samAccountName, NULL); + } else { + char *strdup_realm; + ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal); + if (ret) { + krb5_clear_error_string(context); + goto out; + } + + /* While we have copied the client principal, tests + * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not + * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to + * replace the client principal's realm with the one + * we determine from our records */ + + /* this has to be with malloc() */ + strdup_realm = strdup(realm); + if (!strdup_realm) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_clear_error_string(context); + goto out; + } + free(*krb5_princ_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal)); + krb5_princ_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, &strdup_realm); + } + + entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type); + + if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT) { + entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0; + entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1; + entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1; + entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1; + } + + if (lp_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) { + if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) { + entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0; + } + } + + /* use 'whenCreated' */ + entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0); + /* use '???' */ + entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal = NULL; + + entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event)); + if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + /* use 'whenChanged' */ + entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0); + /* use '???' */ + entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal = NULL; + + entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL; + + acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg); + if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) { + entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL; + } else { + entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end)); + if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + *entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry); + } + + if (ent_type != HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT) { + NTTIME must_change_time + = samdb_result_force_password_change((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, mem_ctx, + domain_dn, msg); + if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) { + entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL; + } else { + entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end)); + if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + *entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time); + } + } else { + entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL; + } + + entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL; + + entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL; + + entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL; + + /* Get keys from the db */ + ret = LDB_message2entry_keys(context, private->iconv_convenience, private, msg, userAccountControl, entry_ex); + if (ret) { + /* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */ + goto out; + } + + entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes))); + if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) { + krb5_clear_error_string(context); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len; + entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int)); + if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) { + krb5_clear_error_string(context); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) { + entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype; + } + + + private->msg = talloc_steal(private, msg); + private->realm_ref_msg = talloc_steal(private, realm_ref_msg); + private->samdb = (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db; + +out: + if (ret != 0) { + /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */ + hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex); + } else { + talloc_steal(db, entry_ex->ctx); + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry. + */ +static krb5_error_code LDB_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context, HDB *db, + struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal, + enum trust_direction direction, + struct ldb_message *msg, + hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) +{ + + const char *dnsdomain; + char *realm; + char *strdup_realm; + DATA_BLOB password_utf16; + struct samr_Password password_hash; + const struct ldb_val *password_val; + struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob; + struct hdb_ldb_private *private; + + enum ndr_err_code ndr_err; + int i, ret, trust_direction_flags; + + private = talloc(mem_ctx, struct hdb_ldb_private); + if (!private) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + private->entry_ex = entry_ex; + private->iconv_convenience = lp_iconv_convenience(lp_ctx); + private->netbios_name = lp_netbios_name(lp_ctx); + + talloc_set_destructor(private, hdb_ldb_destructor); + + entry_ex->ctx = private; + entry_ex->free_entry = hdb_ldb_free_entry; + + /* use 'whenCreated' */ + entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0); + /* use '???' */ + entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal = NULL; + + entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL; + + trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0); + + if (direction == INBOUND) { + realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lp_realm(lp_ctx)); + password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming"); + + } else { /* OUTBOUND */ + dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL); + realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain); + password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing"); + } + + if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) { + ret = ENOENT; + goto out; + } + + ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, private->iconv_convenience, &password_blob, + (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob); + if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { + ret = EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + entry_ex->entry.kvno = -1; + for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) { + if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) { + entry_ex->entry.kvno = password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.version.version; + } + } + + for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) { + if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) { + password_utf16 = data_blob_const(password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password, + password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size); + /* In the future, generate all sorts of + * hashes, but for now we can't safely convert + * the random strings windows uses into + * utf8 */ + + /* but as it is utf16 already, we can get the NT password/arcfour-hmac-md5 key */ + mdfour(password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length); + break; + } else if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) { + password_hash = password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password; + break; + } + } + entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0; + entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL; + + if (i < password_blob.count) { + Key key; + /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */ + entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(1, sizeof(Key)); + + key.mkvno = 0; + key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */ + + if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context, + ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5, + password_hash.hash, sizeof(password_hash.hash), + &key.key); + + entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key; + entry_ex->entry.keys.len++; + } + + entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal))); + + ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal); + if (ret) { + krb5_clear_error_string(context); + goto out; + } + + /* While we have copied the client principal, tests + * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not + * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to + * replace the client principal's realm with the one + * we determine from our records */ + + /* this has to be with malloc() */ + strdup_realm = strdup(realm); + if (!strdup_realm) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_clear_error_string(context); + goto out; + } + free(*krb5_princ_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal)); + krb5_princ_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, &strdup_realm); + + entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0); + entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1; + entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0; + entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1; + entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1; + + entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL; + + entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL; + + entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL; + + entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL; + + entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes))); + if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) { + krb5_clear_error_string(context); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len; + entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int)); + if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) { + krb5_clear_error_string(context); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) { + entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype; + } + + + private->msg = talloc_steal(private, msg); + private->realm_ref_msg = NULL; + private->samdb = (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db; + +out: + if (ret != 0) { + /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */ + hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex); + } else { + talloc_steal(db, entry_ex->ctx); + } + + return ret; + +} + +static krb5_error_code LDB_lookup_principal(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + krb5_const_principal principal, + enum hdb_ldb_ent_type ent_type, + struct ldb_dn *realm_dn, + struct ldb_message ***pmsg) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int lret; + char *filter = NULL; + const char * const *princ_attrs = user_attrs; + + char *short_princ; + char *short_princ_talloc; + + struct ldb_result *res = NULL; + + ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &short_princ); + + if (ret != 0) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_lookup_principal: could not parse principal"); + krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_lookup_principal: could not parse principal"); + return ret; + } + + short_princ_talloc = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, short_princ); + free(short_princ); + if (!short_princ_talloc) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_lookup_principal: talloc_strdup() failed!"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + switch (ent_type) { + case HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT: + case HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_TRUST: + case HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY: + /* Can't happen */ + return EINVAL; + case HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT: + filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))", + KRB5_TGS_NAME); + break; + case HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_SERVER: + filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))", + short_princ_talloc); + break; + } + + if (!filter) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &res, realm_dn, + LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, princ_attrs, "%s", filter); + if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) { + DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search for %s: %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx))); + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + } else if (res->count == 0 || res->count > 1) { + DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for %s: got %d\n", filter, res->count)); + talloc_free(res); + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + } + talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res->msgs); + *pmsg = res->msgs; + talloc_free(res); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code LDB_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const char *realm, + struct ldb_dn *realm_dn, + struct ldb_message ***pmsg) +{ + int lret; + char *filter = NULL; + const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs; + + struct ldb_result *res = NULL; + filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=trustedDomain)(|(flatname=%s)(trustPartner=%s)))", realm, realm); + + if (!filter) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &res, + ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx), + LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs, "%s", filter); + if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) { + DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search for %s: %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx))); + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + } else if (res->count == 0 || res->count > 1) { + DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for %s: got %d\n", filter, res->count)); + talloc_free(res); + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + } + talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res->msgs); + *pmsg = res->msgs; + talloc_free(res); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code LDB_lookup_realm(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const char *realm, + struct ldb_message ***pmsg) +{ + int ret; + struct ldb_result *cross_ref_res; + struct ldb_dn *partitions_basedn = samdb_partitions_dn(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx); + + ret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &cross_ref_res, + partitions_basedn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, realm_ref_attrs, + "(&(&(|(&(dnsRoot=%s)(nETBIOSName=*))(nETBIOSName=%s))(objectclass=crossRef))(ncName=*))", + realm, realm); + + if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { + DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search to lookup realm(%s): %s\n", realm, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx))); + talloc_free(cross_ref_res); + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + } else if (cross_ref_res->count == 0 || cross_ref_res->count > 1) { + DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for realm %s: got %d\n", realm, cross_ref_res->count)); + talloc_free(cross_ref_res); + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + } + + if (pmsg) { + *pmsg = cross_ref_res->msgs; + talloc_steal(mem_ctx, cross_ref_res->msgs); + } + talloc_free(cross_ref_res); + + return 0; +} + + +static krb5_error_code LDB_open(krb5_context context, HDB *db, int flags, mode_t mode) +{ + if (db->hdb_master_key_set) { + krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_open: use of a master key incompatible with LDB\n"); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_open: use of a master key incompatible with LDB\n"); + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + } + + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code LDB_close(krb5_context context, HDB *db) +{ + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code LDB_lock(krb5_context context, HDB *db, int operation) +{ + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code LDB_unlock(krb5_context context, HDB *db) +{ + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code LDB_rename(krb5_context context, HDB *db, const char *new_name) +{ + return HDB_ERR_DB_INUSE; +} + +static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch_client(krb5_context context, HDB *db, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + krb5_const_principal principal, + unsigned flags, + hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) { + NTSTATUS nt_status; + char *principal_string; + krb5_error_code ret; + struct ldb_message **msg = NULL; + struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msg = NULL; + + ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string); + + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + nt_status = sam_get_results_principal((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, + mem_ctx, principal_string, + &msg, &realm_ref_msg); + free(principal_string); + if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) { + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) { + return ENOMEM; + } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + return EINVAL; + } + + ret = LDB_message2entry(context, db, mem_ctx, + principal, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, + msg[0], realm_ref_msg[0], entry_ex); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context, HDB *db, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + krb5_const_principal principal, + unsigned flags, + hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct ldb_message **msg = NULL; + struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msg_1 = NULL; + struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msg_2 = NULL; + struct ldb_dn *realm_dn; + const char *realm; + + krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL; + if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2 + || (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) { + /* Not a krbtgt */ + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + } + + /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */ + + if ((LDB_lookup_realm(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, + mem_ctx, principal->realm, &realm_ref_msg_1) == 0) + && (LDB_lookup_realm(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, + mem_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1], &realm_ref_msg_2) == 0) + && (ldb_dn_compare(realm_ref_msg_1[0]->dn, realm_ref_msg_1[0]->dn) == 0)) { + /* us */ + /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm, + * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary + * krbtgt */ + + const char *dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(realm_ref_msg_1[0], "dnsRoot", NULL); + char *realm_fixed = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain); + if (!realm_fixed) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "strupper_talloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &alloc_principal); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + + free(alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]); + alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1] = strdup(realm_fixed); + talloc_free(realm_fixed); + if (!alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_fetch: strdup() failed!"); + return ENOMEM; + } + principal = alloc_principal; + realm_dn = samdb_result_dn((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, mem_ctx, realm_ref_msg_1[0], "nCName", NULL); + + ret = LDB_lookup_principal(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, + mem_ctx, + principal, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, realm_dn, &msg); + + if (ret != 0) { + krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: could not find principal in DB"); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_fetch: could not find principal in DB"); + return ret; + } + + ret = LDB_message2entry(context, db, mem_ctx, + principal, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, + msg[0], realm_ref_msg_1[0], entry_ex); + if (ret != 0) { + krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed"); + } + return ret; + + } else { + enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN; + + struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = talloc_get_type(ldb_get_opaque(db->hdb_db, "loadparm"), struct loadparm_context); + /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */ + + if (strcasecmp(lp_realm(lp_ctx), principal->realm) == 0) { + /* look for inbound trust */ + direction = INBOUND; + realm = principal->name.name_string.val[1]; + } + + if (strcasecmp(lp_realm(lp_ctx), principal->name.name_string.val[1]) == 0) { + /* look for outbound trust */ + direction = OUTBOUND; + realm = principal->realm; + } + + /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */ + + ret = LDB_lookup_trust(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, + mem_ctx, + realm, realm_dn, &msg); + + if (ret != 0) { + krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: could not find principal in DB"); + krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_fetch: could not find principal in DB"); + return ret; + } + + ret = LDB_trust_message2entry(context, db, lp_ctx, mem_ctx, + principal, direction, + msg[0], entry_ex); + if (ret != 0) { + krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: trust_message2entry failed"); + } + return ret; + + + /* we should lookup trusted domains */ + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + } + +} + +static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch_server(krb5_context context, HDB *db, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + krb5_const_principal principal, + unsigned flags, + hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + const char *realm; + struct ldb_message **msg = NULL; + struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msg = NULL; + struct ldb_dn *partitions_basedn = samdb_partitions_dn(db->hdb_db, mem_ctx); + if (principal->name.name_string.len >= 2) { + /* 'normal server' case */ + int ldb_ret; + NTSTATUS nt_status; + struct ldb_dn *user_dn, *domain_dn; + char *principal_string; + + ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, + KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, + &principal_string); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* At this point we may find the host is known to be + * in a different realm, so we should generate a + * referral instead */ + nt_status = crack_service_principal_name((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, + mem_ctx, principal_string, + &user_dn, &domain_dn); + free(principal_string); + + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + } + + ldb_ret = gendb_search_dn((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, + mem_ctx, user_dn, &msg, user_attrs); + + if (ldb_ret != 1) { + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + } + + ldb_ret = gendb_search((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, + mem_ctx, partitions_basedn, &realm_ref_msg, realm_ref_attrs, + "ncName=%s", ldb_dn_get_linearized(domain_dn)); + + if (ldb_ret != 1) { + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + } + + } else { + struct ldb_dn *realm_dn; + /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */ + + realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal); + + ret = LDB_lookup_realm(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, + mem_ctx, realm, &realm_ref_msg); + if (ret != 0) { + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + } + + realm_dn = samdb_result_dn((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, mem_ctx, realm_ref_msg[0], "nCName", NULL); + + ret = LDB_lookup_principal(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, + mem_ctx, + principal, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_SERVER, realm_dn, &msg); + + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + ret = LDB_message2entry(context, db, mem_ctx, + principal, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_SERVER, + msg[0], realm_ref_msg[0], entry_ex); + if (ret != 0) { + krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: message2entry failed"); + } + + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch(krb5_context context, HDB *db, + krb5_const_principal principal, + unsigned flags, + hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(db, 0, "LDB_fetch context"); + + if (!mem_ctx) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_fetch: talloc_named() failed!"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) { + ret = LDB_fetch_client(context, db, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex); + if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done; + } + if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) { + /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */ + ret = LDB_fetch_krbtgt(context, db, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex); + if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done; + + /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */ + ret = LDB_fetch_server(context, db, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex); + if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done; + } + if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) { + ret = LDB_fetch_krbtgt(context, db, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex); + if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done; + } + +done: + talloc_free(mem_ctx); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code LDB_store(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry_ex *entry) +{ + return HDB_ERR_DB_INUSE; +} + +static krb5_error_code LDB_remove(krb5_context context, HDB *db, krb5_const_principal principal) +{ + return HDB_ERR_DB_INUSE; +} + +struct hdb_ldb_seq { + struct ldb_context *ctx; + int index; + int count; + struct ldb_message **msgs; + struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msgs; +}; + +static krb5_error_code LDB_seq(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry_ex *entry) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct hdb_ldb_seq *priv = (struct hdb_ldb_seq *)db->hdb_dbc; + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx; + hdb_entry_ex entry_ex; + memset(&entry_ex, '\0', sizeof(entry_ex)); + + if (!priv) { + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + } + + mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "LDB_seq context"); + + if (!mem_ctx) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_seq: talloc_named() failed!"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + if (priv->index < priv->count) { + ret = LDB_message2entry(context, db, mem_ctx, + NULL, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY, + priv->msgs[priv->index++], + priv->realm_ref_msgs[0], entry); + } else { + ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + } + + if (ret != 0) { + talloc_free(priv); + db->hdb_dbc = NULL; + } else { + talloc_free(mem_ctx); + } + + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code LDB_firstkey(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, + hdb_entry_ex *entry) +{ + struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db; + struct hdb_ldb_seq *priv = (struct hdb_ldb_seq *)db->hdb_dbc; + char *realm; + struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = NULL; + struct ldb_result *res = NULL; + struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msgs = NULL; + krb5_error_code ret; + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx; + int lret; + + if (priv) { + talloc_free(priv); + db->hdb_dbc = NULL; + } + + priv = (struct hdb_ldb_seq *) talloc(db, struct hdb_ldb_seq); + if (!priv) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "talloc: out of memory"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + priv->ctx = ldb_ctx; + priv->index = 0; + priv->msgs = NULL; + priv->realm_ref_msgs = NULL; + priv->count = 0; + + mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "LDB_firstkey context"); + + if (!mem_ctx) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!"); + return ENOMEM; + } + + ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm); + if (ret != 0) { + talloc_free(priv); + return ret; + } + + ret = LDB_lookup_realm(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, + mem_ctx, realm, &realm_ref_msgs); + + free(realm); + + if (ret != 0) { + talloc_free(priv); + krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_firstkey: could not find realm\n"); + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + } + + realm_dn = samdb_result_dn((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, mem_ctx, realm_ref_msgs[0], "nCName", NULL); + + priv->realm_ref_msgs = talloc_steal(priv, realm_ref_msgs); + + lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res, + realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs, + "(objectClass=user)"); + + if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) { + talloc_free(priv); + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + } + + priv->count = res->count; + priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs); + talloc_free(res); + + db->hdb_dbc = priv; + + ret = LDB_seq(context, db, flags, entry); + + if (ret != 0) { + talloc_free(priv); + db->hdb_dbc = NULL; + } else { + talloc_free(mem_ctx); + } + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code LDB_nextkey(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, + hdb_entry_ex *entry) +{ + return LDB_seq(context, db, flags, entry); +} + +static krb5_error_code LDB_destroy(krb5_context context, HDB *db) +{ + talloc_free(db); + return 0; +} + +/* This interface is to be called by the KDC, which is expecting Samba + * calling conventions. It is also called by a wrapper + * (hdb_ldb_create) from the kpasswdd -> krb5 -> keytab_hdb -> hdb + * code */ + +NTSTATUS kdc_hdb_samba4_create(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct event_context *ev_ctx, + struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx, + krb5_context context, struct HDB **db, const char *arg) +{ + NTSTATUS nt_status; + struct auth_session_info *session_info; + *db = talloc(mem_ctx, HDB); + if (!*db) { + krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + (*db)->hdb_master_key_set = 0; + (*db)->hdb_db = NULL; + + nt_status = auth_system_session_info(*db, lp_ctx, &session_info); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + return nt_status; + } + + /* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to + * authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is higly likely to + * be circular. + * + * In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL + * certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP + */ + + cli_credentials_set_kerberos_state(session_info->credentials, + CRED_DONT_USE_KERBEROS); + + /* Setup the link to LDB */ + (*db)->hdb_db = samdb_connect(*db, ev_ctx, lp_ctx, session_info); + if ((*db)->hdb_db == NULL) { + DEBUG(1, ("hdb_ldb_create: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!")); + return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO; + } + + (*db)->hdb_dbc = NULL; + (*db)->hdb_open = LDB_open; + (*db)->hdb_close = LDB_close; + (*db)->hdb_fetch = LDB_fetch; + (*db)->hdb_store = LDB_store; + (*db)->hdb_remove = LDB_remove; + (*db)->hdb_firstkey = LDB_firstkey; + (*db)->hdb_nextkey = LDB_nextkey; + (*db)->hdb_lock = LDB_lock; + (*db)->hdb_unlock = LDB_unlock; + (*db)->hdb_rename = LDB_rename; + /* we don't implement these, as we are not a lockable database */ + (*db)->hdb__get = NULL; + (*db)->hdb__put = NULL; + /* kadmin should not be used for deletes - use other tools instead */ + (*db)->hdb__del = NULL; + (*db)->hdb_destroy = LDB_destroy; + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_create(krb5_context context, struct HDB **db, const char *arg) +{ + NTSTATUS nt_status; + /* The global kdc_mem_ctx and kdc_lp_ctx, Disgusting, ugly hack, but it means one less private hook */ + nt_status = kdc_hdb_samba4_create(kdc_mem_ctx, event_context_find(kdc_mem_ctx), kdc_lp_ctx, + context, db, arg); + + if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + return 0; + } + return EINVAL; +} |