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We now put the PAC in the AS-REP, so that the client has it in the
TGT. We then validate it (and re-sign it) on a TGS-REQ, ie when the
client wants a ticket.
This should also allow us to interop with windows KDCs.
If we get an invalid PAC at the TGS stage, we just drop it.
I'm slowly trying to move the application logic out of hdb-ldb.c, and
back in with the rest of Samba's auth system, for consistancy. This
continues that trend.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 36973b1eef7db5983cce76ba241e54d5f925c69c)
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the code in auth/auth_sam.c for consistancy. This will also allow us
to have one place for a backend directory hook.
I will use a very similar hook to add the PAC.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 4315836cd8c94eb8340c4050804face4d0066810)
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Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit ede638c00b574bf4149d11844c0adf8e0f5c4efb)
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to CVS of 2005-10-24).
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 939d4f340feaad15d0a6a5da79feba2b2558f174)
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Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 4d2a9a9bc497eae269c24cbf156b43b8588e2f73)
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ignore Kerberos and fallback to NTLMSSP when joining. Thanks to Andrew Bartlett
for the assistence.
(This used to be commit 3b6bfbe8cf555f4144ed06044d3ecb8044f86bca)
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with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct.
Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over
all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in
gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab.
I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce
the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to
track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE
support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for
merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but
I've started to address some of that).
This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current
heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification.
On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by
checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these
right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and
torture test validate this behaviour.
One thing doesn't work with this patch:
- the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems
broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break
apart the gss_wrap interface.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit a3aba57c00a9c5318f4706db55d03f64e8bea60c)
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to Heimdal CVS as of 2005-08-27).
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 913924a4997f5e14c503f87510cbd8e4bfd965a9)
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saga was
that the logon_time field in the pac must match the authtime field in the ticket we
gave the client in the AS-REP (and thus also the authtime field in the ticket we get
back in the TGS-REQ).
Many thanks to Andrew Bartlett for his patience in showing me the
basic ropes of all this code! This was a joint effort.
(This used to be commit 7bee374b3ffcdb0424a83f909fe5ad504ea3882e)
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Delete test_crypto_wrapping.c, previously included but unbuilt.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit d5fb30fb0cef330e0947969f0c9afc1f58fc4c7d)
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This is my first attempt at this, so there may be a few rough edges.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 9a1d2f2fec67930975da856a2d365345cec46216)
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(This used to be commit 118be28a7aef233799956615a99d1a2a74dac175)
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