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Diffstat (limited to 'source4/passdb/secrets.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | source4/passdb/secrets.c | 612 |
1 files changed, 612 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source4/passdb/secrets.c b/source4/passdb/secrets.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..01eb82f414 --- /dev/null +++ b/source4/passdb/secrets.c @@ -0,0 +1,612 @@ +/* + Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. + Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-2001 + Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2002 + Copyright (C) Rafal Szczesniak 2002 + + This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + GNU General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. +*/ + +/* the Samba secrets database stores any generated, private information + such as the local SID and machine trust password */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#undef DBGC_CLASS +#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_PASSDB + +static TDB_CONTEXT *tdb; + +/* open up the secrets database */ +BOOL secrets_init(void) +{ + pstring fname; + + if (tdb) + return True; + + pstrcpy(fname, lp_private_dir()); + pstrcat(fname,"/secrets.tdb"); + + tdb = tdb_open_log(fname, 0, TDB_DEFAULT, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0600); + + if (!tdb) { + DEBUG(0,("Failed to open %s\n", fname)); + return False; + } + return True; +} + +/* read a entry from the secrets database - the caller must free the result + if size is non-null then the size of the entry is put in there + */ +void *secrets_fetch(const char *key, size_t *size) +{ + TDB_DATA kbuf, dbuf; + secrets_init(); + if (!tdb) + return NULL; + kbuf.dptr = strdup(key); + kbuf.dsize = strlen(key); + dbuf = tdb_fetch(tdb, kbuf); + if (size) + *size = dbuf.dsize; + free(kbuf.dptr); + return dbuf.dptr; +} + +/* store a secrets entry + */ +BOOL secrets_store(const char *key, const void *data, size_t size) +{ + TDB_DATA kbuf, dbuf; + int ret; + + secrets_init(); + if (!tdb) + return False; + kbuf.dptr = strdup(key); + kbuf.dsize = strlen(key); + dbuf.dptr = memdup(data, size); + dbuf.dsize = size; + + ret = tdb_store(tdb, kbuf, dbuf, TDB_REPLACE) == 0; + + free(kbuf.dptr); + free(dbuf.dptr); + + return ret == 0; +} + + +/* delete a secets database entry + */ +BOOL secrets_delete(const char *key) +{ + TDB_DATA kbuf; + int ret; + + secrets_init(); + if (!tdb) + return False; + kbuf.dptr = strdup(key); + kbuf.dsize = strlen(key); + ret = tdb_delete(tdb, kbuf); + free(kbuf.dptr); + return ret == 0; +} + +BOOL secrets_store_domain_sid(const char *domain, const DOM_SID *sid) +{ + fstring key; + + slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain); + strupper(key); + return secrets_store(key, sid, sizeof(DOM_SID)); +} + +BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_sid(const char *domain, DOM_SID *sid) +{ + DOM_SID *dyn_sid; + fstring key; + size_t size; + + slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain); + strupper(key); + dyn_sid = (DOM_SID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); + + if (dyn_sid == NULL) + return False; + + if (size != sizeof(DOM_SID)) + { + SAFE_FREE(dyn_sid); + return False; + } + + *sid = *dyn_sid; + SAFE_FREE(dyn_sid); + return True; +} + +BOOL secrets_store_domain_guid(const char *domain, GUID *guid) +{ + fstring key; + + slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain); + strupper(key); + return secrets_store(key, guid, sizeof(GUID)); +} + +BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_guid(const char *domain, GUID *guid) +{ + GUID *dyn_guid; + fstring key; + size_t size; + GUID new_guid; + + slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain); + strupper(key); + dyn_guid = (GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); + + DEBUG(6,("key is %s, size is %d\n", key, (int)size)); + + if ((NULL == dyn_guid) && (ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC == lp_server_role())) { + uuid_generate_random(&new_guid); + if (!secrets_store_domain_guid(domain, &new_guid)) + return False; + dyn_guid = (GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); + if (dyn_guid == NULL) + return False; + } + + if (size != sizeof(GUID)) + { + SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid); + return False; + } + + *guid = *dyn_guid; + SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid); + return True; +} + +/** + * Form a key for fetching the machine trust account password + * + * @param domain domain name + * + * @return stored password's key + **/ +const char *trust_keystr(const char *domain) +{ + static fstring keystr; + + slprintf(keystr,sizeof(keystr)-1,"%s/%s", + SECRETS_MACHINE_ACCT_PASS, domain); + strupper(keystr); + + return keystr; +} + +/** + * Form a key for fetching a trusted domain password + * + * @param domain trusted domain name + * + * @return stored password's key + **/ +char *trustdom_keystr(const char *domain) +{ + static char* keystr; + + asprintf(&keystr, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS, domain); + strupper(keystr); + + return keystr; +} + +/************************************************************************ + Lock the trust password entry. +************************************************************************/ + +BOOL secrets_lock_trust_account_password(const char *domain, BOOL dolock) +{ + if (!tdb) + return False; + + if (dolock) + return (tdb_lock_bystring(tdb, trust_keystr(domain),0) == 0); + else + tdb_unlock_bystring(tdb, trust_keystr(domain)); + return True; +} + +/************************************************************************ + Routine to get the trust account password for a domain. + The user of this function must have locked the trust password file using + the above call. +************************************************************************/ + +BOOL secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 ret_pwd[16], + time_t *pass_last_set_time) +{ + struct machine_acct_pass *pass; + char *plaintext; + size_t size; + + plaintext = secrets_fetch_machine_password(); + if (plaintext) { + /* we have an ADS password - use that */ + DEBUG(4,("Using ADS machine password\n")); + E_md4hash(plaintext, ret_pwd); + SAFE_FREE(plaintext); + pass_last_set_time = 0; + return True; + } + + if (!(pass = secrets_fetch(trust_keystr(domain), &size))) { + DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n")); + return False; + } + + if (size != sizeof(*pass)) { + DEBUG(0, ("secrets were of incorrect size!\n")); + return False; + } + + if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass->mod_time; + memcpy(ret_pwd, pass->hash, 16); + SAFE_FREE(pass); + return True; +} + +/************************************************************************ + Routine to get account password to trusted domain +************************************************************************/ + +BOOL secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(const char *domain, char** pwd, + DOM_SID *sid, time_t *pass_last_set_time) +{ + struct trusted_dom_pass *pass; + size_t size; + + /* fetching trusted domain password structure */ + if (!(pass = secrets_fetch(trustdom_keystr(domain), &size))) { + DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n")); + return False; + } + + if (size != sizeof(*pass)) { + DEBUG(0, ("secrets were of incorrect size!\n")); + return False; + } + + /* the trust's password */ + if (pwd) { + *pwd = strdup(pass->pass); + if (!*pwd) { + return False; + } + } + + /* last change time */ + if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass->mod_time; + + /* domain sid */ + memcpy(&sid, &(pass->domain_sid), sizeof(sid)); + + SAFE_FREE(pass); + + return True; +} + +/************************************************************************ + Routine to set the trust account password for a domain. +************************************************************************/ + +BOOL secrets_store_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 new_pwd[16]) +{ + struct machine_acct_pass pass; + + pass.mod_time = time(NULL); + memcpy(pass.hash, new_pwd, 16); + + return secrets_store(trust_keystr(domain), (void *)&pass, sizeof(pass)); +} + +/** + * Routine to set the password for trusted domain + * + * @param domain remote domain name + * @param pwd plain text password of trust relationship + * @param sid remote domain sid + * + * @return true if succeeded + **/ + +BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, smb_ucs2_t *uni_dom_name, + size_t uni_name_len, const char* pwd, + DOM_SID sid) +{ + struct trusted_dom_pass pass; + ZERO_STRUCT(pass); + + /* unicode domain name and its length */ + if (!uni_dom_name) + return False; + + strncpy_w(pass.uni_name, uni_dom_name, sizeof(pass.uni_name) - 1); + pass.uni_name_len = uni_name_len; + + /* last change time */ + pass.mod_time = time(NULL); + + /* password of the trust */ + pass.pass_len = strlen(pwd); + fstrcpy(pass.pass, pwd); + + /* domain sid */ + memcpy(&(pass.domain_sid), &sid, sizeof(sid)); + + return secrets_store(trustdom_keystr(domain), (void *)&pass, sizeof(pass)); +} + +/************************************************************************ + Routine to set the plaintext machine account password for a realm +the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string +************************************************************************/ + +BOOL secrets_store_machine_password(const char *pass) +{ + char *key; + BOOL ret; + asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, lp_workgroup()); + strupper(key); + ret = secrets_store(key, pass, strlen(pass)+1); + free(key); + return ret; +} + + +/************************************************************************ + Routine to fetch the plaintext machine account password for a realm +the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string +************************************************************************/ +char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(void) +{ + char *key; + char *ret; + asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, lp_workgroup()); + strupper(key); + ret = (char *)secrets_fetch(key, NULL); + free(key); + return ret; +} + + + +/************************************************************************ + Routine to delete the machine trust account password file for a domain. +************************************************************************/ + +BOOL trust_password_delete(const char *domain) +{ + return secrets_delete(trust_keystr(domain)); +} + +/************************************************************************ + Routine to delete the password for trusted domain +************************************************************************/ + +BOOL trusted_domain_password_delete(const char *domain) +{ + return secrets_delete(trustdom_keystr(domain)); +} + + +BOOL secrets_store_ldap_pw(const char* dn, char* pw) +{ + char *key = NULL; + BOOL ret; + + if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, dn) < 0) { + DEBUG(0, ("secrets_store_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n")); + return False; + } + + ret = secrets_store(key, pw, strlen(pw)+1); + + SAFE_FREE(key); + return ret; +} + + +/** + * Get trusted domains info from secrets.tdb. + * + * The linked list is allocated on the supplied talloc context, caller gets to destroy + * when done. + * + * @param ctx Allocation context + * @param enum_ctx Starting index, eg. we can start fetching at third + * or sixth trusted domain entry. Zero is the first index. + * Value it is set to is the enum context for the next enumeration. + * @param num_domains Number of domain entries to fetch at one call + * @param domains Pointer to array of trusted domain structs to be filled up + * + * @return nt status code of rpc response + **/ + +NTSTATUS secrets_get_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX* ctx, int* enum_ctx, unsigned int max_num_domains, int *num_domains, TRUSTDOM ***domains) +{ + TDB_LIST_NODE *keys, *k; + TRUSTDOM *dom = NULL; + char *pattern; + unsigned int start_idx; + uint32 idx = 0; + size_t size; + fstring dom_name; + struct trusted_dom_pass *pass; + NTSTATUS status; + + if (!secrets_init()) return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + + *num_domains = 0; + start_idx = *enum_ctx; + + /* generate searching pattern */ + if (!(pattern = talloc_asprintf(ctx, "%s/*", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS))) { + DEBUG(0, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: talloc_asprintf() failed!\n")); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: looking for %d domains, starting at index %d\n", + max_num_domains, *enum_ctx)); + + *domains = talloc_zero(ctx, sizeof(**domains)*max_num_domains); + + /* fetching trusted domains' data and collecting them in a list */ + keys = tdb_search_keys(tdb, pattern); + + /* + * if there's no keys returned ie. no trusted domain, + * return "no more entries" code + */ + status = NT_STATUS_NO_MORE_ENTRIES; + + /* searching for keys in sectrets db -- way to go ... */ + for (k = keys; k; k = k->next) { + char *secrets_key; + + /* important: ensure null-termination of the key string */ + secrets_key = strndup(k->node_key.dptr, k->node_key.dsize); + if (!secrets_key) { + DEBUG(0, ("strndup failed!\n")); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + pass = secrets_fetch(secrets_key, &size); + + if (size != sizeof(*pass)) { + DEBUG(2, ("Secrets record %s is invalid!\n", secrets_key)); + SAFE_FREE(pass); + continue; + } + + pull_ucs2_fstring(dom_name, pass->uni_name); + DEBUG(18, ("Fetched secret record num %d.\nDomain name: %s, SID: %s\n", + idx, dom_name, sid_string_talloc(ctx, &pass->domain_sid))); + + SAFE_FREE(secrets_key); + + if (idx >= start_idx && idx < start_idx + max_num_domains) { + dom = talloc_zero(ctx, sizeof(*dom)); + if (!dom) { + /* free returned tdb record */ + SAFE_FREE(pass); + + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + /* copy domain sid */ + SMB_ASSERT(sizeof(dom->sid) == sizeof(pass->domain_sid)); + memcpy(&(dom->sid), &(pass->domain_sid), sizeof(dom->sid)); + + /* copy unicode domain name */ + dom->name = talloc_strdup_w(ctx, pass->uni_name); + + (*domains)[idx - start_idx] = dom; + + DEBUG(18, ("Secret record is in required range.\n \ + start_idx = %d, max_num_domains = %d. Added to returned array.\n", + start_idx, max_num_domains)); + + *enum_ctx = idx + 1; + (*num_domains)++; + + /* set proper status code to return */ + if (k->next) { + /* there are yet some entries to enumerate */ + status = STATUS_MORE_ENTRIES; + } else { + /* this is the last entry in the whole enumeration */ + status = NT_STATUS_OK; + } + } else { + DEBUG(18, ("Secret is outside the required range.\n \ + start_idx = %d, max_num_domains = %d. Not added to returned array\n", + start_idx, max_num_domains)); + } + + idx++; + + /* free returned tdb record */ + SAFE_FREE(pass); + } + + DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: got %d domains\n", *num_domains)); + + /* free the results of searching the keys */ + tdb_search_list_free(keys); + + return status; +} + +/******************************************************************************* + Lock the secrets tdb based on a string - this is used as a primitive form of mutex + between smbd instances. +*******************************************************************************/ + +BOOL secrets_named_mutex(const char *name, unsigned int timeout, size_t *p_ref_count) +{ + size_t ref_count = *p_ref_count; + int ret = 0; + + if (!message_init()) + return False; + + if (ref_count == 0) { + ret = tdb_lock_bystring(tdb, name, timeout); + if (ret == 0) + DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: got mutex for %s\n", name )); + } + + if (ret == 0) { + *p_ref_count = ++ref_count; + DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: ref_count for mutex %s = %u\n", name, (unsigned int)ref_count )); + } + return (ret == 0); +} + +/******************************************************************************* + Unlock a named mutex. +*******************************************************************************/ + +void secrets_named_mutex_release(const char *name, size_t *p_ref_count) +{ + size_t ref_count = *p_ref_count; + + SMB_ASSERT(ref_count != 0); + + if (ref_count == 1) { + tdb_unlock_bystring(tdb, name); + DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: released mutex for %s\n", name )); + } + + *p_ref_count = --ref_count; + DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex_release: ref_count for mutex %s = %u\n", name, (unsigned int)ref_count )); +} + |