Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
|
Break up auth/auth.h not to include the world.
Add credentials_krb5.h with the kerberos dependent prototypes.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 2b569c42e0fbb596ea82484d0e1cb22e193037b9)
|
|
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 8ae880b5019ab275fe0eca48120ab9e0fcca6293)
|
|
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 0afb4d1992b3c93557dec1e1cdca467efc299853)
|
|
(This used to be commit 51b4270513752d2eafbe77f9de598de16ef84a1f)
|
|
metze
(This used to be commit af63ed9eb3a5af3e4eeb84c66397255ea90ea764)
|
|
it's ugly, but they're used in torture tests
I hope to find a better solution for this later...
metze
(This used to be commit be8874e9d3f1a022a42ccd1262dc5ce7bd5d1a91)
|
|
(This used to be commit 2d655f05285a86bb1bbb882e4dd843def15c9dfa)
|
|
default.
(This used to be commit c80a8f1102caf744b66c13bebde38fba74983dc4)
|
|
The new RPC-SCHANNEL test shows that the full credentials state must
be kept in some shared memory, for some length of time. In
particular, clients will reconnect with SCHANNEL (after loosing all
connections) and expect that the credentials chain will remain in the
same place.
To achive this, we do the server-side crypto in a transaction,
including the fetch/store of the shared state.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 982a6aa871c9fce17410a9712cd9fa726025ff90)
|
|
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 6021fa373405f8788dc216aae82a3f4a80df4ba7)
|
|
schannel connections.
Test for Win2k3 SP1 behaviour in RPC-SCHANNEL.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 1c3911374ec65e4770c2fe9109d7b7d3ecd99f6a)
|
|
data to be signed/sealed. We can use this to split the data from the
signature portion of the resultant wrapped packet.
This required merging the gsskrb5_wrap_size patch from
lorikeet-heimdal, and fixes AES encrption issues on DCE/RPC (we no
longer use a static 45 byte value).
This fixes one of the krb5 issues in my list.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit e4f2afc34362953f56a026b66ae1aea81e9db104)
|
|
into Samba3.
The NTLMSSP sign/seal code now assumes that GENSEC has already checked
to see if SIGN or SEAL should be permitted. This simplfies the code
ensures that no matter what the mech, the correct code paths have been
set in place.
Also remove duplication caused by the NTLMv2 code's history, and
document why some of the things a bit funny.
In SPNEGO, create a new routine to handle the negTokenInit creation.
We no longer send an OID for a mech we can't start (like kerberos on
the server without a valid trust account).
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit fe45ef608f961a6950d4d19b4cb5e7c27b38ba5f)
|
|
(This used to be commit 250f1f69dd719a7981ec4c1698942b31826888d2)
|
|
auth/gensec and auth/kerberos.
This also pulls the kerberos configure code out of libads (which is
otherwise dead), and into auth/kerberos/kerberos.m4
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit e074d63f3dcf4f84239a10879112ebaf1cfa6c4f)
|