summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/source4/passdb/secrets.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'source4/passdb/secrets.c')
-rw-r--r--source4/passdb/secrets.c612
1 files changed, 612 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source4/passdb/secrets.c b/source4/passdb/secrets.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..01eb82f414
--- /dev/null
+++ b/source4/passdb/secrets.c
@@ -0,0 +1,612 @@
+/*
+ Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-2001
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2002
+ Copyright (C) Rafal Szczesniak 2002
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+*/
+
+/* the Samba secrets database stores any generated, private information
+ such as the local SID and machine trust password */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_PASSDB
+
+static TDB_CONTEXT *tdb;
+
+/* open up the secrets database */
+BOOL secrets_init(void)
+{
+ pstring fname;
+
+ if (tdb)
+ return True;
+
+ pstrcpy(fname, lp_private_dir());
+ pstrcat(fname,"/secrets.tdb");
+
+ tdb = tdb_open_log(fname, 0, TDB_DEFAULT, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0600);
+
+ if (!tdb) {
+ DEBUG(0,("Failed to open %s\n", fname));
+ return False;
+ }
+ return True;
+}
+
+/* read a entry from the secrets database - the caller must free the result
+ if size is non-null then the size of the entry is put in there
+ */
+void *secrets_fetch(const char *key, size_t *size)
+{
+ TDB_DATA kbuf, dbuf;
+ secrets_init();
+ if (!tdb)
+ return NULL;
+ kbuf.dptr = strdup(key);
+ kbuf.dsize = strlen(key);
+ dbuf = tdb_fetch(tdb, kbuf);
+ if (size)
+ *size = dbuf.dsize;
+ free(kbuf.dptr);
+ return dbuf.dptr;
+}
+
+/* store a secrets entry
+ */
+BOOL secrets_store(const char *key, const void *data, size_t size)
+{
+ TDB_DATA kbuf, dbuf;
+ int ret;
+
+ secrets_init();
+ if (!tdb)
+ return False;
+ kbuf.dptr = strdup(key);
+ kbuf.dsize = strlen(key);
+ dbuf.dptr = memdup(data, size);
+ dbuf.dsize = size;
+
+ ret = tdb_store(tdb, kbuf, dbuf, TDB_REPLACE) == 0;
+
+ free(kbuf.dptr);
+ free(dbuf.dptr);
+
+ return ret == 0;
+}
+
+
+/* delete a secets database entry
+ */
+BOOL secrets_delete(const char *key)
+{
+ TDB_DATA kbuf;
+ int ret;
+
+ secrets_init();
+ if (!tdb)
+ return False;
+ kbuf.dptr = strdup(key);
+ kbuf.dsize = strlen(key);
+ ret = tdb_delete(tdb, kbuf);
+ free(kbuf.dptr);
+ return ret == 0;
+}
+
+BOOL secrets_store_domain_sid(const char *domain, const DOM_SID *sid)
+{
+ fstring key;
+
+ slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain);
+ strupper(key);
+ return secrets_store(key, sid, sizeof(DOM_SID));
+}
+
+BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_sid(const char *domain, DOM_SID *sid)
+{
+ DOM_SID *dyn_sid;
+ fstring key;
+ size_t size;
+
+ slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain);
+ strupper(key);
+ dyn_sid = (DOM_SID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+
+ if (dyn_sid == NULL)
+ return False;
+
+ if (size != sizeof(DOM_SID))
+ {
+ SAFE_FREE(dyn_sid);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ *sid = *dyn_sid;
+ SAFE_FREE(dyn_sid);
+ return True;
+}
+
+BOOL secrets_store_domain_guid(const char *domain, GUID *guid)
+{
+ fstring key;
+
+ slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain);
+ strupper(key);
+ return secrets_store(key, guid, sizeof(GUID));
+}
+
+BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_guid(const char *domain, GUID *guid)
+{
+ GUID *dyn_guid;
+ fstring key;
+ size_t size;
+ GUID new_guid;
+
+ slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain);
+ strupper(key);
+ dyn_guid = (GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+
+ DEBUG(6,("key is %s, size is %d\n", key, (int)size));
+
+ if ((NULL == dyn_guid) && (ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC == lp_server_role())) {
+ uuid_generate_random(&new_guid);
+ if (!secrets_store_domain_guid(domain, &new_guid))
+ return False;
+ dyn_guid = (GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+ if (dyn_guid == NULL)
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if (size != sizeof(GUID))
+ {
+ SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ *guid = *dyn_guid;
+ SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid);
+ return True;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Form a key for fetching the machine trust account password
+ *
+ * @param domain domain name
+ *
+ * @return stored password's key
+ **/
+const char *trust_keystr(const char *domain)
+{
+ static fstring keystr;
+
+ slprintf(keystr,sizeof(keystr)-1,"%s/%s",
+ SECRETS_MACHINE_ACCT_PASS, domain);
+ strupper(keystr);
+
+ return keystr;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Form a key for fetching a trusted domain password
+ *
+ * @param domain trusted domain name
+ *
+ * @return stored password's key
+ **/
+char *trustdom_keystr(const char *domain)
+{
+ static char* keystr;
+
+ asprintf(&keystr, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS, domain);
+ strupper(keystr);
+
+ return keystr;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Lock the trust password entry.
+************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_lock_trust_account_password(const char *domain, BOOL dolock)
+{
+ if (!tdb)
+ return False;
+
+ if (dolock)
+ return (tdb_lock_bystring(tdb, trust_keystr(domain),0) == 0);
+ else
+ tdb_unlock_bystring(tdb, trust_keystr(domain));
+ return True;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to get the trust account password for a domain.
+ The user of this function must have locked the trust password file using
+ the above call.
+************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 ret_pwd[16],
+ time_t *pass_last_set_time)
+{
+ struct machine_acct_pass *pass;
+ char *plaintext;
+ size_t size;
+
+ plaintext = secrets_fetch_machine_password();
+ if (plaintext) {
+ /* we have an ADS password - use that */
+ DEBUG(4,("Using ADS machine password\n"));
+ E_md4hash(plaintext, ret_pwd);
+ SAFE_FREE(plaintext);
+ pass_last_set_time = 0;
+ return True;
+ }
+
+ if (!(pass = secrets_fetch(trust_keystr(domain), &size))) {
+ DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if (size != sizeof(*pass)) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("secrets were of incorrect size!\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass->mod_time;
+ memcpy(ret_pwd, pass->hash, 16);
+ SAFE_FREE(pass);
+ return True;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to get account password to trusted domain
+************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(const char *domain, char** pwd,
+ DOM_SID *sid, time_t *pass_last_set_time)
+{
+ struct trusted_dom_pass *pass;
+ size_t size;
+
+ /* fetching trusted domain password structure */
+ if (!(pass = secrets_fetch(trustdom_keystr(domain), &size))) {
+ DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if (size != sizeof(*pass)) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("secrets were of incorrect size!\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ /* the trust's password */
+ if (pwd) {
+ *pwd = strdup(pass->pass);
+ if (!*pwd) {
+ return False;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* last change time */
+ if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass->mod_time;
+
+ /* domain sid */
+ memcpy(&sid, &(pass->domain_sid), sizeof(sid));
+
+ SAFE_FREE(pass);
+
+ return True;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to set the trust account password for a domain.
+************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_store_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 new_pwd[16])
+{
+ struct machine_acct_pass pass;
+
+ pass.mod_time = time(NULL);
+ memcpy(pass.hash, new_pwd, 16);
+
+ return secrets_store(trust_keystr(domain), (void *)&pass, sizeof(pass));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Routine to set the password for trusted domain
+ *
+ * @param domain remote domain name
+ * @param pwd plain text password of trust relationship
+ * @param sid remote domain sid
+ *
+ * @return true if succeeded
+ **/
+
+BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, smb_ucs2_t *uni_dom_name,
+ size_t uni_name_len, const char* pwd,
+ DOM_SID sid)
+{
+ struct trusted_dom_pass pass;
+ ZERO_STRUCT(pass);
+
+ /* unicode domain name and its length */
+ if (!uni_dom_name)
+ return False;
+
+ strncpy_w(pass.uni_name, uni_dom_name, sizeof(pass.uni_name) - 1);
+ pass.uni_name_len = uni_name_len;
+
+ /* last change time */
+ pass.mod_time = time(NULL);
+
+ /* password of the trust */
+ pass.pass_len = strlen(pwd);
+ fstrcpy(pass.pass, pwd);
+
+ /* domain sid */
+ memcpy(&(pass.domain_sid), &sid, sizeof(sid));
+
+ return secrets_store(trustdom_keystr(domain), (void *)&pass, sizeof(pass));
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to set the plaintext machine account password for a realm
+the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string
+************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_store_machine_password(const char *pass)
+{
+ char *key;
+ BOOL ret;
+ asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, lp_workgroup());
+ strupper(key);
+ ret = secrets_store(key, pass, strlen(pass)+1);
+ free(key);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to fetch the plaintext machine account password for a realm
+the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string
+************************************************************************/
+char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(void)
+{
+ char *key;
+ char *ret;
+ asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, lp_workgroup());
+ strupper(key);
+ ret = (char *)secrets_fetch(key, NULL);
+ free(key);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to delete the machine trust account password file for a domain.
+************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL trust_password_delete(const char *domain)
+{
+ return secrets_delete(trust_keystr(domain));
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to delete the password for trusted domain
+************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL trusted_domain_password_delete(const char *domain)
+{
+ return secrets_delete(trustdom_keystr(domain));
+}
+
+
+BOOL secrets_store_ldap_pw(const char* dn, char* pw)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ BOOL ret;
+
+ if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, dn) < 0) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("secrets_store_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ ret = secrets_store(key, pw, strlen(pw)+1);
+
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Get trusted domains info from secrets.tdb.
+ *
+ * The linked list is allocated on the supplied talloc context, caller gets to destroy
+ * when done.
+ *
+ * @param ctx Allocation context
+ * @param enum_ctx Starting index, eg. we can start fetching at third
+ * or sixth trusted domain entry. Zero is the first index.
+ * Value it is set to is the enum context for the next enumeration.
+ * @param num_domains Number of domain entries to fetch at one call
+ * @param domains Pointer to array of trusted domain structs to be filled up
+ *
+ * @return nt status code of rpc response
+ **/
+
+NTSTATUS secrets_get_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX* ctx, int* enum_ctx, unsigned int max_num_domains, int *num_domains, TRUSTDOM ***domains)
+{
+ TDB_LIST_NODE *keys, *k;
+ TRUSTDOM *dom = NULL;
+ char *pattern;
+ unsigned int start_idx;
+ uint32 idx = 0;
+ size_t size;
+ fstring dom_name;
+ struct trusted_dom_pass *pass;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+
+ if (!secrets_init()) return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+
+ *num_domains = 0;
+ start_idx = *enum_ctx;
+
+ /* generate searching pattern */
+ if (!(pattern = talloc_asprintf(ctx, "%s/*", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS))) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: talloc_asprintf() failed!\n"));
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: looking for %d domains, starting at index %d\n",
+ max_num_domains, *enum_ctx));
+
+ *domains = talloc_zero(ctx, sizeof(**domains)*max_num_domains);
+
+ /* fetching trusted domains' data and collecting them in a list */
+ keys = tdb_search_keys(tdb, pattern);
+
+ /*
+ * if there's no keys returned ie. no trusted domain,
+ * return "no more entries" code
+ */
+ status = NT_STATUS_NO_MORE_ENTRIES;
+
+ /* searching for keys in sectrets db -- way to go ... */
+ for (k = keys; k; k = k->next) {
+ char *secrets_key;
+
+ /* important: ensure null-termination of the key string */
+ secrets_key = strndup(k->node_key.dptr, k->node_key.dsize);
+ if (!secrets_key) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("strndup failed!\n"));
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ pass = secrets_fetch(secrets_key, &size);
+
+ if (size != sizeof(*pass)) {
+ DEBUG(2, ("Secrets record %s is invalid!\n", secrets_key));
+ SAFE_FREE(pass);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ pull_ucs2_fstring(dom_name, pass->uni_name);
+ DEBUG(18, ("Fetched secret record num %d.\nDomain name: %s, SID: %s\n",
+ idx, dom_name, sid_string_talloc(ctx, &pass->domain_sid)));
+
+ SAFE_FREE(secrets_key);
+
+ if (idx >= start_idx && idx < start_idx + max_num_domains) {
+ dom = talloc_zero(ctx, sizeof(*dom));
+ if (!dom) {
+ /* free returned tdb record */
+ SAFE_FREE(pass);
+
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ /* copy domain sid */
+ SMB_ASSERT(sizeof(dom->sid) == sizeof(pass->domain_sid));
+ memcpy(&(dom->sid), &(pass->domain_sid), sizeof(dom->sid));
+
+ /* copy unicode domain name */
+ dom->name = talloc_strdup_w(ctx, pass->uni_name);
+
+ (*domains)[idx - start_idx] = dom;
+
+ DEBUG(18, ("Secret record is in required range.\n \
+ start_idx = %d, max_num_domains = %d. Added to returned array.\n",
+ start_idx, max_num_domains));
+
+ *enum_ctx = idx + 1;
+ (*num_domains)++;
+
+ /* set proper status code to return */
+ if (k->next) {
+ /* there are yet some entries to enumerate */
+ status = STATUS_MORE_ENTRIES;
+ } else {
+ /* this is the last entry in the whole enumeration */
+ status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(18, ("Secret is outside the required range.\n \
+ start_idx = %d, max_num_domains = %d. Not added to returned array\n",
+ start_idx, max_num_domains));
+ }
+
+ idx++;
+
+ /* free returned tdb record */
+ SAFE_FREE(pass);
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: got %d domains\n", *num_domains));
+
+ /* free the results of searching the keys */
+ tdb_search_list_free(keys);
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ Lock the secrets tdb based on a string - this is used as a primitive form of mutex
+ between smbd instances.
+*******************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_named_mutex(const char *name, unsigned int timeout, size_t *p_ref_count)
+{
+ size_t ref_count = *p_ref_count;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!message_init())
+ return False;
+
+ if (ref_count == 0) {
+ ret = tdb_lock_bystring(tdb, name, timeout);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: got mutex for %s\n", name ));
+ }
+
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ *p_ref_count = ++ref_count;
+ DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: ref_count for mutex %s = %u\n", name, (unsigned int)ref_count ));
+ }
+ return (ret == 0);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ Unlock a named mutex.
+*******************************************************************************/
+
+void secrets_named_mutex_release(const char *name, size_t *p_ref_count)
+{
+ size_t ref_count = *p_ref_count;
+
+ SMB_ASSERT(ref_count != 0);
+
+ if (ref_count == 1) {
+ tdb_unlock_bystring(tdb, name);
+ DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: released mutex for %s\n", name ));
+ }
+
+ *p_ref_count = --ref_count;
+ DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex_release: ref_count for mutex %s = %u\n", name, (unsigned int)ref_count ));
+}
+