diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'source4')
| -rw-r--r-- | source4/rpc_server/backupkey/dcesrv_backupkey.c | 1306 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | source4/rpc_server/wscript_build | 9 |
2 files changed, 1315 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/backupkey/dcesrv_backupkey.c b/source4/rpc_server/backupkey/dcesrv_backupkey.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e499128c88 --- /dev/null +++ b/source4/rpc_server/backupkey/dcesrv_backupkey.c @@ -0,0 +1,1306 @@ +/* + Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. + + endpoint server for the backupkey interface + + Copyright (C) Matthieu Patou <mat@samba.org> 2010 + + This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + GNU General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +*/ + +#include "includes.h" +#include "rpc_server/dcerpc_server.h" +#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_backupkey.h" +#include "dsdb/common/util.h" +#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h" +#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb_errors.h" +#include "../lib/util/util_ldb.h" +#include "param/param.h" +#include "auth/session.h" +#include "heimdal/lib/hx509/hx_locl.h" +#include "heimdal/lib/hcrypto/rsa.h" +#include "heimdal/lib/hcrypto/bn.h" +#include "../lib/tsocket/tsocket.h" +#include "../libcli/security/security.h" + +#define BACKUPKEY_MIN_VERSION 2 +#define BACKUPKEY_MAX_VERSION 3 + +static const unsigned rsa_with_var_num[] = { 1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 1 }; +/* Equivalent to asn1_oid_id_pkcs1_rsaEncryption*/ +static const AlgorithmIdentifier _hx509_signature_rsa_with_var_num = { + { 7, discard_const_p(unsigned, rsa_with_var_num) }, NULL +}; + +static NTSTATUS set_lsa_secret(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct ldb_context *ldb, + const char *name, + const DATA_BLOB *secret) +{ + struct ldb_message *msg; + struct ldb_result *res; + struct ldb_dn *domain_dn; + struct ldb_dn *system_dn; + struct ldb_val val; + int ret; + char *name2; + struct timeval now = timeval_current(); + NTTIME nt_now = timeval_to_nttime(&now); + const char *attrs[] = { + NULL + }; + + domain_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb); + if (!domain_dn) { + return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + msg = ldb_msg_new(mem_ctx); + if (msg == NULL) { + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + /* + * This function is a lot like dcesrv_lsa_CreateSecret + * in the rpc_server/lsa directory + * The reason why we duplicate the effort here is that: + * * we want to keep the former function static + * * we want to avoid the burden of doing LSA calls + * when we can just manipulate the secrets directly + * * taillor the function to the particular needs of backup protocol + */ + + system_dn = samdb_search_dn(ldb, msg, domain_dn, "(&(objectClass=container)(cn=System))"); + if (system_dn == NULL) { + talloc_free(msg); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + name2 = talloc_asprintf(msg, "%s Secret", name); + if (name2 == NULL) { + talloc_free(msg); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + ret = ldb_search(ldb, mem_ctx, &res, system_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs, + "(&(cn=%s)(objectclass=secret))", + ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, name2)); + + if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS || res->count != 0 ) { + DEBUG(0, ("Secret %s already exists !\n", name2)); + talloc_free(msg); + return NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_COLLISION; + } + + /* + * We don't care about previous value as we are + * here only if the key didn't exists before + */ + + msg->dn = ldb_dn_copy(mem_ctx, system_dn); + if (msg->dn == NULL) { + talloc_free(msg); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + if (!ldb_dn_add_child_fmt(msg->dn, "cn=%s", name2)) { + talloc_free(msg); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + ret = samdb_msg_add_string(ldb, mem_ctx, msg, "cn", name2); + if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { + talloc_free(msg); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + ret = samdb_msg_add_string(ldb, mem_ctx, msg, "objectClass", "secret"); + if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { + talloc_free(msg); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + ret = samdb_msg_add_uint64(ldb, mem_ctx, msg, "priorSetTime", nt_now); + if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { + talloc_free(msg); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + val.data = secret->data; + val.length = secret->length; + ret = ldb_msg_add_value(msg, "currentValue", &val, NULL); + if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { + talloc_free(msg); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + ret = samdb_msg_add_uint64(ldb, mem_ctx, msg, "lastSetTime", nt_now); + if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { + talloc_free(msg); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + /* + * create the secret with DSDB_MODIFY_RELAX + * otherwise dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/objectclass.c forbid + * the create of LSA secret object + */ + ret = dsdb_add(ldb, msg, DSDB_MODIFY_RELAX); + if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { + DEBUG(0,("Failed to create secret record %s: %s\n", + ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn), + ldb_errstring(ldb))); + talloc_free(msg); + return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + + talloc_free(msg); + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +/* This function is pretty much like dcesrv_lsa_QuerySecret */ +static NTSTATUS get_lsa_secret(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct ldb_context *ldb, + const char *name, + DATA_BLOB *secret) +{ + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_mem; + struct ldb_result *res; + struct ldb_dn *domain_dn; + struct ldb_dn *system_dn; + const struct ldb_val *val; + uint8_t *data; + const char *attrs[] = { + "currentValue", + NULL + }; + int ret; + + secret->data = NULL; + secret->length = 0; + + domain_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb); + if (!domain_dn) { + return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + tmp_mem = talloc_new(mem_ctx); + if (tmp_mem == NULL) { + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + system_dn = samdb_search_dn(ldb, tmp_mem, domain_dn, "(&(objectClass=container)(cn=System))"); + if (system_dn == NULL) { + talloc_free(tmp_mem); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + ret = ldb_search(ldb, mem_ctx, &res, system_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs, + "(&(cn=%s Secret)(objectclass=secret))", + ldb_binary_encode_string(tmp_mem, name)); + + if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS || res->count == 0) { + talloc_free(tmp_mem); + /* + * Important NOT to use NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND + * as this return value is used to detect the case + * when we have the secret but without the currentValue + * (case RODC) + */ + return NT_STATUS_RESOURCE_NAME_NOT_FOUND; + } + + if (res->count > 1) { + DEBUG(0, ("Secret %s collision\n", name)); + talloc_free(tmp_mem); + return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_DB_CORRUPTION; + } + + val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(res->msgs[0], "currentValue"); + if (val == NULL) { + /* + * The secret object is here but we don't have the secret value + * The most common case is a RODC + */ + talloc_free(tmp_mem); + return NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND; + } + + data = val->data; + secret->data = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &data); + secret->length = val->length; + + talloc_free(tmp_mem); + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +static DATA_BLOB *reverse_and_get_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, BIGNUM *bn) +{ + DATA_BLOB blob; + DATA_BLOB *rev = talloc(mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB); + uint32_t i; + + blob.length = BN_num_bytes(bn); + blob.data = talloc_array(mem_ctx, uint8_t, blob.length); + + if (blob.data == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + BN_bn2bin(bn, blob.data); + + rev->data = talloc_array(mem_ctx, uint8_t, blob.length); + if (rev->data == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + for(i=0; i < blob.length; i++) { + rev->data[i] = blob.data[blob.length - i -1]; + } + rev->length = blob.length; + talloc_free(blob.data); + return rev; +} + +static BIGNUM *reverse_and_get_bignum(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB *blob) +{ + BIGNUM *ret; + DATA_BLOB rev; + uint32_t i; + + rev.data = talloc_array(mem_ctx, uint8_t, blob->length); + if (rev.data == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + for(i=0; i < blob->length; i++) { + rev.data[i] = blob->data[blob->length - i -1]; + } + rev.length = blob->length; + + ret = BN_bin2bn(rev.data, rev.length, NULL); + talloc_free(rev.data); + + return ret; +} + +static NTSTATUS get_pk_from_raw_keypair_params(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, + struct bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair *keypair, + hx509_private_key *pk) +{ + hx509_context hctx; + RSA *rsa; + struct hx509_private_key_ops *ops; + + hx509_context_init(&hctx); + ops = hx509_find_private_alg(&_hx509_signature_rsa_with_var_num.algorithm); + if (ops == NULL) { + DEBUG(0, ("Not supported algorithm\n")); + return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + if (_hx509_private_key_init(pk, ops, NULL) != 0) { + hx509_context_free(&hctx); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + rsa = RSA_new(); + if (rsa ==NULL) { + hx509_context_free(&hctx); + return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + rsa->n = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->modulus)); + if (rsa->n == NULL) { + RSA_free(rsa); + hx509_context_free(&hctx); + return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + rsa->d = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->private_exponent)); + if (rsa->d == NULL) { + RSA_free(rsa); + hx509_context_free(&hctx); + return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + rsa->p = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->prime1)); + if (rsa->p == NULL) { + RSA_free(rsa); + hx509_context_free(&hctx); + return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + rsa->q = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->prime2)); + if (rsa->q == NULL) { + RSA_free(rsa); + hx509_context_free(&hctx); + return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + rsa->dmp1 = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->exponent1)); + if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL) { + RSA_free(rsa); + hx509_context_free(&hctx); + return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + rsa->dmq1 = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->exponent2)); + if (rsa->dmq1 == NULL) { + RSA_free(rsa); + hx509_context_free(&hctx); + return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + rsa->iqmp = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->coefficient)); + if (rsa->iqmp == NULL) { + RSA_free(rsa); + hx509_context_free(&hctx); + return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + rsa->e = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->public_exponent)); + if (rsa->e == NULL) { + RSA_free(rsa); + hx509_context_free(&hctx); + return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + _hx509_private_key_assign_rsa(*pk, rsa); + + hx509_context_free(&hctx); + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +static WERROR get_and_verify_access_check(TALLOC_CTX *sub_ctx, + uint32_t version, + uint8_t *key_and_iv, + uint8_t *access_check, + uint32_t access_check_len, + struct dom_sid **access_sid) +{ + heim_octet_string iv; + heim_octet_string access_check_os; + hx509_crypto crypto; + + DATA_BLOB blob_us; + uint32_t key_len; + uint32_t iv_len; + int res; + enum ndr_err_code ndr_err; + hx509_context hctx; + + /* This one should not be freed */ + const AlgorithmIdentifier *alg; + + *access_sid = NULL; + switch (version) { + case 2: + key_len = 24; + iv_len = 8; + alg = hx509_crypto_des_rsdi_ede3_cbc(); + break; + + case 3: + key_len = 32; + iv_len = 16; + alg =hx509_crypto_aes256_cbc(); + break; + + default: + return WERR_INVALID_DATA; + } + + hx509_context_init(&hctx); + res = hx509_crypto_init(hctx, NULL, + &(alg->algorithm), + &crypto); + hx509_context_free(&hctx); + + if (res != 0) { + return WERR_INVALID_DATA; + } + + res = hx509_crypto_set_key_data(crypto, key_and_iv, key_len); + + iv.data = talloc_memdup(sub_ctx, key_len + key_and_iv, iv_len); + iv.length = iv_len; + + if (res != 0) { + hx509_crypto_destroy(crypto); + return WERR_INVALID_DATA; + } + + hx509_crypto_set_padding(crypto, HX509_CRYPTO_PADDING_NONE); + res = hx509_crypto_decrypt(crypto, + access_check, + access_check_len, + &iv, + &access_check_os); + + if (res != 0) { + hx509_crypto_destroy(crypto); + return WERR_INVALID_DATA; + } + + blob_us.data = access_check_os.data; + blob_us.length = access_check_os.length; + + hx509_crypto_destroy(crypto); + + if (version == 2) { + uint32_t hash_size = 20; + uint8_t hash[hash_size]; + struct sha sctx; + struct bkrp_access_check_v2 uncrypted_accesscheckv2; + + ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob_us, sub_ctx, &uncrypted_accesscheckv2, + (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_access_check_v2); + if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { + /* Unable to unmarshall */ + der_free_octet_string(&access_check_os); + return WERR_INVALID_DATA; + } + if (uncrypted_accesscheckv2.magic != 0x1) { + /* wrong magic */ + der_free_octet_string(&access_check_os); + return WERR_INVALID_DATA; + } + + SHA1_Init(&sctx); + SHA1_Update(&sctx, blob_us.data, blob_us.length - hash_size); + SHA1_Final(hash, &sctx); + der_free_octet_string(&access_check_os); + /* + * We free it after the sha1 calculation because blob.data + * point to the same area + */ + + if (memcmp(hash, uncrypted_accesscheckv2.hash, hash_size) != 0) { + DEBUG(0, ("Wrong hash value in the access check in backup key remote protocol\n")); + return WERR_INVALID_DATA; + } + *access_sid = dom_sid_dup(sub_ctx, &(uncrypted_accesscheckv2.sid)); + if (*access_sid == NULL) { + return WERR_NOMEM; + } + return WERR_OK; + } + + if (version == 3) { + uint32_t hash_size = 64; + uint8_t hash[hash_size]; + struct hc_sha512state sctx; + struct bkrp_access_check_v3 uncrypted_accesscheckv3; + + ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob_us, sub_ctx, &uncrypted_accesscheckv3, + (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_access_check_v3); + if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { + /* Unable to unmarshall */ + der_free_octet_string(&access_check_os); + return WERR_INVALID_DATA; + } + if (uncrypted_accesscheckv3.magic != 0x1) { + /* wrong magic */ + der_free_octet_string(&access_check_os); + return WERR_INVALID_DATA; + } + + SHA512_Init(&sctx); + SHA512_Update(&sctx, blob_us.data, blob_us.length - hash_size); + SHA512_Final(hash, &sctx); + der_free_octet_string(&access_check_os); + /* + * We free it after the sha1 calculation because blob.data + * point to the same area + */ + + if (memcmp(hash, uncrypted_accesscheckv3.hash, hash_size) != 0) { + DEBUG(0, ("Wrong hash value in the access check in backup key remote protocol\n")); + return WERR_INVALID_DATA; + } + *access_sid = dom_sid_dup(sub_ctx, &(uncrypted_accesscheckv3.sid)); + if (*access_sid == NULL) { + return WERR_NOMEM; + } + return WERR_OK; + } + + /* Never reached normally as we filtered at the switch / case level */ + return WERR_INVALID_DATA; +} + +static WERROR bkrp_do_uncrypt_client_wrap_key(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct bkrp_BackupKey *r, + struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx) +{ + struct bkrp_client_side_wrapped uncrypt_request; + DATA_BLOB blob; + enum ndr_err_code ndr_err; + char *guid_string; + char *cert_secret_name; + DATA_BLOB secret; + DATA_BLOB *uncrypted; + NTSTATUS status; + + blob.data = r->in.data_in; + blob.length = r->in.data_in_len; + + if (r->in.data_in_len == 0 || r->in.data_in == NULL) { + return WERR_INVALID_PARAM; + } + + ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &uncrypt_request, + (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_client_side_wrapped); + if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { + return WERR_INVALID_PARAM; + } + + if (uncrypt_request.version < BACKUPKEY_MIN_VERSION) { + return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + if (uncrypt_request.version > BACKUPKEY_MAX_VERSION) { + return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + guid_string = GUID_string(mem_ctx, &uncrypt_request.guid); + if (guid_string == NULL) { + return WERR_NOMEM; + } + + cert_secret_name = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, + "BCKUPKEY_%s", + guid_string); + if (cert_secret_name == NULL) { + return WERR_NOMEM; + } + + status = get_lsa_secret(mem_ctx, + ldb_ctx, + cert_secret_name, + &secret); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + DEBUG(10, ("Error while fetching secret %s\n", cert_secret_name)); + if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status,NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND)) { + /* we do not have the real secret attribute */ + return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } else { + return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND; + } + } + + if (secret.length != 0) { + hx509_context hctx; + struct bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair keypair; + hx509_private_key pk; + uint32_t i, res; + struct dom_sid *access_sid = NULL; + heim_octet_string reversed_secret; + heim_octet_string uncrypted_secret; + AlgorithmIdentifier alg; + struct dom_sid *caller_sid; + DATA_BLOB blob_us; + WERROR werr; + + ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&secret, mem_ctx, &keypair, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair); + if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { + DEBUG(1, ("Unable to parse the ndr encoded cert in key %s\n", cert_secret_name)); + return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND; + } + + status = get_pk_from_raw_keypair_params(mem_ctx, &keypair, &pk); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + reversed_secret.data = talloc_array(mem_ctx, uint8_t, + uncrypt_request.encrypted_secret_len); + if (reversed_secret.data == NULL) { + _hx509_private_key_free(&pk); + return WERR_NOMEM; + } + + /* The secret has to be reversed ... */ + for(i=0; i< uncrypt_request.encrypted_secret_len; i++) { + uint8_t *reversed = (uint8_t *)reversed_secret.data; + uint8_t *uncrypt = uncrypt_request.encrypted_secret; + reversed[i] = uncrypt[uncrypt_request.encrypted_secret_len - 1 - i]; + } + reversed_secret.length = uncrypt_request.encrypted_secret_len; + + /* + * Let's try to decrypt the secret now that + * we have the private key ... + */ + hx509_context_init(&hctx); + res = _hx509_private_key_private_decrypt(hctx, &reversed_secret, + &alg.algorithm, pk, + &uncrypted_secret); + hx509_context_free(&hctx); + _hx509_private_key_free(&pk); + if (res != 0) { + /* We are not able to decrypt the secret, looks like something is wrong */ + return WERR_INVALID_DATA; + } + blob_us.data = uncrypted_secret.data; + blob_us.length = uncrypted_secret.length; + + if (uncrypt_request.version == 2) { + struct bkrp_encrypted_secret_v2 uncrypted_secretv2; + + ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob_us, mem_ctx, &uncrypted_secretv2, + (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_encrypted_secret_v2); + der_free_octet_string(&uncrypted_secret); + if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { + /* Unable to unmarshall */ + return WERR_INVALID_DATA; + } + if (uncrypted_secretv2.magic != 0x20) { + /* wrong magic */ + return WERR_INVALID_DATA; + } + + werr = get_and_verify_access_check(mem_ctx, 2, + uncrypted_secretv2.payload_key, + uncrypt_request.access_check, + uncrypt_request.access_check_len, + &access_sid); + if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(werr)) { + return werr; + } + uncrypted = talloc(mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB); + if (uncrypted == NULL) { + return WERR_INVALID_DATA; + } + + uncrypted->data = uncrypted_secretv2.secret; + uncrypted->length = uncrypted_secretv2.secret_len; + } + if (uncrypt_request.version == 3) { + struct bkrp_encrypted_secret_v3 uncrypted_secretv3; + + ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob_us, mem_ctx, &uncrypted_secretv3, + (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_encrypted_secret_v3); + + der_free_octet_string(&uncrypted_secret); + if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { + /* Unable to unmarshall */ + return WERR_INVALID_DATA; + } + + if (uncrypted_secretv3.magic1 != 0x30 || + uncrypted_secretv3.magic2 != 0x6610 || + uncrypted_secretv3.magic3 != 0x800e) { + /* wrong magic */ + return WERR_INVALID_DATA; + } + + werr = get_and_verify_access_check(mem_ctx, 3, + uncrypted_secretv3.payload_key, + uncrypt_request.access_check, + uncrypt_request.access_check_len, + &access_sid); + if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(werr)) { + return werr; + } + + uncrypted = talloc(mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB); + if (uncrypted == NULL) { + return WERR_INVALID_DATA; + } + + uncrypted->data = uncrypted_secretv3.secret; + uncrypted->length = uncrypted_secretv3.secret_len; + } + + caller_sid = &dce_call->conn->auth_state.session_info->security_token->sids[PRIMARY_USER_SID_INDEX]; + + if (!dom_sid_equal(caller_sid, access_sid)) { + talloc_free(uncrypted); + return WERR_INVALID_ACCESS; + } + + /* + * Yeah if we are here all looks pretty good: + * - hash is ok + * - user sid is the same as the one in access check + * - we were able to decrypt the whole stuff + */ + } + + if (uncrypted->data == NULL) { + return WERR_INVALID_DATA; + } + + /* There is a magic value a the beginning of the data + * we can use an adhoc structure but as the + * parent structure is just an array of bytes it a lot of work + * work just prepending 4 bytes + */ + *(r->out.data_out) = talloc_zero_array(mem_ctx, uint8_t, uncrypted->length + 4); + W_ERROR_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(*(r->out.data_out)); + memcpy(4+*(r->out.data_out), uncrypted->data, uncrypted->length); + *(r->out.data_out_len) = uncrypted->length + 4; + + return WERR_OK; +} + +static WERROR create_heimdal_rsa_key(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, hx509_context *hctx, + hx509_private_key *pk, RSA **_rsa) +{ + BIGNUM *pub_expo; + RSA *rsa; + int ret; + uint8_t *p0, *p; + size_t len; + int bits = 2048; + + *_rsa = NULL; + + pub_expo = BN_new(); + if(pub_expo == NULL) { + return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* set the public expo to 65537 like everyone */ + BN_set_word(pub_expo, 0x10001); + + rsa = RSA_new(); + if(rsa == NULL) { + BN_free(pub_expo); + return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + ret = RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, pub_expo, NULL); + if(ret != 1) { + RSA_free(rsa); + BN_free(pub_expo); + return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + BN_free(pub_expo); + + len = i2d_RSAPrivateKey(rsa, NULL); + if (len < 1) { + RSA_free(rsa); + return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + p0 = p = talloc_array(ctx, uint8_t, len); + if (p == NULL) { + RSA_free(rsa); + return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + len = i2d_RSAPrivateKey(rsa, &p); + if (len < 1) { + RSA_free(rsa); + talloc_free(p0); + return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* + * To dump the key we can use : + * rk_dumpdata("h5lkey", p0, len); + */ + ret = _hx509_parse_private_key(*hctx, &_hx509_signature_rsa_with_var_num , + p0, len, HX509_KEY_FORMAT_DER, pk); + memset(p0, 0, len); + talloc_free(p0); + if (ret !=0) { + RSA_free(rsa); + return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + *_rsa = rsa; + return WERR_OK; +} + +static WERROR self_sign_cert(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, hx509_context *hctx, hx509_request *req, + time_t lifetime, hx509_private_key *private_key, + hx509_cert *cert, DATA_BLOB *guidblob) +{ + SubjectPublicKeyInfo spki; + hx509_name subject = NULL; + hx509_ca_tbs tbs; + struct heim_bit_string uniqueid; + int ret; + + uniqueid.data = talloc_memdup(ctx, guidblob->data, guidblob->length); + /* uniqueid is a bit string in which each byte represent 1 bit (1 or 0) + * so as 1 byte is 8 bits we need to provision 8 times more space as in the + * blob + */ + uniqueid.length = 8 * guidblob->length; + + memset(&spki, 0, sizeof(spki)); + + ret = _hx509_request_get_name(*hctx, *req, &subject); + if (ret !=0) { + talloc_free(uniqueid.data); + return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + ret = _hx509_request_get_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(*hctx, *req, &spki); + if (ret !=0) { + talloc_free(uniqueid.data); + hx509_name_free(&subject); + return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + ret = hx509_ca_tbs_init(*hctx, &tbs); + if (ret !=0) { + talloc_free(uniqueid.data); + hx509_name_free(&subject); + free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki); + return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + ret = hx509_ca_tbs_set_spki(*hctx, tbs, &spki); + if (ret !=0) { + talloc_free(uniqueid.data); + hx509_name_free(&subject); + free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki); + return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + ret = hx509_ca_tbs_set_subject(*hctx, tbs, subject); + if (ret !=0) { + talloc_free(uniqueid.data); + hx509_name_free(&subject); + free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki); + hx509_ca_tbs_free(&tbs); + return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + ret = hx509_ca_tbs_set_ca(*hctx, tbs, 1); + if (ret !=0) { + talloc_free(uniqueid.data); + hx509_name_free(&subject); + free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki); + hx509_ca_tbs_free(&tbs); + return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + ret = hx509_ca_tbs_set_notAfter_lifetime(*hctx, tbs, lifetime); + if (ret !=0) { + talloc_free(uniqueid.data); + hx509_name_free(&subject); + free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki); + hx509_ca_tbs_free(&tbs); + return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + ret = hx509_ca_tbs_set_unique(*hctx, tbs, &uniqueid, &uniqueid); + if (ret !=0) { + talloc_free(uniqueid.data); + hx509_name_free(&subject); + free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki); + hx509_ca_tbs_free(&tbs); + return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + ret = hx509_ca_sign_self(*hctx, tbs, *private_key, cert); + if (ret !=0) { + talloc_free(uniqueid.data); + hx509_name_free(&subject); + free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki); + hx509_ca_tbs_free(&tbs); + return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + hx509_name_free(&subject); + free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki); + hx509_ca_tbs_free(&tbs); + + return WERR_OK; +} + +static WERROR create_req(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, hx509_context *hctx, hx509_request *req, + hx509_private_key *signer,RSA **rsa, const char *dn) +{ + int ret; + SubjectPublicKeyInfo key; + + hx509_name name; + WERROR w_err; + + w_err = create_heimdal_rsa_key(ctx, hctx, signer, rsa); + if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(w_err)) { + return w_err; + } + + _hx509_request_init(*hctx, req); + ret = hx509_parse_name(*hctx, dn, &name); + if (ret != 0) { + RSA_free(*rsa); + _hx509_private_key_free(signer); + _hx509_request_free(req); + hx509_name_free(&name); + return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + ret = _hx509_request_set_name(*hctx, *req, name); + if (ret != 0) { + RSA_free(*rsa); + _hx509_private_key_free(signer); + _hx509_request_free(req); + hx509_name_free(&name); + return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + hx509_name_free(&name); + + ret = _hx509_private_key2SPKI(*hctx, *signer, &key); + if (ret != 0) { + RSA_free(*rsa); + _hx509_private_key_free(signer); + _hx509_request_free(req); + return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + ret = _hx509_request_set_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(*hctx, *req, &key); + if (ret != 0) { + RSA_free(*rsa); + _hx509_private_key_free(signer); + free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&key); + _hx509_request_free(req); + return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&key); + + return WERR_OK; +} + +/* Return an error when we fail to generate a certificate */ +static WERROR generate_bkrp_cert(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx, const char *dn) +{ + + struct heim_octet_string data; + WERROR w_err; + RSA *rsa; + hx509_context hctx; + hx509_private_key pk; + hx509_request req; + hx509_cert cert; + DATA_BLOB blob; + DATA_BLOB blobkeypair; + DATA_BLOB *tmp; + int ret; + bool ok = true; + struct GUID guid = GUID_random(); + NTSTATUS status; + char *secret_name; + struct bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair keypair; + enum ndr_err_code ndr_err; + uint32_t nb_days_validity = 365; + + DEBUG(0, ("Trying to generate a certificate\n")); + hx509_context_init(&hctx); + w_err = create_req(ctx, &hctx, &req, &pk, &rsa, dn); + if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(w_err)) { + hx509_context_free(&hctx); + return w_err; + } + + status = GUID_to_ndr_blob(&guid, ctx, &blob); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + hx509_context_free(&hctx); + _hx509_private_key_free(&pk); + RSA_free(rsa); + return WERR_INVALID_DATA; + } + + w_err = self_sign_cert(ctx, &hctx, &req, nb_days_validity, &pk, &cert, &blob); + if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(w_err)) { + _hx509_private_key_free(&pk); + hx509_context_free(&hctx); + return WERR_INVALID_DATA; + } + + ret = hx509_cert_binary(hctx, cert, &data); + if (ret !=0) { + hx509_cert_free(cert); + _hx509_private_key_free(&pk); + hx509_context_free(&hctx); + return WERR_INVALID_DATA; + } + + keypair.cert.data = talloc_memdup(ctx, data.data, data.length); + keypair.cert.length = data.length; + + /* + * Heimdal's bignum are big endian and the + * structure expect it to be in little endian + * so we reverse the buffer to make it work + */ + tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx, rsa->e); + if (tmp == NULL) { + ok = false; + } else { + keypair.public_exponent = *tmp; + SMB_ASSERT(tmp->length <= 4); + /* + * The value is now in little endian but if can happen that the length is + * less than 4 bytes. + * So if we have less than 4 bytes we pad with zeros so that it correctly + * fit into the structure. + */ + if (tmp->length < 4) { + /* + * We need the expo to fit 4 bytes + */ + keypair.public_exponent.data = talloc_zero_array(ctx, uint8_t, 4); + memcpy(keypair.public_exponent.data, tmp->data, tmp->length); + keypair.public_exponent.length = 4; + } + } + + tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->d); + if (tmp == NULL) { + ok = false; + } else { + keypair.private_exponent = *tmp; + } + + tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->n); + if (tmp == NULL) { + ok = false; + } else { + keypair.modulus = *tmp; + } + + tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->p); + if (tmp == NULL) { + ok = false; + } else { + keypair.prime1 = *tmp; + } + + tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->q); + if (tmp == NULL) { + ok = false; + } else { + keypair.prime2 = *tmp; + } + + tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->dmp1); + if (tmp == NULL) { + ok = false; + } else { + keypair.exponent1 = *tmp; + } + + tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->dmq1); + if (tmp == NULL) { + ok = false; + } else { + keypair.exponent2 = *tmp; + } + + tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->iqmp); + if (tmp == NULL) { + ok = false; + } else { + keypair.coefficient = *tmp; + } + + /* One of the keypair allocation was wrong */ + if (ok == false) { + der_free_octet_string(&data); + hx509_cert_free(cert); + _hx509_private_key_free(&pk); + hx509_context_free(&hctx); + RSA_free(rsa); + return WERR_INVALID_DATA; + } + keypair.certificate_len = keypair.cert.length; + DEBUG(0, ("Len of priv key: %d pub_expo: %d\n", keypair.private_exponent.length, keypair.public_exponent.length)); + ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(&blobkeypair, ctx, &keypair, (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair); + if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { + der_free_octet_string(&data); + hx509_cert_free(cert); + _hx509_private_key_free(&pk); + hx509_context_free(&hctx); + RSA_free(rsa); + return WERR_INVALID_DATA; + } + + secret_name = talloc_asprintf(ctx, "BCKUPKEY_%s", GUID_string(ctx, &guid)); + if (secret_name == NULL) { + der_free_octet_string(&data); + hx509_cert_free(cert); + _hx509_private_key_free(&pk); + hx509_context_free(&hctx); + RSA_free(rsa); + return WERR_OUTOFMEMORY; + } + + status = set_lsa_secret(ctx, ldb_ctx, secret_name, &blobkeypair); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + DEBUG(0, ("Failed to save the secret %s\n", secret_name)); + } + talloc_free(secret_name); + + GUID_to_ndr_blob(&guid, ctx, &blob); + status = set_lsa_secret(ctx, ldb_ctx, "BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED", &blob); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + DEBUG(0, ("Failed to save the secret BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED\n")); + } + + der_free_octet_string(&data); + hx509_cert_free(cert); + _hx509_private_key_free(&pk); + hx509_context_free(&hctx); + RSA_free(rsa); + return WERR_OK; +} + +static WERROR bkrp_do_retreive_client_wrap_key(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct bkrp_BackupKey *r ,struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx) +{ + struct GUID guid; + char *guid_string; + DATA_BLOB secret; + enum ndr_err_code ndr_err; + NTSTATUS status; + + /* + * here we basicaly need to return our certificate + * search for lsa secret BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED first + */ + + status = get_lsa_secret(mem_ctx, + ldb_ctx, + "BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED", + &secret); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + DEBUG(10, ("Error while fetching secret BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED\n")); + if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND)) { + /* Ok we can be in this case if there was no certs */ + struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx; + char *dn = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "CN=%s.%s", + lpcfg_netbios_name(lp_ctx), + lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx)); + + WERROR werr = generate_bkrp_cert(mem_ctx, dce_call, ldb_ctx, dn); + if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(werr)) { + return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + status = get_lsa_secret(mem_ctx, + ldb_ctx, + "BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED", + &secret); + + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + /* Ok we really don't manage to get this certs ...*/ + DEBUG(0, ("Unable to locate BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED after cert generation\n")); + return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND; + } + } else { + /* In theory we should NEVER reach this point as it + should only appear in a rodc server */ + /* we do not have the real secret attribute */ + return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + } + + if (secret.length != 0) { + char *cert_secret_name; + + status = GUID_from_ndr_blob(&secret, &guid); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND; + } + + guid_string = GUID_string(mem_ctx, &guid); + if (guid_string == NULL) { + /* We return file not found because the client + * expect this error + */ + return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND; + } + + cert_secret_name = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, + "BCKUPKEY_%s", + guid_string); + status = get_lsa_secret(mem_ctx, + ldb_ctx, + cert_secret_name, + &secret); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND; + } + + if (secret.length != 0) { + struct bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair keypair; + ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&secret, mem_ctx, &keypair, + (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair); + if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { + return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND; + } + *(r->out.data_out_len) = keypair.cert.length; + *(r->out.data_out) = talloc_memdup(mem_ctx, keypair.cert.data, keypair.cert.length); + W_ERROR_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(*(r->out.data_out)); + return WERR_OK; + } else { + DEBUG(10, ("No or broken secret called %s\n", cert_secret_name)); + return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND; + } + } else { + DEBUG(10, ("No secret BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED\n")); + return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND; + } + + return WERR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} + +WERROR dcesrv_bkrp_BackupKey (struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct bkrp_BackupKey *r) +{ + WERROR error = WERR_INVALID_PARAM; + struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx; + bool is_rodc; + const char *addr = "unknown"; + /* At which level we start to add more debug of what is done in the protocol */ + int debuglevel =4; + + if (DEBUGLEVEL >= debuglevel) { + const struct tsocket_address *remote_address; + remote_address = dcesrv_connection_get_remote_address(dce_call->conn); + if (tsocket_address_is_inet(remote_address, "ip")) { + addr = tsocket_address_inet_addr_string(remote_address, mem_ctx); + W_ERROR_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(addr); + } + } + + if (lpcfg_server_role(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx) != ROLE_DOMAIN_CONTROLLER) { + return WERR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (!dce_call->conn->auth_state.auth_info || + dce_call->conn->auth_state.auth_info->auth_level != DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) { + DCESRV_FAULT(DCERPC_FAULT_ACCESS_DENIED); + } + + ldb_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, dce_call->event_ctx, + dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx, + system_session(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx), 0); + + if (samdb_rodc(ldb_ctx, &is_rodc) != LDB_SUCCESS) { + talloc_unlink(mem_ctx, ldb_ctx); + return WERR_INVALID_PARAM; + } + + if (!is_rodc) { + if(strncasecmp(GUID_string(mem_ctx, r->in.guidActionAgent), + BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID, strlen(BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID)) == 0) { + DEBUG(debuglevel, ("Client %s requested to decrypt a client side wrapped secret\n", addr)); + error = bkrp_do_uncrypt_client_wrap_key(dce_call, mem_ctx, r, ldb_ctx); + } + + if (strncasecmp(GUID_string(mem_ctx, r->in.guidActionAgent), + BACKUPKEY_RETRIEVE_BACKUP_KEY_GUID, strlen(BACKUPKEY_RETRIEVE_BACKUP_KEY_GUID)) == 0) { + DEBUG(debuglevel, ("Client %s requested certificate for client wrapped secret\n", addr)); + error = bkrp_do_retreive_client_wrap_key(dce_call, mem_ctx, r, ldb_ctx); + } + } + /*else: I am a RODC so I don't handle backup key protocol */ + + talloc_unlink(mem_ctx, ldb_ctx); + return error; +} + +/* include the generated boilerplate */ +#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_backupkey_s.c" diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/wscript_build b/source4/rpc_server/wscript_build index 3aafaa566a..3d1d36a3a3 100644 --- a/source4/rpc_server/wscript_build +++ b/source4/rpc_server/wscript_build @@ -99,6 +99,15 @@ bld.SAMBA_MODULE('dcerpc_lsarpc', ) +bld.SAMBA_MODULE('dcerpc_backupkey', + source='backupkey/dcesrv_backupkey.c ', + autoproto='backupkey/proto.h', + subsystem='dcerpc_server', + init_function='dcerpc_server_backupkey_init', + deps='samdb DCERPC_COMMON NDR_BACKUPKEY RPC_NDR_BACKUPKEY' + ) + + bld.SAMBA_MODULE('dcerpc_spoolss', source='spoolss/dcesrv_spoolss.c', subsystem='dcerpc_server', |