From ef2e26c91b80556af033d3335e55f5dfa6fff31d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Tridgell Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2003 01:53:07 +0000 Subject: first public release of samba4 code (This used to be commit b0510b5428b3461aeb9bbe3cc95f62fc73e2b97f) --- source4/auth/auth_server.c | 402 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 402 insertions(+) create mode 100644 source4/auth/auth_server.c (limited to 'source4/auth/auth_server.c') diff --git a/source4/auth/auth_server.c b/source4/auth/auth_server.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..620d9a33c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/source4/auth/auth_server.c @@ -0,0 +1,402 @@ +/* + Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. + Authenticate to a remote server + Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1998 + Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2001 + + This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + GNU General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. +*/ + +#include "includes.h" + +#undef DBGC_CLASS +#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH + +extern userdom_struct current_user_info; + +/**************************************************************************** + Support for server level security. +****************************************************************************/ + +static struct cli_state *server_cryptkey(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx) +{ + struct cli_state *cli = NULL; + fstring desthost; + struct in_addr dest_ip; + const char *p; + char *pserver; + BOOL connected_ok = False; + + if (!(cli = cli_initialise(cli))) + return NULL; + + /* security = server just can't function with spnego */ + cli->use_spnego = False; + + pserver = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, lp_passwordserver()); + p = pserver; + + while(next_token( &p, desthost, LIST_SEP, sizeof(desthost))) { + standard_sub_basic(current_user_info.smb_name, desthost, sizeof(desthost)); + strupper(desthost); + + if(!resolve_name( desthost, &dest_ip, 0x20)) { + DEBUG(1,("server_cryptkey: Can't resolve address for %s\n",desthost)); + continue; + } + + if (ismyip(dest_ip)) { + DEBUG(1,("Password server loop - disabling password server %s\n",desthost)); + continue; + } + + /* we use a mutex to prevent two connections at once - when a + Win2k PDC get two connections where one hasn't completed a + session setup yet it will send a TCP reset to the first + connection (tridge) */ + + if (!grab_server_mutex(desthost)) { + return NULL; + } + + if (cli_connect(cli, desthost, &dest_ip)) { + DEBUG(3,("connected to password server %s\n",desthost)); + connected_ok = True; + break; + } + } + + if (!connected_ok) { + release_server_mutex(); + DEBUG(0,("password server not available\n")); + cli_shutdown(cli); + return NULL; + } + + if (!attempt_netbios_session_request(cli, lp_netbios_name(), + desthost, &dest_ip)) { + release_server_mutex(); + DEBUG(1,("password server fails session request\n")); + cli_shutdown(cli); + return NULL; + } + + if (strequal(desthost,myhostname(mem_ctx))) { + exit_server("Password server loop!"); + } + + DEBUG(3,("got session\n")); + + if (!cli_negprot(cli)) { + DEBUG(1,("%s rejected the negprot\n",desthost)); + release_server_mutex(); + cli_shutdown(cli); + return NULL; + } + + if (cli->protocol < PROTOCOL_LANMAN2 || + !(cli->sec_mode & NEGOTIATE_SECURITY_USER_LEVEL)) { + DEBUG(1,("%s isn't in user level security mode\n",desthost)); + release_server_mutex(); + cli_shutdown(cli); + return NULL; + } + + /* Get the first session setup done quickly, to avoid silly + Win2k bugs. (The next connection to the server will kill + this one... + */ + + if (!cli_session_setup(cli, "", "", 0, "", 0, + "")) { + DEBUG(0,("%s rejected the initial session setup (%s)\n", + desthost, cli_errstr(cli))); + release_server_mutex(); + cli_shutdown(cli); + return NULL; + } + + release_server_mutex(); + + DEBUG(3,("password server OK\n")); + + return cli; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Clean up our allocated cli. +****************************************************************************/ + +static void free_server_private_data(void **private_data_pointer) +{ + struct cli_state **cli = (struct cli_state **)private_data_pointer; + if (*cli && (*cli)->initialised) { + cli_shutdown(*cli); + } +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Send a 'keepalive' packet down the cli pipe. +****************************************************************************/ + +static void send_server_keepalive(void **private_data_pointer) +{ + struct cli_state **cli = (struct cli_state **)private_data_pointer; + + /* also send a keepalive to the password server if its still + connected */ + if (cli && *cli && (*cli)->initialised) { + if (!send_nbt_keepalive((*cli)->fd)) { + DEBUG( 2, ( "password server keepalive failed.\n")); + cli_shutdown(*cli); + } + } +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Get the challenge out of a password server. +****************************************************************************/ + +static DATA_BLOB auth_get_challenge_server(const struct auth_context *auth_context, + void **my_private_data, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx) +{ + struct cli_state *cli = server_cryptkey(mem_ctx); + + if (cli) { + DEBUG(3,("using password server validation\n")); + + if ((cli->sec_mode & NEGOTIATE_SECURITY_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE) == 0) { + /* We can't work with unencrypted password servers + unless 'encrypt passwords = no' */ + DEBUG(5,("make_auth_info_server: Server is unencrypted, no challenge available..\n")); + + /* However, it is still a perfectly fine connection + to pass that unencrypted password over */ + *my_private_data = (void *)cli; + return data_blob(NULL, 0); + + } else if (cli->secblob.length < 8) { + /* We can't do much if we don't get a full challenge */ + DEBUG(2,("make_auth_info_server: Didn't receive a full challenge from server\n")); + cli_shutdown(cli); + return data_blob(NULL, 0); + } + + *my_private_data = (void *)cli; + + /* The return must be allocated on the caller's mem_ctx, as our own will be + destoyed just after the call. */ + return data_blob_talloc(auth_context->mem_ctx, cli->secblob.data,8); + } else { + return data_blob(NULL, 0); + } +} + + +/**************************************************************************** + Check for a valid username and password in security=server mode. + - Validate a password with the password server. +****************************************************************************/ + +static NTSTATUS check_smbserver_security(const struct auth_context *auth_context, + void *my_private_data, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + const auth_usersupplied_info *user_info, + auth_serversupplied_info **server_info) +{ + struct cli_state *cli; + static unsigned char badpass[24]; + static fstring baduser; + static BOOL tested_password_server = False; + static BOOL bad_password_server = False; + NTSTATUS nt_status = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE; + BOOL locally_made_cli = False; + + /* + * Check that the requested domain is not our own machine name. + * If it is, we should never check the PDC here, we use our own local + * password file. + */ + + if(is_myname(user_info->domain.str)) { + DEBUG(3,("check_smbserver_security: Requested domain was for this machine.\n")); + return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE; + } + + cli = my_private_data; + + if (cli) { + } else { + cli = server_cryptkey(mem_ctx); + locally_made_cli = True; + } + + if (!cli || !cli->initialised) { + DEBUG(1,("password server is not connected (cli not initilised)\n")); + return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE; + } + + if ((cli->sec_mode & NEGOTIATE_SECURITY_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE) == 0) { + if (user_info->encrypted) { + DEBUG(1,("password server %s is plaintext, but we are encrypted. This just can't work :-(\n", cli->desthost)); + return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE; + } + } else { + if (memcmp(cli->secblob.data, auth_context->challenge.data, 8) != 0) { + DEBUG(1,("the challenge that the password server (%s) supplied us is not the one we gave our client. This just can't work :-(\n", cli->desthost)); + return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE; + } + } + + if(badpass[0] == 0) + memset(badpass, 0x1f, sizeof(badpass)); + + if((user_info->nt_resp.length == sizeof(badpass)) && + !memcmp(badpass, user_info->nt_resp.data, sizeof(badpass))) { + /* + * Very unlikely, our random bad password is the same as the users + * password. + */ + memset(badpass, badpass[0]+1, sizeof(badpass)); + } + + if(baduser[0] == 0) { + fstrcpy(baduser, INVALID_USER_PREFIX); + fstrcat(baduser, lp_netbios_name()); + } + + /* + * Attempt a session setup with a totally incorrect password. + * If this succeeds with the guest bit *NOT* set then the password + * server is broken and is not correctly setting the guest bit. We + * need to detect this as some versions of NT4.x are broken. JRA. + */ + + /* I sure as hell hope that there aren't servers out there that take + * NTLMv2 and have this bug, as we don't test for that... + * - abartlet@samba.org + */ + + if ((!tested_password_server) && (lp_paranoid_server_security())) { + if (cli_session_setup(cli, baduser, (char *)badpass, sizeof(badpass), + (char *)badpass, sizeof(badpass), user_info->domain.str)) { + + /* + * We connected to the password server so we + * can say we've tested it. + */ + tested_password_server = True; + + if ((SVAL(cli->inbuf,smb_vwv2) & 1) == 0) { + DEBUG(0,("server_validate: password server %s allows users as non-guest \ +with a bad password.\n", cli->desthost)); + DEBUG(0,("server_validate: This is broken (and insecure) behaviour. Please do not \ +use this machine as the password server.\n")); + cli_ulogoff(cli); + + /* + * Password server has the bug. + */ + bad_password_server = True; + return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE; + } + cli_ulogoff(cli); + } + } else { + + /* + * We have already tested the password server. + * Fail immediately if it has the bug. + */ + + if(bad_password_server) { + DEBUG(0,("server_validate: [1] password server %s allows users as non-guest \ +with a bad password.\n", cli->desthost)); + DEBUG(0,("server_validate: [1] This is broken (and insecure) behaviour. Please do not \ +use this machine as the password server.\n")); + return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE; + } + } + + /* + * Now we know the password server will correctly set the guest bit, or is + * not guest enabled, we can try with the real password. + */ + + if (!user_info->encrypted) { + /* Plaintext available */ + if (!cli_session_setup(cli, user_info->smb_name.str, + (char *)user_info->plaintext_password.data, + user_info->plaintext_password.length, + NULL, 0, + user_info->domain.str)) { + DEBUG(1,("password server %s rejected the password\n", cli->desthost)); + /* Make this cli_nt_error() when the conversion is in */ + nt_status = cli_nt_error(cli); + } else { + nt_status = NT_STATUS_OK; + } + } else { + if (!cli_session_setup(cli, user_info->smb_name.str, + (char *)user_info->lm_resp.data, + user_info->lm_resp.length, + (char *)user_info->nt_resp.data, + user_info->nt_resp.length, + user_info->domain.str)) { + DEBUG(1,("password server %s rejected the password\n", cli->desthost)); + /* Make this cli_nt_error() when the conversion is in */ + nt_status = cli_nt_error(cli); + } else { + nt_status = NT_STATUS_OK; + } + } + + /* if logged in as guest then reject */ + if ((SVAL(cli->inbuf,smb_vwv2) & 1) != 0) { + DEBUG(1,("password server %s gave us guest only\n", cli->desthost)); + nt_status = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE; + } + + cli_ulogoff(cli); + + if NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status) { + struct passwd *pass = Get_Pwnam(user_info->internal_username.str); + if (pass) { + nt_status = make_server_info_pw(server_info, pass); + } else { + nt_status = NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER; + } + } + + if (locally_made_cli) { + cli_shutdown(cli); + } + + return(nt_status); +} + +NTSTATUS auth_init_smbserver(struct auth_context *auth_context, const char* param, auth_methods **auth_method) +{ + if (!make_auth_methods(auth_context, auth_method)) { + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + (*auth_method)->name = "smbserver"; + (*auth_method)->auth = check_smbserver_security; + (*auth_method)->get_chal = auth_get_challenge_server; + (*auth_method)->send_keepalive = send_server_keepalive; + (*auth_method)->free_private_data = free_server_private_data; + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} -- cgit