Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
|
This was used in only 2 places, db-glue.c and the lsa server.
In db-glue.c it is awkward though, as it forces to use an unconvenient lsa
structure and conversions from time_t to nt_time only to have nt_times
converted back to time_t for actual use. This is silly.
Also the kdc-policy file was a single funciton library, that's just ridiculous.
The loadparm helper is all we need to keep the values consistent, and if we
ever end up doing something with group policies we will care about it when it's
the time. the code would have to change quite a lot anyway.
Autobuild-User: Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Fri Apr 20 01:53:37 CEST 2012 on sn-devel-104
|
|
kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap is not used anywhere else, so just move it there and
make it static, one less dependency to worry about.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
|
|
Autobuild-User: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Sat Jan 21 13:06:35 CET 2012 on sn-devel-104
|
|
This sorts out the correct handling for the 'kvno=255'
problem. Windows will use the previous trust password for 1 hour after
a password set, and indicates that the previous password is being used
by sending current_kvno-1. That maps to 255 if the trust password has
not actually been changed, so the initial trust password is being
used.
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
|
|
the kdc should not be looking for users in GC partial replicas, as
these users do not have all of the attributes needed for the KDC to
operate
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
|
|
windows sometimes sends us a kvno of 255 for inter-domain trusts. We
don't yet know why it does this, but it seems that we need to treat
this as an unspecified kvno
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
|
|
the kdc doesn't want to find users who are in partialReplica
partitions, as they won't have the needed secret info for the kdc to
operate. We need to generate referrals instead
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
|
|
the exact value doesn't matter, as both Samba and windows check
against the latest password, but the old default of -1 caused ASN.1
parsing errors on windows, which prevented it answering TGS requests
thanks to Hongwei Sun for finding this from a ttt trace
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
|
|
use ldb_get_default_basedn() with a subtree search
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
|
|
metze
Autobuild-User: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Tue Aug 2 06:06:15 CEST 2011 on sn-devel-104
|
|
Windows seems to always canonicalize the principal in TGS replies.
metze
Autobuild-User: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Tue Jul 26 03:25:06 CEST 2011 on sn-devel-104
|
|
metze
|
|
metze
|
|
flags.trusted_for_delegation
metze
|
|
|
|
|
|
Bit shifting is non-trivial in C:-)
This
int32_t a = 0x12340000;
uint32_t b = (a >> 16);
results in 0x00001234, but this
int32_t a = 0xEDCB0000;
uint32_t b = (a >> 16);
results in 0xFFFFEDCB, while we expected 0x0000EDCB.
metze
|
|
otherwise msg->dn would be non-minimal and would fail in searches
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
|
|
Autobuild-User: Matthias Dieter Wallnöfer <mdw@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Sun Dec 12 15:20:46 CET 2010 on sn-devel-104
|
|
We now no longer print tickets with a potentially infinite life, and
we report the same life over LSA as we use in the KDC. We should get
this from group policy, but for now it's parametric smb.conf options.
Andrew Bartlett
|
|
Autobuild-User: Matthias Dieter Wallnöfer <mdw@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Fri Dec 3 23:56:15 CET 2010 on sn-devel-104
|
|
Thanks to Hongwei Sun for the clear description of the algorithim
involved. Importantly, it isn't possible to remove encryption types
from the list, only to add them over the defaults (DES and
arcfour-hmac-md5, and additional AES for DCs and RODCs).
This changes the behaviour for entries with
msDS-supportedEncryptionTypes: 0, which Angelos Oikonomopoulos
reported finding set by ADUC when attempting to store cleartext
passwords.
Andrew Bartlett
Autobuild-User: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Tue Nov 16 21:24:43 UTC 2010 on sn-devel-104
|
|
The KDC sets different flags for the AS-REQ (this is client-depenent)
and the TGS-REQ to determine if the realm should be forced to the
canonical value. If we do this always, or do this never, we get into
trouble, so it's much better to honour the flags we are given.
Andrew Bartlett
|
|
This avoids setting these values when the caller simply does not care
Andrew Bartlett
|
|
This will allow these calls to honour the flags passed in from the KDC
Andrew Bartlett
|
|
we should reset the realm part of the principal, but not the lowercase
realm embedded in the 'krbtgt/realm@REALM'.
Andrew Bartlett
|
|
This means that when we are an RODC, and an account does not have the
password attributes, we can now indicate to the kdc code that it
should forward the request to a real DC.
(The proxy code itself is not in this commit).
Andrew Bartlett
|
|
|
|
in "dsdb/common/util.c""
This reverts commit 8a2ce5c47cee499f90b125ebde83de5f9f1a9aa0.
Jelmer pointed out that these are also in use by other LDB databases - not only
SAMDB ones.
Autobuild-User: Matthias Dieter Wallnöfer <mdw@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Sun Oct 17 13:37:16 UTC 2010 on sn-devel-104
|
|
"dsdb/common/util.c"
They're only in use by SAMDB code.
Autobuild-User: Matthias Dieter Wallnöfer <mdw@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Sun Oct 17 09:40:13 UTC 2010 on sn-devel-104
|
|
|
|
It doesn't change much but it's nicer to have it consistent.
|
|
Autobuild-User: Matthias Dieter Wallnöfer <mdw@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Sun Oct 3 17:30:34 UTC 2010 on sn-devel-104
|
|
We should avoid using Kerberos or any other recursive auth mechanism
in ldb backends, but denying Kerberos here won't be enough, so
remove the special case. (Typcially we bind using a different password
space and DIGEST-MD5 or NTLM).
Andrew Bartlett
|
|
All DCs and all krbtgt servers are forced to use AES, regardless
of the msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber value.
Andrew Bartlett
|
|
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
|
|
the krbtgt role).
Andrew Bartlett
|
|
This includes rewriting the PAC if the original krbtgt isn't to be
trusted, and reading different entries from the DB for the krbtgt
depending on the krbtgt number.
Andrew Bartlett
|
|
This means we just set up the system_session etc in one place
and don't diverge between the MIT and Heimdal plugins.
We also now determine if we are an RODC and store some details
that we will need later.
Andrew Bartlett
|
|
Andrew Bartlett
|
|
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
|
|
Also remove bogus trustCurrentPasswords struct which we just had because our IDL
was incorrect.
Guenther
|
|
this converts all callers that use the Samba4 loadparm lp_ calling
convention to use the lpcfg_ prefix.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
|
|
This changes the calculation to apply the allowed enc types to all
uses of the key (no point allowing a weak kinit to a key the server
wanted strongly protected). It also ensures that all the non-DES keys
are available on the krbtgt in particular, even as it does not have a
msds-SupportedEncryptionTypes attributes.
Andrew Bartlett
|
|
We need to honour this, otherwise we will send AES-encrypted tickets
to unprepared Kerberos targets.
Andrew Bartlett
|
|
Would be nice if someone could check if this fits.
|
|
|
|
context
Also after a free "priv" could be != NULL and may be freed again.
This should fix bug #7365.
|
|
|
|
For now, this shares the 'if it's the same host' system with the
constrained delegation code.
Andrew Bartlett
|