From 37d5ba8eae030ef852ca64181a5f8e5dbdc52079 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Tridgell Date: Sat, 15 Aug 1998 03:31:57 +0000 Subject: use user instead of this_user to prevent global shadowing (This used to be commit 76e523907c2ee51031341c3cef9e9f6b5b2d9dc4) --- source3/auth/pass_check.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) (limited to 'source3/auth/pass_check.c') diff --git a/source3/auth/pass_check.c b/source3/auth/pass_check.c index b5aa832f48..23ae4d0974 100644 --- a/source3/auth/pass_check.c +++ b/source3/auth/pass_check.c @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static struct pam_conv PAM_conversation = { }; -static BOOL pam_auth(char *this_user,char *password) +static BOOL pam_auth(char *user,char *password) { pam_handle_t *pamh; int pam_error; @@ -142,8 +142,8 @@ static BOOL pam_auth(char *this_user,char *password) pam_end(pamh, 0); return False; \ } PAM_password = password; - PAM_username = this_user; - pam_error = pam_start("samba", this_user, &PAM_conversation, &pamh); + PAM_username = user; + pam_error = pam_start("samba", user, &PAM_conversation, &pamh); PAM_BAIL; /* Setting PAM_SILENT stops generation of error messages to syslog * to enable debugging on Red Hat Linux set: @@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ static BOOL pam_auth(char *this_user,char *password) /******************************************************************* check on AFS authentication ********************************************************************/ -static BOOL afs_auth(char *this_user,char *password) +static BOOL afs_auth(char *user,char *password) { long password_expires = 0; char *reason; @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static BOOL afs_auth(char *this_user,char *password) /* but since I can't find the old documentation... :-) */ setpag(); if (ka_UserAuthenticateGeneral(KA_USERAUTH_VERSION+KA_USERAUTH_DOSETPAG, - this_user, + user, (char *) 0, /* instance */ (char *) 0, /* cell */ password, @@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ int dcelogin_atmost_once = 0; /******************************************************************* check on a DCE/DFS authentication ********************************************************************/ -static BOOL dfs_auth(char *this_user,char *password) +static BOOL dfs_auth(char *user,char *password) { error_status_t err; int err2; @@ -317,13 +317,13 @@ static BOOL dfs_auth(char *this_user,char *password) } } - if (sec_login_setup_identity((unsigned char *)this_user, + if (sec_login_setup_identity((unsigned char *)user, sec_login_no_flags, &my_dce_sec_context, &err) == 0) { dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2); DEBUG(0,("DCE Setup Identity for %s failed: %s\n", - this_user,dce_errstr)); + user,dce_errstr)); return(False); } @@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static BOOL dfs_auth(char *this_user,char *password) return False; } - if (sec_login_setup_identity((unsigned char *)this_user, + if (sec_login_setup_identity((unsigned char *)user, sec_login_no_flags, &my_dce_sec_context, &err) == 0) { @@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ static BOOL dfs_auth(char *this_user,char *password) setuid(0); setgid(0); DEBUG(0,("DCE Setup Identity for %s failed: %s\n", - this_user,dce_errstr)); + user,dce_errstr)); return(False); } @@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ static BOOL dfs_auth(char *this_user,char *password) setuid(0); setgid(0); DEBUG(0,("DCE Identity Validation failed for principal %s: %s\n", - this_user,dce_errstr)); + user,dce_errstr)); return(False); } @@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ static BOOL dfs_auth(char *this_user,char *password) if (err != error_status_ok) { dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2); DEBUG(0,("DCE login failed for principal %s, cant set context: %s\n", - this_user,dce_errstr)); + user,dce_errstr)); sec_login_purge_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err); /* Go back to root, JRA. */ @@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ static BOOL dfs_auth(char *this_user,char *password) } DEBUG(0,("DCE login succeeded for principal %s on pid %d\n", - this_user, getpid())); + user, getpid())); DEBUG(3,("DCE principal: %s\n" " uid: %d\n" @@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ void dfs_unlogin(void) /******************************************************************* check on Kerberos authentication ********************************************************************/ -static BOOL krb5_auth(char *this_user,char *password) +static BOOL krb5_auth(char *user,char *password) { krb5_data tgtname = { 0, @@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ static BOOL krb5_auth(char *this_user,char *password) return(False); } - if (retval = krb5_parse_name(kcontext, this_user, &kprinc)) { + if (retval = krb5_parse_name(kcontext, user, &kprinc)) { return(False); } @@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ static BOOL krb5_auth(char *this_user,char *password) /******************************************************************* check on Kerberos authentication ********************************************************************/ -static BOOL krb4_auth(char *this_user,char *password) +static BOOL krb4_auth(char *user,char *password) { char realm[REALM_SZ]; char tkfile[MAXPATHLEN]; @@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ static BOOL krb4_auth(char *this_user,char *password) getpid()); krb_set_tkt_string(tkfile); - if (krb_verify_user(this_user, "", realm, + if (krb_verify_user(user, "", realm, password, 0, "rmcd") == KSUCCESS) { unlink(tkfile); @@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ static BOOL password_check(char *password) - if HAVE_CRYPT is defined this is a potential security hole as it may authenticate via the crypt call when PAM settings say it should fail. - if (pam_auth(this_user,password)) return(True); + if (pam_auth(user,password)) return(True); Hence we make a direct return to avoid a second chance!!! */ return (pam_auth(this_user,password)); -- cgit