From 04cfbc7854bb793481e9050264a1f0cac1c6198a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: John Terpstra Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2003 01:15:53 +0000 Subject: Update pre-release of RC2. Note: Due to config errors not all manpages were rebuilt. (This used to be commit 01fde1a40b11e73cc98f09ab2ebbd14ed0bed4cf) --- docs/htmldocs/Samba-Developers-Guide.html | 434 +++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 217 insertions(+), 217 deletions(-) (limited to 'docs/htmldocs/Samba-Developers-Guide.html') diff --git a/docs/htmldocs/Samba-Developers-Guide.html b/docs/htmldocs/Samba-Developers-Guide.html index c16b48441b..97e48f3e27 100644 --- a/docs/htmldocs/Samba-Developers-Guide.html +++ b/docs/htmldocs/Samba-Developers-Guide.html @@ -26,15 +26,15 @@ Please send updates to Jelmer Ve This documentation is distributed under the GNU General Public License (GPL) version 2. A copy of the license is included with the Samba source distribution. A copy can be found on-line at http://www.fsf.org/licenses/gpl.txt -

Table of Contents

Attributions
1. Definition of NetBIOS Protocol and Name Resolution Modes
NETBIOS
BROADCAST NetBIOS
NBNS NetBIOS
2. Samba Architecture
Introduction
Multithreading and Samba
Threading smbd
Threading nmbd
nbmd Design
3. The samba DEBUG system
New Output Syntax
The DEBUG() Macro
The DEBUGADD() Macro
The DEBUGLVL() Macro
New Functions
dbgtext()
dbghdr()
format_debug_text()
4. Coding Suggestions
5. Samba Internals
Character Handling
The new functions
Macros in byteorder.h
CVAL(buf,pos)
PVAL(buf,pos)
SCVAL(buf,pos,val)
SVAL(buf,pos)
IVAL(buf,pos)
SVALS(buf,pos)
IVALS(buf,pos)
SSVAL(buf,pos,val)
SIVAL(buf,pos,val)
SSVALS(buf,pos,val)
SIVALS(buf,pos,val)
RSVAL(buf,pos)
RIVAL(buf,pos)
RSSVAL(buf,pos,val)
RSIVAL(buf,pos,val)
LAN Manager Samba API
Parameters
Return value
Code character table
6. The smb.conf file
Lexical Analysis
Handling of Whitespace
Handling of Line Continuation
Line Continuation Quirks
Syntax
About params.c
7. NetBIOS in a Unix World
Introduction
Usernames
File Ownership
Passwords
Locking
Deny Modes
Trapdoor UIDs
Port numbers
Protocol Complexity
8. Tracing samba system calls
9. Finding useful information on windows
Netlogon debugging output
10. NT Domain RPC's
Introduction
Sources
Credits
Notes and Structures
Notes
Enumerations
Structures
MSRPC over Transact Named Pipe
MSRPC Pipes
Header
Tail
RPC Bind / Bind Ack
NTLSA Transact Named Pipe
LSA Open Policy
LSA Query Info Policy
LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains
LSA Open Secret
LSA Close
LSA Lookup SIDS
LSA Lookup Names
NETLOGON rpc Transact Named Pipe
LSA Request Challenge
LSA Authenticate 2
LSA Server Password Set
LSA SAM Logon
LSA SAM Logoff
\\MAILSLOT\NET\NTLOGON
Query for PDC
SAM Logon
SRVSVC Transact Named Pipe
Net Share Enum
Net Server Get Info
Cryptographic side of NT Domain Authentication
Definitions
Protocol
Comments
SIDs and RIDs
Well-known SIDs
Well-known RIDS
11. Samba Printing Internals
Abstract
+

Table of Contents

Attributions
1. Definition of NetBIOS Protocol and Name Resolution Modes
NETBIOS
BROADCAST NetBIOS
NBNS NetBIOS
2. Samba Architecture
Introduction
Multithreading and Samba
Threading smbd
Threading nmbd
nbmd Design
3. The samba DEBUG system
New Output Syntax
The DEBUG() Macro
The DEBUGADD() Macro
The DEBUGLVL() Macro
New Functions
dbgtext()
dbghdr()
format_debug_text()
4. Coding Suggestions
5. Samba Internals
Character Handling
The new functions
Macros in byteorder.h
CVAL(buf,pos)
PVAL(buf,pos)
SCVAL(buf,pos,val)
SVAL(buf,pos)
IVAL(buf,pos)
SVALS(buf,pos)
IVALS(buf,pos)
SSVAL(buf,pos,val)
SIVAL(buf,pos,val)
SSVALS(buf,pos,val)
SIVALS(buf,pos,val)
RSVAL(buf,pos)
RIVAL(buf,pos)
RSSVAL(buf,pos,val)
RSIVAL(buf,pos,val)
LAN Manager Samba API
Parameters
Return value
Code character table
6. The smb.conf file
Lexical Analysis
Handling of Whitespace
Handling of Line Continuation
Line Continuation Quirks
Syntax
About params.c
7. NetBIOS in a Unix World
Introduction
Usernames
File Ownership
Passwords
Locking
Deny Modes
Trapdoor UIDs
Port numbers
Protocol Complexity
8. Tracing samba system calls
9. Finding useful information on windows
Netlogon debugging output
10. NT Domain RPC's
Introduction
Sources
Credits
Notes and Structures
Notes
Enumerations
Structures
MSRPC over Transact Named Pipe
MSRPC Pipes
Header
Tail
RPC Bind / Bind Ack
NTLSA Transact Named Pipe
LSA Open Policy
LSA Query Info Policy
LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains
LSA Open Secret
LSA Close
LSA Lookup SIDS
LSA Lookup Names
NETLOGON rpc Transact Named Pipe
LSA Request Challenge
LSA Authenticate 2
LSA Server Password Set
LSA SAM Logon
LSA SAM Logoff
\\MAILSLOT\NET\NTLOGON
Query for PDC
SAM Logon
SRVSVC Transact Named Pipe
Net Share Enum
Net Server Get Info
Cryptographic side of NT Domain Authentication
Definitions
Protocol
Comments
SIDs and RIDs
Well-known SIDs
Well-known RIDS
11. Samba Printing Internals
Abstract
Printing Interface to Various Back ends -
+
Print Queue TDB's -
+
ChangeID and Client Caching of Printer Information -
+
Windows NT/2K Printer Change Notify -
12. Samba WINS Internals
WINS Failover
13. The Upcoming SAM System
Security in the 'new SAM'
Standalone from UNIX
Handles and Races in the new SAM
Layers
Application
SAM Interface
SAM Modules
SAM Modules
Special Module: sam_passdb
sam_ads
Memory Management
Testing
14. LanMan and NT Password Encryption
Introduction
How does it work?
The smbpasswd file
15. Modules
Advantages
Loading modules
Static modules
Shared modules
Writing modules
Static/Shared selection in configure.in
16. RPC Pluggable Modules
About
General Overview
17. VFS Modules
The Samba (Posix) VFS layer
The general interface
Possible VFS operation layers
The Interaction between the Samba VFS subsystem and the modules
Initialization and registration
How the Modules handle per connection data
Upgrading to the New VFS Interface
Upgrading from 2.2.* and 3.0aplha modules
Some Notes
Implement TRANSPARENT functions
Implement OPAQUE functions
18. Notes to packagers
Versioning
Modules
19. Contributing code

Attributions

Definition of NetBIOS Protocol and Name Resolution Modes

  • Luke Leighton

Samba Architecture

  • Dan Shearer

The samba DEBUG system

  • Chris Hertel

Coding Suggestions

  • Steve French

  • Simo Sorce

  • Andrew Bartlett

  • Tim Potter

  • Martin Pool

Samba Internals

The smb.conf file

  • Chris Hertel

NetBIOS in a Unix World

  • Andrew Tridgell

Tracing samba system calls

  • Andrew Tridgell

Finding useful information on windows

NT Domain RPC's

Samba Printing Internals

  • Gerald Carter

Samba WINS Internals

  • Gerald Carter

The Upcoming SAM System

  • Andrew Bartlett

LanMan and NT Password Encryption

Modules

RPC Pluggable Modules

VFS Modules

Notes to packagers

  • Jelmer Vernooij

Contributing code

Chapter 1. Definition of NetBIOS Protocol and Name Resolution Modes

Luke Leighton

12 June 1997

Table of Contents

NETBIOS
BROADCAST NetBIOS
NBNS NetBIOS

NETBIOS

+

12. Samba WINS Internals
WINS Failover
13. The Upcoming SAM System
Security in the 'new SAM'
Standalone from UNIX
Handles and Races in the new SAM
Layers
Application
SAM Interface
SAM Modules
SAM Modules
Special Module: sam_passdb
sam_ads
Memory Management
Testing
14. LanMan and NT Password Encryption
Introduction
How does it work?
The smbpasswd file
15. Modules
Advantages
Loading modules
Static modules
Shared modules
Writing modules
Static/Shared selection in configure.in
16. RPC Pluggable Modules
About
General Overview
17. VFS Modules
The Samba (Posix) VFS layer
The general interface
Possible VFS operation layers
The Interaction between the Samba VFS subsystem and the modules
Initialization and registration
How the Modules handle per connection data
Upgrading to the New VFS Interface
Upgrading from 2.2.* and 3.0aplha modules
Some Notes
Implement TRANSPARENT functions
Implement OPAQUE functions
18. Notes to packagers
Versioning
Modules
19. Contributing code

Attributions

Definition of NetBIOS Protocol and Name Resolution Modes

  • Luke Leighton

Samba Architecture

  • Dan Shearer

The samba DEBUG system

  • Chris Hertel

Coding Suggestions

  • Steve French

  • Simo Sorce

  • Andrew Bartlett

  • Tim Potter

  • Martin Pool

Samba Internals

The smb.conf file

  • Chris Hertel

NetBIOS in a Unix World

  • Andrew Tridgell

Tracing samba system calls

  • Andrew Tridgell

Finding useful information on windows

NT Domain RPC's

Samba Printing Internals

  • Gerald Carter

Samba WINS Internals

  • Gerald Carter

The Upcoming SAM System

  • Andrew Bartlett

LanMan and NT Password Encryption

Modules

RPC Pluggable Modules

VFS Modules

Notes to packagers

  • Jelmer Vernooij

Contributing code

Chapter 1. Definition of NetBIOS Protocol and Name Resolution Modes

Luke Leighton

12 June 1997

Table of Contents

NETBIOS
BROADCAST NetBIOS
NBNS NetBIOS

NETBIOS

NetBIOS runs over the following tranports: TCP/IP; NetBEUI and IPX/SPX. Samba only uses NetBIOS over TCP/IP. For details on the TCP/IP NetBIOS Session Service NetBIOS Datagram Service, and NetBIOS Names, see @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ NetBIOS names are either UNIQUE or GROUP. Only one application can claim a UNIQUE NetBIOS name on a network.

There are two kinds of NetBIOS Name resolution: Broadcast and Point-to-Point. -

BROADCAST NetBIOS

+

BROADCAST NetBIOS

Clients can claim names, and therefore offer services on successfully claimed names, on their broadcast-isolated subnet. One way to get NetBIOS services (such as browsing: see ftp.microsoft.com/drg/developr/CIFS/browdiff.txt; and @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ find that some of your hosts spend 95 percent of their time dealing with broadcast traffic. [If you have IPX/SPX on your LAN or WAN, you will find that this is already happening: a packet analyzer will show, roughly every twelve minutes, great swathes of broadcast traffic!]. -

NBNS NetBIOS

+

NBNS NetBIOS

rfc1001.txt describes, amongst other things, the implementation and use of, a 'NetBIOS Name Service'. NT/AS offers 'Windows Internet Name Service' which is fully rfc1001/2 compliant, but has had to take specific action @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ WINS Clients therefore claim names from the WINS server. If the WINS server allows them to register a name, the client's NetBIOS session service can then offer services on this name. Other WINS clients will then contact the WINS server to resolve a NetBIOS name. -

Chapter 2. Samba Architecture

Dan Shearer

November 1997

Table of Contents

Introduction
Multithreading and Samba
Threading smbd
Threading nmbd
nbmd Design

Introduction

+

Chapter 2. Samba Architecture

Dan Shearer

November 1997

Table of Contents

Introduction
Multithreading and Samba
Threading smbd
Threading nmbd
nbmd Design

Introduction

This document gives a general overview of how Samba works internally. The Samba Team has tried to come up with a model which is the best possible compromise between elegance, portability, security @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ It also tries to answer some of the frequently asked questions such as:

  1. Is Samba secure when running on Unix? The xyz platform? What about the root priveliges issue? -

  2. Pros and cons of multithreading in various parts of Samba

  3. Why not have a separate process for name resolution, WINS, and browsing?

Multithreading and Samba

+

  • Pros and cons of multithreading in various parts of Samba

  • Why not have a separate process for name resolution, WINS, and browsing?

    • Multithreading and Samba

    People sometimes tout threads as a uniformly good thing. They are very nice in their place but are quite inappropriate for smbd. nmbd is another matter, and multi-threading it would be very nice. @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ smbd multi-threaded. Multi-threading would actually make Samba much slower, less scalable, less portable and much less robust. The fact that we use a separate process for each connection is one of Samba's biggest advantages. -

    Threading smbd

    +

    Threading smbd

    A few problems that would arise from a threaded smbd are:

    1. It's not only to create threads instead of processes, but you @@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ A few problems that would arise from a threaded smbd are:

    2. we couldn't use the system locking calls as the locking context of fcntl() is a process, not a thread. -

    Threading nmbd

    +

    Threading nmbd

    This would be ideal, but gets sunk by portability requirements.

    Andrew tried to write a test threads library for nmbd that used only @@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ packet that arrives. Having a pool of processes is possible but is nasty to program cleanly due to the enormous amount of shared data (in complex structures) between the processes. We can't rely on each platform having a shared memory system. -

    nbmd Design

    +

    nbmd Design

    Originally Andrew used recursion to simulate a multi-threaded environment, which use the stack enormously and made for really confusing debugging sessions. Luke Leighton rewrote it to use a @@ -225,11 +225,11 @@ a single process.

    Then Jeremy rewrote nmbd. The packet data in nmbd isn't what's on the wire. It's a nice format that is very amenable to processing but still -keeps the idea of a distinct packet. See "struct packet_struct" in +keeps the idea of a distinct packet. See "struct packet_struct" in nameserv.h. It has all the detail but none of the on-the-wire mess. This makes it ideal for using in disk or memory-based databases for browsing and WINS support. -

    Chapter 3. The samba DEBUG system

    Chris Hertel

    July 1998

    Table of Contents

    New Output Syntax
    The DEBUG() Macro
    The DEBUGADD() Macro
    The DEBUGLVL() Macro
    New Functions
    dbgtext()
    dbghdr()
    format_debug_text()

    New Output Syntax

    +

    Chapter 3. The samba DEBUG system

    Chris Hertel

    July 1998

    Table of Contents

    New Output Syntax
    The DEBUG() Macro
    The DEBUGADD() Macro
    The DEBUGLVL() Macro
    New Functions
    dbgtext()
    dbghdr()
    format_debug_text()

    New Output Syntax

    The syntax of a debugging log file is represented as: 

       >debugfile< :== { >debugmsg< }
@@ -282,16 +282,16 @@ by a newline.
 Note that in the above example the function names are not listed on
 the header line. That's because the example above was generated on an
 SGI Indy, and the SGI compiler doesn't support the __FUNCTION__ macro.
-

    The DEBUG() Macro

    +

    The DEBUG() Macro

    Use of the DEBUG() macro is unchanged. DEBUG() takes two parameters. The first is the message level, the second is the body of a function call to the Debug1() function.

    That's confusing.

    Here's an example which may help a bit. If you would write

    -printf( "This is a %s message.\n", "debug" );
+printf( "This is a %s message.\n", "debug" );

    to send the output to stdout, then you would write 

    -DEBUG( 0, ( "This is a %s message.\n", "debug" ) );
+DEBUG( 0, ( "This is a %s message.\n", "debug" ) );

    to send the output to the debug file. All of the normal printf() formatting escapes work. @@ -316,12 +316,12 @@ DEBUG() is called, the new input is simply appended. DEBUG() has been used to write partial lines. Here's a simple (dumb) example of the kind of thing I'm talking about: 

    -    DEBUG( 0, ("The test returned " ) );
+    DEBUG( 0, ("The test returned " ) );
     if( test() )
-      DEBUG(0, ("True") );
+      DEBUG(0, ("True") );
     else
-      DEBUG(0, ("False") );
-    DEBUG(0, (".\n") );
+      DEBUG(0, ("False") );
+    DEBUG(0, (".\n") );

    Without the format buffer, the output (assuming test() returned true) would look like this: @@ -333,35 +333,35 @@ would look like this: [1998/07/30 16:00:51, 0] file.c:function(261) .

    Which isn't much use. The format buffer kludge fixes this problem. -

    The DEBUGADD() Macro

    +

    The DEBUGADD() Macro

    In addition to the kludgey solution to the broken line problem described above, there is a clean solution. The DEBUGADD() macro never generates a header. It will append new text to the current debug message even if the format buffer is empty. The syntax of the DEBUGADD() macro is the same as that of the DEBUG() macro. 

    -    DEBUG( 0, ("This is the first line.\n" ) );
-    DEBUGADD( 0, ("This is the second line.\nThis is the third line.\n" ) );
+    DEBUG( 0, ("This is the first line.\n" ) );
+    DEBUGADD( 0, ("This is the second line.\nThis is the third line.\n" ) );

    Produces

         [1998/07/30 16:00:51, 0] file.c:function(512)
       This is the first line.
       This is the second line.
       This is the third line.
-

    The DEBUGLVL() Macro

    +

    The DEBUGLVL() Macro

    One of the problems with the DEBUG() macro was that DEBUG() lines tended to get a bit long. Consider this example from nmbd_sendannounce.c: 

    -  DEBUG(3,("send_local_master_announcement: type %x for name %s on subnet %s for workgroup %s\n",
+  DEBUG(3,("send_local_master_announcement: type %x for name %s on subnet %s for workgroup %s\n",
             type, global_myname, subrec->subnet_name, work->work_group));

    One solution to this is to break it down using DEBUG() and DEBUGADD(), as follows: 

    -  DEBUG( 3, ( "send_local_master_announcement: " ) );
-  DEBUGADD( 3, ( "type %x for name %s ", type, global_myname ) );
-  DEBUGADD( 3, ( "on subnet %s ", subrec->subnet_name ) );
-  DEBUGADD( 3, ( "for workgroup %s\n", work->work_group ) );
+  DEBUG( 3, ( "send_local_master_announcement: " ) );
+  DEBUGADD( 3, ( "type %x for name %s ", type, global_myname ) );
+  DEBUGADD( 3, ( "on subnet %s ", subrec->subnet_name ) );
+  DEBUGADD( 3, ( "for workgroup %s\n", work->work_group ) );

    A similar, but arguably nicer approach is to use the DEBUGLVL() macro. This macro returns True if the message level is less than or equal to @@ -369,10 +369,10 @@ the global DEBUGLEVEL value, so: 

       if( DEBUGLVL( 3 ) )
     {
-    dbgtext( "send_local_master_announcement: " );
-    dbgtext( "type %x for name %s ", type, global_myname );
-    dbgtext( "on subnet %s ", subrec->subnet_name );
-    dbgtext( "for workgroup %s\n", work->work_group );
+    dbgtext( "send_local_master_announcement: " );
+    dbgtext( "type %x for name %s ", type, global_myname );
+    dbgtext( "on subnet %s ", subrec->subnet_name );
+    dbgtext( "for workgroup %s\n", work->work_group );
     }

    (The dbgtext() function is explained below.)

    There are a few advantages to this scheme:

    1. The test is performed only once. @@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ within the DEBUGLVL() block.

    2. Processing that is only relevant to debug output can be contained within the DEBUGLVL() block. -

    New Functions

    dbgtext()

    +

    New Functions

    dbgtext()

    This function prints debug message text to the debug file (and possibly to syslog) via the format buffer. The function uses a variable argument list just like printf() or Debug1(). The @@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ and then passed to format_debug_text(). If you use DEBUGLVL() you will probably print the body of the message using dbgtext(). -

    dbghdr()

    +

    dbghdr()

    This is the function that writes a debug message header. Headers are not processed via the format buffer. Also note that if the format buffer is not empty, a call to dbghdr() will not @@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ produce any output. See the comments in dbghdr() for more info.

    It is not likely that this function will be called directly. It is used by DEBUG() and DEBUGADD(). -

    format_debug_text()

    +

    format_debug_text()

    This is a static function in debug.c. It stores the output text for the body of the message in a buffer until it encounters a newline. When the newline character is found, the buffer is @@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ Here are some other suggestions: reason: consistency

  • don't explicitly extern functions (they are autogenerated by - "make proto" into proto.h) + "make proto" into proto.h) reason: consistency

  • use endian safe macros when unpacking SMBs (see byteorder.h and @@ -550,7 +550,7 @@ The suggestions above are simply that, suggestions, but the information may help in reducing the routine rework done on new code. The preceeding list is expected to change routinely as new support routines and macros are added. -

    • Chapter 5. Samba Internals

    8 May 1996

    Table of Contents

    Character Handling
    The new functions
    Macros in byteorder.h
    CVAL(buf,pos)
    PVAL(buf,pos)
    SCVAL(buf,pos,val)
    SVAL(buf,pos)
    IVAL(buf,pos)
    SVALS(buf,pos)
    IVALS(buf,pos)
    SSVAL(buf,pos,val)
    SIVAL(buf,pos,val)
    SSVALS(buf,pos,val)
    SIVALS(buf,pos,val)
    RSVAL(buf,pos)
    RIVAL(buf,pos)
    RSSVAL(buf,pos,val)
    RSIVAL(buf,pos,val)
    LAN Manager Samba API
    Parameters
    Return value
    Code character table

    Character Handling

    +

    Chapter 5. Samba Internals

    8 May 1996

    Table of Contents

    Character Handling
    The new functions
    Macros in byteorder.h
    CVAL(buf,pos)
    PVAL(buf,pos)
    SCVAL(buf,pos,val)
    SVAL(buf,pos)
    IVAL(buf,pos)
    SVALS(buf,pos)
    IVALS(buf,pos)
    SSVAL(buf,pos,val)
    SIVAL(buf,pos,val)
    SSVALS(buf,pos,val)
    SIVALS(buf,pos,val)
    RSVAL(buf,pos)
    RIVAL(buf,pos)
    RSSVAL(buf,pos,val)
    RSIVAL(buf,pos,val)
    LAN Manager Samba API
    Parameters
    Return value
    Code character table

    Character Handling

    This section describes character set handling in Samba, as implemented in Samba 3.0 and above

    @@ -560,12 +560,12 @@ strings to/from DOS codepages. The problem is that there was no way of telling if a particular char* is in dos codepage or unix codepage. This led to a nightmare of code that tried to cope with particular cases without handlingt the general case. -

    The new functions

    +

    The new functions

    The new system works like this:

    1. - all char* strings inside Samba are "unix" strings. These are - multi-byte strings that are in the charset defined by the "unix - charset" option in smb.conf. + all char* strings inside Samba are "unix" strings. These are + multi-byte strings that are in the charset defined by the "unix + charset" option in smb.conf.

    2. there is no single fixed character set for unix strings, but any character set that is used does need the following properties: @@ -618,32 +618,32 @@ The new system works like this: like strchr_m(). I know this is very slow, and we will eventually speed it up but right now we want this stuff correct not fast.

    3. - all lp_ functions now return unix strings. The magic "DOS" flag on + all lp_ functions now return unix strings. The magic "DOS" flag on parameters is gone.

    4. all vfs functions take unix strings. Don't convert when passing to them -

    Macros in byteorder.h

    +

    Macros in byteorder.h

    This section describes the macros defined in byteorder.h. These macros are used extensively in the Samba code. -

    CVAL(buf,pos)

    +

    CVAL(buf,pos)

    returns the byte at offset pos within buffer buf as an unsigned character. -

    PVAL(buf,pos)

    returns the value of CVAL(buf,pos) cast to type unsigned integer.

    SCVAL(buf,pos,val)

    sets the byte at offset pos within buffer buf to value val.

    SVAL(buf,pos)

    +

    PVAL(buf,pos)

    returns the value of CVAL(buf,pos) cast to type unsigned integer.

    SCVAL(buf,pos,val)

    sets the byte at offset pos within buffer buf to value val.

    SVAL(buf,pos)

    returns the value of the unsigned short (16 bit) little-endian integer at offset pos within buffer buf. An integer of this type is sometimes - refered to as "USHORT". -

    IVAL(buf,pos)

    returns the value of the unsigned 32 bit little-endian integer at offset -pos within buffer buf.

    SVALS(buf,pos)

    returns the value of the signed short (16 bit) little-endian integer at -offset pos within buffer buf.

    IVALS(buf,pos)

    returns the value of the signed 32 bit little-endian integer at offset pos -within buffer buf.

    SSVAL(buf,pos,val)

    sets the unsigned short (16 bit) little-endian integer at offset pos within -buffer buf to value val.

    SIVAL(buf,pos,val)

    sets the unsigned 32 bit little-endian integer at offset pos within buffer -buf to the value val.

    SSVALS(buf,pos,val)

    sets the short (16 bit) signed little-endian integer at offset pos within -buffer buf to the value val.

    SIVALS(buf,pos,val)

    sets the signed 32 bit little-endian integer at offset pos withing buffer -buf to the value val.

    RSVAL(buf,pos)

    returns the value of the unsigned short (16 bit) big-endian integer at -offset pos within buffer buf.

    RIVAL(buf,pos)

    returns the value of the unsigned 32 bit big-endian integer at offset -pos within buffer buf.

    RSSVAL(buf,pos,val)

    sets the value of the unsigned short (16 bit) big-endian integer at + refered to as "USHORT". +

    IVAL(buf,pos)

    returns the value of the unsigned 32 bit little-endian integer at offset +pos within buffer buf.

    SVALS(buf,pos)

    returns the value of the signed short (16 bit) little-endian integer at +offset pos within buffer buf.

    IVALS(buf,pos)

    returns the value of the signed 32 bit little-endian integer at offset pos +within buffer buf.

    SSVAL(buf,pos,val)

    sets the unsigned short (16 bit) little-endian integer at offset pos within +buffer buf to value val.

    SIVAL(buf,pos,val)

    sets the unsigned 32 bit little-endian integer at offset pos within buffer +buf to the value val.

    SSVALS(buf,pos,val)

    sets the short (16 bit) signed little-endian integer at offset pos within +buffer buf to the value val.

    SIVALS(buf,pos,val)

    sets the signed 32 bit little-endian integer at offset pos withing buffer +buf to the value val.

    RSVAL(buf,pos)

    returns the value of the unsigned short (16 bit) big-endian integer at +offset pos within buffer buf.

    RIVAL(buf,pos)

    returns the value of the unsigned 32 bit big-endian integer at offset +pos within buffer buf.

    RSSVAL(buf,pos,val)

    sets the value of the unsigned short (16 bit) big-endian integer at offset pos within buffer buf to value val. -refered to as "USHORT".

    RSIVAL(buf,pos,val)

    sets the value of the unsigned 32 bit big-endian integer at offset -pos within buffer buf to value val.

    LAN Manager Samba API

    +refered to as "USHORT".

    RSIVAL(buf,pos,val)

    sets the value of the unsigned 32 bit big-endian integer at offset +pos within buffer buf to value val.

    LAN Manager Samba API

    This section describes the functions need to make a LAN Manager RPC call. This information had been obtained by examining the Samba code and the LAN Manager 2.0 API documentation. It should not be considered entirely @@ -656,7 +656,7 @@ call_api(int prcnt, int drcnt, int mprcnt, int mdrcnt,

    This function is defined in client.c. It uses an SMB transaction to call a remote api. -

    Parameters

    The parameters are as follows:

    1. +

      Parameters

      The parameters are as follows:

      1. prcnt: the number of bytes of parameters begin sent.

      2. drcnt: the number of bytes of data begin sent. @@ -689,8 +689,8 @@ in the manual, not the data which is actually passed. An ASCIIZ string describing the data structure which ought to be returned.

      3. Any parameters which appear in the function call, as defined in the LAN -Manager API documentation, after the "Server" and up to and including the -"uLevel" parameters. +Manager API documentation, after the "Server" and up to and including the +"uLevel" parameters.

      4. An unsigned 16 bit integer which gives the size in bytes of the buffer we will use to receive the returned array of data structures. Presumably this @@ -701,7 +701,7 @@ substructures apply, this string is of zero length.

      The code in client.c always calls call_api() with no data. It is unclear when a non-zero length data buffer would be sent. -

      Return value

      +

      Return value

      The returned parameters (pointed to by rparam), in their order of appearance are:

      1. An unsigned 16 bit integer which contains the API function's return code. @@ -718,9 +718,9 @@ It is also possible that this may sometimes be the number of bytes returned.

      When call_api() returns, rparam points to the returned parameters. The first if these is the result code. It will be zero if the API call -suceeded. This value by be read with "SVAL(rparam,0)". +suceeded. This value by be read with "SVAL(rparam,0)".

      -The second parameter may be read as "SVAL(rparam,2)". It is a 16 bit offset +The second parameter may be read as "SVAL(rparam,2)". It is a 16 bit offset which indicates what the base address of the returned data buffer was when it was built on the server. It should be used to correct pointer before use. @@ -729,10 +729,10 @@ The returned data buffer contains the array of returned data structures. Note that all pointers must be adjusted before use. The function fix_char_ptr() in client.c can be used for this purpose.

      -The third parameter (which may be read as "SVAL(rparam,4)") has something to +The third parameter (which may be read as "SVAL(rparam,4)") has something to do with indicating the amount of data returned or possibly the amount of data which can be returned if enough buffer space is allowed. -

    Code character table

    +

    Code character table

    Certain data structures are described by means of ASCIIz strings containing code characters. These are the code characters:

    1. @@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ r pointer to returned data buffer??? L length in bytes of returned data buffer???

    2. h number of bytes of information available??? -

    Chapter 6. The smb.conf file

    Chris Hertel

    November 1997

    Table of Contents

    Lexical Analysis
    Handling of Whitespace
    Handling of Line Continuation
    Line Continuation Quirks
    Syntax
    About params.c

    Lexical Analysis

    +

    Chapter 6. The smb.conf file

    Chris Hertel

    November 1997

    Table of Contents

    Lexical Analysis
    Handling of Whitespace
    Handling of Line Continuation
    Line Continuation Quirks
    Syntax
    About params.c

    Lexical Analysis

    Basically, the file is processed on a line by line basis. There are four types of lines that are recognized by the lexical analyzer (params.c): @@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ ignores them. The latter two line types are scanned for These are the only tokens passed to the parameter loader (loadparm.c). Parameter names and values are divided from one another by an equal sign: '='. -

    Handling of Whitespace

    +

    Handling of Whitespace

    Whitespace is defined as all characters recognized by the isspace() function (see ctype(3C)) except for the newline character ('\n') The newline is excluded because it identifies the end of the line. @@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ the exception of carriage return characters ('\r'), all of which are removed.

  • Leading and trailing whitespace is removed from names and values. -

    • Handling of Line Continuation

    +

    Handling of Line Continuation

    Long section header and parameter lines may be extended across multiple lines by use of the backslash character ('\\'). Line continuation is ignored for blank and comment lines. @@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ line, plus the four preceeding the word 'with' in the second line. Line continuation characters are ignored on blank lines and at the end of comments. They are *only* recognized within section and parameter lines. -

    Line Continuation Quirks

    Note the following example:

    +

    Line Continuation Quirks

    Note the following example:

     	param name = parameter value string \
     \
     with line continuation.
@@ -844,7 +844,7 @@ terminating character, and the rest of the line is ignored.  The lines

    are read as

     	[section name]
     param name = value
-

    Syntax

    The syntax of the smb.conf file is as follows:

    +

    Syntax

    The syntax of the smb.conf file is as follows:

       <file>            :==  { <section> } EOF
   <section>         :==  <section header> { <parameter line> }
   <section header>  :==  '[' NAME ']'
@@ -863,12 +863,12 @@ terminating character, and the rest of the line is ignored.  The lines
 	A parameter line is divided into a NAME and a VALUE.  The *first*
 	equal sign on the line separates the NAME from the VALUE.  The
 	VALUE is terminated by a newline character (NL = '\n').
-

    About params.c

    +

    About params.c

    The parsing of the config file is a bit unusual if you are used to lex, yacc, bison, etc. Both lexical analysis (scanning) and parsing are performed by params.c. Values are loaded via callbacks to loadparm.c. -

    Chapter 7. NetBIOS in a Unix World

    Andrew Tridgell

    April 1995

    Table of Contents

    Introduction
    Usernames
    File Ownership
    Passwords
    Locking
    Deny Modes
    Trapdoor UIDs
    Port numbers
    Protocol Complexity

    Introduction

    +

    Chapter 7. NetBIOS in a Unix World

    Andrew Tridgell

    April 1995

    Table of Contents

    Introduction
    Usernames
    File Ownership
    Passwords
    Locking
    Deny Modes
    Trapdoor UIDs
    Port numbers
    Protocol Complexity

    Introduction

    This is a short document that describes some of the issues that confront a SMB implementation on unix, and how Samba copes with them. They may help people who are looking at unix<->PC @@ -876,7 +876,7 @@ interoperability.

    It was written to help out a person who was writing a paper on unix to PC connectivity. -

    Usernames

    +

    Usernames

    The SMB protocol has only a loose username concept. Early SMB protocols (such as CORE and COREPLUS) have no username concept at all. Even in later protocols clients often attempt operations @@ -887,20 +887,20 @@ Unix security is based around username/password pairs. A unix box should not allow clients to do any substantive operation without some sort of validation.

    -The problem mostly manifests itself when the unix server is in "share -level" security mode. This is the default mode as the alternative -"user level" security mode usually forces a client to connect to the +The problem mostly manifests itself when the unix server is in "share +level" security mode. This is the default mode as the alternative +"user level" security mode usually forces a client to connect to the server as the same user for each connected share, which is inconvenient in many sites.

    -In "share level" security the client normally gives a username in the -"session setup" protocol, but does not supply an accompanying -password. The client then connects to resources using the "tree -connect" protocol, and supplies a password. The problem is that the +In "share level" security the client normally gives a username in the +"session setup" protocol, but does not supply an accompanying +password. The client then connects to resources using the "tree +connect" protocol, and supplies a password. The problem is that the user on the PC types the username and the password in different contexts, unaware that they need to go together to give access to the server. The username is normally the one the user typed in when they -"logged onto" the PC (this assumes Windows for Workgroups). The +"logged onto" the PC (this assumes Windows for Workgroups). The password is the one they chose when connecting to the disk or printer.

    The user often chooses a totally different username for their login as @@ -913,9 +913,9 @@ in the vast majority of cases. The methods include username maps, the service%user syntax, the saving of session setup usernames for later validation and the derivation of the username from the service name (either directly or via the user= option). -

    File Ownership

    -The commonly used SMB protocols have no way of saying "you can't do -that because you don't own the file". They have, in fact, no concept +

    File Ownership

    +The commonly used SMB protocols have no way of saying "you can't do +that because you don't own the file". They have, in fact, no concept of file ownership at all.

    This brings up all sorts of interesting problems. For example, when @@ -925,13 +925,13 @@ receive the wrong date. This is because the utime() call under unix only succeeds for the owner of the file, or root, even if the file is world writeable. For security reasons Samba does all file operations as the validated user, not root, so the utime() fails. This can stuff -up shared development diectories as programs like "make" will not get +up shared development diectories as programs like "make" will not get file time comparisons right.

    There are several possible solutions to this problem, including username mapping, and forcing a specific username for particular shares. -

    Passwords

    +

    Passwords

    Many SMB clients uppercase passwords before sending them. I have no idea why they do this. Interestingly WfWg uppercases the password only if the server is running a protocol greater than COREPLUS, so @@ -940,20 +940,20 @@ obviously it isn't just the data entry routines that are to blame. Unix passwords are case sensitive. So if users use mixed case passwords they are in trouble.

    -Samba can try to cope with this by either using the "password level" +Samba can try to cope with this by either using the "password level" option which causes Samba to try the offered password with up to the -specified number of case changes, or by using the "password server" +specified number of case changes, or by using the "password server" option which allows Samba to do its validation via another machine (typically a WinNT server).

    Samba supports the password encryption method used by SMB clients. Note that the use of password encryption in Microsoft -networking leads to password hashes that are "plain text equivalent". +networking leads to password hashes that are "plain text equivalent". This means that it is *VERY* important to ensure that the Samba smbpasswd file containing these password hashes is only readable by the root user. See the documentation ENCRYPTION.txt for more details. -

    Locking

    +

    Locking

    Since samba 2.2, samba supports other types of locking as well. This section is outdated.

    @@ -978,14 +978,14 @@ a unix environment because few unix programs use byte range locking. The stress of huge numbers of lock requests from dos/windows clients can kill the daemon on some systems.

    -The second major problem is the "opportunistic locking" requested by +The second major problem is the "opportunistic locking" requested by some clients. If a client requests opportunistic locking then it is asking the server to notify it if anyone else tries to do something on the same file, at which time the client will say if it is willing to give up its lock. Unix has no simple way of implementing opportunistic locking, and currently Samba has no support for it. -

    Deny Modes

    -When a SMB client opens a file it asks for a particular "deny mode" to +

    Deny Modes

    +When a SMB client opens a file it asks for a particular "deny mode" to be placed on the file. These modes (DENY_NONE, DENY_READ, DENY_WRITE, DENY_ALL, DENY_FCB and DENY_DOS) specify what actions should be allowed by anyone else who tries to use the file at the same time. If @@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ directory or a shared memory implementation. The lock file method is clumsy and consumes processing and file resources, the shared memory implementation is vastly prefered and is turned on by default for those systems that support it. -

    Trapdoor UIDs

    +

    Trapdoor UIDs

    A SMB session can run with several uids on the one socket. This happens when a user connects to two shares with different usernames. To cope with this the unix server needs to switch uids @@ -1006,11 +1006,11 @@ within the one process. On some unixes (such as SCO) this is not possible. This means that on those unixes the client is restricted to a single uid.

    -Note that you can also get the "trapdoor uid" message for other +Note that you can also get the "trapdoor uid" message for other reasons. Please see the FAQ for details. -

    Port numbers

    -There is a convention that clients on sockets use high "unprivilaged" -port numbers (>1000) and connect to servers on low "privilaged" port +

    Port numbers

    +There is a convention that clients on sockets use high "unprivilaged" +port numbers (>1000) and connect to servers on low "privilaged" port numbers. This is enforced in Unix as non-root users can't open a socket for listening on port numbers less than 1000.

    @@ -1031,13 +1031,13 @@ to any of these OSes unless they are running as root. The answer comes back, but it goes to port 137 which the unix user can't listen on. Interestingly WinNT3.1 got this right - it sends node status responses back to the source port in the request. -

    Protocol Complexity

    -There are many "protocol levels" in the SMB protocol. It seems that +

    Protocol Complexity

    +There are many "protocol levels" in the SMB protocol. It seems that each time new functionality was added to a Microsoft operating system, they added the equivalent functions in a new protocol level of the SMB -protocol to "externalise" the new capabilities. +protocol to "externalise" the new capabilities.

    -This means the protocol is very "rich", offering many ways of doing +This means the protocol is very "rich", offering many ways of doing each file operation. This means SMB servers need to be complex and large. It also means it is very difficult to make them bug free. It is not just Samba that suffers from this problem, other servers such as @@ -1045,19 +1045,19 @@ WinNT don't support every variation of every call and it has almost certainly been a headache for MS developers to support the myriad of SMB calls that are available.

    -There are about 65 "top level" operations in the SMB protocol (things +There are about 65 "top level" operations in the SMB protocol (things like SMBread and SMBwrite). Some of these include hundreds of sub-functions (SMBtrans has at least 120 sub-functions, like DosPrintQAdd and NetSessionEnum). All of them take several options that can change the way they work. Many take dozens of possible -"information levels" that change the structures that need to be -returned. Samba supports all but 2 of the "top level" functions. It +"information levels" that change the structures that need to be +returned. Samba supports all but 2 of the "top level" functions. It supports only 8 (so far) of the SMBtrans sub-functions. Even NT doesn't support them all.

    -Samba currently supports up to the "NT LM 0.12" protocol, which is the +Samba currently supports up to the "NT LM 0.12" protocol, which is the one preferred by Win95 and WinNT3.5. Luckily this protocol level has a -"capabilities" field which specifies which super-duper new-fangled +"capabilities" field which specifies which super-duper new-fangled options the server suports. This helps to make the implementation of this protocol level much easier.

    @@ -1102,13 +1102,13 @@ You'll notice that it produces a LOT of output. It is showing you the arguments to every system call that the program makes and the result. Very little happens in a program without a system call so you get lots of output. You'll also find that it produces a lot of -"preamble" stuff showing the loading of shared libraries etc. Ignore +"preamble" stuff showing the loading of shared libraries etc. Ignore this (unless its going wrong!)

    For example, the only line that really matters in the strace echo hello output is: 

    -write(1, "hello\n", 6)                  = 6
+write(1, "hello\n", 6)                  = 6

    all the rest is just setting up to run the program.

    Ok, now you're familiar with strace. To use it on Samba you need to strace the running smbd daemon. The way I tend ot use it is to first @@ -1118,10 +1118,10 @@ find which process ID that client is attached to, then as root I do stderr output from this command to a file for later perusal. For example, if I'm using a csh style shell:

    strace -f -p 3872 >& strace.out

    or with a sh style shell:

    strace -f -p 3872 > strace.out 2>&1

    -Note the "-f" option. This is only available on some systems, and +Note the "-f" option. This is only available on some systems, and allows you to trace not just the current process, but any children it forks. This is great for finding printing problems caused by the -"print command" being wrong. +"print command" being wrong.

    Once you are attached you then can do whatever it is on the client that is causing problems and you will capture all the system calls @@ -1132,20 +1132,20 @@ output for strings that I know will appear when the problem happens. For example, if I am having touble with permissions on a file I would search for that files name in the strace output and look at the surrounding lines. Another trick is to match up file descriptor -numbers and "follow" what happens to an open file until it is closed. +numbers and "follow" what happens to an open file until it is closed.

    Beyond this you will have to use your initiative. To give you an idea of what you are looking for here is a piece of strace output that shows that /dev/null is not world writeable, which causes printing to fail with Samba: 

    -[pid 28268] open("/dev/null", O_RDWR)   = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
-[pid 28268] open("/dev/null", O_WRONLY) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
+[pid 28268] open("/dev/null", O_RDWR)   = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
+[pid 28268] open("/dev/null", O_WRONLY) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)

    The process is trying to first open /dev/null read-write then read-only. Both fail. This means /dev/null has incorrect permissions. -

    Chapter 9. Finding useful information on windows

    Jelmer R. Vernooij

    The Samba Team

    Andrew Tridgell

    Samba Team

    Table of Contents

    Netlogon debugging output

    Netlogon debugging output

    1. stop netlogon service on PDC

    2. rename original netlogon.dll to netlogon.dll.original

    3. copy checked version of netlogon.dll to system32 directory

    4. set HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon\Parameters\DBFlag to 0x20000004

    5. start netlogon service on PDC

    Chapter 10. NT Domain RPC's

    Luke Leighton

    Duncan Stansfield

    01 November 97(version 0.0.24)

    Table of Contents

    Introduction
    Sources
    Credits
    Notes and Structures
    Notes
    Enumerations
    Structures
    MSRPC over Transact Named Pipe
    MSRPC Pipes
    Header
    Tail
    RPC Bind / Bind Ack
    NTLSA Transact Named Pipe
    LSA Open Policy
    LSA Query Info Policy
    LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains
    LSA Open Secret
    LSA Close
    LSA Lookup SIDS
    LSA Lookup Names
    NETLOGON rpc Transact Named Pipe
    LSA Request Challenge
    LSA Authenticate 2
    LSA Server Password Set
    LSA SAM Logon
    LSA SAM Logoff
    \\MAILSLOT\NET\NTLOGON
    Query for PDC
    SAM Logon
    SRVSVC Transact Named Pipe
    Net Share Enum
    Net Server Get Info
    Cryptographic side of NT Domain Authentication
    Definitions
    Protocol
    Comments
    SIDs and RIDs
    Well-known SIDs
    Well-known RIDS

    Introduction

    +

    Chapter 9. Finding useful information on windows

    Jelmer R. Vernooij

    The Samba Team

    Andrew Tridgell

    Samba Team

    Table of Contents

    Netlogon debugging output

    Netlogon debugging output

    1. stop netlogon service on PDC

    2. rename original netlogon.dll to netlogon.dll.original

    3. copy checked version of netlogon.dll to system32 directory

    4. set HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon\Parameters\DBFlag to 0x20000004

    5. start netlogon service on PDC

    Chapter 10. NT Domain RPC's

    Luke Leighton

    Duncan Stansfield

    01 November 97(version 0.0.24)

    Table of Contents

    Introduction
    Sources
    Credits
    Notes and Structures
    Notes
    Enumerations
    Structures
    MSRPC over Transact Named Pipe
    MSRPC Pipes
    Header
    Tail
    RPC Bind / Bind Ack
    NTLSA Transact Named Pipe
    LSA Open Policy
    LSA Query Info Policy
    LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains
    LSA Open Secret
    LSA Close
    LSA Lookup SIDS
    LSA Lookup Names
    NETLOGON rpc Transact Named Pipe
    LSA Request Challenge
    LSA Authenticate 2
    LSA Server Password Set
    LSA SAM Logon
    LSA SAM Logoff
    \\MAILSLOT\NET\NTLOGON
    Query for PDC
    SAM Logon
    SRVSVC Transact Named Pipe
    Net Share Enum
    Net Server Get Info
    Cryptographic side of NT Domain Authentication
    Definitions
    Protocol
    Comments
    SIDs and RIDs
    Well-known SIDs
    Well-known RIDS

    Introduction

    This document contains information to provide an NT workstation with login services, without the need for an NT server. It is the sgml version of http://mailhost.cb1.com/~lkcl/cifsntdomain.txt, controlled by Luke.

    @@ -1178,7 +1178,7 @@ NT workstation, and enabling full debugging in NETLOGON. This is achieved by setting the following REG_SZ registry key to 0x1ffffff:

    HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon\Parameters

    Incorrect direct editing of the registry can cause your machine to fail. Then again, so can incorrect implementation of this -protocol. See "Liability:" above.

    +protocol. See "Liability:" above.

    Bear in mind that each packet over-the-wire will have its origin in an API call. Therefore, there are likely to be structures, enumerations and defines that are usefully documented elsewhere. @@ -1191,12 +1191,12 @@ Failure to return this error code will make the workstation report that it is already a member of the domain.

  • the cryptographic side of the NetrServerPasswordSet command, which would allow the workstation to change its password. This password is used to generate the long-term session key. [It is possible to reject this -command, and keep the default workstation password].

    • Sources

    cket Traces from Netmonitor (Service Pack 1 and above)
    ul Ashton and Luke Leighton's other "NT Domain" doc.
    FS documentation - cifs6.txt
    FS documentation - cifsrap2.txt

    Credits

    Paul Ashton: loads of work with Net Monitor; understanding the NT authentication system; reference implementation of the NT domain support on which this document is originally based.
    Duncan Stansfield: low-level analysis of MSRPC Pipes.
    Linus Nordberg: producing c-code from Paul's crypto spec.
    Windows Sourcer development team

    Notes and Structures

    Notes

    1. -In the SMB Transact pipes, some "Structures", described here, appear to be +command, and keep the default workstation password].

    Sources

    cket Traces from Netmonitor (Service Pack 1 and above)
    ul Ashton and Luke Leighton's other "NT Domain" doc.
    FS documentation - cifs6.txt
    FS documentation - cifsrap2.txt

    Credits

    Paul Ashton: loads of work with Net Monitor; understanding the NT authentication system; reference implementation of the NT domain support on which this document is originally based.
    Duncan Stansfield: low-level analysis of MSRPC Pipes.
    Linus Nordberg: producing c-code from Paul's crypto spec.
    Windows Sourcer development team

    Notes and Structures

    Notes

    1. +In the SMB Transact pipes, some "Structures", described here, appear to be 4-byte aligned with the SMB header, at their start. Exactly which -"Structures" need aligning is not precisely known or documented. +"Structures" need aligning is not precisely known or documented.

    2. -In the UDP NTLOGON Mailslots, some "Structures", described here, appear to be +In the UDP NTLOGON Mailslots, some "Structures", described here, appear to be 2-byte aligned with the start of the mailslot, at their start.

    3. Domain SID is of the format S-revision-version-auth1-auth2...authN. @@ -1219,15 +1219,15 @@ into or taken out of the SMB data stream. if the count is non-zero, then the pointer is also non-zero. immediately following the pointer is the count again, followed by an array of container sub-structures. the count appears a third time after the last sub-structure. -

    Enumerations

    MSRPC Header type

    command number in the msrpc packet header

    MSRPC_Request:

    0x00

    MSRPC_Response:

    0x02

    MSRPC_Bind:

    0x0B

    MSRPC_BindAck:

    0x0C

    MSRPC Packet info

    The meaning of these flags is undocumented

    FirstFrag:

    0x01

    LastFrag:

    0x02

    NotaFrag:

    0x04

    RecRespond:

    0x08

    NoMultiplex:

    0x10

    NotForIdemp:

    0x20

    NotforBcast:

    0x40

    NoUuid:

    0x80

    Structures

    VOID *

    sizeof VOID* is 32 bits.

    char

    sizeof char is 8 bits.

    UTIME

    UTIME is 32 bits, indicating time in seconds since 01jan1970. documented in cifs6.txt (section 3.5 page, page 30).

    NTTIME

    NTTIME is 64 bits. documented in cifs6.txt (section 3.5 page, page 30).

    DOM_SID (domain SID structure)

    UINT32

    num of sub-authorities in domain SID

    UINT8

    SID revision number

    UINT8

    num of sub-authorities in domain SID

    UINT8[6]

    6 bytes for domain SID - Identifier Authority.

    UINT16[n_subauths]

    domain SID sub-authorities

    Note: the domain SID is documented elsewhere. -

    STR (string)

    STR (string) is a char[] : a null-terminated string of ascii characters.

    UNIHDR (unicode string header)

    UINT16

    length of unicode string

    UINT16

    max length of unicode string

    UINT32

    4 - undocumented.

    UNIHDR2 (unicode string header plus buffer pointer)

    UNIHDR

    unicode string header

    VOID*

    undocumented buffer pointer

    UNISTR (unicode string)

    UINT16[]

    null-terminated string of unicode characters.

    NAME (length-indicated unicode string)

    UINT32

    length of unicode string

    UINT16[]

    null-terminated string of unicode characters.

    UNISTR2 (aligned unicode string)

    UINT8[]

    padding to get unicode string 4-byte aligned with the start of the SMB header.

    UINT32

    max length of unicode string

    UINT32

    0 - undocumented

    UINT32

    length of unicode string

    UINT16[]

    string of uncode characters

    OBJ_ATTR (object attributes)

    UINT32

    0x18 - length (in bytes) including the length field.

    VOID*

    0 - root directory (pointer)

    VOID*

    0 - object name (pointer)

    UINT32

    0 - attributes (undocumented)

    VOID*

    0 - security descriptior (pointer)

    UINT32

    0 - security quality of service

    POL_HND (LSA policy handle)

    char[20]

    policy handle

    DOM_SID2 (domain SID structure, SIDS stored in unicode)

    UINT32

    5 - SID type

    UINT32

    0 - undocumented

    UNIHDR2

    domain SID unicode string header

    UNISTR

    domain SID unicode string

    Note: there is a conflict between the unicode string header and the unicode string itself as to which to use to indicate string length. this will need to be resolved.

    Note: the SID type indicates, for example, an alias; a well-known group etc. this is documented somewhere.

    DOM_RID (domain RID structure)

    UINT32

    5 - well-known SID. 1 - user SID (see ShowACLs)

    UINT32

    5 - undocumented

    UINT32

    domain RID

    UINT32

    0 - domain index out of above reference domains

    LOG_INFO (server, account, client structure)

    Note: logon server name starts with two '\' characters and is upper case.

    Note: account name is the logon client name from the LSA Request Challenge, with a $ on the end of it, in upper case.

    VOID*

    undocumented buffer pointer

    UNISTR2

    logon server unicode string

    UNISTR2

    account name unicode string

    UINT16

    sec_chan - security channel type

    UNISTR2

    logon client machine unicode string

    CLNT_SRV (server, client names structure)

    Note: logon server name starts with two '\' characters and is upper case.

    VOID*

    undocumented buffer pointer

    UNISTR2

    logon server unicode string

    VOID*

    undocumented buffer pointer

    UNISTR2

    logon client machine unicode string

    CREDS (credentials + time stamp)

    char[8]

    credentials

    UTIME

    time stamp

    CLNT_INFO2 (server, client structure, client credentials)

    Note: whenever this structure appears in a request, you must take a copy of the client-calculated credentials received, because they will beused in subsequent credential checks. the presumed intention is to - maintain an authenticated request/response trail.

    CLNT_SRV

    client and server names

    UINT8[]

    ???? padding, for 4-byte alignment with SMB header.

    VOID*

    pointer to client credentials.

    CREDS

    client-calculated credentials + client time

    CLNT_INFO (server, account, client structure, client credentials)

    Note: whenever this structure appears in a request, you must take a copy of the client-calculated credentials received, because they will be used in subsequent credential checks. the presumed intention is to maintain an authenticated request/response trail.

    LOG_INFO

    logon account info

    CREDS

    client-calculated credentials + client time

    ID_INFO_1 (id info structure, auth level 1)

    VOID*

    ptr_id_info_1

    UNIHDR

    domain name unicode header

    UINT32

    param control

    UINT64

    logon ID

    UNIHDR

    user name unicode header

    UNIHDR

    workgroup name unicode header

    char[16]

    arc4 LM OWF Password

    char[16]

    arc4 NT OWF Password

    UNISTR2

    domain name unicode string

    UNISTR2

    user name unicode string

    UNISTR2

    workstation name unicode string

    SAM_INFO (sam logon/logoff id info structure)

    Note: presumably, the return credentials is supposedly for the server to verify that the credential chain hasn't been compromised.

    CLNT_INFO2

    client identification/authentication info

    VOID*

    pointer to return credentials.

    CRED

    return credentials - ignored.

    UINT16

    logon level

    UINT16

    switch value

    +

    Enumerations

    MSRPC Header type

    command number in the msrpc packet header

    MSRPC_Request:

    0x00

    MSRPC_Response:

    0x02

    MSRPC_Bind:

    0x0B

    MSRPC_BindAck:

    0x0C

    MSRPC Packet info

    The meaning of these flags is undocumented

    FirstFrag:

    0x01

    LastFrag:

    0x02

    NotaFrag:

    0x04

    RecRespond:

    0x08

    NoMultiplex:

    0x10

    NotForIdemp:

    0x20

    NotforBcast:

    0x40

    NoUuid:

    0x80

    Structures

    VOID *

    sizeof VOID* is 32 bits.

    char

    sizeof char is 8 bits.

    UTIME

    UTIME is 32 bits, indicating time in seconds since 01jan1970. documented in cifs6.txt (section 3.5 page, page 30).

    NTTIME

    NTTIME is 64 bits. documented in cifs6.txt (section 3.5 page, page 30).

    DOM_SID (domain SID structure)

    UINT32

    num of sub-authorities in domain SID

    UINT8

    SID revision number

    UINT8

    num of sub-authorities in domain SID

    UINT8[6]

    6 bytes for domain SID - Identifier Authority.

    UINT16[n_subauths]

    domain SID sub-authorities

    Note: the domain SID is documented elsewhere. +

    STR (string)

    STR (string) is a char[] : a null-terminated string of ascii characters.

    UNIHDR (unicode string header)

    UINT16

    length of unicode string

    UINT16

    max length of unicode string

    UINT32

    4 - undocumented.

    UNIHDR2 (unicode string header plus buffer pointer)

    UNIHDR

    unicode string header

    VOID*

    undocumented buffer pointer

    UNISTR (unicode string)

    UINT16[]

    null-terminated string of unicode characters.

    NAME (length-indicated unicode string)

    UINT32

    length of unicode string

    UINT16[]

    null-terminated string of unicode characters.

    UNISTR2 (aligned unicode string)

    UINT8[]

    padding to get unicode string 4-byte aligned with the start of the SMB header.

    UINT32

    max length of unicode string

    UINT32

    0 - undocumented

    UINT32

    length of unicode string

    UINT16[]

    string of uncode characters

    OBJ_ATTR (object attributes)

    UINT32

    0x18 - length (in bytes) including the length field.

    VOID*

    0 - root directory (pointer)

    VOID*

    0 - object name (pointer)

    UINT32

    0 - attributes (undocumented)

    VOID*

    0 - security descriptior (pointer)

    UINT32

    0 - security quality of service

    POL_HND (LSA policy handle)

    char[20]

    policy handle

    DOM_SID2 (domain SID structure, SIDS stored in unicode)

    UINT32

    5 - SID type

    UINT32

    0 - undocumented

    UNIHDR2

    domain SID unicode string header

    UNISTR

    domain SID unicode string

    Note: there is a conflict between the unicode string header and the unicode string itself as to which to use to indicate string length. this will need to be resolved.

    Note: the SID type indicates, for example, an alias; a well-known group etc. this is documented somewhere.

    DOM_RID (domain RID structure)

    UINT32

    5 - well-known SID. 1 - user SID (see ShowACLs)

    UINT32

    5 - undocumented

    UINT32

    domain RID

    UINT32

    0 - domain index out of above reference domains

    LOG_INFO (server, account, client structure)

    Note: logon server name starts with two '\' characters and is upper case.

    Note: account name is the logon client name from the LSA Request Challenge, with a $ on the end of it, in upper case.

    VOID*

    undocumented buffer pointer

    UNISTR2

    logon server unicode string

    UNISTR2

    account name unicode string

    UINT16

    sec_chan - security channel type

    UNISTR2

    logon client machine unicode string

    CLNT_SRV (server, client names structure)

    Note: logon server name starts with two '\' characters and is upper case.

    VOID*

    undocumented buffer pointer

    UNISTR2

    logon server unicode string

    VOID*

    undocumented buffer pointer

    UNISTR2

    logon client machine unicode string

    CREDS (credentials + time stamp)

    char[8]

    credentials

    UTIME

    time stamp

    CLNT_INFO2 (server, client structure, client credentials)

    Note: whenever this structure appears in a request, you must take a copy of the client-calculated credentials received, because they will beused in subsequent credential checks. the presumed intention is to + maintain an authenticated request/response trail.

    CLNT_SRV

    client and server names

    UINT8[]

    ???? padding, for 4-byte alignment with SMB header.

    VOID*

    pointer to client credentials.

    CREDS

    client-calculated credentials + client time

    CLNT_INFO (server, account, client structure, client credentials)

    Note: whenever this structure appears in a request, you must take a copy of the client-calculated credentials received, because they will be used in subsequent credential checks. the presumed intention is to maintain an authenticated request/response trail.

    LOG_INFO

    logon account info

    CREDS

    client-calculated credentials + client time

    ID_INFO_1 (id info structure, auth level 1)

    VOID*

    ptr_id_info_1

    UNIHDR

    domain name unicode header

    UINT32

    param control

    UINT64

    logon ID

    UNIHDR

    user name unicode header

    UNIHDR

    workgroup name unicode header

    char[16]

    arc4 LM OWF Password

    char[16]

    arc4 NT OWF Password

    UNISTR2

    domain name unicode string

    UNISTR2

    user name unicode string

    UNISTR2

    workstation name unicode string

    SAM_INFO (sam logon/logoff id info structure)

    Note: presumably, the return credentials is supposedly for the server to verify that the credential chain hasn't been compromised.

    CLNT_INFO2

    client identification/authentication info

    VOID*

    pointer to return credentials.

    CRED

    return credentials - ignored.

    UINT16

    logon level

    UINT16

    switch value

             switch (switch_value)
         case 1:
         {
             ID_INFO_1     id_info_1;
         }
-

    GID (group id info)

    UINT32

    group id

    UINT32

    user attributes (only used by NT 3.1 and 3.51)

    DOM_REF (domain reference info)

    VOID*

    undocumented buffer pointer.

    UINT32

    num referenced domains?

    VOID*

    undocumented domain name buffer pointer.

    UINT32

    32 - max number of entries

    UINT32

    4 - num referenced domains?

    UNIHDR2

    domain name unicode string header

    UNIHDR2[num_ref_doms-1]

    referenced domain unicode string headers

    UNISTR

    domain name unicode string

    DOM_SID[num_ref_doms]

    referenced domain SIDs

    DOM_INFO (domain info, levels 3 and 5 are the same))

    UINT8[]

    ??? padding to get 4-byte alignment with start of SMB header

    UINT16

    domain name string length * 2

    UINT16

    domain name string length * 2

    VOID*

    undocumented domain name string buffer pointer

    VOID*

    undocumented domain SID string buffer pointer

    UNISTR2

    domain name (unicode string)

    DOM_SID

    domain SID

    USER_INFO (user logon info)

    Note: it would be nice to know what the 16 byte user session key is for.

    NTTIME

    logon time

    NTTIME

    logoff time

    NTTIME

    kickoff time

    NTTIME

    password last set time

    NTTIME

    password can change time

    NTTIME

    password must change time

    UNIHDR

    username unicode string header

    UNIHDR

    user's full name unicode string header

    UNIHDR

    logon script unicode string header

    UNIHDR

    profile path unicode string header

    UNIHDR

    home directory unicode string header

    UNIHDR

    home directory drive unicode string header

    UINT16

    logon count

    UINT16

    bad password count

    UINT32

    User ID

    UINT32

    Group ID

    UINT32

    num groups

    VOID*

    undocumented buffer pointer to groups.

    UINT32

    user flags

    char[16]

    user session key

    UNIHDR

    logon server unicode string header

    UNIHDR

    logon domain unicode string header

    VOID*

    undocumented logon domain id pointer

    char[40]

    40 undocumented padding bytes. future expansion?

    UINT32

    0 - num_other_sids?

    VOID*

    NULL - undocumented pointer to other domain SIDs.

    UNISTR2

    username unicode string

    UNISTR2

    user's full name unicode string

    UNISTR2

    logon script unicode string

    UNISTR2

    profile path unicode string

    UNISTR2

    home directory unicode string

    UNISTR2

    home directory drive unicode string

    UINT32

    num groups

    GID[num_groups]

    group info

    UNISTR2

    logon server unicode string

    UNISTR2

    logon domain unicode string

    DOM_SID

    domain SID

    DOM_SID[num_sids]

    other domain SIDs?

    SH_INFO_1_PTR (pointers to level 1 share info strings)

    Note: see cifsrap2.txt section5, page 10.

    0 for shi1_type indicates a Disk.
    1 for shi1_type indicates a Print Queue.
    2 for shi1_type indicates a Device.
    3 for shi1_type indicates an IPC pipe.
    0x8000 0000 (top bit set in shi1_type) indicates a hidden share.
    VOID*

    shi1_netname - pointer to net name

    UINT32

    shi1_type - type of share. 0 - undocumented.

    VOID*

    shi1_remark - pointer to comment.

    SH_INFO_1_STR (level 1 share info strings)

    UNISTR2

    shi1_netname - unicode string of net name

    UNISTR2

    shi1_remark - unicode string of comment.

    SHARE_INFO_1_CTR

    share container with 0 entries:

    UINT32

    0 - EntriesRead

    UINT32

    0 - Buffer

    share container with > 0 entries:

    UINT32

    EntriesRead

    UINT32

    non-zero - Buffer

    UINT32

    EntriesRead

    SH_INFO_1_PTR[EntriesRead]

    share entry pointers

    SH_INFO_1_STR[EntriesRead]

    share entry strings

    UINT8[]

    padding to get unicode string 4-byte aligned with start of the SMB header.

    UINT32

    EntriesRead

    UINT32

    0 - padding

    SERVER_INFO_101

    Note: see cifs6.txt section 6.4 - the fields described therein will be of assistance here. for example, the type listed below is the same as fServerType, which is described in 6.4.1.

    SV_TYPE_WORKSTATION

    0x00000001 All workstations

    SV_TYPE_SERVER

    0x00000002 All servers

    SV_TYPE_SQLSERVER

    0x00000004 Any server running with SQL server

    SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_CTRL

    0x00000008 Primary domain controller

    SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_BAKCTRL

    0x00000010 Backup domain controller

    SV_TYPE_TIME_SOURCE

    0x00000020 Server running the timesource service

    SV_TYPE_AFP

    0x00000040 Apple File Protocol servers

    SV_TYPE_NOVELL

    0x00000080 Novell servers

    SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_MEMBER

    0x00000100 Domain Member

    SV_TYPE_PRINTQ_SERVER

    0x00000200 Server sharing print queue

    SV_TYPE_DIALIN_SERVER

    0x00000400 Server running dialin service.

    SV_TYPE_XENIX_SERVER

    0x00000800 Xenix server

    SV_TYPE_NT

    0x00001000 NT server

    SV_TYPE_WFW

    0x00002000 Server running Windows for

    SV_TYPE_SERVER_NT

    0x00008000 Windows NT non DC server

    SV_TYPE_POTENTIAL_BROWSER

    0x00010000 Server that can run the browser service

    SV_TYPE_BACKUP_BROWSER

    0x00020000 Backup browser server

    SV_TYPE_MASTER_BROWSER

    0x00040000 Master browser server

    SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_MASTER

    0x00080000 Domain Master Browser server

    SV_TYPE_LOCAL_LIST_ONLY

    0x40000000 Enumerate only entries marked "local"

    SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_ENUM

    0x80000000 Enumerate Domains. The pszServer and pszDomain parameters must be NULL.

    UINT32

    500 - platform_id

    VOID*

    pointer to name

    UINT32

    5 - major version

    UINT32

    4 - minor version

    UINT32

    type (SV_TYPE_... bit field)

    VOID*

    pointer to comment

    UNISTR2

    sv101_name - unicode string of server name

    UNISTR2

    sv_101_comment - unicode string of server comment.

    UINT8[]

    padding to get unicode string 4-byte aligned with start of the SMB header.

    MSRPC over Transact Named Pipe

    For details on the SMB Transact Named Pipe, see cifs6.txt

    MSRPC Pipes

    +

    GID (group id info)

    UINT32

    group id

    UINT32

    user attributes (only used by NT 3.1 and 3.51)

    DOM_REF (domain reference info)

    VOID*

    undocumented buffer pointer.

    UINT32

    num referenced domains?

    VOID*

    undocumented domain name buffer pointer.

    UINT32

    32 - max number of entries

    UINT32

    4 - num referenced domains?

    UNIHDR2

    domain name unicode string header

    UNIHDR2[num_ref_doms-1]

    referenced domain unicode string headers

    UNISTR

    domain name unicode string

    DOM_SID[num_ref_doms]

    referenced domain SIDs

    DOM_INFO (domain info, levels 3 and 5 are the same))

    UINT8[]

    ??? padding to get 4-byte alignment with start of SMB header

    UINT16

    domain name string length * 2

    UINT16

    domain name string length * 2

    VOID*

    undocumented domain name string buffer pointer

    VOID*

    undocumented domain SID string buffer pointer

    UNISTR2

    domain name (unicode string)

    DOM_SID

    domain SID

    USER_INFO (user logon info)

    Note: it would be nice to know what the 16 byte user session key is for.

    NTTIME

    logon time

    NTTIME

    logoff time

    NTTIME

    kickoff time

    NTTIME

    password last set time

    NTTIME

    password can change time

    NTTIME

    password must change time

    UNIHDR

    username unicode string header

    UNIHDR

    user's full name unicode string header

    UNIHDR

    logon script unicode string header

    UNIHDR

    profile path unicode string header

    UNIHDR

    home directory unicode string header

    UNIHDR

    home directory drive unicode string header

    UINT16

    logon count

    UINT16

    bad password count

    UINT32

    User ID

    UINT32

    Group ID

    UINT32

    num groups

    VOID*

    undocumented buffer pointer to groups.

    UINT32

    user flags

    char[16]

    user session key

    UNIHDR

    logon server unicode string header

    UNIHDR

    logon domain unicode string header

    VOID*

    undocumented logon domain id pointer

    char[40]

    40 undocumented padding bytes. future expansion?

    UINT32

    0 - num_other_sids?

    VOID*

    NULL - undocumented pointer to other domain SIDs.

    UNISTR2

    username unicode string

    UNISTR2

    user's full name unicode string

    UNISTR2

    logon script unicode string

    UNISTR2

    profile path unicode string

    UNISTR2

    home directory unicode string

    UNISTR2

    home directory drive unicode string

    UINT32

    num groups

    GID[num_groups]

    group info

    UNISTR2

    logon server unicode string

    UNISTR2

    logon domain unicode string

    DOM_SID

    domain SID

    DOM_SID[num_sids]

    other domain SIDs?

    SH_INFO_1_PTR (pointers to level 1 share info strings)

    Note: see cifsrap2.txt section5, page 10.

    0 for shi1_type indicates a Disk.
    1 for shi1_type indicates a Print Queue.
    2 for shi1_type indicates a Device.
    3 for shi1_type indicates an IPC pipe.
    0x8000 0000 (top bit set in shi1_type) indicates a hidden share.
    VOID*

    shi1_netname - pointer to net name

    UINT32

    shi1_type - type of share. 0 - undocumented.

    VOID*

    shi1_remark - pointer to comment.

    SH_INFO_1_STR (level 1 share info strings)

    UNISTR2

    shi1_netname - unicode string of net name

    UNISTR2

    shi1_remark - unicode string of comment.

    SHARE_INFO_1_CTR

    share container with 0 entries:

    UINT32

    0 - EntriesRead

    UINT32

    0 - Buffer

    share container with > 0 entries:

    UINT32

    EntriesRead

    UINT32

    non-zero - Buffer

    UINT32

    EntriesRead

    SH_INFO_1_PTR[EntriesRead]

    share entry pointers

    SH_INFO_1_STR[EntriesRead]

    share entry strings

    UINT8[]

    padding to get unicode string 4-byte aligned with start of the SMB header.

    UINT32

    EntriesRead

    UINT32

    0 - padding

    SERVER_INFO_101

    Note: see cifs6.txt section 6.4 - the fields described therein will be of assistance here. for example, the type listed below is the same as fServerType, which is described in 6.4.1.

    SV_TYPE_WORKSTATION

    0x00000001 All workstations

    SV_TYPE_SERVER

    0x00000002 All servers

    SV_TYPE_SQLSERVER

    0x00000004 Any server running with SQL server

    SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_CTRL

    0x00000008 Primary domain controller

    SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_BAKCTRL

    0x00000010 Backup domain controller

    SV_TYPE_TIME_SOURCE

    0x00000020 Server running the timesource service

    SV_TYPE_AFP

    0x00000040 Apple File Protocol servers

    SV_TYPE_NOVELL

    0x00000080 Novell servers

    SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_MEMBER

    0x00000100 Domain Member

    SV_TYPE_PRINTQ_SERVER

    0x00000200 Server sharing print queue

    SV_TYPE_DIALIN_SERVER

    0x00000400 Server running dialin service.

    SV_TYPE_XENIX_SERVER

    0x00000800 Xenix server

    SV_TYPE_NT

    0x00001000 NT server

    SV_TYPE_WFW

    0x00002000 Server running Windows for

    SV_TYPE_SERVER_NT

    0x00008000 Windows NT non DC server

    SV_TYPE_POTENTIAL_BROWSER

    0x00010000 Server that can run the browser service

    SV_TYPE_BACKUP_BROWSER

    0x00020000 Backup browser server

    SV_TYPE_MASTER_BROWSER

    0x00040000 Master browser server

    SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_MASTER

    0x00080000 Domain Master Browser server

    SV_TYPE_LOCAL_LIST_ONLY

    0x40000000 Enumerate only entries marked "local"

    SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_ENUM

    0x80000000 Enumerate Domains. The pszServer and pszDomain parameters must be NULL.

    UINT32

    500 - platform_id

    VOID*

    pointer to name

    UINT32

    5 - major version

    UINT32

    4 - minor version

    UINT32

    type (SV_TYPE_... bit field)

    VOID*

    pointer to comment

    UNISTR2

    sv101_name - unicode string of server name

    UNISTR2

    sv_101_comment - unicode string of server comment.

    UINT8[]

    padding to get unicode string 4-byte aligned with start of the SMB header.

    MSRPC over Transact Named Pipe

    For details on the SMB Transact Named Pipe, see cifs6.txt

    MSRPC Pipes

    The MSRPC is conducted over an SMB Transact Pipe with a name of \PIPE\. You must first obtain a 16 bit file handle, by sending a SMBopenX with the pipe name \PIPE\srvsvc for @@ -1266,21 +1266,21 @@ To be resolved: lkcl/01nov97 there appear to be two additional bytes after the null-terminated \PIPE\ name for the RPC pipe. Values seen so far are listed below:

             initial SMBopenX request:         RPC API command 0x26 params:
-        "\\PIPE\\lsarpc"                  0x65 0x63; 0x72 0x70; 0x44 0x65;
-        "\\PIPE\\srvsvc"                  0x73 0x76; 0x4E 0x00; 0x5C 0x43;
-

    Header

    [section to be rewritten, following receipt of work by Duncan Stansfield]

    Interesting note: if you set packed data representation to 0x0100 0000 -then all 4-byte and 2-byte word ordering is turned around!

    The start of each of the NTLSA and NETLOGON named pipes begins with:

    offset: 00

    Variable type: UINT8

    Variable data: 5 - RPC major version

    offset: 01

    Variable type: UINT8

    Variable data: 0 - RPC minor version

    offset: 02

    Variable type: UINT8

    Variable data: 2 - RPC response packet

    offset: 03

    Variable type: UINT8

    Variable data: 3 - (FirstFrag bit-wise or with LastFrag)

    offset: 04

    Variable type: UINT32

    Variable data: 0x1000 0000 - packed data representation

    offset: 08

    Variable type: UINT16

    Variable data: fragment length - data size (bytes) inc header and tail.

    offset: 0A

    Variable type: UINT16

    Variable data: 0 - authentication length

    offset: 0C

    Variable type: UINT32

    Variable data: call identifier. matches 12th UINT32 of incoming RPC data.

    offset: 10

    Variable type: UINT32

    Variable data: allocation hint - data size (bytes) minus header and tail.

    offset: 14

    Variable type: UINT16

    Variable data: 0 - presentation context identifier

    offset: 16

    Variable type: UINT8

    Variable data: 0 - cancel count

    offset: 17

    Variable type: UINT8

    Variable data: in replies: 0 - reserved; in requests: opnum - see #defines.

    offset: 18

    Variable type: ......

    Variable data: start of data (goes on for allocation_hint bytes)

    RPC_Packet for request, response, bind and bind acknowledgement

    UINT8 versionmaj

    reply same as request (0x05)

    UINT8 versionmin

    reply same as request (0x00)

    UINT8 type

    one of the MSRPC_Type enums

    UINT8 flags

    reply same as request (0x00 for Bind, 0x03 for Request)

    UINT32 representation

    reply same as request (0x00000010)

    UINT16 fraglength

    the length of the data section of the SMB trans packet

    UINT16 authlength

    UINT32 callid

    call identifier. (e.g. 0x00149594)

    * stub USE TvPacket

    the remainder of the packet depending on the "type"

    Interface identification

    the interfaces are numbered. as yet I haven't seen more than one interface used on the same pipe name srvsvc

    +        "\\PIPE\\lsarpc"                  0x65 0x63; 0x72 0x70; 0x44 0x65;
+        "\\PIPE\\srvsvc"                  0x73 0x76; 0x4E 0x00; 0x5C 0x43;
+

    Header

    [section to be rewritten, following receipt of work by Duncan Stansfield]

    Interesting note: if you set packed data representation to 0x0100 0000 +then all 4-byte and 2-byte word ordering is turned around!

    The start of each of the NTLSA and NETLOGON named pipes begins with:

    offset: 00

    Variable type: UINT8

    Variable data: 5 - RPC major version

    offset: 01

    Variable type: UINT8

    Variable data: 0 - RPC minor version

    offset: 02

    Variable type: UINT8

    Variable data: 2 - RPC response packet

    offset: 03

    Variable type: UINT8

    Variable data: 3 - (FirstFrag bit-wise or with LastFrag)

    offset: 04

    Variable type: UINT32

    Variable data: 0x1000 0000 - packed data representation

    offset: 08

    Variable type: UINT16

    Variable data: fragment length - data size (bytes) inc header and tail.

    offset: 0A

    Variable type: UINT16

    Variable data: 0 - authentication length

    offset: 0C

    Variable type: UINT32

    Variable data: call identifier. matches 12th UINT32 of incoming RPC data.

    offset: 10

    Variable type: UINT32

    Variable data: allocation hint - data size (bytes) minus header and tail.

    offset: 14

    Variable type: UINT16

    Variable data: 0 - presentation context identifier

    offset: 16

    Variable type: UINT8

    Variable data: 0 - cancel count

    offset: 17

    Variable type: UINT8

    Variable data: in replies: 0 - reserved; in requests: opnum - see #defines.

    offset: 18

    Variable type: ......

    Variable data: start of data (goes on for allocation_hint bytes)

    RPC_Packet for request, response, bind and bind acknowledgement

    UINT8 versionmaj

    reply same as request (0x05)

    UINT8 versionmin

    reply same as request (0x00)

    UINT8 type

    one of the MSRPC_Type enums

    UINT8 flags

    reply same as request (0x00 for Bind, 0x03 for Request)

    UINT32 representation

    reply same as request (0x00000010)

    UINT16 fraglength

    the length of the data section of the SMB trans packet

    UINT16 authlength

    UINT32 callid

    call identifier. (e.g. 0x00149594)

    * stub USE TvPacket

    the remainder of the packet depending on the "type"

    Interface identification

    the interfaces are numbered. as yet I haven't seen more than one interface used on the same pipe name srvsvc

     abstract (0x4B324FC8, 0x01D31670, 0x475A7812, 0x88E16EBF, 0x00000003)
 transfer (0x8A885D04, 0x11C91CEB, 0x0008E89F, 0x6048102B, 0x00000002)
-

    RPC_Iface RW

    UINT8 byte[16]

    16 bytes of number

    UINT32 version

    the interface number

    RPC_ReqBind RW

    the remainder of the packet after the header if "type" was Bind in the response header, "type" should be BindAck

    UINT16 maxtsize

    maximum transmission fragment size (0x1630)

    UINT16 maxrsize

    max receive fragment size (0x1630)

    UINT32 assocgid

    associated group id (0x0)

    UINT32 numelements

    the number of elements (0x1)

    UINT16 contextid

    presentation context identifier (0x0)

    UINT8 numsyntaxes

    the number of syntaxes (has always been 1?)(0x1)

    UINT8[]

    4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header

    * abstractint USE RPC_Iface

    num and vers. of interface client is using

    * transferint USE RPC_Iface

    num and vers. of interface to use for replies

    RPC_Address RW

    UINT16 length

    length of the string including null terminator

    * port USE string

    the string above in single byte, null terminated form

    RPC_ResBind RW

    the response to place after the header in the reply packet

    UINT16 maxtsize

    same as request

    UINT16 maxrsize

    same as request

    UINT32 assocgid

    zero

    * secondaddr USE RPC_Address

    the address string, as described earlier

    UINT8[]

    4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header

    UINT8 numresults

    the number of results (0x01)

    UINT8[]

    4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header

    UINT16 result

    result (0x00 = accept)

    UINT16 reason

    reason (0x00 = no reason specified)

    * transfersyntax USE RPC_Iface

    the transfer syntax from the request

    RPC_ReqNorm RW

    the remainder of the packet after the header for every other other request

    UINT32 allochint

    the size of the stub data in bytes

    UINT16 prescontext

    presentation context identifier (0x0)

    UINT16 opnum

    operation number (0x15)

    * stub USE TvPacket

    a packet dependent on the pipe name (probably the interface) and the op number)

    RPC_ResNorm RW

    UINT32 allochint

    # size of the stub data in bytes

    UINT16 prescontext

    # presentation context identifier (same as request)

    UINT8 cancelcount

    # cancel count? (0x0)

    UINT8 reserved

    # 0 - one byte padding

    * stub USE TvPacket

    # the remainder of the reply

    Tail

    The end of each of the NTLSA and NETLOGON named pipes ends with:

    ......

    end of data

    UINT32

    return code

    RPC Bind / Bind Ack

    +

    RPC_Iface RW

    UINT8 byte[16]

    16 bytes of number

    UINT32 version

    the interface number

    RPC_ReqBind RW

    the remainder of the packet after the header if "type" was Bind in the response header, "type" should be BindAck

    UINT16 maxtsize

    maximum transmission fragment size (0x1630)

    UINT16 maxrsize

    max receive fragment size (0x1630)

    UINT32 assocgid

    associated group id (0x0)

    UINT32 numelements

    the number of elements (0x1)

    UINT16 contextid

    presentation context identifier (0x0)

    UINT8 numsyntaxes

    the number of syntaxes (has always been 1?)(0x1)

    UINT8[]

    4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header

    * abstractint USE RPC_Iface

    num and vers. of interface client is using

    * transferint USE RPC_Iface

    num and vers. of interface to use for replies

    RPC_Address RW

    UINT16 length

    length of the string including null terminator

    * port USE string

    the string above in single byte, null terminated form

    RPC_ResBind RW

    the response to place after the header in the reply packet

    UINT16 maxtsize

    same as request

    UINT16 maxrsize

    same as request

    UINT32 assocgid

    zero

    * secondaddr USE RPC_Address

    the address string, as described earlier

    UINT8[]

    4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header

    UINT8 numresults

    the number of results (0x01)

    UINT8[]

    4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header

    UINT16 result

    result (0x00 = accept)

    UINT16 reason

    reason (0x00 = no reason specified)

    * transfersyntax USE RPC_Iface

    the transfer syntax from the request

    RPC_ReqNorm RW

    the remainder of the packet after the header for every other other request

    UINT32 allochint

    the size of the stub data in bytes

    UINT16 prescontext

    presentation context identifier (0x0)

    UINT16 opnum

    operation number (0x15)

    * stub USE TvPacket

    a packet dependent on the pipe name (probably the interface) and the op number)

    RPC_ResNorm RW

    UINT32 allochint

    # size of the stub data in bytes

    UINT16 prescontext

    # presentation context identifier (same as request)

    UINT8 cancelcount

    # cancel count? (0x0)

    UINT8 reserved

    # 0 - one byte padding

    * stub USE TvPacket

    # the remainder of the reply

    Tail

    The end of each of the NTLSA and NETLOGON named pipes ends with:

    ......

    end of data

    UINT32

    return code

    RPC Bind / Bind Ack

    RPC Binds are the process of associating an RPC pipe (e.g \PIPE\lsarpc) -with a "transfer syntax" (see RPC_Iface structure). The purpose for doing +with a "transfer syntax" (see RPC_Iface structure). The purpose for doing this is unknown.

    Note: The RPC_ResBind SMB Transact request is sent with two uint16 setup parameters. The first is 0x0026; the second is the file handle returned by the SMBopenX Transact response.

    Note: The RPC_ResBind members maxtsize, maxrsize and assocgid are the same in the response as the same members in the RPC_ReqBind. The RPC_ResBind member transfersyntax is the same in the response as the

    Note: The RPC_ResBind response member secondaddr contains the name of what is presumed to be the service behind the RPC pipe. The - mapping identified so far is:

    initial SMBopenX request:

    RPC_ResBind response:

    "\\PIPE\\srvsvc"

    "\\PIPE\\ntsvcs"

    "\\PIPE\\samr"

    "\\PIPE\\lsass"

    "\\PIPE\\lsarpc"

    "\\PIPE\\lsass"

    "\\PIPE\\wkssvc"

    "\\PIPE\\wksvcs"

    "\\PIPE\\NETLOGON"

    "\\PIPE\\NETLOGON"

    Note: The RPC_Packet fraglength member in both the Bind Request and Bind Acknowledgment must contain the length of the entire RPC data, including the RPC_Packet header.

    Request:

    RPC_Packet
    RPC_ReqBind

    Response:

    RPC_Packet
    RPC_ResBind

    NTLSA Transact Named Pipe

    The sequence of actions taken on this pipe are:

    Establish a connection to the IPC$ share (SMBtconX). use encrypted passwords.
    Open an RPC Pipe with the name "\\PIPE\\lsarpc". Store the file handle.
    Using the file handle, send a Set Named Pipe Handle state to 0x4300.
    Send an LSA Open Policy request. Store the Policy Handle.
    Using the Policy Handle, send LSA Query Info Policy requests, etc.
    Using the Policy Handle, send an LSA Close.
    Close the IPC$ share.

    Defines for this pipe, identifying the query are:

    LSA Open Policy:

    0x2c

    LSA Query Info Policy:

    0x07

    LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains:

    0x0d

    LSA Open Secret:

    0xff

    LSA Lookup SIDs:

    0xfe

    LSA Lookup Names:

    0xfd

    LSA Close:

    0x00

    LSA Open Policy

    Note: The policy handle can be anything you like.

    Request

    VOID*

    buffer pointer

    UNISTR2

    server name - unicode string starting with two '\'s

    OBJ_ATTR

    object attributes

    UINT32

    1 - desired access

    Response

    POL_HND

    LSA policy handle

    return

    0 - indicates success

    LSA Query Info Policy

    Note: The info class in response must be the same as that in the request.

    Request

    POL_HND

    LSA policy handle

    UINT16

    info class (also a policy handle?)

    Response

    VOID*

    undocumented buffer pointer

    UINT16

    info class (same as info class in request).

    +	mapping identified so far is:
    initial SMBopenX request:
    RPC_ResBind response:
    "\\PIPE\\srvsvc"
    "\\PIPE\\ntsvcs"
    "\\PIPE\\samr"
    "\\PIPE\\lsass"
    "\\PIPE\\lsarpc"
    "\\PIPE\\lsass"
    "\\PIPE\\wkssvc"
    "\\PIPE\\wksvcs"
    "\\PIPE\\NETLOGON"
    "\\PIPE\\NETLOGON"
    Note:	The RPC_Packet fraglength member in both the Bind Request and Bind Acknowledgment must contain the length of the entire RPC data, including the RPC_Packet header.
    Request:
    RPC_Packet
    RPC_ReqBind
    Response:
    RPC_Packet
    RPC_ResBind

    NTLSA Transact Named Pipe

    The sequence of actions taken on this pipe are:

    Establish a connection to the IPC$ share (SMBtconX). use encrypted passwords.
    Open an RPC Pipe with the name "\\PIPE\\lsarpc". Store the file handle.
    Using the file handle, send a Set Named Pipe Handle state to 0x4300.
    Send an LSA Open Policy request. Store the Policy Handle.
    Using the Policy Handle, send LSA Query Info Policy requests, etc.
    Using the Policy Handle, send an LSA Close.
    Close the IPC$ share.

    Defines for this pipe, identifying the query are:

    LSA Open Policy:

    0x2c

    LSA Query Info Policy:

    0x07

    LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains:

    0x0d

    LSA Open Secret:

    0xff

    LSA Lookup SIDs:

    0xfe

    LSA Lookup Names:

    0xfd

    LSA Close:

    0x00

    LSA Open Policy

    Note: The policy handle can be anything you like.

    Request

    VOID*

    buffer pointer

    UNISTR2

    server name - unicode string starting with two '\'s

    OBJ_ATTR

    object attributes

    UINT32

    1 - desired access

    Response

    POL_HND

    LSA policy handle

    return

    0 - indicates success

    LSA Query Info Policy

    Note: The info class in response must be the same as that in the request.

    Request

    POL_HND

    LSA policy handle

    UINT16

    info class (also a policy handle?)

    Response

    VOID*

    undocumented buffer pointer

    UINT16

    info class (same as info class in request).

     switch (info class)
 case 3:
 case 5:
@@ -1289,11 +1289,11 @@ DOM_INFO domain info, levels 3 and 5 (are the same).
 }
 
 return    0 - indicates success
-

    LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains

    Request

    no extra data

    Response

    UINT32

    0 - enumeration context

    UINT32

    0 - entries read

    UINT32

    0 - trust information

    return

    0x8000 001a - "no trusted domains" success code

    LSA Open Secret

    Request

    no extra data

    Response

    UINT32

    0 - undocumented

    UINT32

    0 - undocumented

    UINT32

    0 - undocumented

    UINT32

    0 - undocumented

    UINT32

    0 - undocumented

    return 0x0C00 0034 - "no such secret" success code

    LSA Close

    Request

    POL_HND

    policy handle to be closed

    Response

    POL_HND

    0s - closed policy handle (all zeros)

    return 0 - indicates success

    LSA Lookup SIDS

    Note: num_entries in response must be same as num_entries in request.

    Request

    POL_HND

    LSA policy handle

    UINT32

    num_entries

    VOID*

    undocumented domain SID buffer pointer

    VOID*

    undocumented domain name buffer pointer

    VOID*[num_entries] undocumented domain SID pointers to be looked up. -

    DOM_SID[num_entries] domain SIDs to be looked up.

    char[16]

    completely undocumented 16 bytes.

    Response

    DOM_REF

    domain reference response

    UINT32

    num_entries (listed above)

    VOID*

    undocumented buffer pointer

    UINT32

    num_entries (listed above)

    DOM_SID2[num_entries]

    domain SIDs (from Request, listed above).

    UINT32

    num_entries (listed above)

    return 0 - indicates success

    LSA Lookup Names

    Note: num_entries in response must be same as num_entries in request.

    Request

    POL_HND

    LSA policy handle

    UINT32

    num_entries

    UINT32

    num_entries

    VOID*

    undocumented domain SID buffer pointer

    VOID*

    undocumented domain name buffer pointer

    NAME[num_entries]

    names to be looked up.

    char[]

    undocumented bytes - falsely translated SID structure?

    Response

    DOM_REF

    domain reference response

    UINT32

    num_entries (listed above)

    VOID*

    undocumented buffer pointer

    UINT32

    num_entries (listed above)

    DOM_RID[num_entries]

    domain SIDs (from Request, listed above).

    UINT32

    num_entries (listed above)

    return 0 - indicates success

    NETLOGON rpc Transact Named Pipe

    The sequence of actions taken on this pipe are:

    tablish a connection to the IPC$ share (SMBtconX). use encrypted passwords.
    en an RPC Pipe with the name "\\PIPE\\NETLOGON". Store the file handle.
    ing the file handle, send a Set Named Pipe Handle state to 0x4300.
    eate Client Challenge. Send LSA Request Challenge. Store Server Challenge.
    lculate Session Key. Send an LSA Auth 2 Challenge. Store Auth2 Challenge.
    lc/Verify Client Creds. Send LSA Srv PW Set. Calc/Verify Server Creds.
    lc/Verify Client Creds. Send LSA SAM Logon . Calc/Verify Server Creds.
    lc/Verify Client Creds. Send LSA SAM Logoff. Calc/Verify Server Creds.
    ose the IPC$ share.

    Defines for this pipe, identifying the query are

    LSA Request Challenge:

    0x04

    LSA Server Password Set:

    0x06

    LSA SAM Logon:

    0x02

    LSA SAM Logoff:

    0x03

    LSA Auth 2:

    0x0f

    LSA Logon Control:

    0x0e

    LSA Request Challenge

    Note: logon server name starts with two '\' characters and is upper case.

    Note: logon client is the machine, not the user.

    Note: the initial LanManager password hash, against which the challenge is issued, is the machine name itself (lower case). there will becalls issued (LSA Server Password Set) which will change this, later. refusing these calls allows you to always deal with the same password (i.e the LM# of the machine name in lower case).

    Request

    VOID*

    undocumented buffer pointer

    UNISTR2

    logon server unicode string

    UNISTR2

    logon client unicode string

    char[8]

    client challenge

    Response

    char[8]

    server challenge

    return 0 - indicates success

    LSA Authenticate 2

    Note: in between request and response, calculate the client credentials, and check them against the client-calculated credentials (this process uses the previously received client credentials).

    Note: neg_flags in the response is the same as that in the request.

    Note: you must take a copy of the client-calculated credentials received here, because they will be used in subsequent authentication packets.

    Request

    LOG_INFO

    client identification info

    char[8]

    client-calculated credentials

    UINT8[]

    padding to 4-byte align with start of SMB header.

    UINT32

    neg_flags - negotiated flags (usual value is 0x0000 01ff)

    Response

    char[8]

    server credentials.

    UINT32

    neg_flags - same as neg_flags in request.

    return 0 - indicates success. failure value unknown.

    LSA Server Password Set

    Note: the new password is suspected to be a DES encryption using the old password to generate the key.

    Note: in between request and response, calculate the client credentials, and check them against the client-calculated credentials (this process uses the previously received client credentials).

    Note: the server credentials are constructed from the client-calculated credentials and the client time + 1 second.

    Note: you must take a copy of the client-calculated credentials received here, because they will be used in subsequent authentication packets.

    Request

    CLNT_INFO

    client identification/authentication info

    char[]

    new password - undocumented.

    Response

    CREDS

    server credentials. server time stamp appears to be ignored.

    return 0 - indicates success; 0xC000 006a indicates failure

    LSA SAM Logon

    +

    LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains

    Request

    no extra data

    Response

    UINT32

    0 - enumeration context

    UINT32

    0 - entries read

    UINT32

    0 - trust information

    return

    0x8000 001a - "no trusted domains" success code

    LSA Open Secret

    Request

    no extra data

    Response

    UINT32

    0 - undocumented

    UINT32

    0 - undocumented

    UINT32

    0 - undocumented

    UINT32

    0 - undocumented

    UINT32

    0 - undocumented

    return 0x0C00 0034 - "no such secret" success code

    LSA Close

    Request

    POL_HND

    policy handle to be closed

    Response

    POL_HND

    0s - closed policy handle (all zeros)

    return 0 - indicates success

    LSA Lookup SIDS

    Note: num_entries in response must be same as num_entries in request.

    Request

    POL_HND

    LSA policy handle

    UINT32

    num_entries

    VOID*

    undocumented domain SID buffer pointer

    VOID*

    undocumented domain name buffer pointer

    VOID*[num_entries] undocumented domain SID pointers to be looked up. +

    DOM_SID[num_entries] domain SIDs to be looked up.

    char[16]

    completely undocumented 16 bytes.

    Response

    DOM_REF

    domain reference response

    UINT32

    num_entries (listed above)

    VOID*

    undocumented buffer pointer

    UINT32

    num_entries (listed above)

    DOM_SID2[num_entries]

    domain SIDs (from Request, listed above).

    UINT32

    num_entries (listed above)

    return 0 - indicates success

    LSA Lookup Names

    Note: num_entries in response must be same as num_entries in request.

    Request

    POL_HND

    LSA policy handle

    UINT32

    num_entries

    UINT32

    num_entries

    VOID*

    undocumented domain SID buffer pointer

    VOID*

    undocumented domain name buffer pointer

    NAME[num_entries]

    names to be looked up.

    char[]

    undocumented bytes - falsely translated SID structure?

    Response

    DOM_REF

    domain reference response

    UINT32

    num_entries (listed above)

    VOID*

    undocumented buffer pointer

    UINT32

    num_entries (listed above)

    DOM_RID[num_entries]

    domain SIDs (from Request, listed above).

    UINT32

    num_entries (listed above)

    return 0 - indicates success

    NETLOGON rpc Transact Named Pipe

    The sequence of actions taken on this pipe are:

    tablish a connection to the IPC$ share (SMBtconX). use encrypted passwords.
    en an RPC Pipe with the name "\\PIPE\\NETLOGON". Store the file handle.
    ing the file handle, send a Set Named Pipe Handle state to 0x4300.
    eate Client Challenge. Send LSA Request Challenge. Store Server Challenge.
    lculate Session Key. Send an LSA Auth 2 Challenge. Store Auth2 Challenge.
    lc/Verify Client Creds. Send LSA Srv PW Set. Calc/Verify Server Creds.
    lc/Verify Client Creds. Send LSA SAM Logon . Calc/Verify Server Creds.
    lc/Verify Client Creds. Send LSA SAM Logoff. Calc/Verify Server Creds.
    ose the IPC$ share.

    Defines for this pipe, identifying the query are

    LSA Request Challenge:

    0x04

    LSA Server Password Set:

    0x06

    LSA SAM Logon:

    0x02

    LSA SAM Logoff:

    0x03

    LSA Auth 2:

    0x0f

    LSA Logon Control:

    0x0e

    LSA Request Challenge

    Note: logon server name starts with two '\' characters and is upper case.

    Note: logon client is the machine, not the user.

    Note: the initial LanManager password hash, against which the challenge is issued, is the machine name itself (lower case). there will becalls issued (LSA Server Password Set) which will change this, later. refusing these calls allows you to always deal with the same password (i.e the LM# of the machine name in lower case).

    Request

    VOID*

    undocumented buffer pointer

    UNISTR2

    logon server unicode string

    UNISTR2

    logon client unicode string

    char[8]

    client challenge

    Response

    char[8]

    server challenge

    return 0 - indicates success

    LSA Authenticate 2

    Note: in between request and response, calculate the client credentials, and check them against the client-calculated credentials (this process uses the previously received client credentials).

    Note: neg_flags in the response is the same as that in the request.

    Note: you must take a copy of the client-calculated credentials received here, because they will be used in subsequent authentication packets.

    Request

    LOG_INFO

    client identification info

    char[8]

    client-calculated credentials

    UINT8[]

    padding to 4-byte align with start of SMB header.

    UINT32

    neg_flags - negotiated flags (usual value is 0x0000 01ff)

    Response

    char[8]

    server credentials.

    UINT32

    neg_flags - same as neg_flags in request.

    return 0 - indicates success. failure value unknown.

    LSA Server Password Set

    Note: the new password is suspected to be a DES encryption using the old password to generate the key.

    Note: in between request and response, calculate the client credentials, and check them against the client-calculated credentials (this process uses the previously received client credentials).

    Note: the server credentials are constructed from the client-calculated credentials and the client time + 1 second.

    Note: you must take a copy of the client-calculated credentials received here, because they will be used in subsequent authentication packets.

    Request

    CLNT_INFO

    client identification/authentication info

    char[]

    new password - undocumented.

    Response

    CREDS

    server credentials. server time stamp appears to be ignored.

    return 0 - indicates success; 0xC000 006a indicates failure

    LSA SAM Logon

    Note: valid_user is True iff the username and password hash are valid for the requested domain. -

    Request

    SAM_INFO

    sam_id structure

    Response

    VOID*

    undocumented buffer pointer

    CREDS

    server credentials. server time stamp appears to be ignored.

    +
    Request
    SAM_INFO
    sam_id structure
    Response
    VOID*
    undocumented buffer pointer
    CREDS
    server credentials.  server time stamp appears to be ignored.
     if (valid_user)
 {
 	UINT16      3 - switch value indicating USER_INFO structure.
@@ -1313,16 +1313,16 @@ else
 
     return    0xC000 0064 - NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER.
 }
-

    LSA SAM Logoff

    +

    LSA SAM Logoff

    Note: presumably, the SAM_INFO structure is validated, and a (currently undocumented) error code returned if the Logoff is invalid. -

    Request

    SAM_INFO

    sam_id structure

    Response

    VOID*

    undocumented buffer pointer

    CREDS

    server credentials. server time stamp appears to be ignored.

    return 0 - indicates success. undocumented failure indication.

    \\MAILSLOT\NET\NTLOGON

    +

    Request

    SAM_INFO

    sam_id structure

    Response

    VOID*

    undocumented buffer pointer

    CREDS

    server credentials. server time stamp appears to be ignored.

    return 0 - indicates success. undocumented failure indication.

    \\MAILSLOT\NET\NTLOGON

    Note: mailslots will contain a response mailslot, to which the response should be sent. the target NetBIOS name is REQUEST_NAME<20>, where REQUEST_NAME is the name of the machine that sent the request. -

    Query for PDC

    Note: NTversion, LMNTtoken, LM20token in response are the same as those given in the request.

    Request

    UINT16

    0x0007 - Query for PDC

    STR

    machine name

    STR

    response mailslot

    UINT8[]

    padding to 2-byte align with start of mailslot.

    UNISTR

    machine name

    UINT32

    NTversion

    UINT16

    LMNTtoken

    UINT16

    LM20token

    Response

    UINT16

    0x000A - Respose to Query for PDC

    STR

    machine name (in uppercase)

    UINT8[]

    padding to 2-byte align with start of mailslot.

    UNISTR

    machine name

    UNISTR

    domain name

    UINT32

    NTversion (same as received in request)

    UINT16

    LMNTtoken (same as received in request)

    UINT16

    LM20token (same as received in request)

    SAM Logon

    Note: machine name in response is preceded by two '\' characters.

    Note: NTversion, LMNTtoken, LM20token in response are the same as those given in the request.

    Note: user name in the response is presumably the same as that in the request.

    Request

    UINT16

    0x0012 - SAM Logon

    UINT16

    request count

    UNISTR

    machine name

    UNISTR

    user name

    STR

    response mailslot

    UINT32

    alloweable account

    UINT32

    domain SID size

    char[sid_size]

    domain SID, of sid_size bytes.

    UINT8[]

    ???? padding to 4? 2? -byte align with start of mailslot.

    UINT32

    NTversion

    UINT16

    LMNTtoken

    UINT16

    LM20token

    Response

    UINT16

    0x0013 - Response to SAM Logon

    UNISTR

    machine name

    UNISTR

    user name - workstation trust account

    UNISTR

    domain name

    UINT32

    NTversion

    UINT16

    LMNTtoken

    UINT16

    LM20token

    SRVSVC Transact Named Pipe

    Defines for this pipe, identifying the query are:

    Net Share Enum

    0x0f

    Net Server Get Info

    0x15

    Net Share Enum

    Note: share level and switch value in the response are presumably the same as those in the request.

    Note: cifsrap2.txt (section 5) may be of limited assistance here.

    Request

    VOID*

    pointer (to server name?)

    UNISTR2

    server name

    UINT8[]

    padding to get unicode string 4-byte aligned with the start of the SMB header.

    UINT32

    share level

    UINT32

    switch value

    VOID*

    pointer to SHARE_INFO_1_CTR

    SHARE_INFO_1_CTR

    share info with 0 entries

    UINT32

    preferred maximum length (0xffff ffff)

    Response

    UINT32

    share level

    UINT32

    switch value

    VOID*

    pointer to SHARE_INFO_1_CTR

    SHARE_INFO_1_CTR

    share info (only added if share info ptr is non-zero)

    return 0 - indicates success

    Net Server Get Info

    Note: level is the same value as in the request.

    Request

    UNISTR2

    server name

    UINT32

    switch level

    Response

    UINT32

    switch level

    VOID*

    pointer to SERVER_INFO_101

    SERVER_INFO_101

    server info (only added if server info ptr is non-zero)

    return 0 - indicates success

    Cryptographic side of NT Domain Authentication

    Definitions

    Add(A1,A2)

    Intel byte ordered addition of corresponding 4 byte words in arrays A1 and A2

    E(K,D)

    DES ECB encryption of 8 byte data D using 7 byte key K

    lmowf()

    Lan man hash

    ntowf()

    NT hash

    PW

    md4(machine_password) == md4(lsadump $machine.acc) == +

    Query for PDC

    Note: NTversion, LMNTtoken, LM20token in response are the same as those given in the request.

    Request

    UINT16

    0x0007 - Query for PDC

    STR

    machine name

    STR

    response mailslot

    UINT8[]

    padding to 2-byte align with start of mailslot.

    UNISTR

    machine name

    UINT32

    NTversion

    UINT16

    LMNTtoken

    UINT16

    LM20token

    Response

    UINT16

    0x000A - Respose to Query for PDC

    STR

    machine name (in uppercase)

    UINT8[]

    padding to 2-byte align with start of mailslot.

    UNISTR

    machine name

    UNISTR

    domain name

    UINT32

    NTversion (same as received in request)

    UINT16

    LMNTtoken (same as received in request)

    UINT16

    LM20token (same as received in request)

    SAM Logon

    Note: machine name in response is preceded by two '\' characters.

    Note: NTversion, LMNTtoken, LM20token in response are the same as those given in the request.

    Note: user name in the response is presumably the same as that in the request.

    Request

    UINT16

    0x0012 - SAM Logon

    UINT16

    request count

    UNISTR

    machine name

    UNISTR

    user name

    STR

    response mailslot

    UINT32

    alloweable account

    UINT32

    domain SID size

    char[sid_size]

    domain SID, of sid_size bytes.

    UINT8[]

    ???? padding to 4? 2? -byte align with start of mailslot.

    UINT32

    NTversion

    UINT16

    LMNTtoken

    UINT16

    LM20token

    Response

    UINT16

    0x0013 - Response to SAM Logon

    UNISTR

    machine name

    UNISTR

    user name - workstation trust account

    UNISTR

    domain name

    UINT32

    NTversion

    UINT16

    LMNTtoken

    UINT16

    LM20token

    SRVSVC Transact Named Pipe

    Defines for this pipe, identifying the query are:

    Net Share Enum

    0x0f

    Net Server Get Info

    0x15

    Net Share Enum

    Note: share level and switch value in the response are presumably the same as those in the request.

    Note: cifsrap2.txt (section 5) may be of limited assistance here.

    Request

    VOID*

    pointer (to server name?)

    UNISTR2

    server name

    UINT8[]

    padding to get unicode string 4-byte aligned with the start of the SMB header.

    UINT32

    share level

    UINT32

    switch value

    VOID*

    pointer to SHARE_INFO_1_CTR

    SHARE_INFO_1_CTR

    share info with 0 entries

    UINT32

    preferred maximum length (0xffff ffff)

    Response

    UINT32

    share level

    UINT32

    switch value

    VOID*

    pointer to SHARE_INFO_1_CTR

    SHARE_INFO_1_CTR

    share info (only added if share info ptr is non-zero)

    return 0 - indicates success

    Net Server Get Info

    Note: level is the same value as in the request.

    Request

    UNISTR2

    server name

    UINT32

    switch level

    Response

    UINT32

    switch level

    VOID*

    pointer to SERVER_INFO_101

    SERVER_INFO_101

    server info (only added if server info ptr is non-zero)

    return 0 - indicates success

    Cryptographic side of NT Domain Authentication

    Definitions

    Add(A1,A2)

    Intel byte ordered addition of corresponding 4 byte words in arrays A1 and A2

    E(K,D)

    DES ECB encryption of 8 byte data D using 7 byte key K

    lmowf()

    Lan man hash

    ntowf()

    NT hash

    PW

    md4(machine_password) == md4(lsadump $machine.acc) == pwdump(machine$) (initially) == md4(lmowf(unicode(machine))) -

    ARC4(K,Lk,D,Ld)

    ARC4 encryption of data D of length Ld with key K of length Lk

    v[m..n(,l)]

    subset of v from bytes m to n, optionally padded with zeroes to length l

    Cred(K,D)

    E(K[7..7,7],E(K[0..6],D)) computes a credential

    Time()

    4 byte current time

    Cc,Cs

    8 byte client and server challenges Rc,Rs: 8 byte client and server credentials

    Protocol

    +
    ARC4(K,Lk,D,Ld)
    ARC4 encryption of data D of length Ld with key K of length Lk
    v[m..n(,l)]
    subset of v from bytes m to n, optionally padded with zeroes to length l
    Cred(K,D)
    E(K[7..7,7],E(K[0..6],D)) computes a credential
    Time()
    4 byte current time
    Cc,Cs
    8 byte client and server challenges Rc,Rs: 8 byte client and server credentials

    Protocol

     C->S ReqChal,Cc
 S->C Cs
 
    @@ -1358,7 +1358,7 @@ S: Ts = Time()
 S->C Cred(Ks,Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc+1)),userinfo(logon script,UID,SIDs,etc)
 C: assert(Rs == Cred(Ks,Cred(Rc+Tc+1))
 C: Rc = Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc+1)
-

    Comments

    +

    Comments

    On first joining the domain the session key could be computed by anyone listening in on the network as the machine password has a well known value. Until the machine is rebooted it will use this session @@ -1379,30 +1379,30 @@ returned by the server. The password OWFs should NOT be sent over the network reversibly encrypted. They should be sent using ARC4(Ks,md4(owf)) with the server computing the same function using the owf values in the SAM. -

    SIDs and RIDs

    +

    SIDs and RIDs

    SIDs and RIDs are well documented elsewhere.

    A SID is an NT Security ID (see DOM_SID structure). They are of the form:

    revision-NN-SubAuth1-SubAuth2-SubAuth3...
    revision-0xNNNNNNNNNNNN-SubAuth1-SubAuth2-SubAuth3...

    currently, the SID revision is 1. The Sub-Authorities are known as Relative IDs (RIDs). -

    Well-known SIDs

    Universal well-known SIDs

    Null SID

    S-1-0-0

    World

    S-1-1-0

    Local

    S-1-2-0

    Creator Owner ID

    S-1-3-0

    Creator Group ID

    S-1-3-1

    Creator Owner Server ID

    S-1-3-2

    Creator Group Server ID

    S-1-3-3

    (Non-unique IDs)

    S-1-4

    NT well-known SIDs

    NT Authority

    S-1-5

    Dialup

    S-1-5-1

    Network

    S-1-5-2

    Batch

    S-1-5-3

    Interactive

    S-1-5-4

    Service

    S-1-5-6

    AnonymousLogon(aka null logon session)

    S-1-5-7

    Proxy

    S-1-5-8

    ServerLogon(aka domain controller account)

    S-1-5-8

    (Logon IDs)

    S-1-5-5-X-Y

    (NT non-unique IDs)

    S-1-5-0x15-...

    (Built-in domain)

    s-1-5-0x20

    Well-known RIDS

    +

    Well-known SIDs

    Universal well-known SIDs

    Null SID

    S-1-0-0

    World

    S-1-1-0

    Local

    S-1-2-0

    Creator Owner ID

    S-1-3-0

    Creator Group ID

    S-1-3-1

    Creator Owner Server ID

    S-1-3-2

    Creator Group Server ID

    S-1-3-3

    (Non-unique IDs)

    S-1-4

    NT well-known SIDs

    NT Authority

    S-1-5

    Dialup

    S-1-5-1

    Network

    S-1-5-2

    Batch

    S-1-5-3

    Interactive

    S-1-5-4

    Service

    S-1-5-6

    AnonymousLogon(aka null logon session)

    S-1-5-7

    Proxy

    S-1-5-8

    ServerLogon(aka domain controller account)

    S-1-5-8

    (Logon IDs)

    S-1-5-5-X-Y

    (NT non-unique IDs)

    S-1-5-0x15-...

    (Built-in domain)

    s-1-5-0x20

    Well-known RIDS

    A RID is a sub-authority value, as part of either a SID, or in the case of Group RIDs, part of the DOM_GID structure, in the USER_INFO_1 structure, in the LSA SAM Logon response. -

    Well-known RID users

    Groupname: DOMAIN_USER_RID_ADMIN

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 01F4

    Groupname: DOMAIN_USER_RID_GUEST

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 01F5

    Well-known RID groups

    Groupname: DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_ADMINS

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 0200

    Groupname: DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_USERS

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 0201

    Groupname: DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_GUESTS

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 0202

    Well-known RID aliases

    Groupname: DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 0220

    Groupname: DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_USERS

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 0221

    Groupname: DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_GUESTS

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 0222

    Groupname: DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_POWER_USERS

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 0223

    Groupname: DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ACCOUNT_OPS

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 0224

    Groupname: DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_SYSTEM_OPS

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 0225

    Groupname: DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_PRINT_OPS

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 0226

    Groupname: DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_BACKUP_OPS

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 0227

    Groupname: DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_REPLICATOR

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 0228

    Chapter 11. Samba Printing Internals

    Gerald Carter

    October 2002

    Table of Contents

    Abstract
    +

    Well-known RID users

    Groupname: DOMAIN_USER_RID_ADMIN

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 01F4

    Groupname: DOMAIN_USER_RID_GUEST

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 01F5

    Well-known RID groups

    Groupname: DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_ADMINS

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 0200

    Groupname: DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_USERS

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 0201

    Groupname: DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_GUESTS

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 0202

    Well-known RID aliases

    Groupname: DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 0220

    Groupname: DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_USERS

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 0221

    Groupname: DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_GUESTS

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 0222

    Groupname: DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_POWER_USERS

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 0223

    Groupname: DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ACCOUNT_OPS

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 0224

    Groupname: DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_SYSTEM_OPS

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 0225

    Groupname: DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_PRINT_OPS

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 0226

    Groupname: DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_BACKUP_OPS

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 0227

    Groupname: DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_REPLICATOR

    ????: 0x0000

    RID: 0228

    Chapter 11. Samba Printing Internals

    Gerald Carter

    October 2002

    Table of Contents

    Abstract
    Printing Interface to Various Back ends -
    +
    Print Queue TDB's -
    +
    ChangeID and Client Caching of Printer Information -
    +
    Windows NT/2K Printer Change Notify -

    Abstract

    +

    Abstract

    The purpose of this document is to provide some insight into Samba's printing functionality and also to describe the semantics of certain features of Windows client printing. -

    +

    Printing Interface to Various Back ends

    Samba uses a table of function pointers to seven functions. The @@ -1413,10 +1413,10 @@ Currently there are only two printing back end implementations defined.

    • a generic set of functions for working with standard UNIX printing subsystems

    • a set of CUPS specific functions (this is only enabled if - the CUPS libraries were located at compile time).

    + the CUPS libraries were located at compile time).

    Print Queue TDB's

    -Samba provides periodic caching of the output from the "lpq command" +Samba provides periodic caching of the output from the "lpq command" for performance reasons. This cache time is configurable in seconds. Obviously the longer the cache time the less often smbd will be required to exec a copy of lpq. However, the accuracy of the print @@ -1436,7 +1436,7 @@ There are two ways in which a a print job can be entered into a print queue's TDB. The first is to submit the job from a Windows client which will insert the job information directly into the TDB. The second method is to have the print job picked up by executing the -"lpq command". +"lpq command". 

     /* included from printing.h */
 struct printjob {
@@ -1457,9 +1457,9 @@ struct printjob {
 };

    The current manifestation of the printjob structure contains a field -for the UNIX job id returned from the "lpq command" and a Windows job +for the UNIX job id returned from the "lpq command" and a Windows job ID (32-bit bounded by PRINT_MAX_JOBID). When a print job is returned -by the "lpq command" that does not match an existing job in the queue's +by the "lpq command" that does not match an existing job in the queue's TDB, a 32-bit job ID above the <*vance doesn't know what word is missing here*> is generating by adding UNIX_JOB_START to the id reported by lpq.

    @@ -1474,7 +1474,7 @@ steps ( refer to print.c:print_queue_update() ): stored in LOCK/printer_name. If so, then do not update the TDB.

  • Lock the mutex entry in the TDB and store our own pid. Check that this succeeded, else fail.

  • Store the updated time stamp for the new cache - listing

  • Retrieve the queue listing via "lpq command"

  • +	listing

  • Retrieve the queue listing via "lpq command"

  •  	foreach job in the queue
      	{
 		if the job is a UNIX job, create a new entry;
@@ -1489,7 +1489,7 @@ steps ( refer to print.c:print_queue_update() ):
 	}

  • Delete any jobs in the TDB that are not in the in the lpq listing

  • Store the print queue status in the TDB

  • update the cache time stamp again

    • Note that it is the contents of this TDB that is returned to Windows -clients and not the actual listing from the "lpq command". +clients and not the actual listing from the "lpq command".

    The NT_DEVICEMODE stored as part of the printjob structure is used to store a pointer to a non-default DeviceMode associated with the print @@ -1502,11 +1502,11 @@ and the job has the printer's device mode associated with it by default. Only non-default Device Mode are stored with print jobs in the print queue TDB. Otherwise, the Device Mode is obtained from the printer object when the client issues a GetJob(level == 2) request. -

    +

    ChangeID and Client Caching of Printer Information

    [To be filled in later] -

    +

    Windows NT/2K Printer Change Notify

    When working with Windows NT+ clients, it is possible for a @@ -1604,13 +1604,13 @@ handle for notification. Samba currently uses the snum of the printer for this which can break if the list of services has been modified since the notification handle was registered.

  • The size is either (a) the string length in UNICODE for strings, (b) the size in bytes of the security descriptor, or (c) 0 for -data values.

    • Chapter 12. Samba WINS Internals

    Gerald Carter

    October 2002

    Table of Contents

    WINS Failover

    WINS Failover

    +data values.

    Chapter 12. Samba WINS Internals

    Gerald Carter

    October 2002

    Table of Contents

    WINS Failover

    WINS Failover

    The current Samba codebase possesses the capability to use groups of WINS servers that share a common namespace for NetBIOS name registration and resolution. The formal parameter syntax is 

     	WINS_SERVER_PARAM 	= SERVER [ SEPARATOR SERVER_LIST ]
-	WINS_SERVER_PARAM 	= "wins server"
+	WINS_SERVER_PARAM 	= "wins server"
 	SERVER 			= ADDR[:TAG]
 	ADDR 			= ip_addr | fqdn
 	TAG 			= string
@@ -1623,7 +1623,7 @@ A simple example of a valid wins server setting is
 	wins server = 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.3

    In the event that no TAG is defined in for a SERVER in the list, smbd assigns a default -TAG of "*". A TAG is used to group servers of a shared NetBIOS namespace together. Upon +TAG of "*". A TAG is used to group servers of a shared NetBIOS namespace together. Upon startup, nmbd will attempt to register the netbios name value with one server in each tagged group.

    @@ -1634,7 +1634,7 @@ interface names in the tags is only by convention and is not a technical require wins server = 192.168.1.2:eth0 192.168.1.3:eth0 192.168.2.2:eth1

    Using this configuration, nmbd would attempt to register the server's NetBIOS name -with one WINS server in each group. Because the "eth0" group has two servers, the +with one WINS server in each group. Because the "eth0" group has two servers, the second server would only be used when a registration (or resolution) request to the first server in that group timed out.

    @@ -1646,7 +1646,7 @@ If a timeout occurs when querying a specific WINS server, that server is marked prevent further timeouts and the next server in the WINS group is contacted. Once marked as dead, Samba will not attempt to contact that server for name registration/resolution queries for a period of 10 minutes. -

    Chapter 13. The Upcoming SAM System

    Andrew Bartlett

    1 October 2002

    Table of Contents

    Security in the 'new SAM'
    Standalone from UNIX
    Handles and Races in the new SAM
    Layers
    Application
    SAM Interface
    SAM Modules
    SAM Modules
    Special Module: sam_passdb
    sam_ads
    Memory Management
    Testing

    Security in the 'new SAM'

    One of the biggest problems with passdb is it's implementation of +

    Chapter 13. The Upcoming SAM System

    Andrew Bartlett

    1 October 2002

    Table of Contents

    Security in the 'new SAM'
    Standalone from UNIX
    Handles and Races in the new SAM
    Layers
    Application
    SAM Interface
    SAM Modules
    SAM Modules
    Special Module: sam_passdb
    sam_ads
    Memory Management
    Testing

    Security in the 'new SAM'

    One of the biggest problems with passdb is it's implementation of 'security'. Access control is on a 'are you root at the moment' basis, and it has no concept of NT ACLs. Things like ldapsam had to add 'magic' 'are you root' checks.

    We took this very seriously when we started work, and the new structure @@ -1706,7 +1706,7 @@ actual data store (like the LDAP server).

    Finally, we have generic get_sec_desc() and set_sec_desc() routines to allow external ACL manipulation. These do lookups based on SID. -

    Standalone from UNIX

    +

    Standalone from UNIX

    One of the primary tenants of the 'new SAM' is that it would not attempt to deal with 'what unix id for that'. This would be left to the 'SMS' (Sid Mapping System') or SID farm, and probably administered via @@ -1716,7 +1716,7 @@ Accounts not preexisting in unix would be served up via winbind.

    This is an *optional* part, and my preferred end-game. We have a fare way to go before things like winbind up to it however. -

    Handles and Races in the new SAM

    +

    Handles and Races in the new SAM

    One of the things that the 'new SAM' work has tried to face is both compatibility with existing code, and a closer alignment to the SAMR interface. I consider SAMR to be a 'primary customer' to the this work, @@ -1741,11 +1741,11 @@ have *really* changed. 'conflicting' updates: Currently we don't deal with this (in passdb or the new sam stuff), but the design is sufficiently flexible to 'deny' a second update. I don't foresee locking records however. -

    Layers

    Application

    +

    Layers

    Application

    This is where smbd, samtest and whatever end-user replacement we have for pdbedit sits. They use only the SAM interface, and do not get 'special knowledge' of what is below them. -

    SAM Interface

    +

    SAM Interface

    This level 'owns' the various handle structures, the get/set routines on those structures and provides the public interface. The application layer may initialize a 'context' to be passed to all interface routines, @@ -1756,7 +1756,7 @@ abstraction to the modules below, and arrange for their initial loading.

    We could possibly add ACL checking at this layer, to avoid discrepancies in implementation modules. -

    SAM Modules

    +

    SAM Modules

    These do not communicate with the application directly, only by setting values in the handles, and receiving requests from the interface. These modules are responsible for translating values from the handle's @@ -1764,13 +1764,13 @@ modules are responsible for translating values from the handle's to 'know' things like it's own domain SID, domain name, and any other state attached to the SAM. Simpler modules may call back to some helper routine. -

    SAM Modules

    Special Module: sam_passdb

    +

    SAM Modules

    Special Module: sam_passdb

    In order for there to be a smooth transition, kai is writing a module that reads existing passdb backends, and translates them into SAM replies. (Also pulling data from the account policy DB etc). We also intend to write a module that does the reverse - gives the SAM a passdb interface. -

    sam_ads

    +

    sam_ads

    This is the first of the SAM modules to be committed to the tree - mainly because I needed to coordinate work with metze (who authored most of it). This module aims to use Samba's libads code to provide an @@ -1782,7 +1782,7 @@ the construction of an Samba AD DC.

    We also intend to construct a Samba 2.2/3.0 compatible ldap module, again using libads code. -

    Memory Management

    +

    Memory Management

    The 'new SAM' development effort also concerned itself with getting a sane implementation of memory management. It was decided that we would be (as much as possible) talloc based, using an 'internal talloc @@ -1811,7 +1811,7 @@ NT_USER_TOKEN *access_token, uint32 access_desired, const DOM_SID NTSTATUS sam_enum_accounts(const SAM_CONTEXT *context, const NT_USER_TOKEN *access_token, const DOM_SID *domainsid, uint16 acct_ctrl, int32 *account_count, SAM_ACCOUNT_ENUM **accounts) -

    Testing

    +

    Testing

    Testing is vital in any piece of software, and Samba is certainly no exception. In designing this new subsystem, we have taken care to ensure it is easily tested, independent of outside protocols. @@ -1840,13 +1840,13 @@ Because the 'new SAM' is NT ACL based, there will be a command to specify an arbitrary NT ACL, but for now it uses 'system' by default.

    Chapter 14. LanMan and NT Password Encryption

    Jeremy Allison

    Samba Team



    -

    19 Apr 1999

    Table of Contents

    Introduction
    How does it work?
    The smbpasswd file

    Introduction

    With the development of LanManager and Windows NT +

    19 Apr 1999

    Table of Contents

    Introduction
    How does it work?
    The smbpasswd file

    Introduction

    With the development of LanManager and Windows NT compatible password encryption for Samba, it is now able to validate user connections in exactly the same way as a LanManager or Windows NT server.

    This document describes how the SMB password encryption algorithm works and what issues there are in choosing whether you want to use it. You should read it carefully, especially - the part about security and the "PROS and CONS" section.

    How does it work?

    LanManager encryption is somewhat similar to UNIX + the part about security and the "PROS and CONS" section.

    How does it work?

    LanManager encryption is somewhat similar to UNIX password encryption. The server uses a file containing a hashed value of a user's password. This is created by taking the user's plaintext password, capitalising it, and either @@ -1854,7 +1854,7 @@ specify an arbitrary NT ACL, but for now it uses 'system' by default. This 14 byte value is used as two 56 bit DES keys to encrypt a 'magic' eight byte value, forming a 16 byte value which is stored by the server and client. Let this value be known as - the "hashed password".

    Windows NT encryption is a higher quality mechanism, + the "hashed password".

    Windows NT encryption is a higher quality mechanism, consisting of doing an MD4 hash on a Unicode version of the user's password. This also produces a 16 byte hash value that is non-reversible.

    When a client (LanManager, Windows for WorkGroups, Windows @@ -1863,11 +1863,11 @@ specify an arbitrary NT ACL, but for now it uses 'system' by default. protocol that the client and server will use. In the reply to this request the Samba server generates and appends an 8 byte, random value - this is stored in the Samba server after the reply is sent - and is known as the "challenge". The challenge is different for + and is known as the "challenge". The challenge is different for every client connection.

    The client then uses the hashed password (16 byte values described above), appended with 5 null bytes, as three 56 bit DES keys, each of which is used to encrypt the challenge 8 byte - value, forming a 24 byte value known as the "response".

    In the SMB call SMBsessionsetupX (when user level security + value, forming a 24 byte value known as the "response".

    In the SMB call SMBsessionsetupX (when user level security is selected) or the call SMBtconX (when share level security is selected), the 24 byte response is returned by the client to the Samba server. For Windows NT protocol levels the above calculation @@ -1883,7 +1883,7 @@ specify an arbitrary NT ACL, but for now it uses 'system' by default. know the correct password and is denied access.

    Note that the Samba server never knows or stores the cleartext of the user's password - just the 16 byte hashed values derived from it. Also note that the cleartext password or 16 byte hashed values - are never transmitted over the network - thus increasing security.

    The smbpasswd file

    In order for Samba to participate in the above protocol + are never transmitted over the network - thus increasing security.

    The smbpasswd file

    In order for Samba to participate in the above protocol it must be able to look up the 16 byte hashed values given a user name. Unfortunately, as the UNIX password value is also a one way hash function (ie. it is impossible to retrieve the cleartext of the user's @@ -1924,7 +1924,7 @@ username:uid:XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX:XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX: to 32 ascii hexadecimal digits (0-9, A-F). These are an ascii representation of the 16 byte hashed value of a user's password.

    To set a user to have no password (not recommended), edit the file using vi, and replace the first 11 characters with the ascii text - "NO PASSWORD" (minus the quotes).

    For example, to clear the password for user bob, his smbpasswd file + "NO PASSWORD" (minus the quotes).

    For example, to clear the password for user bob, his smbpasswd file entry would look like :

     bob:100:NO PASSWORDXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX:XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX:
 	[U          ]:LCT-00000000:Bob's full name:/bobhome:/bobshell
@@ -1940,10 +1940,10 @@ bob:100:NO PASSWORDXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX:XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX:
 	to enable this on your server.
    Note : This file should be protected very 
 	carefully. Anyone with access to this file can (with enough knowledge of 
 	the protocols) gain access to your SMB server. The file is thus more 
-	sensitive than a normal unix /etc/passwd file.

    Chapter 15. Modules

    Jelmer Vernooij

    Samba Team

    19 March 2003

    Table of Contents

    Advantages
    Loading modules
    Static modules
    Shared modules
    Writing modules
    Static/Shared selection in configure.in

    Advantages

    + sensitive than a normal unix /etc/passwd file.

    Chapter 15. Modules

    Jelmer Vernooij

    Samba Team

    19 March 2003

    Table of Contents

    Advantages
    Loading modules
    Static modules
    Shared modules
    Writing modules
    Static/Shared selection in configure.in

    Advantages

    The new modules system has the following advantages:

    Transparent loading of static and shared modules (no need -for a subsystem to know about modules)
    Simple selection between shared and static modules at configure time
    "preload modules" option for increasing performance for stable modules
    No nasty #define stuff anymore
    All backends are available as plugin now (including pdb_ldap and pdb_tdb)

    Loading modules

    +for a subsystem to know about modules)Simple selection between shared and static modules at configure time"preload modules" option for increasing performance for stable modulesNo nasty #define stuff anymoreAll backends are available as plugin now (including pdb_ldap and pdb_tdb)

    Loading modules

    Some subsystems in samba use different backends. These backends can be either statically linked in to samba or available as a plugin. A subsystem should have a function that allows a module to register itself. For example, @@ -1953,7 +1953,7 @@ NTSTATUS smb_register_passdb(int version, const char *name, pdb_init_function in

    This function will be called by the initialisation function of the module to register itself. -

    Static modules

    +

    Static modules

    The modules system compiles a list of initialisation functions for the static modules of each subsystem. This is a define. For example, it is here currently (from include/config.h): @@ -1963,7 +1963,7 @@ it is here currently (from include/config.h):

    These functions should be called before the subsystem is used. That should be done when the subsystem is initialised or first used. -

    Shared modules

    +

    Shared modules

    If a subsystem needs a certain backend, it should check if it has already been registered. If the backend hasn't been registered already, the subsystem should call smb_probe_module(char *subsystem, char *backend). @@ -1973,7 +1973,7 @@ is a slash, smb_probe_module() tries to load the module from the absolute path specified in 'backend'.

    After smb_probe_module() has been executed, the subsystem should check again if the module has been registered. -

    Writing modules

    +

    Writing modules

    Each module has an initialisation function. For modules that are included with samba this name is 'subsystem_backend_init'. For external modules (that will never be built-in, but only available as a module) this name is always 'init_module'. (In the case of modules included with samba, the configure system will add a #define subsystem_backend_init() init_module()). The prototype for these functions is: @@ -1984,11 +1984,11 @@ registration functions. The function should return NT_STATUS_OK on success and NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL or a more useful nt error code on failure.

    For example, pdb_ldap_init() contains: 

     NTSTATUS pdb_ldap_init(void)
 {
-smb_register_passdb(PASSDB_INTERFACE_VERSION, "ldapsam", pdb_init_ldapsam);
-smb_register_passdb(PASSDB_INTERFACE_VERSION, "ldapsam_nua", pdb_init_ldapsam_nua);
+smb_register_passdb(PASSDB_INTERFACE_VERSION, "ldapsam", pdb_init_ldapsam);
+smb_register_passdb(PASSDB_INTERFACE_VERSION, "ldapsam_nua", pdb_init_ldapsam_nua);
 	return NT_STATUS_OK;
 }
-

    Static/Shared selection in configure.in

    +

    Static/Shared selection in configure.in

    Some macros in configure.in generate the various defines and substs that are necessary for the system to work correct. All modules that should be built by default have to be added to the variable 'default_modules'. @@ -2009,13 +2009,13 @@ Practically, this means all c files that contain static_init_

    Note

    There currently also is a configure.in command called SMB_MODULE_PROVIVES(). This is used for modules that register multiple things. It should not -be used as probing will most likely disappear in the future.

    Chapter 16. RPC Pluggable Modules

    Anthony Liguori

    IBM

    Jelmer Vernooij

    Samba Team

    January 2003

    Table of Contents

    About
    General Overview

    About

    +be used as probing will most likely disappear in the future.

    Chapter 16. RPC Pluggable Modules

    Anthony Liguori

    IBM

    Jelmer Vernooij

    Samba Team

    January 2003

    Table of Contents

    About
    General Overview

    About

    This document describes how to make use the new RPC Pluggable Modules features of Samba 3.0. This architecture was added to increase the maintainability of Samba allowing RPC Pipes to be worked on separately from the main CVS branch. The RPM architecture will also allow third-party vendors to add functionality to Samba through plug-ins. -

    General Overview

    +

    General Overview

    When an RPC call is sent to smbd, smbd tries to load a shared library by the name librpc_<pipename>.so to handle the call if it doesn't know how to handle the call internally. For instance, LSA calls @@ -2032,7 +2032,7 @@ NTSTATUS rpc_pipe_register_commands(int version, const char *clnt, const char *s argument.

    clnt

    the Client name of the named pipe

    srv

    the Server name of the named pipe

    cmds

    a list of api_structs that map RPC ordinal numbers to function calls

    size

    the number of api_structs contained in cmds

    See rpc_server/srv_reg.c and rpc_server/srv_reg_nt.c for a small example of how to use this library. -

    Chapter 17. VFS Modules

    Alexander Bokovoy

    Stefan Metzmacher

    27 May 2003

    Table of Contents

    The Samba (Posix) VFS layer
    The general interface
    Possible VFS operation layers
    The Interaction between the Samba VFS subsystem and the modules
    Initialization and registration
    How the Modules handle per connection data
    Upgrading to the New VFS Interface
    Upgrading from 2.2.* and 3.0aplha modules
    Some Notes
    Implement TRANSPARENT functions
    Implement OPAQUE functions

    The Samba (Posix) VFS layer

    The general interface

    +

    Chapter 17. VFS Modules

    Alexander Bokovoy

    Stefan Metzmacher

    27 May 2003

    Table of Contents

    The Samba (Posix) VFS layer
    The general interface
    Possible VFS operation layers
    The Interaction between the Samba VFS subsystem and the modules
    Initialization and registration
    How the Modules handle per connection data
    Upgrading to the New VFS Interface
    Upgrading from 2.2.* and 3.0aplha modules
    Some Notes
    Implement TRANSPARENT functions
    Implement OPAQUE functions

    The Samba (Posix) VFS layer

    The general interface

    Each VFS operation has a vfs_op_type, a function pointer and a handle pointer in the struct vfs_ops and tree macros to make it easier to call the operations. (Take a look at include/vfs.h and include/vfs_macros.h.) @@ -2128,7 +2128,7 @@ DO NOT ACCESS conn->vfs.ops.* directly !!! (tofd), (fsp), (fromfd), (header), (offset), (count))) ... -

    Possible VFS operation layers

    +

    Possible VFS operation layers

    These values are used by the VFS subsystem when building the conn->vfs and conn->vfs_opaque structs for a connection with multiple VFS modules. Internally, Samba differentiates only opaque and transparent layers at this process. @@ -2157,7 +2157,7 @@ typedef enum _vfs_op_layer { SMB_VFS_LAYER_SCANNER /* - Checks data and possibly initiates additional */ /* file activity like logging to files _inside_ samba VFS */ } vfs_op_layer; -

    The Interaction between the Samba VFS subsystem and the modules

    Initialization and registration

    +

    The Interaction between the Samba VFS subsystem and the modules

    Initialization and registration

    As each Samba module a VFS module should have a 

    NTSTATUS vfs_example_init(void);

    function if it's staticly linked to samba or 

    NTSTATUS init_module(void);

    function if it's a shared module. @@ -2195,9 +2195,9 @@ static vfs_op_tuple example_op_tuples[] = { NTSTATUS init_module(void) { - return smb_register_vfs(SMB_VFS_INTERFACE_VERSION, "example", example_op_tuples); + return smb_register_vfs(SMB_VFS_INTERFACE_VERSION, "example", example_op_tuples); } -

    How the Modules handle per connection data

    Each VFS function has as first parameter a pointer to the modules vfs_handle_struct. +

    How the Modules handle per connection data

    Each VFS function has as first parameter a pointer to the modules vfs_handle_struct. 

     typedef struct vfs_handle_struct {
 	struct vfs_handle_struct  *next, *prev;
@@ -2207,7 +2207,7 @@ typedef struct vfs_handle_struct {
 	void *data;
 	void (*free_data)(void **data);
 } vfs_handle_struct;
-
    param

    this is the module parameter specified in the vfs objects parameter.

    e.g. for 'vfs objects = example:test' param would be "test".

    vfs_next

    This vfs_ops struct contains the information for calling the next module operations. +

    param

    this is the module parameter specified in the vfs objects parameter.

    e.g. for 'vfs objects = example:test' param would be "test".

    vfs_next

    This vfs_ops struct contains the information for calling the next module operations. Use the SMB_VFS_NEXT_* macros to call a next module operations and don't access handle->vfs_next.ops.* directly!

    conn

    This is a pointer back to the connection_struct to witch the handle belongs.

    data

    This is a pointer for holding module private data. You can alloc data with connection life time on the handle->conn->mem_ctx TALLOC_CTX. @@ -2217,14 +2217,14 @@ you can set this function pointer to NULL.

    Some useful MAC 

     #define SMB_VFS_HANDLE_GET_DATA(handle, datap, type, ret) { \
 	if (!(handle)||((datap=(type *)(handle)->data)==NULL)) { \
-		DEBUG(0,("%s() failed to get vfs_handle->data!\n",FUNCTION_MACRO)); \
+		DEBUG(0,("%s() failed to get vfs_handle->data!\n",FUNCTION_MACRO)); \
 		ret; \
 	} \
 }
 
 #define SMB_VFS_HANDLE_SET_DATA(handle, datap, free_fn, type, ret) { \
 	if (!(handle)) { \
-		DEBUG(0,("%s() failed to set handle->data!\n",FUNCTION_MACRO)); \
+		DEBUG(0,("%s() failed to set handle->data!\n",FUNCTION_MACRO)); \
 		ret; \
 	} else { \
 		if ((handle)->free_data) { \
@@ -2298,20 +2298,20 @@ you can set this function pointer to NULL.

    Some useful MAC (handle)->vfs_next.handles.sendfile,\ (tofd), (fsp), (fromfd), (header), (offset), (count))) ... -

    Upgrading to the New VFS Interface

    Upgrading from 2.2.* and 3.0aplha modules

    1. -Add "vfs_handle_struct *handle, " as first parameter to all vfs operation functions. +

    Upgrading to the New VFS Interface

    Upgrading from 2.2.* and 3.0aplha modules

    1. +Add "vfs_handle_struct *handle, " as first parameter to all vfs operation functions. e.g. example_connect(connection_struct *conn, const char *service, const char *user); -> example_connect(vfs_handle_struct *handle, connection_struct *conn, const char *service, const char *user);

    2. -Replace "default_vfs_ops." with "smb_vfs_next_". +Replace "default_vfs_ops." with "smb_vfs_next_". e.g. default_vfs_ops.connect(conn, service, user); -> smb_vfs_next_connect(conn, service, user);

    3. -Uppercase all "smb_vfs_next_*" functions. +Uppercase all "smb_vfs_next_*" functions. e.g. smb_vfs_next_connect(conn, service, user); -> SMB_VFS_NEXT_CONNECT(conn, service, user);

    4. -Add "handle, " as first parameter to all SMB_VFS_NEXT_*() calls. +Add "handle, " as first parameter to all SMB_VFS_NEXT_*() calls. e.g. SMB_VFS_NEXT_CONNECT(conn, service, user); -> SMB_VFS_NEXT_CONNECT(handle, conn, service, user);

    5. @@ -2411,7 +2411,7 @@ e.g. 

       NTSTATUS init_module(void)
 {
-	return smb_register_vfs(SMB_VFS_INTERFACE_VERSION,"example",example_op_tuples);
+	return smb_register_vfs(SMB_VFS_INTERFACE_VERSION,"example",example_op_tuples);
 }

    6. @@ -2447,14 +2447,14 @@ static int example_connect(vfs_handle_struct *handle, /* alloc our private data */ data = (struct example_privates *)talloc_zero(conn->mem_ctx, sizeof(struct example_privates)); if (!data) { - DEBUG(0,("talloc_zero() failed\n")); + DEBUG(0,("talloc_zero() failed\n")); return -1; } /* init out private data */ - data->some_string = talloc_strdup(conn->mem_ctx,"test"); + data->some_string = talloc_strdup(conn->mem_ctx,"test"); if (!data->some_string) { - DEBUG(0,("talloc_strdup() failed\n")); + DEBUG(0,("talloc_strdup() failed\n")); return -1; } @@ -2480,7 +2480,7 @@ static int example_close(vfs_handle_struct *handle, files_struct *fsp, int fd) SMB_VFS_HANDLE_GET_DATA(handle, data, struct example_privates, return -1); /* do something here...*/ - DEBUG(0,("some_string: %s\n",data->some_string)); + DEBUG(0,("some_string: %s\n",data->some_string)); return SMB_VFS_NEXT_CLOSE(handle, fsp, fd); } @@ -2508,14 +2508,14 @@ static int example_connect(vfs_handle_struct *handle, /* alloc our private data */ data = (struct example_privates *)malloc(sizeof(struct example_privates)); if (!data) { - DEBUG(0,("malloc() failed\n")); + DEBUG(0,("malloc() failed\n")); return -1; } /* init out private data */ - data->some_string = strdup("test"); + data->some_string = strdup("test"); if (!data->some_string) { - DEBUG(0,("strdup() failed\n")); + DEBUG(0,("strdup() failed\n")); return -1; } @@ -2540,7 +2540,7 @@ static int example_close(vfs_handle_struct *handle, files_struct *fsp, int fd) SMB_VFS_HANDLE_GET_DATA(handle, data, struct example_privates, return -1); /* do something here...*/ - DEBUG(0,("some_string: %s\n",data->some_string)); + DEBUG(0,("some_string: %s\n",data->some_string)); return SMB_VFS_NEXT_CLOSE(handle, fsp, fd); } @@ -2561,7 +2561,7 @@ for your module.

    7. Compiling & Testing...

      ./configure --enable-developer ...
      make
      Try to fix all compiler warnings
      make
      Testing, Testing, Testing ...

      -

    Some Notes

    Implement TRANSPARENT functions

    +

    Some Notes

    Implement TRANSPARENT functions

    Avoid writing functions like this: 

    @@ -2572,7 +2572,7 @@ static int example_close(vfs_handle_struct *handle, files_struct *fsp, int fd)

    Overload only the functions you really need to! -

    Implement OPAQUE functions

    +

    Implement OPAQUE functions

    If you want to just implement a better version of a default samba opaque function (e.g. like a disk_free() function for a special filesystem) @@ -2588,16 +2588,16 @@ e.g. for a readonly filesystem. static int example_rename(vfs_handle_struct *handle, connection_struct *conn, char *oldname, char *newname) { - DEBUG(10,("function rename() not allowed on vfs 'example'\n")); + DEBUG(10,("function rename() not allowed on vfs 'example'\n")); errno = ENOSYS; return -1; } -

    Chapter 18. Notes to packagers

    Jelmer Vernooij

    Table of Contents

    Versioning
    Modules

    Versioning

    Please, please update the version number in +

    Chapter 18. Notes to packagers

    Jelmer Vernooij

    Table of Contents

    Versioning
    Modules

    Versioning

    Please, please update the version number in source/include/version.h to include the versioning of your package. This makes it easier to distinguish standard samba builds from custom-build samba builds (distributions often patch packages). For example, a good version would be: 

     Version 2.999+3.0.alpha21-5 for Debian
-

    Modules

    Samba now has support for building parts of samba as plugins. This +

    Modules

    Samba now has support for building parts of samba as plugins. This makes it possible to, for example, put ldap or mysql support in a seperate package, thus making it possible to have a normal samba package not depending on ldap or mysql. To build as much parts of samba -- cgit