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path: root/source4/auth/kerberos/kerberos_pac.c
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2007-10-10r15379: Fix shared library build's unresolved dependenciesJelmer Vernooij1-1/+1
(This used to be commit 0fafa2e59566f8f892d7dfd7dd33d0100b96a780)
2007-10-10r15298: Fix the build using a few hacks in the build system.Jelmer Vernooij1-0/+1
Recursive dependencies are now forbidden (the build system will bail out if there are any). I've split up auth_sam.c into auth_sam.c and sam.c. Andrew, please rename sam.c / move its contents to whatever/wherever you think suits best. (This used to be commit 6646384aaf3e7fa2aa798c3e564b94b0617ec4d0)
2007-10-10r15297: Move create_security_token() to samdb as it requires SAMDB (and the ↵Jelmer Vernooij1-1/+1
rest of LIBSECURITY doesn't) Make the ldb password_hash module only depend on some keys manipulation code, not full heimdal Some other dependency fixes (This used to be commit 5b3ab728edfc9cdd9eee16ad0fe6dfd4b5ced630)
2007-10-10r14180: The PAC isn't so special that it deserves a level 0 debug any more.Andrew Bartlett1-1/+1
Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 2ab71ed51868da123131d8bdaa7c30ab61ae280f)
2007-10-10r12594: Jelmer pushed some proposed header reductions to the list today. ThisAndrew Bartlett1-3/+0
commits some of these that I know to be correct in the kerberos area. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 6787b3737c27f5136152b007b0ee2ae314efac3c)
2007-10-10r11543: A major upgrade to our KDC and PAC handling.Andrew Bartlett1-6/+26
We now put the PAC in the AS-REP, so that the client has it in the TGT. We then validate it (and re-sign it) on a TGS-REQ, ie when the client wants a ticket. This should also allow us to interop with windows KDCs. If we get an invalid PAC at the TGS stage, we just drop it. I'm slowly trying to move the application logic out of hdb-ldb.c, and back in with the rest of Samba's auth system, for consistancy. This continues that trend. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 36973b1eef7db5983cce76ba241e54d5f925c69c)
2007-10-10r11272: In trying to track down why Win2k3 is again rejecting our PAC, ensureAndrew Bartlett1-2/+0
we can round-trip all the way back to a server_info structure, not just a filled in PAC_DATA. (I was worried about generated fields being incorrect, or some other logical flaw). Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 11b1d78cc550c60201d12f8778ca8533712a5b1e)
2007-10-10r10174: This patch implements generic PAC verification, without assumptionsAndrew Bartlett1-23/+98
about the size of the signature. In particular, this works with AES, which was previously broken Samba4/Samba4. Reviewed by metze (and thanks for help with the previous IDL commit). (This used to be commit 3c8be196cce3bf275a0bf8d0cf127df570b560d3)
2007-10-10r10145: Allow a variable length signature, so we can support signing withAndrew Bartlett1-17/+7
other than arcfour-hmac-md5. Currently we still fail to verify other signatures however. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 2e5884fc2472c6bcc7e6e083c28a4da6b2f72af1)
2007-10-10r10066: This is the second in my patches to work on Samba4's kerberos support,Andrew Bartlett1-30/+66
with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct. Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab. I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but I've started to address some of that). This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification. On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and torture test validate this behaviour. One thing doesn't work with this patch: - the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break apart the gss_wrap interface. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit a3aba57c00a9c5318f4706db55d03f64e8bea60c)
2007-10-10r9681: We don't need the full smb_krb5_context here, so just pass the ↵Andrew Bartlett1-5/+5
krb5_context. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 47699019dbb7aa48e7acd6bf8364e40917db8410)
2007-10-10r9648: this fixes the krb5 based login with the pac. The key to this whole ↵Andrew Tridgell1-1/+7
saga was that the logon_time field in the pac must match the authtime field in the ticket we gave the client in the AS-REP (and thus also the authtime field in the ticket we get back in the TGS-REQ). Many thanks to Andrew Bartlett for his patience in showing me the basic ropes of all this code! This was a joint effort. (This used to be commit 7bee374b3ffcdb0424a83f909fe5ad504ea3882e)
2007-10-10r9165: Fix inverted error check in untested code path. (My untested code...)Andrew Bartlett1-1/+1
Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit fba7a0edd4ba29e595bb6ebd77381b383701482d)
2007-10-10r9084: 'resign' the sample PAC for the validation of the signature algorithms.Andrew Bartlett1-86/+173
If we ever get problems with the kerberos code, it should show up as a different signature in this PAC. This involved returning more data from the pac functions, so changed some callers and split up some functions. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit d514a7491208afa0533bf9e99601147eb69e08c9)
2007-10-10r8252: Steal metze's thunder, and prove that with a few small tweaks, we canAndrew Bartlett1-2/+2
now push/pull a sample PAC, and still have the same byte buffer. (Metze set up the string code, and probably already has a similar patch). Unfortunetly win2k3 still doesn't like what we provide, but every step helps. Also use data_blob_const() when we are just wrapping data for API reasons. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit e7c8076fc1459ff2ccefdaf0b091d04ee6137957)
2007-10-10r8250: More PAC work. We now sucessfully verify the KDC signature from my DCAndrew Bartlett1-21/+32
(I have included the krbtgt key from my test network). It turns out the krbtgt signature is over the 16 (or whatever, enc-type dependent) bytes of the signature, not the entire structure. Also do not even try to use Kerberos or GSSAPI on an IP address, it will only fail. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 3b9558e82fdebb58f240d43f6a594d676eb04daf)
2007-10-10r8164: - match the ordering w2k3 uses for the PAC_BUFFER:Stefan Metzmacher1-15/+16
LOGON_INFO LOGON_NAME SRV_CHECKSUM KDC_CHECKSUM - w2k3 also don't use the groupmembership array with rids it uses the othersids array metze (This used to be commit 2286fad27d749ebba14f5448f1f635bb36750c9c)
2007-10-10r8156: I found out that the unknown[2] field of the unknown[4] array is a ↵Stefan Metzmacher1-6/+4
length too, it's always 16 bytes smaller than the size in the PAC_BUFFER we now dump the blob's on LOCAL-PAC with -d 10 metze (This used to be commit 4ef721ce53539ac56ca8ac4d601f512149ca7283)
2007-10-10r8148: - make the PAC generation code a bit more readable and add some outof ↵Stefan Metzmacher1-62/+81
memory checks - move to handmodified pull/push code for PAC_BUFFER to get the _ndr_size field and the subcontext size right - after looking closely to the sample w2k3 PAC in our torture test (and some more in my archive) I found out that the first uint32 before the netr_SamInfo3 was also a pointer, (and we passed a NULL pointer there before, so I think that was the reason why the windows clients doesn't want our PAC) w2k3 uses this for unique pointers: ptr = ndr->ptr_count * 4; ptr |= 0x00020000; ndr->ptr_count; - do one more pull/push round with the sample PAC metze (This used to be commit 0eee17941595e9842a264bf89ac73ca66cea7ed5)
2007-10-10r8110: More PAC work. I still can't get WinXP to accept the PAC, but we areAndrew Bartlett1-38/+72
much closer. This changes PIDL to allow a subcontext to have a pad8 flag, saying to pad behind to an 8 byte boundary. This is the only way I can explain the 4 trainling zeros in the signature struct. Far more importantly, the PAC code is now under self-test, both in creating/parsing our own PAC, but also a PAC from my win2k3 server. This required changing auth_anonymous, because I wanted to reuse the anonymous 'server_info' generation code. I'm still having trouble with PIDL, particulary as surrounds value(), but I'll follow up on the list. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 50a54bf4e9bf04d2a8e0aebb3482a2ff655c8bbb)
2007-10-10r8001: Also fill in the krbtgt checksum, and make sure to put the rightAndrew Bartlett1-4/+22
checksum in the right place... Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 90d0f502da20add6784c883b2085cde519604933)
2007-10-10r7993: Further work on the Krb5 PAC.Andrew Bartlett1-15/+167
We now generate the PAC, and can verifiy both our own PAC and the PAC from Win2k3. This commit adds the PAC generation code, spits out the code to get the information we need from the NETLOGON server back into a auth/ helper function, and adds a number of glue functions. In the process of building the PAC generation code, some hints in the Microsoft PAC specification shed light on other parts of the code, and the updates to samr.idl and netlogon.idl come from those hints. Also in this commit: The Heimdal build package has been split up, so as to only link the KDC with smbd, not the client utils. To enable the PAC to be veified with gensec_krb5 (which isn't quite dead yet), the keyblock has been passed back to the calling layer. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit e2015671c2f7501f832ff402873ffe6e53b89466)
2007-10-10r7979: Metze reminded me to try one more combination, and we can now verifyAndrew Bartlett1-32/+14
the 'PAC', required for interopability with Active Directory. This is still a cludge, as it doesn't handle different encryption types, but that should be fairly easy to fix (needs PIDL/IDL changes). Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 690cfc44cef9b349cc31417d8353b6ce1c7832e1)
2007-10-10r7978: A start again on PAC verification. I have noticed that the kerberosAndrew Bartlett1-50/+27
keys appear at the end of the PAC, which I feel is deliberate (it makes this much easier). I still can't make it work, but I'm sure we are closer. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 6f0e1c80ae7b1e31e7a3fbff84f07442ee5a31cf)
2007-10-10r7968: Pull the PAC from within GSSAPI, rather than only when using our ownAndrew Bartlett1-0/+213
'mock GSSAPI'. Many thanks to Luke Howard for the work he has done on Heimdal for XAD, to provide the right API hooks in GSSAPI. Next step is to verify the signatures, and to build the PAC for the KDC end. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 2e82743c98e563e97c5a215d09efa0121854d0f7)
generated by cgit (git 2.34.1) at 2024-11-09 15:26:05 +0000