1 files changed, 293 insertions, 24 deletions

diff --git a/source4/kdc/pac-glue.c b/source4/kdc/pac-glue.c
index ae306b4062..03b53fa3af 100644
--- a/source4/kdc/pac-glue.c
+++ b/source4/kdc/pac-glue.c
@@ -23,42 +23,41 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 #include "kdc/kdc.h"
-#include "kdc/pac-glue.h" /* Ensure we don't get this prototype wrong, as that could be painful */
-
- krb5_error_code samba_get_pac(krb5_context context, 
-			       struct krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
-			       krb5_principal client, 
-			       krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_keyblock, 
-			       krb5_keyblock *server_keyblock, 
-			       time_t tgs_authtime,
-			       krb5_data *pac)
+#include "include/ads.h"
+#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h"
+#include "heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/krb5pac.h"
+#include "auth/auth.h"
+
+/* Given the right private pointer from hdb_ldb, get a PAC from the attached ldb messages */
+static krb5_error_code samba_get_pac(krb5_context context, 
+				     struct hdb_ldb_private *private,
+				     krb5_principal client, 
+				     krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_keyblock, 
+				     krb5_keyblock *server_keyblock, 
+				     time_t tgs_authtime,
+				     krb5_data *pac)
 {
 	krb5_error_code ret;
 	NTSTATUS nt_status;
 	struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info;
 	DATA_BLOB tmp_blob;
-	char *principal_string;
-	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(config, 0, "samba_get_pac context");
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(private, 0, "samba_get_pac context");
+
 	if (!mem_ctx) {
 		return ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-	ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client, &principal_string);
-
-	if (ret != 0) {
-		krb5_set_error_string(context, "get pac: could not unparse principal");
-		krb5_warnx(context, "get pac: could not unparse principal");
-		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
-		return ret;
-	}
-
-	nt_status = sam_get_server_info_principal(mem_ctx, principal_string,
-						  &server_info);
-	free(principal_string);
+	nt_status = authsam_make_server_info(mem_ctx, private->samdb, 
+					     private->msg, 
+					     private->realm_ref_msg,
+					     data_blob(NULL, 0),
+					     data_blob(NULL, 0),
+					     &server_info);
 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
 		DEBUG(0, ("Getting user info for PAC failed: %s\n",
 			  nt_errstr(nt_status)));
-		return EINVAL;
+		return ENOMEM;
 	}
 
 	ret = kerberos_create_pac(mem_ctx, server_info, 
@@ -80,3 +79,273 @@
 	talloc_free(mem_ctx);
 	return ret;
 }
+
+/* Wrap the PAC in the right ASN.1.  Will always free 'pac', on success or failure */
+krb5_error_code wrap_pac(krb5_context context, krb5_data *pac, AuthorizationData **out) 
+{
+	krb5_error_code ret;
+
+	unsigned char *buf;
+	size_t buf_size;
+	size_t len;
+	
+	AD_IF_RELEVANT if_relevant;
+	AuthorizationData *auth_data;
+
+	if_relevant.len = 1;
+	if_relevant.val = malloc(sizeof(*if_relevant.val));
+	if (!if_relevant.val) {
+		krb5_data_free(pac);
+		*out = NULL;
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if_relevant.val[0].ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC;
+	if_relevant.val[0].ad_data.data = NULL;
+	if_relevant.val[0].ad_data.length = 0;
+	
+	/* pac.data will be freed with this */
+	if_relevant.val[0].ad_data.data = pac->data;
+	if_relevant.val[0].ad_data.length = pac->length;
+	
+	ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AuthorizationData, buf, buf_size, &if_relevant, &len, ret);
+	free_AuthorizationData(&if_relevant);
+	if (ret) {
+		*out = NULL;
+		return ret;
+	}		
+	
+	auth_data = malloc(sizeof(*auth_data));
+	if (!auth_data) {
+		free(buf);
+		*out = NULL;
+		return ret;
+	}		
+	auth_data->len = 1;
+	auth_data->val = malloc(sizeof(*auth_data->val));
+	if (!auth_data->val) {
+		free(buf);
+		free(auth_data);
+		*out = NULL;
+		return ret;
+	}
+	auth_data->val[0].ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT;
+	auth_data->val[0].ad_data.length = len;
+	auth_data->val[0].ad_data.data = buf;
+
+	*out = auth_data;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Given a hdb_entry, create a PAC out of the private data 
+
+   Don't create it if the client has the UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED bit
+   set, or if they specificaly asked not to get it.
+*/
+
+ krb5_error_code hdb_ldb_authz_data_as_req(krb5_context context, struct hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex, 
+					   METHOD_DATA* pa_data_seq,
+					   time_t authtime,
+					   EncryptionKey *tgtkey,
+					   EncryptionKey *sessionkey,
+					   AuthorizationData **out)
+{
+	krb5_error_code ret;
+	int i;
+	krb5_data pac;
+	krb5_boolean pac_wanted = TRUE;
+	unsigned int userAccountControl;
+	struct PA_PAC_REQUEST pac_request;
+	struct hdb_ldb_private *private = talloc_get_type(entry_ex->private, struct hdb_ldb_private);
+	
+	/* The user account may be set not to want the PAC */
+	userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_uint(private->msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
+	if (userAccountControl & UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) {
+		*out = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* The user may not want a PAC */
+	for (i=0; i<pa_data_seq->len; i++) {
+		if (pa_data_seq->val[i].padata_type == KRB5_PADATA_PA_PAC_REQUEST) {
+			ret = decode_PA_PAC_REQUEST(pa_data_seq->val[i].padata_value.data, 
+						    pa_data_seq->val[i].padata_value.length, 
+						    &pac_request, NULL);
+			if (ret == 0) {
+				pac_wanted = !!pac_request.include_pac;
+			}
+			free_PA_PAC_REQUEST(&pac_request);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!pac_wanted) {
+		*out = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}	
+
+	/* Get PAC from Samba */
+	ret = samba_get_pac(context,
+			    private,
+			    entry_ex->entry.principal,
+			    tgtkey,
+			    tgtkey,
+			    authtime,
+			    &pac);
+
+	if (ret) {
+		*out = NULL;
+		return ret;
+	}
+	
+	return wrap_pac(context, &pac, out);
+}
+
+/* Resign (and reform, including possibly new groups) a PAC */
+
+ krb5_error_code hdb_ldb_authz_data_tgs_req(krb5_context context, struct hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex, 
+					    krb5_principal client, 
+					    AuthorizationData *in, 
+					    time_t authtime,
+					    EncryptionKey *tgtkey,
+					    EncryptionKey *servicekey,
+					    EncryptionKey *sessionkey,
+					    AuthorizationData **out)
+{
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+	krb5_error_code ret;
+
+	unsigned int userAccountControl;
+
+	struct hdb_ldb_private *private = talloc_get_type(entry_ex->private, struct hdb_ldb_private);
+	krb5_data k5pac_in, k5pac_out;
+	DATA_BLOB pac_in, pac_out;
+
+	struct PAC_LOGON_INFO *logon_info;
+	union netr_Validation validation;
+	struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info_out;
+
+	krb5_boolean found = FALSE;
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
+	
+	/* The service account may be set not to want the PAC */
+	userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_uint(private->msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
+	if (userAccountControl & UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) {
+		*out = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	ret = _krb5_find_type_in_ad(context, KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC,
+				    &k5pac_in, &found, sessionkey, in);
+	if (ret || !found) {
+		*out = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	mem_ctx = talloc_new(private);
+	if (!mem_ctx) {
+		krb5_data_free(&k5pac_in);
+		*out = NULL;
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	pac_in = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, k5pac_in.data, k5pac_in.length);
+	krb5_data_free(&k5pac_in);
+	if (!pac_in.data) {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		*out = NULL;
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+		
+	/* Parse the PAC again, for the logon info */
+	nt_status = kerberos_pac_logon_info(mem_ctx, &logon_info,
+					    pac_in,
+					    context,
+					    tgtkey, 
+					    tgtkey, 
+					    client, authtime, 
+					    &ret);
+
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("Failed to parse PAC in TGT: %s/%s\n", 
+			  nt_errstr(nt_status), error_message(ret)));
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		*out = NULL;
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	/* Pull this right into the normal auth sysstem structures */
+	validation.sam3 = &logon_info->info3;
+	nt_status = make_server_info_netlogon_validation(mem_ctx,
+							 "",
+							 3, &validation,
+							 &server_info_out); 
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		*out = NULL;
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	/* And make a new PAC, possibly containing new groups */
+	ret = kerberos_create_pac(mem_ctx, 
+				  server_info_out,
+				  context,
+				  tgtkey,
+				  servicekey,
+				  client,
+				  authtime,
+				  &pac_out);
+
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		*out = NULL;
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	ret = krb5_data_copy(&k5pac_out, pac_out.data, pac_out.length);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+		*out = NULL;
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	return wrap_pac(context, &k5pac_out, out);
+}
+
+/* Given an hdb entry (and in particular it's private member), consult
+ * the account_ok routine in auth/auth_sam.c for consistancy */
+
+ krb5_error_code hdb_ldb_check_client_access(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex, 
+					    HostAddresses *addresses)
+{
+	krb5_error_code ret;
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+	TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(entry_ex->private);
+	struct hdb_ldb_private *private = talloc_get_type(entry_ex->private, struct hdb_ldb_private);
+	char *name, *workstation = NULL;
+	if (!tmp_ctx) {
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+	
+	ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, &name);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+	}
+	nt_status = authsam_account_ok(tmp_ctx, 
+				       private->samdb, 
+				       MSV1_0_ALLOW_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT | MSV1_0_ALLOW_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT,
+				       private->msg,
+				       private->realm_ref_msg,
+				       workstation,
+				       name);
+	free(name);
+
+	/* TODO:  Need a more complete mapping of NTSTATUS to krb5kdc errors */
+
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+