From 927a8b330435b4c959ad851e32b83d97a6e3001b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Bartlett Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2009 13:26:38 +1100 Subject: Move libcli/auth to the top level --- libcli/auth/ntlm_check.c | 603 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 603 insertions(+) create mode 100644 libcli/auth/ntlm_check.c (limited to 'libcli/auth/ntlm_check.c') diff --git a/libcli/auth/ntlm_check.c b/libcli/auth/ntlm_check.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0805b1b043 --- /dev/null +++ b/libcli/auth/ntlm_check.c @@ -0,0 +1,603 @@ +/* + Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. + Password and authentication handling + Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2001-2004 + Copyright (C) Gerald Carter 2003 + Copyright (C) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton 1996-2000 + + This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + GNU General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + along with this program. If not, see . +*/ + +#include "includes.h" +#include "../lib/crypto/crypto.h" +#include "librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h" +#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h" +#include "auth/ntlm/ntlm_check.h" + +/**************************************************************************** + Core of smb password checking routine. +****************************************************************************/ + +static bool smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const DATA_BLOB *nt_response, + const uint8_t *part_passwd, + const DATA_BLOB *sec_blob, + DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key) +{ + /* Finish the encryption of part_passwd. */ + uint8_t p24[24]; + + if (part_passwd == NULL) { + DEBUG(10,("No password set - DISALLOWING access\n")); + /* No password set - always false ! */ + return false; + } + + if (sec_blob->length != 8) { + DEBUG(0, ("smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1: incorrect challenge size (%lu)\n", + (unsigned long)sec_blob->length)); + return false; + } + + if (nt_response->length != 24) { + DEBUG(0, ("smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1: incorrect password length (%lu)\n", + (unsigned long)nt_response->length)); + return false; + } + + SMBOWFencrypt(part_passwd, sec_blob->data, p24); + +#if DEBUG_PASSWORD + DEBUG(100,("Part password (P16) was |\n")); + dump_data(100, part_passwd, 16); + DEBUGADD(100,("Password from client was |\n")); + dump_data(100, nt_response->data, nt_response->length); + DEBUGADD(100,("Given challenge was |\n")); + dump_data(100, sec_blob->data, sec_blob->length); + DEBUGADD(100,("Value from encryption was |\n")); + dump_data(100, p24, 24); +#endif + if (memcmp(p24, nt_response->data, 24) == 0) { + if (user_sess_key != NULL) { + *user_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16); + SMBsesskeygen_ntv1(part_passwd, user_sess_key->data); + } + return true; + } + return false; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Core of smb password checking routine. (NTLMv2, LMv2) + Note: The same code works with both NTLMv2 and LMv2. +****************************************************************************/ + +static bool smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const DATA_BLOB *ntv2_response, + const uint8_t *part_passwd, + const DATA_BLOB *sec_blob, + const char *user, const char *domain, + bool upper_case_domain, /* should the domain be transformed into upper case? */ + DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key) +{ + /* Finish the encryption of part_passwd. */ + uint8_t kr[16]; + uint8_t value_from_encryption[16]; + DATA_BLOB client_key_data; + + if (part_passwd == NULL) { + DEBUG(10,("No password set - DISALLOWING access\n")); + /* No password set - always false */ + return false; + } + + if (sec_blob->length != 8) { + DEBUG(0, ("smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2: incorrect challenge size (%lu)\n", + (unsigned long)sec_blob->length)); + return false; + } + + if (ntv2_response->length < 24) { + /* We MUST have more than 16 bytes, or the stuff below will go + crazy. No known implementation sends less than the 24 bytes + for LMv2, let alone NTLMv2. */ + DEBUG(0, ("smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2: incorrect password length (%lu)\n", + (unsigned long)ntv2_response->length)); + return false; + } + + client_key_data = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, ntv2_response->data+16, ntv2_response->length-16); + /* + todo: should we be checking this for anything? We can't for LMv2, + but for NTLMv2 it is meant to contain the current time etc. + */ + + if (!ntv2_owf_gen(part_passwd, user, domain, upper_case_domain, kr)) { + return false; + } + + SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2(kr, sec_blob, &client_key_data, value_from_encryption); + +#if DEBUG_PASSWORD + DEBUG(100,("Part password (P16) was |\n")); + dump_data(100, part_passwd, 16); + DEBUGADD(100,("Password from client was |\n")); + dump_data(100, ntv2_response->data, ntv2_response->length); + DEBUGADD(100,("Variable data from client was |\n")); + dump_data(100, client_key_data.data, client_key_data.length); + DEBUGADD(100,("Given challenge was |\n")); + dump_data(100, sec_blob->data, sec_blob->length); + DEBUGADD(100,("Value from encryption was |\n")); + dump_data(100, value_from_encryption, 16); +#endif + data_blob_clear_free(&client_key_data); + if (memcmp(value_from_encryption, ntv2_response->data, 16) == 0) { + if (user_sess_key != NULL) { + *user_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16); + SMBsesskeygen_ntv2(kr, value_from_encryption, user_sess_key->data); + } + return true; + } + return false; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Core of smb password checking routine. (NTLMv2, LMv2) + Note: The same code works with both NTLMv2 and LMv2. +****************************************************************************/ + +static bool smb_sess_key_ntlmv2(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const DATA_BLOB *ntv2_response, + const uint8_t *part_passwd, + const DATA_BLOB *sec_blob, + const char *user, const char *domain, + bool upper_case_domain, /* should the domain be transformed into upper case? */ + DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key) +{ + /* Finish the encryption of part_passwd. */ + uint8_t kr[16]; + uint8_t value_from_encryption[16]; + DATA_BLOB client_key_data; + + if (part_passwd == NULL) { + DEBUG(10,("No password set - DISALLOWING access\n")); + /* No password set - always false */ + return false; + } + + if (sec_blob->length != 8) { + DEBUG(0, ("smb_sess_key_ntlmv2: incorrect challenge size (%lu)\n", + (unsigned long)sec_blob->length)); + return false; + } + + if (ntv2_response->length < 24) { + /* We MUST have more than 16 bytes, or the stuff below will go + crazy. No known implementation sends less than the 24 bytes + for LMv2, let alone NTLMv2. */ + DEBUG(0, ("smb_sess_key_ntlmv2: incorrect password length (%lu)\n", + (unsigned long)ntv2_response->length)); + return false; + } + + client_key_data = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, ntv2_response->data+16, ntv2_response->length-16); + + if (!ntv2_owf_gen(part_passwd, user, domain, upper_case_domain, kr)) { + return false; + } + + SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2(kr, sec_blob, &client_key_data, value_from_encryption); + *user_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16); + SMBsesskeygen_ntv2(kr, value_from_encryption, user_sess_key->data); + return true; +} + +/** + * Compare password hashes against those from the SAM + * + * @param mem_ctx talloc context + * @param client_lanman LANMAN password hash, as supplied by the client + * @param client_nt NT (MD4) password hash, as supplied by the client + * @param username internal Samba username, for log messages + * @param client_username username the client used + * @param client_domain domain name the client used (may be mapped) + * @param stored_lanman LANMAN password hash, as stored on the SAM + * @param stored_nt NT (MD4) password hash, as stored on the SAM + * @param user_sess_key User session key + * @param lm_sess_key LM session key (first 8 bytes of the LM hash) + */ + +NTSTATUS hash_password_check(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + bool lanman_auth, + const struct samr_Password *client_lanman, + const struct samr_Password *client_nt, + const char *username, + const struct samr_Password *stored_lanman, + const struct samr_Password *stored_nt) +{ + if (stored_nt == NULL) { + DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NO NT password stored for user %s.\n", + username)); + } + + if (client_nt && stored_nt) { + if (memcmp(client_nt->hash, stored_nt->hash, sizeof(stored_nt->hash)) == 0) { + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } else { + DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: Interactive logon: NT password check failed for user %s\n", + username)); + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } + + } else if (client_lanman && stored_lanman) { + if (!lanman_auth) { + DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: Interactive logon: only LANMAN password supplied for user %s, and LM passwords are disabled!\n", + username)); + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } + if (strchr_m(username, '@')) { + return NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND; + } + + if (memcmp(client_lanman->hash, stored_lanman->hash, sizeof(stored_lanman->hash)) == 0) { + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } else { + DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: Interactive logon: LANMAN password check failed for user %s\n", + username)); + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } + } + if (strchr_m(username, '@')) { + return NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND; + } + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; +} + +/** + * Check a challenge-response password against the value of the NT or + * LM password hash. + * + * @param mem_ctx talloc context + * @param challenge 8-byte challenge. If all zero, forces plaintext comparison + * @param nt_response 'unicode' NT response to the challenge, or unicode password + * @param lm_response ASCII or LANMAN response to the challenge, or password in DOS code page + * @param username internal Samba username, for log messages + * @param client_username username the client used + * @param client_domain domain name the client used (may be mapped) + * @param stored_lanman LANMAN ASCII password from our passdb or similar + * @param stored_nt MD4 unicode password from our passdb or similar + * @param user_sess_key User session key + * @param lm_sess_key LM session key (first 8 bytes of the LM hash) + */ + +NTSTATUS ntlm_password_check(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + bool lanman_auth, + bool ntlm_auth, + uint32_t logon_parameters, + const DATA_BLOB *challenge, + const DATA_BLOB *lm_response, + const DATA_BLOB *nt_response, + const char *username, + const char *client_username, + const char *client_domain, + const struct samr_Password *stored_lanman, + const struct samr_Password *stored_nt, + DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key, + DATA_BLOB *lm_sess_key) +{ + const static uint8_t zeros[8]; + DATA_BLOB tmp_sess_key; + + if (stored_nt == NULL) { + DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NO NT password stored for user %s.\n", + username)); + } + + *lm_sess_key = data_blob(NULL, 0); + *user_sess_key = data_blob(NULL, 0); + + /* Check for cleartext netlogon. Used by Exchange 5.5. */ + if ((logon_parameters & MSV1_0_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED) + && challenge->length == sizeof(zeros) + && (memcmp(challenge->data, zeros, challenge->length) == 0 )) { + struct samr_Password client_nt; + struct samr_Password client_lm; + char *unix_pw = NULL; + bool lm_ok; + + DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: checking plaintext passwords for user %s\n", + username)); + mdfour(client_nt.hash, nt_response->data, nt_response->length); + + if (lm_response->length && + (convert_string_talloc(mem_ctx, CH_DOS, CH_UNIX, + lm_response->data, lm_response->length, + (void **)&unix_pw, NULL, false))) { + if (E_deshash(unix_pw, client_lm.hash)) { + lm_ok = true; + } else { + lm_ok = false; + } + } else { + lm_ok = false; + } + return hash_password_check(mem_ctx, + lanman_auth, + lm_ok ? &client_lm : NULL, + nt_response->length ? &client_nt : NULL, + username, + stored_lanman, stored_nt); + } + + if (nt_response->length != 0 && nt_response->length < 24) { + DEBUG(2,("ntlm_password_check: invalid NT password length (%lu) for user %s\n", + (unsigned long)nt_response->length, username)); + } + + if (nt_response->length > 24 && stored_nt) { + /* We have the NT MD4 hash challenge available - see if we can + use it + */ + DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NTLMv2 password with domain [%s]\n", client_domain)); + if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx, + nt_response, + stored_nt->hash, challenge, + client_username, + client_domain, + false, + user_sess_key)) { + *lm_sess_key = *user_sess_key; + if (user_sess_key->length) { + lm_sess_key->length = 8; + } + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + + DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NTLMv2 password with uppercased version of domain [%s]\n", client_domain)); + if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx, + nt_response, + stored_nt->hash, challenge, + client_username, + client_domain, + true, + user_sess_key)) { + *lm_sess_key = *user_sess_key; + if (user_sess_key->length) { + lm_sess_key->length = 8; + } + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + + DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NTLMv2 password without a domain\n")); + if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx, + nt_response, + stored_nt->hash, challenge, + client_username, + "", + false, + user_sess_key)) { + *lm_sess_key = *user_sess_key; + if (user_sess_key->length) { + lm_sess_key->length = 8; + } + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } else { + DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NTLMv2 password check failed\n")); + } + } else if (nt_response->length == 24 && stored_nt) { + if (ntlm_auth) { + /* We have the NT MD4 hash challenge available - see if we can + use it (ie. does it exist in the smbpasswd file). + */ + DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NT MD4 password\n")); + if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1(mem_ctx, + nt_response, + stored_nt->hash, challenge, + user_sess_key)) { + /* The LM session key for this response is not very secure, + so use it only if we otherwise allow LM authentication */ + + if (lanman_auth && stored_lanman) { + *lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, stored_lanman->hash, 8); + } + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } else { + DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NT MD4 password check failed for user %s\n", + username)); + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } + } else { + DEBUG(2,("ntlm_password_check: NTLMv1 passwords NOT PERMITTED for user %s\n", + username)); + /* no return, becouse we might pick up LMv2 in the LM field */ + } + } + + if (lm_response->length == 0) { + DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NEITHER LanMan nor NT password supplied for user %s\n", + username)); + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } + + if (lm_response->length < 24) { + DEBUG(2,("ntlm_password_check: invalid LanMan password length (%lu) for user %s\n", + (unsigned long)nt_response->length, username)); + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } + + if (!lanman_auth) { + DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: Lanman passwords NOT PERMITTED for user %s\n", + username)); + } else if (!stored_lanman) { + DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NO LanMan password set for user %s (and no NT password supplied)\n", + username)); + } else if (strchr_m(username, '@')) { + DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NO LanMan password allowed for username@realm logins (user: %s)\n", + username)); + } else { + DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking LM password\n")); + if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1(mem_ctx, + lm_response, + stored_lanman->hash, challenge, + NULL)) { + /* The session key for this response is still very odd. + It not very secure, so use it only if we otherwise + allow LM authentication */ + + if (lanman_auth && stored_lanman) { + uint8_t first_8_lm_hash[16]; + memcpy(first_8_lm_hash, stored_lanman->hash, 8); + memset(first_8_lm_hash + 8, '\0', 8); + *user_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, first_8_lm_hash, 16); + *lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, stored_lanman->hash, 8); + } + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + } + + if (!stored_nt) { + DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: LM password check failed for user, no NT password %s\n",username)); + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } + + /* This is for 'LMv2' authentication. almost NTLMv2 but limited to 24 bytes. + - related to Win9X, legacy NAS pass-though authentication + */ + DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking LMv2 password with domain %s\n", client_domain)); + if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx, + lm_response, + stored_nt->hash, challenge, + client_username, + client_domain, + false, + &tmp_sess_key)) { + if (nt_response->length > 24) { + /* If NTLMv2 authentication has preceeded us + * (even if it failed), then use the session + * key from that. See the RPC-SAMLOGON + * torture test */ + smb_sess_key_ntlmv2(mem_ctx, + nt_response, + stored_nt->hash, challenge, + client_username, + client_domain, + false, + user_sess_key); + } else { + /* Otherwise, use the LMv2 session key */ + *user_sess_key = tmp_sess_key; + } + *lm_sess_key = *user_sess_key; + if (user_sess_key->length) { + lm_sess_key->length = 8; + } + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + + DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking LMv2 password with upper-cased version of domain %s\n", client_domain)); + if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx, + lm_response, + stored_nt->hash, challenge, + client_username, + client_domain, + true, + &tmp_sess_key)) { + if (nt_response->length > 24) { + /* If NTLMv2 authentication has preceeded us + * (even if it failed), then use the session + * key from that. See the RPC-SAMLOGON + * torture test */ + smb_sess_key_ntlmv2(mem_ctx, + nt_response, + stored_nt->hash, challenge, + client_username, + client_domain, + true, + user_sess_key); + } else { + /* Otherwise, use the LMv2 session key */ + *user_sess_key = tmp_sess_key; + } + *lm_sess_key = *user_sess_key; + if (user_sess_key->length) { + lm_sess_key->length = 8; + } + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + + DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking LMv2 password without a domain\n")); + if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx, + lm_response, + stored_nt->hash, challenge, + client_username, + "", + false, + &tmp_sess_key)) { + if (nt_response->length > 24) { + /* If NTLMv2 authentication has preceeded us + * (even if it failed), then use the session + * key from that. See the RPC-SAMLOGON + * torture test */ + smb_sess_key_ntlmv2(mem_ctx, + nt_response, + stored_nt->hash, challenge, + client_username, + "", + false, + user_sess_key); + } else { + /* Otherwise, use the LMv2 session key */ + *user_sess_key = tmp_sess_key; + } + *lm_sess_key = *user_sess_key; + if (user_sess_key->length) { + lm_sess_key->length = 8; + } + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + + /* Apparently NT accepts NT responses in the LM field + - I think this is related to Win9X pass-though authentication + */ + DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NT MD4 password in LM field\n")); + if (ntlm_auth) { + if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1(mem_ctx, + lm_response, + stored_nt->hash, challenge, + NULL)) { + /* The session key for this response is still very odd. + It not very secure, so use it only if we otherwise + allow LM authentication */ + + if (lanman_auth && stored_lanman) { + uint8_t first_8_lm_hash[16]; + memcpy(first_8_lm_hash, stored_lanman->hash, 8); + memset(first_8_lm_hash + 8, '\0', 8); + *user_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, first_8_lm_hash, 16); + *lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, stored_lanman->hash, 8); + } + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: LM password, NT MD4 password in LM field and LMv2 failed for user %s\n",username)); + } else { + DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: LM password and LMv2 failed for user %s, and NT MD4 password in LM field not permitted\n",username)); + } + + /* Try and match error codes */ + if (strchr_m(username, '@')) { + return NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND; + } + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; +} + -- cgit