/* Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-2001 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2002 Copyright (C) Rafal Szczesniak 2002 Copyright (C) Tim Potter 2001 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details. You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. */ /* the Samba secrets database stores any generated, private information such as the local SID and machine trust password */ #include "includes.h" #undef DBGC_CLASS #define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_PASSDB static TDB_CONTEXT *tdb; /* open up the secrets database */ BOOL secrets_init(void) { pstring fname; if (tdb) return True; pstrcpy(fname, lp_private_dir()); pstrcat(fname,"/secrets.tdb"); tdb = tdb_open_log(fname, 0, TDB_DEFAULT, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0600); if (!tdb) { DEBUG(0,("Failed to open %s\n", fname)); return False; } return True; } /* read a entry from the secrets database - the caller must free the result if size is non-null then the size of the entry is put in there */ void *secrets_fetch(const char *key, size_t *size) { TDB_DATA kbuf, dbuf; secrets_init(); if (!tdb) return NULL; kbuf.dptr = (char *)key; kbuf.dsize = strlen(key); dbuf = tdb_fetch(tdb, kbuf); if (size) *size = dbuf.dsize; return dbuf.dptr; } /* store a secrets entry */ BOOL secrets_store(const char *key, const void *data, size_t size) { TDB_DATA kbuf, dbuf; secrets_init(); if (!tdb) return False; kbuf.dptr = (char *)key; kbuf.dsize = strlen(key); dbuf.dptr = (char *)data; dbuf.dsize = size; return tdb_store(tdb, kbuf, dbuf, TDB_REPLACE) == 0; } /* delete a secets database entry */ BOOL secrets_delete(const char *key) { TDB_DATA kbuf; secrets_init(); if (!tdb) return False; kbuf.dptr = (char *)key; kbuf.dsize = strlen(key); return tdb_delete(tdb, kbuf) == 0; } BOOL secrets_store_domain_sid(const char *domain, const DOM_SID *sid) { fstring key; BOOL ret; slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain); strupper_m(key); ret = secrets_store(key, sid, sizeof(DOM_SID)); /* Force a re-query, in case we modified our domain */ if (ret) reset_global_sam_sid(); return ret; } BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_sid(const char *domain, DOM_SID *sid) { DOM_SID *dyn_sid; fstring key; size_t size; slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain); strupper_m(key); dyn_sid = (DOM_SID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); if (dyn_sid == NULL) return False; if (size != sizeof(DOM_SID)) { SAFE_FREE(dyn_sid); return False; } *sid = *dyn_sid; SAFE_FREE(dyn_sid); return True; } BOOL secrets_store_domain_guid(const char *domain, struct uuid *guid) { fstring key; slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain); strupper_m(key); return secrets_store(key, guid, sizeof(struct uuid)); } BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_guid(const char *domain, struct uuid *guid) { struct uuid *dyn_guid; fstring key; size_t size; struct uuid new_guid; slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain); strupper_m(key); dyn_guid = (struct uuid *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); if ((!dyn_guid) && (lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC)) { smb_uuid_generate_random(&new_guid); if (!secrets_store_domain_guid(domain, &new_guid)) return False; dyn_guid = (struct uuid *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); if (dyn_guid == NULL) return False; } if (size != sizeof(struct uuid)) { DEBUG(1,("UUID size %d is wrong!\n", (int)size)); SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid); return False; } *guid = *dyn_guid; SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid); return True; } /** * Form a key for fetching the machine trust account password * * @param domain domain name * * @return stored password's key **/ const char *trust_keystr(const char *domain) { static fstring keystr; slprintf(keystr,sizeof(keystr)-1,"%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_ACCT_PASS, domain); strupper_m(keystr); return keystr; } /** * Form a key for fetching a trusted domain password * * @param domain trusted domain name * * @return stored password's key **/ static char *trustdom_keystr(const char *domain) { static pstring keystr; pstr_sprintf(keystr, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS, domain); strupper_m(keystr); return keystr; } /************************************************************************ Lock the trust password entry. ************************************************************************/ BOOL secrets_lock_trust_account_password(const char *domain, BOOL dolock) { if (!tdb) return False; if (dolock) return (tdb_lock_bystring(tdb, trust_keystr(domain),0) == 0); else tdb_unlock_bystring(tdb, trust_keystr(domain)); return True; } /************************************************************************ Routine to get the default secure channel type for trust accounts ************************************************************************/ uint32 get_default_sec_channel(void) { if (lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_BDC || lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC) { return SEC_CHAN_BDC; } else { return SEC_CHAN_WKSTA; } } /************************************************************************ Routine to get the trust account password for a domain. The user of this function must have locked the trust password file using the above secrets_lock_trust_account_password(). ************************************************************************/ BOOL secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 ret_pwd[16], time_t *pass_last_set_time, uint32 *channel) { struct machine_acct_pass *pass; char *plaintext; size_t size; plaintext = secrets_fetch_machine_password(domain, pass_last_set_time, channel); if (plaintext) { DEBUG(4,("Using cleartext machine password\n")); E_md4hash(plaintext, ret_pwd); SAFE_FREE(plaintext); return True; } if (!(pass = secrets_fetch(trust_keystr(domain), &size))) { DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n")); return False; } if (size != sizeof(*pass)) { DEBUG(0, ("secrets were of incorrect size!\n")); return False; } if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass->mod_time; memcpy(ret_pwd, pass->hash, 16); SAFE_FREE(pass); if (channel) *channel = get_default_sec_channel(); return True; } /************************************************************************ Routine to get account password to trusted domain ************************************************************************/ BOOL secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(const char *domain, char** pwd, DOM_SID *sid, time_t *pass_last_set_time) { struct trusted_dom_pass pass; size_t size; /* unpacking structures */ char* pass_buf; int pass_len = 0; ZERO_STRUCT(pass); /* fetching trusted domain password structure */ if (!(pass_buf = secrets_fetch(trustdom_keystr(domain), &size))) { DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n")); return False; } /* unpack trusted domain password */ pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(pass_buf, size, &pass); SAFE_FREE(pass_buf); if (pass_len != size) { DEBUG(5, ("Invalid secrets size. Unpacked data doesn't match trusted_dom_pass structure.\n")); return False; } /* the trust's password */ if (pwd) { *pwd = strdup(pass.pass); if (!*pwd) { return False; } } /* last change time */ if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass.mod_time; /* domain sid */ sid_copy(sid, &pass.domain_sid); return True; } /** * Routine to store the password for trusted domain * * @param domain remote domain name * @param pwd plain text password of trust relationship * @param sid remote domain sid * * @return true if succeeded **/ BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, smb_ucs2_t *uni_dom_name, size_t uni_name_len, const char* pwd, DOM_SID sid) { /* packing structures */ pstring pass_buf; int pass_len = 0; int pass_buf_len = sizeof(pass_buf); struct trusted_dom_pass pass; ZERO_STRUCT(pass); /* unicode domain name and its length */ if (!uni_dom_name) return False; strncpy_w(pass.uni_name, uni_dom_name, sizeof(pass.uni_name) - 1); pass.uni_name_len = uni_name_len; /* last change time */ pass.mod_time = time(NULL); /* password of the trust */ pass.pass_len = strlen(pwd); fstrcpy(pass.pass, pwd); /* domain sid */ sid_copy(&pass.domain_sid, &sid); pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack(pass_buf, pass_buf_len, &pass); return secrets_store(trustdom_keystr(domain), (void *)&pass_buf, pass_len); } /************************************************************************ Routine to set the plaintext machine account password for a realm the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string ************************************************************************/ BOOL secrets_store_machine_password(const char *pass, const char *domain, uint32 sec_channel) { char *key = NULL; BOOL ret; uint32 last_change_time; uint32 sec_channel_type; asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, domain); if (!key) return False; strupper_m(key); ret = secrets_store(key, pass, strlen(pass)+1); SAFE_FREE(key); if (!ret) return ret; asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_LAST_CHANGE_TIME, domain); if (!key) return False; strupper_m(key); SIVAL(&last_change_time, 0, time(NULL)); ret = secrets_store(key, &last_change_time, sizeof(last_change_time)); SAFE_FREE(key); asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_SEC_CHANNEL_TYPE, domain); if (!key) return False; strupper_m(key); SIVAL(&sec_channel_type, 0, sec_channel); ret = secrets_store(key, &sec_channel_type, sizeof(sec_channel_type)); SAFE_FREE(key); return ret; } /************************************************************************ Routine to fetch the plaintext machine account password for a realm the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string ************************************************************************/ char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(const char *domain, time_t *pass_last_set_time, uint32 *channel) { char *key = NULL; char *ret; asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, domain); strupper_m(key); ret = (char *)secrets_fetch(key, NULL); SAFE_FREE(key); if (pass_last_set_time) { size_t size; uint32 *last_set_time; asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_LAST_CHANGE_TIME, domain); strupper_m(key); last_set_time = secrets_fetch(key, &size); if (last_set_time) { *pass_last_set_time = IVAL(last_set_time,0); SAFE_FREE(last_set_time); } else { *pass_last_set_time = 0; } SAFE_FREE(key); } if (channel) { size_t size; uint32 *channel_type; asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_SEC_CHANNEL_TYPE, domain); strupper_m(key); channel_type = secrets_fetch(key, &size); if (channel_type) { *channel = IVAL(channel_type,0); SAFE_FREE(channel_type); } else { *channel = get_default_sec_channel(); } SAFE_FREE(key); } return ret; } /************************************************************************ Routine to delete the machine trust account password file for a domain. ************************************************************************/ BOOL trust_password_delete(const char *domain) { return secrets_delete(trust_keystr(domain)); } /************************************************************************ Routine to delete the password for trusted domain ************************************************************************/ BOOL trusted_domain_password_delete(const char *domain) { return secrets_delete(trustdom_keystr(domain)); } /******************************************************************* Reset the 'done' variables so after a client process is created from a fork call these calls will be re-done. This should be expanded if more variables need reseting. ******************************************************************/ void reset_globals_after_fork(void) { unsigned char dummy; secrets_init(); /* * Increment the global seed value to ensure every smbd starts * with a new random seed. */ if (tdb) { uint32 initial_val = sys_getpid(); tdb_change_int32_atomic(tdb, "INFO/random_seed", (int *)&initial_val, 1); set_rand_reseed_data((unsigned char *)&initial_val, sizeof(initial_val)); } /* * Re-seed the random crypto generator, so all smbd's * started from the same parent won't generate the same * sequence. */ generate_random_buffer( &dummy, 1, True); } BOOL secrets_store_ldap_pw(const char* dn, char* pw) { char *key = NULL; BOOL ret; if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, dn) < 0) { DEBUG(0, ("secrets_store_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n")); return False; } ret = secrets_store(key, pw, strlen(pw)+1); SAFE_FREE(key); return ret; } /** * Get trusted domains info from secrets.tdb. * * The linked list is allocated on the supplied talloc context, caller gets to destroy * when done. * * @param ctx Allocation context * @param enum_ctx Starting index, eg. we can start fetching at third * or sixth trusted domain entry. Zero is the first index. * Value it is set to is the enum context for the next enumeration. * @param num_domains Number of domain entries to fetch at one call * @param domains Pointer to array of trusted domain structs to be filled up * * @return nt status code of rpc response **/ NTSTATUS secrets_get_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX* ctx, int* enum_ctx, unsigned int max_num_domains, int *num_domains, TRUSTDOM ***domains) { TDB_LIST_NODE *keys, *k; TRUSTDOM *dom = NULL; char *pattern; unsigned int start_idx; uint32 idx = 0; size_t size, packed_size = 0; fstring dom_name; char *packed_pass; struct trusted_dom_pass *pass = talloc_zero(ctx, sizeof(struct trusted_dom_pass)); NTSTATUS status; if (!secrets_init()) return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; if (!pass) { DEBUG(0, ("talloc_zero failed!\n")); return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } *num_domains = 0; start_idx = *enum_ctx; /* generate searching pattern */ if (!(pattern = talloc_asprintf(ctx, "%s/*", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS))) { DEBUG(0, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: talloc_asprintf() failed!\n")); return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: looking for %d domains, starting at index %d\n", max_num_domains, *enum_ctx)); *domains = talloc_zero(ctx, sizeof(**domains)*max_num_domains); /* fetching trusted domains' data and collecting them in a list */ keys = tdb_search_keys(tdb, pattern); /* * if there's no keys returned ie. no trusted domain, * return "no more entries" code */ status = NT_STATUS_NO_MORE_ENTRIES; /* searching for keys in secrets db -- way to go ... */ for (k = keys; k; k = k->next) { char *secrets_key; /* important: ensure null-termination of the key string */ secrets_key = strndup(k->node_key.dptr, k->node_key.dsize); if (!secrets_key) { DEBUG(0, ("strndup failed!\n")); return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } packed_pass = secrets_fetch(secrets_key, &size); packed_size = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(packed_pass, size, pass); /* packed representation isn't needed anymore */ SAFE_FREE(packed_pass); if (size != packed_size) { DEBUG(2, ("Secrets record %s is invalid!\n", secrets_key)); continue; } pull_ucs2_fstring(dom_name, pass->uni_name); DEBUG(18, ("Fetched secret record num %d.\nDomain name: %s, SID: %s\n", idx, dom_name, sid_string_static(&pass->domain_sid))); SAFE_FREE(secrets_key); if (idx >= start_idx && idx < start_idx + max_num_domains) { dom = talloc_zero(ctx, sizeof(*dom)); if (!dom) { /* free returned tdb record */ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } /* copy domain sid */ SMB_ASSERT(sizeof(dom->sid) == sizeof(pass->domain_sid)); memcpy(&(dom->sid), &(pass->domain_sid), sizeof(dom->sid)); /* copy unicode domain name */ dom->name = talloc_strdup_w(ctx, pass->uni_name); (*domains)[idx - start_idx] = dom; DEBUG(18, ("Secret record is in required range.\n \ start_idx = %d, max_num_domains = %d. Added to returned array.\n", start_idx, max_num_domains)); *enum_ctx = idx + 1; (*num_domains)++; /* set proper status code to return */ if (k->next) { /* there are yet some entries to enumerate */ status = STATUS_MORE_ENTRIES; } else { /* this is the last entry in the whole enumeration */ status = NT_STATUS_OK; } } else { DEBUG(18, ("Secret is outside the required range.\n \ start_idx = %d, max_num_domains = %d. Not added to returned array\n", start_idx, max_num_domains)); } idx++; } DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: got %d domains\n", *num_domains)); /* free the results of searching the keys */ tdb_search_list_free(keys); return status; } /******************************************************************************* Lock the secrets tdb based on a string - this is used as a primitive form of mutex between smbd instances. *******************************************************************************/ BOOL secrets_named_mutex(const char *name, unsigned int timeout) { int ret = 0; if (!message_init()) return False; ret = tdb_lock_bystring(tdb, name, timeout); if (ret == 0) DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: got mutex for %s\n", name )); return (ret == 0); } /******************************************************************************* Unlock a named mutex. *******************************************************************************/ void secrets_named_mutex_release(const char *name) { tdb_unlock_bystring(tdb, name); DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: released mutex for %s\n", name )); } /********************************************************* Check to see if we must talk to the PDC to avoid sam sync delays ********************************************************/ BOOL must_use_pdc( const char *domain ) { time_t now = time(NULL); time_t last_change_time; unsigned char passwd[16]; if ( !secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(domain, passwd, &last_change_time, NULL) ) return False; /* * If the time the machine password has changed * was less than about 15 minutes then we need to contact * the PDC only, as we cannot be sure domain replication * has yet taken place. Bug found by Gerald (way to go * Gerald !). JRA. */ if ( now - last_change_time < SAM_SYNC_WINDOW ) return True; return False; } /******************************************************************************* Store a complete AFS keyfile into secrets.tdb. *******************************************************************************/ BOOL secrets_store_afs_keyfile(const char *cell, const struct afs_keyfile *keyfile) { fstring key; if ((cell == NULL) || (keyfile == NULL)) return False; if (ntohl(keyfile->nkeys) > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS) return False; slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell); return secrets_store(key, keyfile, sizeof(struct afs_keyfile)); } /******************************************************************************* Fetch the current (highest) AFS key from secrets.tdb *******************************************************************************/ BOOL secrets_fetch_afs_key(const char *cell, struct afs_key *result) { fstring key; struct afs_keyfile *keyfile; size_t size; uint32 i; slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell); keyfile = (struct afs_keyfile *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); if (keyfile == NULL) return False; if (size != sizeof(struct afs_keyfile)) { SAFE_FREE(keyfile); return False; } i = ntohl(keyfile->nkeys); if (i > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS) { SAFE_FREE(keyfile); return False; } *result = keyfile->entry[i-1]; result->kvno = ntohl(result->kvno); return True; } /****************************************************************************** When kerberos is not available, choose between anonymous or authenticated connections. We need to use an authenticated connection if DCs have the RestrictAnonymous registry entry set > 0, or the "Additional restrictions for anonymous connections" set in the win2k Local Security Policy. Caller to free() result in domain, username, password *******************************************************************************/ void secrets_fetch_ipc_userpass(char **username, char **domain, char **password) { *username = secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_USER, NULL); *domain = secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_DOMAIN, NULL); *password = secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_PASSWORD, NULL); if (*username && **username) { if (!*domain || !**domain) *domain = smb_xstrdup(lp_workgroup()); if (!*password || !**password) *password = smb_xstrdup(""); DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done by user %s\\%s\n", *domain, *username)); } else { DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done anonymously\n")); *username = smb_xstrdup(""); *domain = smb_xstrdup(""); *password = smb_xstrdup(""); } }