summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/client
AgeCommit message (Collapse)AuthorFilesLines
2009-07-27umount.cifs: do not attempt to update /etc/mtab if it is symbolic linkShirish Pargaonkar1-3/+4
If /etc/mtab is a symbolic link to e.g. /proc/mounts, do not update it. This is a fix for a bug reported in 4675 on samba bugzilla Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
2009-07-10Attempt to fix the build -- jlayton, please check!Volker Lendecke1-1/+1
2009-07-09cifs.upcall: use pid value from kernel to determine KRB5CCNAME to useJeff Layton1-12/+75
If the kernel sends the upcall a pid of the requesting process, we can open that process' /proc/<pid>/environ file and scrape the KRB5CCNAME value out of it. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
2009-06-29mount.cifs: don't pass text ro/rw options to kernelJeff Layton1-0/+2
/bin/mount strips off the ro/rw options after setting the MS_RDONLY flag appropriately. Make mount.cifs do the same thing. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
2009-06-25mount.cifs: add support for sending IPv6 scope ID to kernelJeff Layton1-0/+8
When getaddrinfo returns an IPv6 address with a non-zero scope_id, send that to the kernel appended to the address with a '%' delimiter. This allows people to mount servers via their link-local IPv6 addresses (given a kernel that understands this address format, of course). Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
2009-06-10mount.cifs: explicitly handle non AF_INET/AF_INET6 addressesJeff Layton1-0/+2
If we get a non-AF_INET(6) address, then just skip it and try the next one in the list. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
2009-06-06mount.cifs: properly check for mount being in fstab when running setuid root ↵Jeff Layton1-40/+162
(try#3) This is the third attempt to clean up the checks when a setuid mount.cifs is run by an unprivileged user. The main difference in this patch from the last one is that it fixes a bug where the mount might have failed if unnecessarily if CIFS_LEGACY_SETUID_CHECK was set. When mount.cifs is installed setuid root and run as an unprivileged user, it does some checks to limit how the mount is used. It checks that the mountpoint is owned by the user doing the mount. These checks however do not match those that /bin/mount does when it is called by an unprivileged user. When /bin/mount is called by an unprivileged user to do a mount, it checks that the mount in question is in /etc/fstab, that it has the "user" option set, etc. This means that it's currently not possible to set up user mounts the standard way (by the admin, in /etc/fstab) and simultaneously protect from an unprivileged user calling mount.cifs directly to mount a share on any directory that that user owns. Fix this by making the checks in mount.cifs match those of /bin/mount itself. This is a necessary step to make mount.cifs safe to be installed as a setuid binary, but not sufficient. For that, we'd need to give mount.cifs a proper security audit. Since some users may be depending on the legacy behavior, this patch also adds the ability to build mount.cifs with the older behavior. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
2009-06-02Move mount.cifs/umount.cifs to the top level and remove the outdated copyJelmer Vernooij6-0/+2639
in Samba 4.