Chapter�7.�NetBIOS in a Unix World

Andrew Tridgell

April 1995

Table of Contents

Introduction
Usernames
File Ownership
Passwords
Locking
Deny Modes
Trapdoor UIDs
Port numbers
Protocol Complexity

Introduction

This is a short document that describes some of the issues that confront a SMB implementation on unix, and how Samba copes with them. They may help people who are looking at unix<->PC @@ -876,7 +876,7 @@ interoperability.

It was written to help out a person who was writing a paper on unix to PC connectivity. -

Usernames

The SMB protocol has only a loose username concept. Early SMB protocols (such as CORE and COREPLUS) have no username concept at all. Even in later protocols clients often attempt operations @@ -887,20 +887,20 @@ Unix security is based around username/password pairs. A unix box should not allow clients to do any substantive operation without some sort of validation.

-The problem mostly manifests itself when the unix server is in "share -level" security mode. This is the default mode as the alternative -"user level" security mode usually forces a client to connect to the +The problem mostly manifests itself when the unix server is in "share +level" security mode. This is the default mode as the alternative +"user level" security mode usually forces a client to connect to the server as the same user for each connected share, which is inconvenient in many sites.

-In "share level" security the client normally gives a username in the -"session setup" protocol, but does not supply an accompanying -password. The client then connects to resources using the "tree -connect" protocol, and supplies a password. The problem is that the +In "share level" security the client normally gives a username in the +"session setup" protocol, but does not supply an accompanying +password. The client then connects to resources using the "tree +connect" protocol, and supplies a password. The problem is that the user on the PC types the username and the password in different contexts, unaware that they need to go together to give access to the server. The username is normally the one the user typed in when they -"logged onto" the PC (this assumes Windows for Workgroups). The +"logged onto" the PC (this assumes Windows for Workgroups). The password is the one they chose when connecting to the disk or printer.

The user often chooses a totally different username for their login as @@ -913,9 +913,9 @@ in the vast majority of cases. The methods include username maps, the service%user syntax, the saving of session setup usernames for later validation and the derivation of the username from the service name (either directly or via the user= option). -

File Ownership

-The commonly used SMB protocols have no way of saying "you can't do -that because you don't own the file". They have, in fact, no concept +

File Ownership

+The commonly used SMB protocols have no way of saying "you can't do +that because you don't own the file". They have, in fact, no concept of file ownership at all.

This brings up all sorts of interesting problems. For example, when @@ -925,13 +925,13 @@ receive the wrong date. This is because the utime() call under unix only succeeds for the owner of the file, or root, even if the file is world writeable. For security reasons Samba does all file operations as the validated user, not root, so the utime() fails. This can stuff -up shared development diectories as programs like "make" will not get +up shared development diectories as programs like "make" will not get file time comparisons right.

There are several possible solutions to this problem, including username mapping, and forcing a specific username for particular shares. -

Passwords

Many SMB clients uppercase passwords before sending them. I have no idea why they do this. Interestingly WfWg uppercases the password only if the server is running a protocol greater than COREPLUS, so @@ -940,20 +940,20 @@ obviously it isn't just the data entry routines that are to blame. Unix passwords are case sensitive. So if users use mixed case passwords they are in trouble.

-Samba can try to cope with this by either using the "password level" +Samba can try to cope with this by either using the "password level" option which causes Samba to try the offered password with up to the -specified number of case changes, or by using the "password server" +specified number of case changes, or by using the "password server" option which allows Samba to do its validation via another machine (typically a WinNT server).

Samba supports the password encryption method used by SMB clients. Note that the use of password encryption in Microsoft -networking leads to password hashes that are "plain text equivalent". +networking leads to password hashes that are "plain text equivalent". This means that it is *VERY* important to ensure that the Samba smbpasswd file containing these password hashes is only readable by the root user. See the documentation ENCRYPTION.txt for more details. -

Locking

Since samba 2.2, samba supports other types of locking as well. This section is outdated.

@@ -978,14 +978,14 @@ a unix environment because few unix programs use byte range locking. The stress of huge numbers of lock requests from dos/windows clients can kill the daemon on some systems.

-The second major problem is the "opportunistic locking" requested by +The second major problem is the "opportunistic locking" requested by some clients. If a client requests opportunistic locking then it is asking the server to notify it if anyone else tries to do something on the same file, at which time the client will say if it is willing to give up its lock. Unix has no simple way of implementing opportunistic locking, and currently Samba has no support for it. -

Deny Modes

-When a SMB client opens a file it asks for a particular "deny mode" to +

Deny Modes

+When a SMB client opens a file it asks for a particular "deny mode" to be placed on the file. These modes (DENY_NONE, DENY_READ, DENY_WRITE, DENY_ALL, DENY_FCB and DENY_DOS) specify what actions should be allowed by anyone else who tries to use the file at the same time. If @@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ directory or a shared memory implementation. The lock file method is clumsy and consumes processing and file resources, the shared memory implementation is vastly prefered and is turned on by default for those systems that support it. -

Trapdoor UIDs

A SMB session can run with several uids on the one socket. This happens when a user connects to two shares with different usernames. To cope with this the unix server needs to switch uids @@ -1006,11 +1006,11 @@ within the one process. On some unixes (such as SCO) this is not possible. This means that on those unixes the client is restricted to a single uid.

-Note that you can also get the "trapdoor uid" message for other +Note that you can also get the "trapdoor uid" message for other reasons. Please see the FAQ for details. -

Port numbers

-There is a convention that clients on sockets use high "unprivilaged" -port numbers (>1000) and connect to servers on low "privilaged" port +

Port numbers

+There is a convention that clients on sockets use high "unprivilaged" +port numbers (>1000) and connect to servers on low "privilaged" port numbers. This is enforced in Unix as non-root users can't open a socket for listening on port numbers less than 1000.

@@ -1031,13 +1031,13 @@ to any of these OSes unless they are running as root. The answer comes back, but it goes to port 137 which the unix user can't listen on. Interestingly WinNT3.1 got this right - it sends node status responses back to the source port in the request. -

Protocol Complexity

-There are many "protocol levels" in the SMB protocol. It seems that +

Protocol Complexity

+There are many "protocol levels" in the SMB protocol. It seems that each time new functionality was added to a Microsoft operating system, they added the equivalent functions in a new protocol level of the SMB -protocol to "externalise" the new capabilities. +protocol to "externalise" the new capabilities.

-This means the protocol is very "rich", offering many ways of doing +This means the protocol is very "rich", offering many ways of doing each file operation. This means SMB servers need to be complex and large. It also means it is very difficult to make them bug free. It is not just Samba that suffers from this problem, other servers such as @@ -1045,19 +1045,19 @@ WinNT don't support every variation of every call and it has almost certainly been a headache for MS developers to support the myriad of SMB calls that are available.

-There are about 65 "top level" operations in the SMB protocol (things +There are about 65 "top level" operations in the SMB protocol (things like SMBread and SMBwrite). Some of these include hundreds of sub-functions (SMBtrans has at least 120 sub-functions, like DosPrintQAdd and NetSessionEnum). All of them take several options that can change the way they work. Many take dozens of possible -"information levels" that change the structures that need to be -returned. Samba supports all but 2 of the "top level" functions. It +"information levels" that change the structures that need to be +returned. Samba supports all but 2 of the "top level" functions. It supports only 8 (so far) of the SMBtrans sub-functions. Even NT doesn't support them all.

-Samba currently supports up to the "NT LM 0.12" protocol, which is the +Samba currently supports up to the "NT LM 0.12" protocol, which is the one preferred by Win95 and WinNT3.5. Luckily this protocol level has a -"capabilities" field which specifies which super-duper new-fangled +"capabilities" field which specifies which super-duper new-fangled options the server suports. This helps to make the implementation of this protocol level much easier.

@@ -1102,13 +1102,13 @@ You'll notice that it produces a LOT of output. It is showing you the arguments to every system call that the program makes and the result. Very little happens in a program without a system call so you get lots of output. You'll also find that it produces a lot of -"preamble" stuff showing the loading of shared libraries etc. Ignore +"preamble" stuff showing the loading of shared libraries etc. Ignore this (unless its going wrong!)

For example, the only line that really matters in the strace echo hello output is:

-write(1, "hello\n", 6)                  = 6
+write(1, "hello\n", 6)                  = 6

all the rest is just setting up to run the program.

Ok, now you're familiar with strace. To use it on Samba you need to strace the running smbd daemon. The way I tend ot use it is to first @@ -1118,10 +1118,10 @@ find which process ID that client is attached to, then as root I do stderr output from this command to a file for later perusal. For example, if I'm using a csh style shell:

strace -f -p 3872 >& strace.out

or with a sh style shell:

strace -f -p 3872 > strace.out 2>&1

-Note the "-f" option. This is only available on some systems, and +Note the "-f" option. This is only available on some systems, and allows you to trace not just the current process, but any children it forks. This is great for finding printing problems caused by the -"print command" being wrong. +"print command" being wrong.

Once you are attached you then can do whatever it is on the client that is causing problems and you will capture all the system calls @@ -1132,20 +1132,20 @@ output for strings that I know will appear when the problem happens. For example, if I am having touble with permissions on a file I would search for that files name in the strace output and look at the surrounding lines. Another trick is to match up file descriptor -numbers and "follow" what happens to an open file until it is closed. +numbers and "follow" what happens to an open file until it is closed.

Beyond this you will have to use your initiative. To give you an idea of what you are looking for here is a piece of strace output that shows that /dev/null is not world writeable, which causes printing to fail with Samba:

-[pid 28268] open("/dev/null", O_RDWR)   = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
-[pid 28268] open("/dev/null", O_WRONLY) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
+[pid 28268] open("/dev/null", O_RDWR)   = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
+[pid 28268] open("/dev/null", O_WRONLY) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)

The process is trying to first open /dev/null read-write then read-only. Both fail. This means /dev/null has incorrect permissions. -

Chapter�9.�Finding useful information on windows

Jelmer R. Vernooij

The Samba Team

<jelmer@samba.org>

Andrew Tridgell

Samba Team

<tridge@samba.org>

Table of Contents

Netlogon debugging output

Netlogon debugging output

stop netlogon service on PDC
rename original netlogon.dll to netlogon.dll.original
copy checked version of netlogon.dll to system32 directory
set HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon\Parameters\DBFlag to 0x20000004
start netlogon service on PDC

Chapter�10.�NT Domain RPC's

01 November 97(version 0.0.24)

Introduction

Chapter�9.�Finding useful information on windows

Jelmer R. Vernooij

The Samba Team

<jelmer@samba.org>

Andrew Tridgell

Samba Team

<tridge@samba.org>

Table of Contents

Netlogon debugging output

Netlogon debugging output

stop netlogon service on PDC
rename original netlogon.dll to netlogon.dll.original
copy checked version of netlogon.dll to system32 directory
set HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon\Parameters\DBFlag to 0x20000004
start netlogon service on PDC

Chapter�10.�NT Domain RPC's

Luke Leighton

<lkcl@switchboard.net>

Paul Ashton

<paul@argo.demon.co.uk>

Duncan Stansfield

<duncans@sco.com>

01 November 97(version 0.0.24)

Introduction

This document contains information to provide an NT workstation with login services, without the need for an NT server. It is the sgml version of http://mailhost.cb1.com/~lkcl/cifsntdomain.txt, controlled by Luke.

@@ -1178,7 +1178,7 @@ NT workstation, and enabling full debugging in NETLOGON. This is achieved by setting the following REG_SZ registry key to 0x1ffffff:

HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon\Parameters

Incorrect direct editing of the registry can cause your machine to fail. Then again, so can incorrect implementation of this -protocol. See "Liability:" above.

+protocol. See "Liability:" above.

Bear in mind that each packet over-the-wire will have its origin in an API call. Therefore, there are likely to be structures, enumerations and defines that are usefully documented elsewhere. @@ -1191,12 +1191,12 @@ Failure to return this error code will make the workstation report that it is already a member of the domain.

the cryptographic side of the NetrServerPasswordSet command, which would allow the workstation to change its password. This password is used to generate the long-term session key. [It is possible to reject this -command, and keep the default workstation password].

Sources

cket Traces from Netmonitor (Service Pack 1 and above)

ul Ashton and Luke Leighton's other "NT Domain" doc.

FS documentation - cifs6.txt

FS documentation - cifsrap2.txt

Credits

Paul Ashton: loads of work with Net Monitor; understanding the NT authentication system; reference implementation of the NT domain support on which this document is originally based.

Duncan Stansfield: low-level analysis of MSRPC Pipes.

Linus Nordberg: producing c-code from Paul's crypto spec.

Windows Sourcer development team

Notes and Structures

Notes

-In the SMB Transact pipes, some "Structures", described here, appear to be +command, and keep the default workstation password].

Sources

cket Traces from Netmonitor (Service Pack 1 and above)

ul Ashton and Luke Leighton's other "NT Domain" doc.

FS documentation - cifs6.txt

FS documentation - cifsrap2.txt

Credits

Paul Ashton: loads of work with Net Monitor; understanding the NT authentication system; reference implementation of the NT domain support on which this document is originally based.

Duncan Stansfield: low-level analysis of MSRPC Pipes.

Linus Nordberg: producing c-code from Paul's crypto spec.

Windows Sourcer development team

Notes and Structures

Notes

+In the SMB Transact pipes, some "Structures", described here, appear to be 4-byte aligned with the SMB header, at their start. Exactly which -"Structures" need aligning is not precisely known or documented. +"Structures" need aligning is not precisely known or documented.
-In the UDP NTLOGON Mailslots, some "Structures", described here, appear to be +In the UDP NTLOGON Mailslots, some "Structures", described here, appear to be 2-byte aligned with the start of the mailslot, at their start.
Domain SID is of the format S-revision-version-auth1-auth2...authN. @@ -1219,15 +1219,15 @@ into or taken out of the SMB data stream. if the count is non-zero, then the pointer is also non-zero. immediately following the pointer is the count again, followed by an array of container sub-structures. the count appears a third time after the last sub-structure. -

Enumerations

MSRPC Header type

command number in the msrpc packet header

MSRPC_Request:: 0x00
MSRPC_Response:: 0x02
MSRPC_Bind:: 0x0B
MSRPC_BindAck:: 0x0C

MSRPC Packet info

The meaning of these flags is undocumented

FirstFrag:: 0x01
LastFrag:: 0x02
NotaFrag:: 0x04
RecRespond:: 0x08
NoMultiplex:: 0x10
NotForIdemp:: 0x20
NotforBcast:: 0x40
NoUuid:: 0x80

Structures

VOID *

sizeof VOID* is 32 bits.

char

sizeof char is 8 bits.

UTIME

UTIME is 32 bits, indicating time in seconds since 01jan1970. documented in cifs6.txt (section 3.5 page, page 30).

NTTIME

NTTIME is 64 bits. documented in cifs6.txt (section 3.5 page, page 30).

DOM_SID (domain SID structure)

UINT32: num of sub-authorities in domain SID
UINT8: SID revision number
UINT8: num of sub-authorities in domain SID
UINT8[6]: 6 bytes for domain SID - Identifier Authority.
UINT16[n_subauths]: domain SID sub-authorities

Note: the domain SID is documented elsewhere. -

STR (string)

STR (string) is a char[] : a null-terminated string of ascii characters.

UNIHDR (unicode string header)

UINT16: length of unicode string
UINT16: max length of unicode string
UINT32: 4 - undocumented.

UNIHDR2 (unicode string header plus buffer pointer)

UNIHDR: unicode string header
VOID*: undocumented buffer pointer

UNISTR (unicode string)

UINT16[]: null-terminated string of unicode characters.

NAME (length-indicated unicode string)

UINT32: length of unicode string
UINT16[]: null-terminated string of unicode characters.

UNISTR2 (aligned unicode string)

UINT8[]: padding to get unicode string 4-byte aligned with the start of the SMB header.
UINT32: max length of unicode string
UINT32: 0 - undocumented
UINT32: length of unicode string
UINT16[]: string of uncode characters

OBJ_ATTR (object attributes)

UINT32: 0x18 - length (in bytes) including the length field.
VOID*: 0 - root directory (pointer)
VOID*: 0 - object name (pointer)
UINT32: 0 - attributes (undocumented)
VOID*: 0 - security descriptior (pointer)
UINT32: 0 - security quality of service

POL_HND (LSA policy handle)

char[20]: policy handle

DOM_SID2 (domain SID structure, SIDS stored in unicode)

UINT32: 5 - SID type
UINT32: 0 - undocumented
UNIHDR2: domain SID unicode string header
UNISTR: domain SID unicode string

Note: there is a conflict between the unicode string header and the unicode string itself as to which to use to indicate string length. this will need to be resolved.

Note: the SID type indicates, for example, an alias; a well-known group etc. this is documented somewhere.

DOM_RID (domain RID structure)

UINT32: 5 - well-known SID. 1 - user SID (see ShowACLs)
UINT32: 5 - undocumented
UINT32: domain RID
UINT32: 0 - domain index out of above reference domains

LOG_INFO (server, account, client structure)

Note: logon server name starts with two '\' characters and is upper case.

Note: account name is the logon client name from the LSA Request Challenge, with a $ on the end of it, in upper case.

VOID*: undocumented buffer pointer
UNISTR2: logon server unicode string
UNISTR2: account name unicode string
UINT16: sec_chan - security channel type
UNISTR2: logon client machine unicode string

CLNT_SRV (server, client names structure)

Note: logon server name starts with two '\' characters and is upper case.

VOID*: undocumented buffer pointer
UNISTR2: logon server unicode string
VOID*: undocumented buffer pointer
UNISTR2: logon client machine unicode string

CREDS (credentials + time stamp)

char[8]: credentials
UTIME: time stamp

CLNT_INFO2 (server, client structure, client credentials)

Note: whenever this structure appears in a request, you must take a copy of the client-calculated credentials received, because they will beused in subsequent credential checks. the presumed intention is to - maintain an authenticated request/response trail.

CLNT_SRV: client and server names
UINT8[]: ???? padding, for 4-byte alignment with SMB header.
VOID*: pointer to client credentials.
CREDS: client-calculated credentials + client time

CLNT_INFO (server, account, client structure, client credentials)

Note: whenever this structure appears in a request, you must take a copy of the client-calculated credentials received, because they will be used in subsequent credential checks. the presumed intention is to maintain an authenticated request/response trail.

LOG_INFO: logon account info
CREDS: client-calculated credentials + client time

ID_INFO_1 (id info structure, auth level 1)

VOID*: ptr_id_info_1
UNIHDR: domain name unicode header
UINT32: param control
UINT64: logon ID
UNIHDR: user name unicode header
UNIHDR: workgroup name unicode header
char[16]: arc4 LM OWF Password
char[16]: arc4 NT OWF Password
UNISTR2: domain name unicode string
UNISTR2: user name unicode string
UNISTR2: workstation name unicode string

SAM_INFO (sam logon/logoff id info structure)

Note: presumably, the return credentials is supposedly for the server to verify that the credential chain hasn't been compromised.

CLNT_INFO2: client identification/authentication info
VOID*: pointer to return credentials.
CRED: return credentials - ignored.
UINT16: logon level
UINT16: switch value

Enumerations

MSRPC Header type

command number in the msrpc packet header

MSRPC_Request:: 0x00
MSRPC_Response:: 0x02
MSRPC_Bind:: 0x0B
MSRPC_BindAck:: 0x0C

MSRPC Packet info

The meaning of these flags is undocumented

FirstFrag:: 0x01
LastFrag:: 0x02
NotaFrag:: 0x04
RecRespond:: 0x08
NoMultiplex:: 0x10
NotForIdemp:: 0x20
NotforBcast:: 0x40
NoUuid:: 0x80

Structures

VOID *

sizeof VOID* is 32 bits.

char

sizeof char is 8 bits.

UTIME

UTIME is 32 bits, indicating time in seconds since 01jan1970. documented in cifs6.txt (section 3.5 page, page 30).

NTTIME

NTTIME is 64 bits. documented in cifs6.txt (section 3.5 page, page 30).

DOM_SID (domain SID structure)

UINT32: num of sub-authorities in domain SID
UINT8: SID revision number
UINT8: num of sub-authorities in domain SID
UINT8[6]: 6 bytes for domain SID - Identifier Authority.
UINT16[n_subauths]: domain SID sub-authorities

Note: the domain SID is documented elsewhere. +

STR (string)

STR (string) is a char[] : a null-terminated string of ascii characters.

UNIHDR (unicode string header)

UINT16: length of unicode string
UINT16: max length of unicode string
UINT32: 4 - undocumented.

UNIHDR2 (unicode string header plus buffer pointer)

UNIHDR: unicode string header
VOID*: undocumented buffer pointer

UNISTR (unicode string)

UINT16[]: null-terminated string of unicode characters.

NAME (length-indicated unicode string)

UINT32: length of unicode string
UINT16[]: null-terminated string of unicode characters.

UNISTR2 (aligned unicode string)

UINT8[]: padding to get unicode string 4-byte aligned with the start of the SMB header.
UINT32: max length of unicode string
UINT32: 0 - undocumented
UINT32: length of unicode string
UINT16[]: string of uncode characters

OBJ_ATTR (object attributes)

UINT32: 0x18 - length (in bytes) including the length field.
VOID*: 0 - root directory (pointer)
VOID*: 0 - object name (pointer)
UINT32: 0 - attributes (undocumented)
VOID*: 0 - security descriptior (pointer)
UINT32: 0 - security quality of service

POL_HND (LSA policy handle)

char[20]: policy handle

DOM_SID2 (domain SID structure, SIDS stored in unicode)

UINT32: 5 - SID type
UINT32: 0 - undocumented
UNIHDR2: domain SID unicode string header
UNISTR: domain SID unicode string

Note: there is a conflict between the unicode string header and the unicode string itself as to which to use to indicate string length. this will need to be resolved.

Note: the SID type indicates, for example, an alias; a well-known group etc. this is documented somewhere.

DOM_RID (domain RID structure)

UINT32: 5 - well-known SID. 1 - user SID (see ShowACLs)
UINT32: 5 - undocumented
UINT32: domain RID
UINT32: 0 - domain index out of above reference domains

LOG_INFO (server, account, client structure)

Note: logon server name starts with two '\' characters and is upper case.

Note: account name is the logon client name from the LSA Request Challenge, with a $ on the end of it, in upper case.

VOID*: undocumented buffer pointer
UNISTR2: logon server unicode string
UNISTR2: account name unicode string
UINT16: sec_chan - security channel type
UNISTR2: logon client machine unicode string

CLNT_SRV (server, client names structure)

Note: logon server name starts with two '\' characters and is upper case.

VOID*: undocumented buffer pointer
UNISTR2: logon server unicode string
VOID*: undocumented buffer pointer
UNISTR2: logon client machine unicode string

CREDS (credentials + time stamp)

char[8]: credentials
UTIME: time stamp

CLNT_INFO2 (server, client structure, client credentials)

Note: whenever this structure appears in a request, you must take a copy of the client-calculated credentials received, because they will beused in subsequent credential checks. the presumed intention is to + maintain an authenticated request/response trail.

CLNT_SRV: client and server names
UINT8[]: ???? padding, for 4-byte alignment with SMB header.
VOID*: pointer to client credentials.
CREDS: client-calculated credentials + client time

CLNT_INFO (server, account, client structure, client credentials)

Note: whenever this structure appears in a request, you must take a copy of the client-calculated credentials received, because they will be used in subsequent credential checks. the presumed intention is to maintain an authenticated request/response trail.

LOG_INFO: logon account info
CREDS: client-calculated credentials + client time

ID_INFO_1 (id info structure, auth level 1)

VOID*: ptr_id_info_1
UNIHDR: domain name unicode header
UINT32: param control
UINT64: logon ID
UNIHDR: user name unicode header
UNIHDR: workgroup name unicode header
char[16]: arc4 LM OWF Password
char[16]: arc4 NT OWF Password
UNISTR2: domain name unicode string
UNISTR2: user name unicode string
UNISTR2: workstation name unicode string

SAM_INFO (sam logon/logoff id info structure)

Note: presumably, the return credentials is supposedly for the server to verify that the credential chain hasn't been compromised.

CLNT_INFO2: client identification/authentication info
VOID*: pointer to return credentials.
CRED: return credentials - ignored.
UINT16: logon level
UINT16: switch value

         switch (switch_value)
         case 1:
         {
             ID_INFO_1     id_info_1;
         }
-

GID (group id info)

UINT32: group id
UINT32: user attributes (only used by NT 3.1 and 3.51)

DOM_REF (domain reference info)

VOID*: undocumented buffer pointer.
UINT32: num referenced domains?
VOID*: undocumented domain name buffer pointer.
UINT32: 32 - max number of entries
UINT32: 4 - num referenced domains?
UNIHDR2: domain name unicode string header
UNIHDR2[num_ref_doms-1]: referenced domain unicode string headers
UNISTR: domain name unicode string
DOM_SID[num_ref_doms]: referenced domain SIDs

DOM_INFO (domain info, levels 3 and 5 are the same))

UINT8[]: ??? padding to get 4-byte alignment with start of SMB header
UINT16: domain name string length * 2
UINT16: domain name string length * 2
VOID*: undocumented domain name string buffer pointer
VOID*: undocumented domain SID string buffer pointer
UNISTR2: domain name (unicode string)
DOM_SID: domain SID

USER_INFO (user logon info)

Note: it would be nice to know what the 16 byte user session key is for.

NTTIME: logon time
NTTIME: logoff time
NTTIME: kickoff time
NTTIME: password last set time
NTTIME: password can change time
NTTIME: password must change time
UNIHDR: username unicode string header
UNIHDR: user's full name unicode string header
UNIHDR: logon script unicode string header
UNIHDR: profile path unicode string header
UNIHDR: home directory unicode string header
UNIHDR: home directory drive unicode string header
UINT16: logon count
UINT16: bad password count
UINT32: User ID
UINT32: Group ID
UINT32: num groups
VOID*: undocumented buffer pointer to groups.
UINT32: user flags
char[16]: user session key
UNIHDR: logon server unicode string header
UNIHDR: logon domain unicode string header
VOID*: undocumented logon domain id pointer
char[40]: 40 undocumented padding bytes. future expansion?
UINT32: 0 - num_other_sids?
VOID*: NULL - undocumented pointer to other domain SIDs.
UNISTR2: username unicode string
UNISTR2: user's full name unicode string
UNISTR2: logon script unicode string
UNISTR2: profile path unicode string
UNISTR2: home directory unicode string
UNISTR2: home directory drive unicode string
UINT32: num groups
GID[num_groups]: group info
UNISTR2: logon server unicode string
UNISTR2: logon domain unicode string
DOM_SID: domain SID
DOM_SID[num_sids]: other domain SIDs?

SH_INFO_1_PTR (pointers to level 1 share info strings)

Note: see cifsrap2.txt section5, page 10.

0 for shi1_type indicates a Disk.

1 for shi1_type indicates a Print Queue.

2 for shi1_type indicates a Device.

3 for shi1_type indicates an IPC pipe.

0x8000 0000 (top bit set in shi1_type) indicates a hidden share.

VOID*: shi1_netname - pointer to net name
UINT32: shi1_type - type of share. 0 - undocumented.
VOID*: shi1_remark - pointer to comment.

SH_INFO_1_STR (level 1 share info strings)

UNISTR2: shi1_netname - unicode string of net name
UNISTR2: shi1_remark - unicode string of comment.

SHARE_INFO_1_CTR

share container with 0 entries:

UINT32: 0 - EntriesRead
UINT32: 0 - Buffer

share container with > 0 entries:

UINT32: EntriesRead
UINT32: non-zero - Buffer
UINT32: EntriesRead
SH_INFO_1_PTR[EntriesRead]: share entry pointers
SH_INFO_1_STR[EntriesRead]: share entry strings
UINT8[]: padding to get unicode string 4-byte aligned with start of the SMB header.
UINT32: EntriesRead
UINT32: 0 - padding

SERVER_INFO_101

Note: see cifs6.txt section 6.4 - the fields described therein will be of assistance here. for example, the type listed below is the same as fServerType, which is described in 6.4.1.

SV_TYPE_WORKSTATION: 0x00000001 All workstations
SV_TYPE_SERVER: 0x00000002 All servers
SV_TYPE_SQLSERVER: 0x00000004 Any server running with SQL server
SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_CTRL: 0x00000008 Primary domain controller
SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_BAKCTRL: 0x00000010 Backup domain controller
SV_TYPE_TIME_SOURCE: 0x00000020 Server running the timesource service
SV_TYPE_AFP: 0x00000040 Apple File Protocol servers
SV_TYPE_NOVELL: 0x00000080 Novell servers
SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_MEMBER: 0x00000100 Domain Member
SV_TYPE_PRINTQ_SERVER: 0x00000200 Server sharing print queue
SV_TYPE_DIALIN_SERVER: 0x00000400 Server running dialin service.
SV_TYPE_XENIX_SERVER: 0x00000800 Xenix server
SV_TYPE_NT: 0x00001000 NT server
SV_TYPE_WFW: 0x00002000 Server running Windows for
SV_TYPE_SERVER_NT: 0x00008000 Windows NT non DC server
SV_TYPE_POTENTIAL_BROWSER: 0x00010000 Server that can run the browser service
SV_TYPE_BACKUP_BROWSER: 0x00020000 Backup browser server
SV_TYPE_MASTER_BROWSER: 0x00040000 Master browser server
SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_MASTER: 0x00080000 Domain Master Browser server
SV_TYPE_LOCAL_LIST_ONLY: 0x40000000 Enumerate only entries marked "local"
SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_ENUM: 0x80000000 Enumerate Domains. The pszServer and pszDomain parameters must be NULL.

UINT32: 500 - platform_id
VOID*: pointer to name
UINT32: 5 - major version
UINT32: 4 - minor version
UINT32: type (SV_TYPE_... bit field)
VOID*: pointer to comment
UNISTR2: sv101_name - unicode string of server name
UNISTR2: sv_101_comment - unicode string of server comment.
UINT8[]: padding to get unicode string 4-byte aligned with start of the SMB header.

MSRPC over Transact Named Pipe

For details on the SMB Transact Named Pipe, see cifs6.txt

MSRPC Pipes

GID (group id info)

UINT32: group id
UINT32: user attributes (only used by NT 3.1 and 3.51)

DOM_REF (domain reference info)

VOID*: undocumented buffer pointer.
UINT32: num referenced domains?
VOID*: undocumented domain name buffer pointer.
UINT32: 32 - max number of entries
UINT32: 4 - num referenced domains?
UNIHDR2: domain name unicode string header
UNIHDR2[num_ref_doms-1]: referenced domain unicode string headers
UNISTR: domain name unicode string
DOM_SID[num_ref_doms]: referenced domain SIDs

DOM_INFO (domain info, levels 3 and 5 are the same))

UINT8[]: ??? padding to get 4-byte alignment with start of SMB header
UINT16: domain name string length * 2
UINT16: domain name string length * 2
VOID*: undocumented domain name string buffer pointer
VOID*: undocumented domain SID string buffer pointer
UNISTR2: domain name (unicode string)
DOM_SID: domain SID

USER_INFO (user logon info)

Note: it would be nice to know what the 16 byte user session key is for.

NTTIME: logon time
NTTIME: logoff time
NTTIME: kickoff time
NTTIME: password last set time
NTTIME: password can change time
NTTIME: password must change time
UNIHDR: username unicode string header
UNIHDR: user's full name unicode string header
UNIHDR: logon script unicode string header
UNIHDR: profile path unicode string header
UNIHDR: home directory unicode string header
UNIHDR: home directory drive unicode string header
UINT16: logon count
UINT16: bad password count
UINT32: User ID
UINT32: Group ID
UINT32: num groups
VOID*: undocumented buffer pointer to groups.
UINT32: user flags
char[16]: user session key
UNIHDR: logon server unicode string header
UNIHDR: logon domain unicode string header
VOID*: undocumented logon domain id pointer
char[40]: 40 undocumented padding bytes. future expansion?
UINT32: 0 - num_other_sids?
VOID*: NULL - undocumented pointer to other domain SIDs.
UNISTR2: username unicode string
UNISTR2: user's full name unicode string
UNISTR2: logon script unicode string
UNISTR2: profile path unicode string
UNISTR2: home directory unicode string
UNISTR2: home directory drive unicode string
UINT32: num groups
GID[num_groups]: group info
UNISTR2: logon server unicode string
UNISTR2: logon domain unicode string
DOM_SID: domain SID
DOM_SID[num_sids]: other domain SIDs?

SH_INFO_1_PTR (pointers to level 1 share info strings)

Note: see cifsrap2.txt section5, page 10.

0 for shi1_type indicates a Disk.

1 for shi1_type indicates a Print Queue.

2 for shi1_type indicates a Device.

3 for shi1_type indicates an IPC pipe.

0x8000 0000 (top bit set in shi1_type) indicates a hidden share.

VOID*: shi1_netname - pointer to net name
UINT32: shi1_type - type of share. 0 - undocumented.
VOID*: shi1_remark - pointer to comment.

SH_INFO_1_STR (level 1 share info strings)

UNISTR2: shi1_netname - unicode string of net name
UNISTR2: shi1_remark - unicode string of comment.

SHARE_INFO_1_CTR

share container with 0 entries:

UINT32: 0 - EntriesRead
UINT32: 0 - Buffer

share container with > 0 entries:

UINT32: EntriesRead
UINT32: non-zero - Buffer
UINT32: EntriesRead
SH_INFO_1_PTR[EntriesRead]: share entry pointers
SH_INFO_1_STR[EntriesRead]: share entry strings
UINT8[]: padding to get unicode string 4-byte aligned with start of the SMB header.
UINT32: EntriesRead
UINT32: 0 - padding

SERVER_INFO_101

Note: see cifs6.txt section 6.4 - the fields described therein will be of assistance here. for example, the type listed below is the same as fServerType, which is described in 6.4.1.

SV_TYPE_WORKSTATION: 0x00000001 All workstations
SV_TYPE_SERVER: 0x00000002 All servers
SV_TYPE_SQLSERVER: 0x00000004 Any server running with SQL server
SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_CTRL: 0x00000008 Primary domain controller
SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_BAKCTRL: 0x00000010 Backup domain controller
SV_TYPE_TIME_SOURCE: 0x00000020 Server running the timesource service
SV_TYPE_AFP: 0x00000040 Apple File Protocol servers
SV_TYPE_NOVELL: 0x00000080 Novell servers
SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_MEMBER: 0x00000100 Domain Member
SV_TYPE_PRINTQ_SERVER: 0x00000200 Server sharing print queue
SV_TYPE_DIALIN_SERVER: 0x00000400 Server running dialin service.
SV_TYPE_XENIX_SERVER: 0x00000800 Xenix server
SV_TYPE_NT: 0x00001000 NT server
SV_TYPE_WFW: 0x00002000 Server running Windows for
SV_TYPE_SERVER_NT: 0x00008000 Windows NT non DC server
SV_TYPE_POTENTIAL_BROWSER: 0x00010000 Server that can run the browser service
SV_TYPE_BACKUP_BROWSER: 0x00020000 Backup browser server
SV_TYPE_MASTER_BROWSER: 0x00040000 Master browser server
SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_MASTER: 0x00080000 Domain Master Browser server
SV_TYPE_LOCAL_LIST_ONLY: 0x40000000 Enumerate only entries marked "local"
SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_ENUM: 0x80000000 Enumerate Domains. The pszServer and pszDomain parameters must be NULL.

UINT32: 500 - platform_id
VOID*: pointer to name
UINT32: 5 - major version
UINT32: 4 - minor version
UINT32: type (SV_TYPE_... bit field)
VOID*: pointer to comment
UNISTR2: sv101_name - unicode string of server name
UNISTR2: sv_101_comment - unicode string of server comment.
UINT8[]: padding to get unicode string 4-byte aligned with start of the SMB header.

MSRPC over Transact Named Pipe

For details on the SMB Transact Named Pipe, see cifs6.txt

MSRPC Pipes

The MSRPC is conducted over an SMB Transact Pipe with a name of \PIPE\. You must first obtain a 16 bit file handle, by sending a SMBopenX with the pipe name \PIPE\srvsvc for @@ -1266,21 +1266,21 @@ To be resolved: lkcl/01nov97 there appear to be two additional bytes after the null-terminated \PIPE\ name for the RPC pipe. Values seen so far are listed below:

         initial SMBopenX request:         RPC API command 0x26 params:
-        "\\PIPE\\lsarpc"                  0x65 0x63; 0x72 0x70; 0x44 0x65;
-        "\\PIPE\\srvsvc"                  0x73 0x76; 0x4E 0x00; 0x5C 0x43;
-

Header

[section to be rewritten, following receipt of work by Duncan Stansfield]

Interesting note: if you set packed data representation to 0x0100 0000 -then all 4-byte and 2-byte word ordering is turned around!

The start of each of the NTLSA and NETLOGON named pipes begins with:

offset: 00

Variable type: UINT8

Variable data: 5 - RPC major version

offset: 01

Variable type: UINT8

Variable data: 0 - RPC minor version

offset: 02

Variable type: UINT8

Variable data: 2 - RPC response packet

offset: 03

Variable type: UINT8

Variable data: 3 - (FirstFrag bit-wise or with LastFrag)

offset: 04

Variable type: UINT32

Variable data: 0x1000 0000 - packed data representation

offset: 08

Variable type: UINT16

Variable data: fragment length - data size (bytes) inc header and tail.

offset: 0A

Variable type: UINT16

Variable data: 0 - authentication length

offset: 0C

Variable type: UINT32

Variable data: call identifier. matches 12th UINT32 of incoming RPC data.

offset: 10

Variable type: UINT32

Variable data: allocation hint - data size (bytes) minus header and tail.

offset: 14

Variable type: UINT16

Variable data: 0 - presentation context identifier

offset: 16

Variable type: UINT8

Variable data: 0 - cancel count

offset: 17

Variable type: UINT8

Variable data: in replies: 0 - reserved; in requests: opnum - see #defines.

offset: 18

Variable type: ......

Variable data: start of data (goes on for allocation_hint bytes)

RPC_Packet for request, response, bind and bind acknowledgement

UINT8 versionmaj: reply same as request (0x05)
UINT8 versionmin: reply same as request (0x00)
UINT8 type: one of the MSRPC_Type enums
UINT8 flags: reply same as request (0x00 for Bind, 0x03 for Request)
UINT32 representation: reply same as request (0x00000010)
UINT16 fraglength: the length of the data section of the SMB trans packet
UINT16 authlength
UINT32 callid: call identifier. (e.g. 0x00149594)
* stub USE TvPacket: the remainder of the packet depending on the "type"

Interface identification

the interfaces are numbered. as yet I haven't seen more than one interface used on the same pipe name srvsvc

+        "\\PIPE\\lsarpc"                  0x65 0x63; 0x72 0x70; 0x44 0x65;
+        "\\PIPE\\srvsvc"                  0x73 0x76; 0x4E 0x00; 0x5C 0x43;
+

Header

[section to be rewritten, following receipt of work by Duncan Stansfield]

Interesting note: if you set packed data representation to 0x0100 0000 +then all 4-byte and 2-byte word ordering is turned around!

The start of each of the NTLSA and NETLOGON named pipes begins with:

offset: 00

Variable type: UINT8

Variable data: 5 - RPC major version

offset: 01

Variable type: UINT8

Variable data: 0 - RPC minor version

offset: 02

Variable type: UINT8

Variable data: 2 - RPC response packet

offset: 03

Variable type: UINT8

Variable data: 3 - (FirstFrag bit-wise or with LastFrag)

offset: 04

Variable type: UINT32

Variable data: 0x1000 0000 - packed data representation

offset: 08

Variable type: UINT16

Variable data: fragment length - data size (bytes) inc header and tail.

offset: 0A

Variable type: UINT16

Variable data: 0 - authentication length

offset: 0C

Variable type: UINT32

Variable data: call identifier. matches 12th UINT32 of incoming RPC data.

offset: 10

Variable type: UINT32

Variable data: allocation hint - data size (bytes) minus header and tail.

offset: 14

Variable type: UINT16

Variable data: 0 - presentation context identifier

offset: 16

Variable type: UINT8

Variable data: 0 - cancel count

offset: 17

Variable type: UINT8

Variable data: in replies: 0 - reserved; in requests: opnum - see #defines.

offset: 18

Variable type: ......

Variable data: start of data (goes on for allocation_hint bytes)

RPC_Packet for request, response, bind and bind acknowledgement

UINT8 versionmaj: reply same as request (0x05)
UINT8 versionmin: reply same as request (0x00)
UINT8 type: one of the MSRPC_Type enums
UINT8 flags: reply same as request (0x00 for Bind, 0x03 for Request)
UINT32 representation: reply same as request (0x00000010)
UINT16 fraglength: the length of the data section of the SMB trans packet
UINT16 authlength
UINT32 callid: call identifier. (e.g. 0x00149594)
* stub USE TvPacket: the remainder of the packet depending on the "type"

Interface identification

the interfaces are numbered. as yet I haven't seen more than one interface used on the same pipe name srvsvc

 abstract (0x4B324FC8, 0x01D31670, 0x475A7812, 0x88E16EBF, 0x00000003)
 transfer (0x8A885D04, 0x11C91CEB, 0x0008E89F, 0x6048102B, 0x00000002)
-

RPC_Iface RW

UINT8 byte[16]: 16 bytes of number
UINT32 version: the interface number

RPC_ReqBind RW

the remainder of the packet after the header if "type" was Bind in the response header, "type" should be BindAck

UINT16 maxtsize: maximum transmission fragment size (0x1630)
UINT16 maxrsize: max receive fragment size (0x1630)
UINT32 assocgid: associated group id (0x0)
UINT32 numelements: the number of elements (0x1)
UINT16 contextid: presentation context identifier (0x0)
UINT8 numsyntaxes: the number of syntaxes (has always been 1?)(0x1)
UINT8[]: 4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header
* abstractint USE RPC_Iface: num and vers. of interface client is using
* transferint USE RPC_Iface: num and vers. of interface to use for replies

RPC_Address RW

UINT16 length: length of the string including null terminator
* port USE string: the string above in single byte, null terminated form

RPC_ResBind RW

the response to place after the header in the reply packet

UINT16 maxtsize: same as request
UINT16 maxrsize: same as request
UINT32 assocgid: zero
* secondaddr USE RPC_Address: the address string, as described earlier
UINT8[]: 4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header
UINT8 numresults: the number of results (0x01)
UINT8[]: 4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header
UINT16 result: result (0x00 = accept)
UINT16 reason: reason (0x00 = no reason specified)
* transfersyntax USE RPC_Iface: the transfer syntax from the request

RPC_ReqNorm RW

the remainder of the packet after the header for every other other request

UINT32 allochint: the size of the stub data in bytes
UINT16 prescontext: presentation context identifier (0x0)
UINT16 opnum: operation number (0x15)
* stub USE TvPacket: a packet dependent on the pipe name (probably the interface) and the op number)

RPC_ResNorm RW

UINT32 allochint: # size of the stub data in bytes
UINT16 prescontext: # presentation context identifier (same as request)
UINT8 cancelcount: # cancel count? (0x0)
UINT8 reserved: # 0 - one byte padding
* stub USE TvPacket: # the remainder of the reply

Tail

The end of each of the NTLSA and NETLOGON named pipes ends with:

......: end of data
UINT32: return code

RPC Bind / Bind Ack

RPC_Iface RW

UINT8 byte[16]: 16 bytes of number
UINT32 version: the interface number

RPC_ReqBind RW

the remainder of the packet after the header if "type" was Bind in the response header, "type" should be BindAck

UINT16 maxtsize: maximum transmission fragment size (0x1630)
UINT16 maxrsize: max receive fragment size (0x1630)
UINT32 assocgid: associated group id (0x0)
UINT32 numelements: the number of elements (0x1)
UINT16 contextid: presentation context identifier (0x0)
UINT8 numsyntaxes: the number of syntaxes (has always been 1?)(0x1)
UINT8[]: 4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header
* abstractint USE RPC_Iface: num and vers. of interface client is using
* transferint USE RPC_Iface: num and vers. of interface to use for replies

RPC_Address RW

UINT16 length: length of the string including null terminator
* port USE string: the string above in single byte, null terminated form

RPC_ResBind RW

the response to place after the header in the reply packet

UINT16 maxtsize: same as request
UINT16 maxrsize: same as request
UINT32 assocgid: zero
* secondaddr USE RPC_Address: the address string, as described earlier
UINT8[]: 4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header
UINT8 numresults: the number of results (0x01)
UINT8[]: 4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header
UINT16 result: result (0x00 = accept)
UINT16 reason: reason (0x00 = no reason specified)
* transfersyntax USE RPC_Iface: the transfer syntax from the request

RPC_ReqNorm RW

the remainder of the packet after the header for every other other request

UINT32 allochint: the size of the stub data in bytes
UINT16 prescontext: presentation context identifier (0x0)
UINT16 opnum: operation number (0x15)
* stub USE TvPacket: a packet dependent on the pipe name (probably the interface) and the op number)

RPC_ResNorm RW

UINT32 allochint: # size of the stub data in bytes
UINT16 prescontext: # presentation context identifier (same as request)
UINT8 cancelcount: # cancel count? (0x0)
UINT8 reserved: # 0 - one byte padding
* stub USE TvPacket: # the remainder of the reply

Tail

The end of each of the NTLSA and NETLOGON named pipes ends with:

......: end of data
UINT32: return code

RPC Bind / Bind Ack

RPC Binds are the process of associating an RPC pipe (e.g \PIPE\lsarpc) -with a "transfer syntax" (see RPC_Iface structure). The purpose for doing +with a "transfer syntax" (see RPC_Iface structure). The purpose for doing this is unknown.

Note: The RPC_ResBind SMB Transact request is sent with two uint16 setup parameters. The first is 0x0026; the second is the file handle returned by the SMBopenX Transact response.

Note: The RPC_ResBind members maxtsize, maxrsize and assocgid are the same in the response as the same members in the RPC_ReqBind. The RPC_ResBind member transfersyntax is the same in the response as the

Note: The RPC_ResBind response member secondaddr contains the name of what is presumed to be the service behind the RPC pipe. The - mapping identified so far is:

initial SMBopenX request:: RPC_ResBind response:
"\\PIPE\\srvsvc": "\\PIPE\\ntsvcs"
"\\PIPE\\samr": "\\PIPE\\lsass"
"\\PIPE\\lsarpc": "\\PIPE\\lsass"
"\\PIPE\\wkssvc": "\\PIPE\\wksvcs"
"\\PIPE\\NETLOGON": "\\PIPE\\NETLOGON"

Note: The RPC_Packet fraglength member in both the Bind Request and Bind Acknowledgment must contain the length of the entire RPC data, including the RPC_Packet header.

Request:

RPC_Packet

RPC_ReqBind

Response:

RPC_Packet

RPC_ResBind

NTLSA Transact Named Pipe

The sequence of actions taken on this pipe are:

Establish a connection to the IPC$ share (SMBtconX). use encrypted passwords.

Open an RPC Pipe with the name "\\PIPE\\lsarpc". Store the file handle.

Using the file handle, send a Set Named Pipe Handle state to 0x4300.

Send an LSA Open Policy request. Store the Policy Handle.

Using the Policy Handle, send LSA Query Info Policy requests, etc.

Using the Policy Handle, send an LSA Close.

Close the IPC$ share.

Defines for this pipe, identifying the query are:

LSA Open Policy:: 0x2c
LSA Query Info Policy:: 0x07
LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains:: 0x0d
LSA Open Secret:: 0xff
LSA Lookup SIDs:: 0xfe
LSA Lookup Names:: 0xfd
LSA Close:: 0x00

LSA Open Policy

Note: The policy handle can be anything you like.

Request

VOID*: buffer pointer
UNISTR2: server name - unicode string starting with two '\'s
OBJ_ATTR: object attributes
UINT32: 1 - desired access

Response

POL_HND: LSA policy handle
return: 0 - indicates success

LSA Query Info Policy

Note: The info class in response must be the same as that in the request.

Request

POL_HND: LSA policy handle
UINT16: info class (also a policy handle?)

Response

VOID*: undocumented buffer pointer
UINT16: info class (same as info class in request).

+ mapping identified so far is:

initial SMBopenX request:: RPC_ResBind response:
"\\PIPE\\srvsvc": "\\PIPE\\ntsvcs"
"\\PIPE\\samr": "\\PIPE\\lsass"
"\\PIPE\\lsarpc": "\\PIPE\\lsass"
"\\PIPE\\wkssvc": "\\PIPE\\wksvcs"
"\\PIPE\\NETLOGON": "\\PIPE\\NETLOGON"

Note: The RPC_Packet fraglength member in both the Bind Request and Bind Acknowledgment must contain the length of the entire RPC data, including the RPC_Packet header.

Request:

RPC_Packet

RPC_ReqBind

Response:

RPC_Packet

RPC_ResBind

NTLSA Transact Named Pipe

The sequence of actions taken on this pipe are:

Establish a connection to the IPC$ share (SMBtconX). use encrypted passwords.

Open an RPC Pipe with the name "\\PIPE\\lsarpc". Store the file handle.

Using the file handle, send a Set Named Pipe Handle state to 0x4300.

Send an LSA Open Policy request. Store the Policy Handle.

Using the Policy Handle, send LSA Query Info Policy requests, etc.

Using the Policy Handle, send an LSA Close.

Close the IPC$ share.

Defines for this pipe, identifying the query are:

LSA Open Policy:: 0x2c
LSA Query Info Policy:: 0x07
LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains:: 0x0d
LSA Open Secret:: 0xff
LSA Lookup SIDs:: 0xfe
LSA Lookup Names:: 0xfd
LSA Close:: 0x00

LSA Open Policy

Note: The policy handle can be anything you like.

Request

VOID*: buffer pointer
UNISTR2: server name - unicode string starting with two '\'s
OBJ_ATTR: object attributes
UINT32: 1 - desired access

Response

POL_HND: LSA policy handle
return: 0 - indicates success

LSA Query Info Policy

Note: The info class in response must be the same as that in the request.

Request

POL_HND: LSA policy handle
UINT16: info class (also a policy handle?)

Response

VOID*: undocumented buffer pointer
UINT16: info class (same as info class in request).

 switch (info class)
 case 3:
 case 5:
@@ -1289,11 +1289,11 @@ DOM_INFO domain info, levels 3 and 5 (are the same).
 }
 
 return    0 - indicates success
-

LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains

Request

no extra data

Response

UINT32: 0 - enumeration context
UINT32: 0 - entries read
UINT32: 0 - trust information
return: 0x8000 001a - "no trusted domains" success code

LSA Open Secret

Request

no extra data

Response

UINT32: 0 - undocumented
UINT32: 0 - undocumented
UINT32: 0 - undocumented
UINT32: 0 - undocumented
UINT32: 0 - undocumented

return 0x0C00 0034 - "no such secret" success code

LSA Close

Request

POL_HND: policy handle to be closed

Response

POL_HND: 0s - closed policy handle (all zeros)

return 0 - indicates success

LSA Lookup SIDS

Note: num_entries in response must be same as num_entries in request.

Request

POL_HND: LSA policy handle
UINT32: num_entries
VOID*: undocumented domain SID buffer pointer
VOID*: undocumented domain name buffer pointer
VOID*[num_entries] undocumented domain SID pointers to be looked up. -: DOM_SID[num_entries] domain SIDs to be looked up.
char[16]: completely undocumented 16 bytes.

Response

DOM_REF: domain reference response
UINT32: num_entries (listed above)
VOID*: undocumented buffer pointer
UINT32: num_entries (listed above)
DOM_SID2[num_entries]: domain SIDs (from Request, listed above).
UINT32: num_entries (listed above)

return 0 - indicates success

LSA Lookup Names

Note: num_entries in response must be same as num_entries in request.

Request

POL_HND: LSA policy handle
UINT32: num_entries
UINT32: num_entries
VOID*: undocumented domain SID buffer pointer
VOID*: undocumented domain name buffer pointer
NAME[num_entries]: names to be looked up.
char[]: undocumented bytes - falsely translated SID structure?

Response

DOM_REF: domain reference response
UINT32: num_entries (listed above)
VOID*: undocumented buffer pointer
UINT32: num_entries (listed above)
DOM_RID[num_entries]: domain SIDs (from Request, listed above).
UINT32: num_entries (listed above)

return 0 - indicates success

NETLOGON rpc Transact Named Pipe

The sequence of actions taken on this pipe are:

tablish a connection to the IPC$ share (SMBtconX). use encrypted passwords.

en an RPC Pipe with the name "\\PIPE\\NETLOGON". Store the file handle.

ing the file handle, send a Set Named Pipe Handle state to 0x4300.

eate Client Challenge. Send LSA Request Challenge. Store Server Challenge.

lculate Session Key. Send an LSA Auth 2 Challenge. Store Auth2 Challenge.

lc/Verify Client Creds. Send LSA Srv PW Set. Calc/Verify Server Creds.

lc/Verify Client Creds. Send LSA SAM Logon . Calc/Verify Server Creds.

lc/Verify Client Creds. Send LSA SAM Logoff. Calc/Verify Server Creds.

ose the IPC$ share.

Defines for this pipe, identifying the query are

LSA Request Challenge:: 0x04
LSA Server Password Set:: 0x06
LSA SAM Logon:: 0x02
LSA SAM Logoff:: 0x03
LSA Auth 2:: 0x0f
LSA Logon Control:: 0x0e

LSA Request Challenge

Note: logon server name starts with two '\' characters and is upper case.

Note: logon client is the machine, not the user.

Note: the initial LanManager password hash, against which the challenge is issued, is the machine name itself (lower case). there will becalls issued (LSA Server Password Set) which will change this, later. refusing these calls allows you to always deal with the same password (i.e the LM# of the machine name in lower case).

Request

VOID*: undocumented buffer pointer
UNISTR2: logon server unicode string
UNISTR2: logon client unicode string
char[8]: client challenge

Response

char[8]: server challenge

return 0 - indicates success

LSA Authenticate 2

Note: in between request and response, calculate the client credentials, and check them against the client-calculated credentials (this process uses the previously received client credentials).

Note: neg_flags in the response is the same as that in the request.

Note: you must take a copy of the client-calculated credentials received here, because they will be used in subsequent authentication packets.

Request

LOG_INFO: client identification info
char[8]: client-calculated credentials
UINT8[]: padding to 4-byte align with start of SMB header.
UINT32: neg_flags - negotiated flags (usual value is 0x0000 01ff)

Response

char[8]: server credentials.
UINT32: neg_flags - same as neg_flags in request.

return 0 - indicates success. failure value unknown.

LSA Server Password Set

Note: the new password is suspected to be a DES encryption using the old password to generate the key.

Note: in between request and response, calculate the client credentials, and check them against the client-calculated credentials (this process uses the previously received client credentials).

Note: the server credentials are constructed from the client-calculated credentials and the client time + 1 second.

Note: you must take a copy of the client-calculated credentials received here, because they will be used in subsequent authentication packets.

Request

CLNT_INFO: client identification/authentication info
char[]: new password - undocumented.

Response

CREDS: server credentials. server time stamp appears to be ignored.

return 0 - indicates success; 0xC000 006a indicates failure

LSA SAM Logon

LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains

Request

no extra data

Response

UINT32: 0 - enumeration context
UINT32: 0 - entries read
UINT32: 0 - trust information
return: 0x8000 001a - "no trusted domains" success code

LSA Open Secret

Request

no extra data

Response

UINT32: 0 - undocumented
UINT32: 0 - undocumented
UINT32: 0 - undocumented
UINT32: 0 - undocumented
UINT32: 0 - undocumented

return 0x0C00 0034 - "no such secret" success code

LSA Close

Request

POL_HND: policy handle to be closed

Response

POL_HND: 0s - closed policy handle (all zeros)

return 0 - indicates success

LSA Lookup SIDS

Note: num_entries in response must be same as num_entries in request.

Request

POL_HND: LSA policy handle
UINT32: num_entries
VOID*: undocumented domain SID buffer pointer
VOID*: undocumented domain name buffer pointer
VOID*[num_entries] undocumented domain SID pointers to be looked up. +: DOM_SID[num_entries] domain SIDs to be looked up.
char[16]: completely undocumented 16 bytes.

Response

DOM_REF: domain reference response
UINT32: num_entries (listed above)
VOID*: undocumented buffer pointer
UINT32: num_entries (listed above)
DOM_SID2[num_entries]: domain SIDs (from Request, listed above).
UINT32: num_entries (listed above)

return 0 - indicates success

LSA Lookup Names

Note: num_entries in response must be same as num_entries in request.

Request

POL_HND: LSA policy handle
UINT32: num_entries
UINT32: num_entries
VOID*: undocumented domain SID buffer pointer
VOID*: undocumented domain name buffer pointer
NAME[num_entries]: names to be looked up.
char[]: undocumented bytes - falsely translated SID structure?

Response

DOM_REF: domain reference response
UINT32: num_entries (listed above)
VOID*: undocumented buffer pointer
UINT32: num_entries (listed above)
DOM_RID[num_entries]: domain SIDs (from Request, listed above).
UINT32: num_entries (listed above)

return 0 - indicates success

NETLOGON rpc Transact Named Pipe

The sequence of actions taken on this pipe are: