&author.tridge; &author.jelmer; &author.jht; This chapter provides information regarding the types of server that Samba may be configured to be. A Microsoft network administrator who wishes to migrate to or to use Samba will want to know what, within a Samba context, terms familiar to MS Windows administrator mean. This means that it is essential also to define how critical security modes function BEFORE we get into the details of how to configure the server itself. The chapter provides an overview of the security modes of which Samba is capable and how these relate to MS Windows servers and clients. A question often asked is, "Why would I want to use Samba?" Most chapters contain a section that highlights features and benefits. We hope that the information provided will help to answer this question. Be warned though, we want to be fair and reasonable, so not all features are positive towards Samba so the benefit may be on the side of our competition. Two men were walking down a dusty road, when one suddenly kicked up a small red stone. It hurt his toe and lodged in his sandal. He took the stone out and cursed it with a passion and fury fitting his anguish. The other looked at the stone and said, that is a garnet - I can turn that into a precious gem and some day it will make a princess very happy! The moral of this tale: Two men, two very different perspectives regarding the same stone. Like it or not, Samba is like that stone. Treat it the right way and it can bring great pleasure, but if you are forced upon it and have no time for its secrets then it can be a source of discomfort. Samba started out as a project that sought to provide interoperability for MS Windows 3.x clients with a UNIX server. It has grown up a lot since its humble beginnings and now provides features and functionality fit for large scale deployment. It also has some warts. In sections like this one we will tell of both. So now, what are the benefits of features mentioned in this chapter? Samba-3 can replace an MS Windows NT4 Domain Controller Samba-3 offers excellent interoperability with MS Windows NT4 style domains as well as natively with Microsoft Active Directory domains. Samba-3 permits full NT4 style Interdomain Trusts Samba has security modes that permit more flexible authentication than is possible with MS Windows NT4 Domain Controllers. Samba-3 permits use of multiple account database backends The account (password) database backends can be distributed and replicated using multiple methods. This gives Samba-3 greater flexibility than MS Windows NT4 and in many cases a significantly higher utility than Active Directory domains with MS Windows 200x. Administrators of Microsoft networks often refer to three different type of servers: Domain Controller Primary Domain Controller Backup Domain Controller ADS Domain Controller Domain Member Server Active Directory Domain Server NT4 Style Domain Domain Server Stand Alone Server The chapters covering Domain Control, Backup Domain Control and Domain Membership provide pertinent information regarding Samba configuration for each of these server roles. The reader is strongly encouraged to become intimately familiar with the information presented. In this section the function and purpose of Samba's security modes are described. An accurate understanding of how Samba implements each security mode as well as how to configure MS Windows clients for each mode will significantly reduce user complaints and administrator heartache. In the SMB/CIFS networking world, there are only two types of security: USER Level and SHARE Level. We refer to these collectively as security levels. In implementing these two security levels Samba provides flexibilities that are not available with Microsoft Windows NT4 / 200x servers. Samba knows of five (5) ways that allow the security levels to be implemented. In actual fact, Samba implements SHARE Level security only one way, but has four ways of implementing USER Level security. Collectively, we call the Samba implementations Security Modes. These are: SHARE, USER, DOMAIN, ADS, and SERVER modes. They are documented in this chapter. A SMB server tells the client at startup what security level it is running. There are two options: share level and user level. Which of these two the client receives affects the way the client then tries to authenticate itself. It does not directly affect (to any great extent) the way the Samba server does security. This may sound strange, but it fits in with the client/server approach of SMB. In SMB everything is initiated and controlled by the client, and the server can only tell the client what is available and whether an action is allowed. We will describe user level security first, as it's simpler. In user level security, the client will send a session setup command directly after the protocol negotiation. This contains a username and password. The server can either accept or reject that username/password combination. Note that at this stage the server has no idea what share the client will eventually try to connect to, so it can't base the accept/reject on anything other than: The username/password The name of the client machine If the server accepts the username/password then the client expects to be able to mount shares (using a tree connection) without specifying a password. It expects that all access rights will be as the username/password specified in the session setup. It is also possible for a client to send multiple session setup requests. When the server responds, it gives the client a uid to use as an authentication tag for that username/password. The client can maintain multiple authentication contexts in this way (WinDD is an example of an application that does this). The &smb.conf; parameter that sets User Level Security is: securityuser This is the default setting since samba-2.2.x. Ok, now for share level security. In share level security, the client authenticates itself separately for each share. It will send a password along with each tree connection (share mount). It does not explicitly send a username with this operation. The client expects a password to be associated with each share, independent of the user. This means that Samba has to work out what username the client probably wants to use. It is never explicitly sent the username. Some commercial SMB servers such as NT actually associate passwords directly with shares in share level security, but Samba always uses the unix authentication scheme where it is a username/password pair that is authenticated, not a share/password pair. To gain understanding of the MS Windows networking parallels to this, one should think in terms of MS Windows 9x/Me where one can create a shared folder that provides read-only or full access, with or without a password. Many clients send a session setup even if the server is in share level security. They normally send a valid username but no password. Samba records this username in a list of possible usernames. When the client then does a tree connection it also adds to this list the name of the share they try to connect to (useful for home directories) and any users listed in the user &smb.conf; line. The password is then checked in turn against these possible usernames. If a match is found then the client is authenticated as that user. The &smb.conf; parameter that sets Share Level Security is: securityshare Please note that there are reports that recent MS Windows clients do not like to work with share mode security servers. You are strongly discouraged from using share level security. When Samba is operating in securitydomain mode, the Samba server has a domain security trust account (a machine account) and will cause all authentication requests to be passed through to the domain controllers. Samba as a Domain Member Server This method involves addition of the following parameters in the &smb.conf; file: securitydomain workgroup&example.workgroup; In order for this method to work, the Samba server needs to join the MS Windows NT security domain. This is done as follows: On the MS Windows NT domain controller, using the Server Manager, add a machine account for the Samba server. Next, on the UNIX/Linux system execute: &rootprompt;net rpc join -U administrator%password Samba-2.2.4 and later can auto-join a Windows NT4 style Domain just by executing: &rootprompt;smbpasswd -j DOMAIN_NAME -r PDC_NAME \ -U Administrator%password Samba-3 can do the same by executing: &rootprompt;net rpc join -U Administrator%password It is not necessary with Samba-3 to specify the DOMAIN_NAME or the PDC_NAME as it figures this out from the &smb.conf; file settings. Use of this mode of authentication does require there to be a standard UNIX account for each user in order to assign a UID once the account has been authenticated by the remote Windows DC. This account can be blocked to prevent logons by clients other than MS Windows through means such as setting an invalid shell in the /etc/passwd entry. An alternative to assigning UIDs to Windows users on a Samba member server is presented in the chapter about winbind. For more information of being a domain member, see the chapter about domain membership. Both Samba 2.2 and 3.0 can join an Active Directory domain. This is possible if the domain is run in native mode. Active Directory in native mode perfectly allows NT4-style domain members. This is contrary to popular belief. The only thing that Active Directory in native mode prohibits is Backup Domain Controllers running NT4. If you are using Active Directory, starting with Samba-3 you can join as a native AD member. Why would you want to do that? Your security policy might prohibit the use of NT-compatible authentication protocols. All your machines are running Windows 2000 and above and all use Kerberos. In this case Samba as a NT4-style domain would still require NT-compatible authentication data. Samba in AD-member mode can accept Kerberos tickets. realmyour.kerberos.REALM securityADS The following parameter may be required: ads serveryour.kerberos.server Please refer to the chapter on domain membership for more information regarding this configuration option. Server security mode is a left over from the time when Samba was not capable of acting as a domain member server. It is highly recommended NOT to use this feature. Server security mode has many draw backs. The draw backs include: Potential Account Lockout on MS Windows NT4/200x password servers Lack of assurance that the password server is the one specified Does not work with Winbind, particularly needed when storing profiles remotely This mode may open connections to the password server, and keep them open for extended periods. Security on the Samba server breaks badly when the remote password server suddenly shuts down With this mode there is NO security account in the domain that the password server belongs to for the Samba server. In server security mode the Samba server reports to the client that it is in user level security. The client then does a session setup as described earlier. The Samba server takes the username/password that the client sends and attempts to login to the password server by sending exactly the same username/password that it got from the client. If that server is in user level security and accepts the password, then Samba accepts the clients connection. This allows the Samba server to use another SMB server as the password server. You should also note that at the very start of all this, where the server tells the client what security level it is in, it also tells the client if it supports encryption. If it does then it supplies the client with a random cryptkey. The client will then send all passwords in encrypted form. Samba supports this type of encryption by default. The parameter securityserver means that Samba reports to clients that it is running in user mode but actually passes off all authentication requests to another user mode server. This requires an additional parameter password server that points to the real authentication server. That real authentication server can be another Samba server or can be a Windows NT server, the later natively capable of encrypted password support. When Samba is running in server security mode it is essential that the parameter password server is set to the precise NetBIOS machine name of the target authentication server. Samba can NOT determine this from NetBIOS name lookups because the choice of the target authentication server is arbitrary and can not be determined from a domain name. In essence, a Samba server that is in server security mode is operating in what used to be known as workgroup mode. Using MS Windows NT as an authentication server This method involves the additions of the following parameters in the &smb.conf; file: encrypt passwordsYes securityserver password server"NetBIOS_name_of_a_DC" There are two ways of identifying whether or not a username and password pair was valid. One uses the reply information provided as part of the authentication messaging process, the other uses just an error code. The down-side of this mode of configuration is the fact that for security reasons Samba will send the password server a bogus username and a bogus password and if the remote server fails to reject the username and password pair then an alternative mode of identification of validation is used. Where a site uses password lock out after a certain number of failed authentication attempts this will result in user lockouts. Use of this mode of authentication does require there to be a standard UNIX account for the user, though this account can be blocked to prevent logons by non-SMB/CIFS clients. MS Windows clients may use encrypted passwords as part of a challenge/response authentication model (a.k.a. NTLMv1 and NTLMv2) or alone, or clear text strings for simple password based authentication. It should be realized that with the SMB protocol, the password is passed over the network either in plain text or encrypted, but not both in the same authentication request. When encrypted passwords are used, a password that has been entered by the user is encrypted in two ways: An MD4 hash of the UNICODE of the password string. This is known as the NT hash. The password is converted to upper case, and then padded or truncated to 14 bytes. This string is then appended with 5 bytes of NULL characters and split to form two 56 bit DES keys to encrypt a "magic" 8 byte value. The resulting 16 bytes form the LanMan hash. MS Windows 95 pre-service pack 1, MS Windows NT versions 3.x and version 4.0 pre-service pack 3 will use either mode of password authentication. All versions of MS Windows that follow these versions no longer support plain text passwords by default. MS Windows clients have a habit of dropping network mappings that have been idle for 10 minutes or longer. When the user attempts to use the mapped drive connection that has been dropped, the client re-establishes the connection using a cached copy of the password. When Microsoft changed the default password mode, support was dropped for caching of the plain text password. This means that when the registry parameter is changed to re-enable use of plain text passwords it appears to work, but when a dropped service connection mapping attempts to revalidate it will fail if the remote authentication server does not support encrypted passwords. This means that it is definitely not a good idea to re-enable plain text password support in such clients. The following parameters can be used to work around the issue of Windows 9x clients upper casing usernames and password before transmitting them to the SMB server when using clear text authentication. password levelinteger username levelinteger By default Samba will lower case the username before attempting to lookup the user in the database of local system accounts. Because UNIX usernames conventionally only contain lower-case character, the username level parameter is rarely needed. However, passwords on UNIX systems often make use of mixed-case characters. This means that in order for a user on a Windows 9x client to connect to a Samba server using clear text authentication, the password level must be set to the maximum number of upper case letters which could appear in a password. Note that if the server OS uses the traditional DES version of crypt(), a password level of 8 will result in case insensitive passwords as seen from Windows users. This will also result in longer login times as Samba has to compute the permutations of the password string and try them one by one until a match is located (or all combinations fail). The best option to adopt is to enable support for encrypted passwords wherever Samba is used. Most attempts to apply the registry change to re-enable plain text passwords will eventually lead to user complaints and unhappiness. We all make mistakes. It is Ok to make mistakes, so long as they are made in the right places and at the right time. A mistake that causes lost productivity is seldom tolerated. A mistake made in a developmental test lab is expected. Here we look at common mistakes and misapprehensions that have been the subject of discussions on the Samba mailing lists. Many of these are avoidable by doing you homework before attempting a Samba implementation. Some are the result of misunderstanding of the English language. The English language has many turns of phrase that are potentially vague and may be highly confusing to those for whom English is not their native tongue. To some the nature of the Samba security mode is very obvious, but entirely wrong all the same. It is assumed that securityserver means that Samba will act as a server. Not so! See above - this setting means that Samba will try to use another SMB server as its source of user authentication alone. The &smb.conf; parameter securitydomain does NOT really make Samba behave as a Domain Controller! This setting means we want Samba to be a domain member! Guess! So many others do. But whatever you do, do NOT think that securityuser makes Samba act as a domain member. Read the manufacturers manual before the warranty expires! See the chapter about domain membership for more information. Why does server_validate() simply give up rather than re-establishing its connection to the password server? Though I am not fluent in the SMB protocol, perhaps the cluster server process passes along to its client workstation the session key it receives from the password server, which means the password hashes submitted by the client would not work on a subsequent connection, whose session key would be different. So server_validate() must give up. Indeed. That's why securityserver is at best a nasty hack. Please use securitydomain. securityserver mode is also known as pass-through authentication.