/* Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-2001 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2002 Copyright (C) Rafal Szczesniak 2002 Copyright (C) Tim Potter 2001 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details. You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */ /* the Samba secrets database stores any generated, private information such as the local SID and machine trust password */ #include "includes.h" #include "../libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h" #undef DBGC_CLASS #define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_PASSDB static struct db_context *db_ctx; /* Urrrg. global.... */ bool global_machine_password_needs_changing; /** * Use a TDB to store an incrementing random seed. * * Initialised to the current pid, the very first time Samba starts, * and incremented by one each time it is needed. * * @note Not called by systems with a working /dev/urandom. */ static void get_rand_seed(void *userdata, int *new_seed) { *new_seed = sys_getpid(); if (db_ctx) { dbwrap_trans_change_int32_atomic(db_ctx, "INFO/random_seed", new_seed, 1); } } /* open up the secrets database */ bool secrets_init(void) { char *fname = NULL; unsigned char dummy; if (db_ctx != NULL) return True; fname = talloc_asprintf(talloc_tos(), "%s/secrets.tdb", lp_private_dir()); if (fname == NULL) { return false; } db_ctx = db_open(NULL, fname, 0, TDB_DEFAULT, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0600); if (db_ctx == NULL) { DEBUG(0,("Failed to open %s\n", fname)); TALLOC_FREE(fname); return False; } TALLOC_FREE(fname); /** * Set a reseed function for the crypto random generator * * This avoids a problem where systems without /dev/urandom * could send the same challenge to multiple clients */ set_rand_reseed_callback(get_rand_seed, NULL); /* Ensure that the reseed is done now, while we are root, etc */ generate_random_buffer(&dummy, sizeof(dummy)); return True; } struct db_context *secrets_db_ctx(void) { if (!secrets_init()) { return NULL; } return db_ctx; } /* * close secrets.tdb */ void secrets_shutdown(void) { TALLOC_FREE(db_ctx); } /* read a entry from the secrets database - the caller must free the result if size is non-null then the size of the entry is put in there */ void *secrets_fetch(const char *key, size_t *size) { TDB_DATA dbuf; void *result; if (!secrets_init()) { return NULL; } if (db_ctx->fetch(db_ctx, talloc_tos(), string_tdb_data(key), &dbuf) != 0) { return NULL; } result = memdup(dbuf.dptr, dbuf.dsize); if (result == NULL) { return NULL; } TALLOC_FREE(dbuf.dptr); if (size) { *size = dbuf.dsize; } return result; } /* store a secrets entry */ bool secrets_store(const char *key, const void *data, size_t size) { NTSTATUS status; if (!secrets_init()) { return false; } status = dbwrap_trans_store(db_ctx, string_tdb_data(key), make_tdb_data((const uint8 *)data, size), TDB_REPLACE); return NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status); } /* delete a secets database entry */ bool secrets_delete(const char *key) { NTSTATUS status; if (!secrets_init()) { return false; } status = dbwrap_trans_delete(db_ctx, string_tdb_data(key)); return NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status); } /** * Form a key for fetching the domain sid * * @param domain domain name * * @return keystring **/ static const char *domain_sid_keystr(const char *domain) { char *keystr; keystr = talloc_asprintf_strupper_m(talloc_tos(), "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain); SMB_ASSERT(keystr != NULL); return keystr; } bool secrets_store_domain_sid(const char *domain, const DOM_SID *sid) { bool ret; ret = secrets_store(domain_sid_keystr(domain), sid, sizeof(DOM_SID)); /* Force a re-query, in case we modified our domain */ if (ret) reset_global_sam_sid(); return ret; } bool secrets_fetch_domain_sid(const char *domain, DOM_SID *sid) { DOM_SID *dyn_sid; size_t size = 0; dyn_sid = (DOM_SID *)secrets_fetch(domain_sid_keystr(domain), &size); if (dyn_sid == NULL) return False; if (size != sizeof(DOM_SID)) { SAFE_FREE(dyn_sid); return False; } *sid = *dyn_sid; SAFE_FREE(dyn_sid); return True; } bool secrets_store_domain_guid(const char *domain, struct GUID *guid) { fstring key; slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain); strupper_m(key); return secrets_store(key, guid, sizeof(struct GUID)); } bool secrets_fetch_domain_guid(const char *domain, struct GUID *guid) { struct GUID *dyn_guid; fstring key; size_t size = 0; struct GUID new_guid; slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain); strupper_m(key); dyn_guid = (struct GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); if (!dyn_guid) { if (lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC) { new_guid = GUID_random(); if (!secrets_store_domain_guid(domain, &new_guid)) return False; dyn_guid = (struct GUID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); } if (dyn_guid == NULL) { return False; } } if (size != sizeof(struct GUID)) { DEBUG(1,("UUID size %d is wrong!\n", (int)size)); SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid); return False; } *guid = *dyn_guid; SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid); return True; } bool secrets_store_local_schannel_key(uint8_t schannel_key[16]) { return secrets_store(SECRETS_LOCAL_SCHANNEL_KEY, schannel_key, 16); } bool secrets_fetch_local_schannel_key(uint8_t schannel_key[16]) { size_t size = 0; uint8_t *key; key = (uint8_t *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_LOCAL_SCHANNEL_KEY, &size); if (key == NULL) { return false; } if (size != 16) { SAFE_FREE(key); return false; } memcpy(schannel_key, key, 16); SAFE_FREE(key); return true; } /** * Form a key for fetching the machine trust account sec channel type * * @param domain domain name * * @return keystring **/ static const char *machine_sec_channel_type_keystr(const char *domain) { char *keystr; keystr = talloc_asprintf_strupper_m(talloc_tos(), "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_SEC_CHANNEL_TYPE, domain); SMB_ASSERT(keystr != NULL); return keystr; } /** * Form a key for fetching the machine trust account last change time * * @param domain domain name * * @return keystring **/ static const char *machine_last_change_time_keystr(const char *domain) { char *keystr; keystr = talloc_asprintf_strupper_m(talloc_tos(), "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_LAST_CHANGE_TIME, domain); SMB_ASSERT(keystr != NULL); return keystr; } /** * Form a key for fetching the machine trust account password * * @param domain domain name * * @return keystring **/ static const char *machine_password_keystr(const char *domain) { char *keystr; keystr = talloc_asprintf_strupper_m(talloc_tos(), "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, domain); SMB_ASSERT(keystr != NULL); return keystr; } /** * Form a key for fetching the machine trust account password * * @param domain domain name * * @return stored password's key **/ static const char *trust_keystr(const char *domain) { char *keystr; keystr = talloc_asprintf_strupper_m(talloc_tos(), "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_ACCT_PASS, domain); SMB_ASSERT(keystr != NULL); return keystr; } /** * Form a key for fetching a trusted domain password * * @param domain trusted domain name * * @return stored password's key **/ static char *trustdom_keystr(const char *domain) { char *keystr; keystr = talloc_asprintf_strupper_m(talloc_tos(), "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS, domain); SMB_ASSERT(keystr != NULL); return keystr; } /************************************************************************ Lock the trust password entry. ************************************************************************/ void *secrets_get_trust_account_lock(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const char *domain) { if (!secrets_init()) { return NULL; } return db_ctx->fetch_locked( db_ctx, mem_ctx, string_term_tdb_data(trust_keystr(domain))); } /************************************************************************ Routine to get the default secure channel type for trust accounts ************************************************************************/ uint32 get_default_sec_channel(void) { if (lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_BDC || lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC) { return SEC_CHAN_BDC; } else { return SEC_CHAN_WKSTA; } } /************************************************************************ Routine to get the trust account password for a domain. This only tries to get the legacy hashed version of the password. The user of this function must have locked the trust password file using the above secrets_lock_trust_account_password(). ************************************************************************/ bool secrets_fetch_trust_account_password_legacy(const char *domain, uint8 ret_pwd[16], time_t *pass_last_set_time, uint32 *channel) { struct machine_acct_pass *pass; size_t size = 0; if (!(pass = (struct machine_acct_pass *)secrets_fetch( trust_keystr(domain), &size))) { DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n")); return False; } if (size != sizeof(*pass)) { DEBUG(0, ("secrets were of incorrect size!\n")); SAFE_FREE(pass); return False; } if (pass_last_set_time) { *pass_last_set_time = pass->mod_time; } memcpy(ret_pwd, pass->hash, 16); if (channel) { *channel = get_default_sec_channel(); } /* Test if machine password has expired and needs to be changed */ if (lp_machine_password_timeout()) { if (pass->mod_time > 0 && time(NULL) > (pass->mod_time + (time_t)lp_machine_password_timeout())) { global_machine_password_needs_changing = True; } } SAFE_FREE(pass); return True; } /************************************************************************ Routine to get the trust account password for a domain. The user of this function must have locked the trust password file using the above secrets_lock_trust_account_password(). ************************************************************************/ bool secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 ret_pwd[16], time_t *pass_last_set_time, uint32 *channel) { char *plaintext; plaintext = secrets_fetch_machine_password(domain, pass_last_set_time, channel); if (plaintext) { DEBUG(4,("Using cleartext machine password\n")); E_md4hash(plaintext, ret_pwd); SAFE_FREE(plaintext); return True; } return secrets_fetch_trust_account_password_legacy(domain, ret_pwd, pass_last_set_time, channel); } /** * Pack SID passed by pointer * * @param pack_buf pointer to buffer which is to be filled with packed data * @param bufsize size of packing buffer * @param sid pointer to sid to be packed * * @return length of the packed representation of the whole structure **/ static size_t tdb_sid_pack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, DOM_SID* sid) { int idx; size_t len = 0; uint8 *p = pack_buf; int remaining_space = pack_buf ? bufsize : 0; if (!sid) { return -1; } len += tdb_pack(p, remaining_space, "bb", sid->sid_rev_num, sid->num_auths); if (pack_buf) { p = pack_buf + len; remaining_space = bufsize - len; } for (idx = 0; idx < 6; idx++) { len += tdb_pack(p, remaining_space, "b", sid->id_auth[idx]); if (pack_buf) { p = pack_buf + len; remaining_space = bufsize - len; } } for (idx = 0; idx < MAXSUBAUTHS; idx++) { len += tdb_pack(p, remaining_space, "d", sid->sub_auths[idx]); if (pack_buf) { p = pack_buf + len; remaining_space = bufsize - len; } } return len; } /** * Unpack SID into a pointer * * @param pack_buf pointer to buffer with packed representation * @param bufsize size of the buffer * @param sid pointer to sid structure to be filled with unpacked data * * @return size of structure unpacked from buffer **/ static size_t tdb_sid_unpack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, DOM_SID* sid) { int idx, len = 0; if (!sid || !pack_buf) return -1; len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "bb", &sid->sid_rev_num, &sid->num_auths); for (idx = 0; idx < 6; idx++) { len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "b", &sid->id_auth[idx]); } for (idx = 0; idx < MAXSUBAUTHS; idx++) { len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "d", &sid->sub_auths[idx]); } return len; } /** * Pack TRUSTED_DOM_PASS passed by pointer * * @param pack_buf pointer to buffer which is to be filled with packed data * @param bufsize size of the buffer * @param pass pointer to trusted domain password to be packed * * @return length of the packed representation of the whole structure **/ static size_t tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, TRUSTED_DOM_PASS* pass) { int idx, len = 0; uint8 *p = pack_buf; int remaining_space = pack_buf ? bufsize : 0; if (!pass) { return -1; } /* packing unicode domain name and password */ len += tdb_pack(p, remaining_space, "d", pass->uni_name_len); if (pack_buf) { p = pack_buf + len; remaining_space = bufsize - len; } for (idx = 0; idx < 32; idx++) { len += tdb_pack(p, remaining_space, "w", pass->uni_name[idx]); if (pack_buf) { p = pack_buf + len; remaining_space = bufsize - len; } } len += tdb_pack(p, remaining_space, "dPd", pass->pass_len, pass->pass, pass->mod_time); if (pack_buf) { p = pack_buf + len; remaining_space = bufsize - len; } /* packing SID structure */ len += tdb_sid_pack(p, remaining_space, &pass->domain_sid); if (pack_buf) { p = pack_buf + len; remaining_space = bufsize - len; } return len; } /** * Unpack TRUSTED_DOM_PASS passed by pointer * * @param pack_buf pointer to buffer with packed representation * @param bufsize size of the buffer * @param pass pointer to trusted domain password to be filled with unpacked data * * @return size of structure unpacked from buffer **/ static size_t tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(uint8 *pack_buf, int bufsize, TRUSTED_DOM_PASS* pass) { int idx, len = 0; char *passp = NULL; if (!pack_buf || !pass) return -1; /* unpack unicode domain name and plaintext password */ len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf, bufsize - len, "d", &pass->uni_name_len); for (idx = 0; idx < 32; idx++) len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "w", &pass->uni_name[idx]); len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "dPd", &pass->pass_len, &passp, &pass->mod_time); if (passp) { fstrcpy(pass->pass, passp); } SAFE_FREE(passp); /* unpack domain sid */ len += tdb_sid_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, &pass->domain_sid); return len; } /************************************************************************ Routine to get account password to trusted domain ************************************************************************/ bool secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(const char *domain, char** pwd, DOM_SID *sid, time_t *pass_last_set_time) { struct trusted_dom_pass pass; size_t size = 0; /* unpacking structures */ uint8 *pass_buf; int pass_len = 0; ZERO_STRUCT(pass); /* fetching trusted domain password structure */ if (!(pass_buf = (uint8 *)secrets_fetch(trustdom_keystr(domain), &size))) { DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n")); return False; } /* unpack trusted domain password */ pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(pass_buf, size, &pass); SAFE_FREE(pass_buf); if (pass_len != size) { DEBUG(5, ("Invalid secrets size. Unpacked data doesn't match trusted_dom_pass structure.\n")); return False; } /* the trust's password */ if (pwd) { *pwd = SMB_STRDUP(pass.pass); if (!*pwd) { return False; } } /* last change time */ if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass.mod_time; /* domain sid */ if (sid != NULL) sid_copy(sid, &pass.domain_sid); return True; } /** * Routine to store the password for trusted domain * * @param domain remote domain name * @param pwd plain text password of trust relationship * @param sid remote domain sid * * @return true if succeeded **/ bool secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, const char* pwd, const DOM_SID *sid) { smb_ucs2_t *uni_dom_name; bool ret; size_t converted_size; /* packing structures */ uint8 *pass_buf = NULL; int pass_len = 0; struct trusted_dom_pass pass; ZERO_STRUCT(pass); if (!push_ucs2_talloc(talloc_tos(), &uni_dom_name, domain, &converted_size)) { DEBUG(0, ("Could not convert domain name %s to unicode\n", domain)); return False; } strncpy_w(pass.uni_name, uni_dom_name, sizeof(pass.uni_name) - 1); pass.uni_name_len = strlen_w(uni_dom_name)+1; TALLOC_FREE(uni_dom_name); /* last change time */ pass.mod_time = time(NULL); /* password of the trust */ pass.pass_len = strlen(pwd); fstrcpy(pass.pass, pwd); /* domain sid */ sid_copy(&pass.domain_sid, sid); /* Calculate the length. */ pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack(NULL, 0, &pass); pass_buf = talloc_array(talloc_tos(), uint8, pass_len); if (!pass_buf) { return false; } pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack(pass_buf, pass_len, &pass); ret = secrets_store(trustdom_keystr(domain), (void *)pass_buf, pass_len); TALLOC_FREE(pass_buf); return ret; } /************************************************************************ Routine to delete the plaintext machine account password ************************************************************************/ bool secrets_delete_machine_password(const char *domain) { return secrets_delete(machine_password_keystr(domain)); } /************************************************************************ Routine to delete the plaintext machine account password, sec channel type and last change time from secrets database ************************************************************************/ bool secrets_delete_machine_password_ex(const char *domain) { if (!secrets_delete(machine_password_keystr(domain))) { return false; } if (!secrets_delete(machine_sec_channel_type_keystr(domain))) { return false; } return secrets_delete(machine_last_change_time_keystr(domain)); } /************************************************************************ Routine to delete the domain sid ************************************************************************/ bool secrets_delete_domain_sid(const char *domain) { return secrets_delete(domain_sid_keystr(domain)); } /************************************************************************ Routine to set the plaintext machine account password for a realm the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string ************************************************************************/ bool secrets_store_machine_password(const char *pass, const char *domain, uint32 sec_channel) { bool ret; uint32 last_change_time; uint32 sec_channel_type; ret = secrets_store(machine_password_keystr(domain), pass, strlen(pass)+1); if (!ret) return ret; SIVAL(&last_change_time, 0, time(NULL)); ret = secrets_store(machine_last_change_time_keystr(domain), &last_change_time, sizeof(last_change_time)); SIVAL(&sec_channel_type, 0, sec_channel); ret = secrets_store(machine_sec_channel_type_keystr(domain), &sec_channel_type, sizeof(sec_channel_type)); return ret; } /************************************************************************ Routine to fetch the plaintext machine account password for a realm the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string. ************************************************************************/ char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(const char *domain, time_t *pass_last_set_time, uint32 *channel) { char *ret; ret = (char *)secrets_fetch(machine_password_keystr(domain), NULL); if (pass_last_set_time) { size_t size; uint32 *last_set_time; last_set_time = (unsigned int *)secrets_fetch(machine_last_change_time_keystr(domain), &size); if (last_set_time) { *pass_last_set_time = IVAL(last_set_time,0); SAFE_FREE(last_set_time); } else { *pass_last_set_time = 0; } } if (channel) { size_t size; uint32 *channel_type; channel_type = (unsigned int *)secrets_fetch(machine_sec_channel_type_keystr(domain), &size); if (channel_type) { *channel = IVAL(channel_type,0); SAFE_FREE(channel_type); } else { *channel = get_default_sec_channel(); } } return ret; } /************************************************************************ Routine to delete the password for trusted domain ************************************************************************/ bool trusted_domain_password_delete(const char *domain) { return secrets_delete(trustdom_keystr(domain)); } bool secrets_store_ldap_pw(const char* dn, char* pw) { char *key = NULL; bool ret; if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, dn) < 0) { DEBUG(0, ("secrets_store_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n")); return False; } ret = secrets_store(key, pw, strlen(pw)+1); SAFE_FREE(key); return ret; } /******************************************************************* Find the ldap password. ******************************************************************/ bool fetch_ldap_pw(char **dn, char** pw) { char *key = NULL; size_t size = 0; *dn = smb_xstrdup(lp_ldap_admin_dn()); if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, *dn) < 0) { SAFE_FREE(*dn); DEBUG(0, ("fetch_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n")); } *pw=(char *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); SAFE_FREE(key); if (!size) { /* Upgrade 2.2 style entry */ char *p; char* old_style_key = SMB_STRDUP(*dn); char *data; fstring old_style_pw; if (!old_style_key) { DEBUG(0, ("fetch_ldap_pw: strdup failed!\n")); return False; } for (p=old_style_key; *p; p++) if (*p == ',') *p = '/'; data=(char *)secrets_fetch(old_style_key, &size); if ((data == NULL) || (size < sizeof(old_style_pw))) { DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: neither ldap secret retrieved!\n")); SAFE_FREE(old_style_key); SAFE_FREE(*dn); SAFE_FREE(data); return False; } size = MIN(size, sizeof(fstring)-1); strncpy(old_style_pw, data, size); old_style_pw[size] = 0; SAFE_FREE(data); if (!secrets_store_ldap_pw(*dn, old_style_pw)) { DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: ldap secret could not be upgraded!\n")); SAFE_FREE(old_style_key); SAFE_FREE(*dn); return False; } if (!secrets_delete(old_style_key)) { DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: old ldap secret could not be deleted!\n")); } SAFE_FREE(old_style_key); *pw = smb_xstrdup(old_style_pw); } return True; } /** * Get trusted domains info from secrets.tdb. **/ struct list_trusted_domains_state { uint32 num_domains; struct trustdom_info **domains; }; static int list_trusted_domain(struct db_record *rec, void *private_data) { const size_t prefix_len = strlen(SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS); size_t converted_size, packed_size = 0; struct trusted_dom_pass pass; struct trustdom_info *dom_info; struct list_trusted_domains_state *state = (struct list_trusted_domains_state *)private_data; if ((rec->key.dsize < prefix_len) || (strncmp((char *)rec->key.dptr, SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS, prefix_len) != 0)) { return 0; } packed_size = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack( rec->value.dptr, rec->value.dsize, &pass); if (rec->value.dsize != packed_size) { DEBUG(2, ("Secrets record is invalid!\n")); return 0; } if (pass.domain_sid.num_auths != 4) { DEBUG(0, ("SID %s is not a domain sid, has %d " "auths instead of 4\n", sid_string_dbg(&pass.domain_sid), pass.domain_sid.num_auths)); return 0; } if (!(dom_info = TALLOC_P(state->domains, struct trustdom_info))) { DEBUG(0, ("talloc failed\n")); return 0; } if (!pull_ucs2_talloc(dom_info, &dom_info->name, pass.uni_name, &converted_size)) { DEBUG(2, ("pull_ucs2_talloc failed\n")); TALLOC_FREE(dom_info); return 0; } sid_copy(&dom_info->sid, &pass.domain_sid); ADD_TO_ARRAY(state->domains, struct trustdom_info *, dom_info, &state->domains, &state->num_domains); if (state->domains == NULL) { state->num_domains = 0; return -1; } return 0; } NTSTATUS secrets_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, uint32 *num_domains, struct trustdom_info ***domains) { struct list_trusted_domains_state state; secrets_init(); if (db_ctx == NULL) { return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; } state.num_domains = 0; /* * Make sure that a talloc context for the trustdom_info structs * exists */ if (!(state.domains = TALLOC_ARRAY( mem_ctx, struct trustdom_info *, 1))) { return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } db_ctx->traverse_read(db_ctx, list_trusted_domain, (void *)&state); *num_domains = state.num_domains; *domains = state.domains; return NT_STATUS_OK; } /******************************************************************************* Store a complete AFS keyfile into secrets.tdb. *******************************************************************************/ bool secrets_store_afs_keyfile(const char *cell, const struct afs_keyfile *keyfile) { fstring key; if ((cell == NULL) || (keyfile == NULL)) return False; if (ntohl(keyfile->nkeys) > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS) return False; slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell); return secrets_store(key, keyfile, sizeof(struct afs_keyfile)); } /******************************************************************************* Fetch the current (highest) AFS key from secrets.tdb *******************************************************************************/ bool secrets_fetch_afs_key(const char *cell, struct afs_key *result) { fstring key; struct afs_keyfile *keyfile; size_t size = 0; uint32 i; slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell); keyfile = (struct afs_keyfile *)secrets_fetch(key, &size); if (keyfile == NULL) return False; if (size != sizeof(struct afs_keyfile)) { SAFE_FREE(keyfile); return False; } i = ntohl(keyfile->nkeys); if (i > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS) { SAFE_FREE(keyfile); return False; } *result = keyfile->entry[i-1]; result->kvno = ntohl(result->kvno); SAFE_FREE(keyfile); return True; } /****************************************************************************** When kerberos is not available, choose between anonymous or authenticated connections. We need to use an authenticated connection if DCs have the RestrictAnonymous registry entry set > 0, or the "Additional restrictions for anonymous connections" set in the win2k Local Security Policy. Caller to free() result in domain, username, password *******************************************************************************/ void secrets_fetch_ipc_userpass(char **username, char **domain, char **password) { *username = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_USER, NULL); *domain = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_DOMAIN, NULL); *password = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_PASSWORD, NULL); if (*username && **username) { if (!*domain || !**domain) *domain = smb_xstrdup(lp_workgroup()); if (!*password || !**password) *password = smb_xstrdup(""); DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done by user %s\\%s\n", *domain, *username)); } else { DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done anonymously\n")); *username = smb_xstrdup(""); *domain = smb_xstrdup(""); *password = smb_xstrdup(""); } } /****************************************************************************** Open or create the schannel session store tdb. *******************************************************************************/ static TDB_CONTEXT *open_schannel_session_store(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx) { TDB_DATA vers; uint32 ver; TDB_CONTEXT *tdb_sc = NULL; char *fname = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s/schannel_store.tdb", lp_private_dir()); if (!fname) { return NULL; } tdb_sc = tdb_open_log(fname, 0, TDB_DEFAULT, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0600); if (!tdb_sc) { DEBUG(0,("open_schannel_session_store: Failed to open %s\n", fname)); TALLOC_FREE(fname); return NULL; } vers = tdb_fetch_bystring(tdb_sc, "SCHANNEL_STORE_VERSION"); if (vers.dptr == NULL) { /* First opener, no version. */ SIVAL(&ver,0,1); vers.dptr = (uint8 *)&ver; vers.dsize = 4; tdb_store_bystring(tdb_sc, "SCHANNEL_STORE_VERSION", vers, TDB_REPLACE); vers.dptr = NULL; } else if (vers.dsize == 4) { ver = IVAL(vers.dptr,0); if (ver != 1) { tdb_close(tdb_sc); tdb_sc = NULL; DEBUG(0,("open_schannel_session_store: wrong version number %d in %s\n", (int)ver, fname )); } } else { tdb_close(tdb_sc); tdb_sc = NULL; DEBUG(0,("open_schannel_session_store: wrong version number size %d in %s\n", (int)vers.dsize, fname )); } SAFE_FREE(vers.dptr); TALLOC_FREE(fname); return tdb_sc; } /****************************************************************************** Store the schannel state after an AUTH2 call. Note we must be root here. *******************************************************************************/ bool secrets_store_schannel_session_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const char *remote_machine, const struct dcinfo *pdc) { TDB_CONTEXT *tdb_sc = NULL; TDB_DATA value; bool ret; char *keystr = talloc_asprintf_strupper_m(mem_ctx, "%s/%s", SECRETS_SCHANNEL_STATE, remote_machine); if (!keystr) { return False; } /* Work out how large the record is. */ value.dsize = tdb_pack(NULL, 0, "dBBBBBfff", pdc->sequence, 8, pdc->seed_chal.data, 8, pdc->clnt_chal.data, 8, pdc->srv_chal.data, 16, pdc->sess_key, 16, pdc->mach_pw, pdc->mach_acct, pdc->remote_machine, pdc->domain); value.dptr = TALLOC_ARRAY(mem_ctx, uint8, value.dsize); if (!value.dptr) { TALLOC_FREE(keystr); return False; } value.dsize = tdb_pack(value.dptr, value.dsize, "dBBBBBfff", pdc->sequence, 8, pdc->seed_chal.data, 8, pdc->clnt_chal.data, 8, pdc->srv_chal.data, 16, pdc->sess_key, 16, pdc->mach_pw, pdc->mach_acct, pdc->remote_machine, pdc->domain); tdb_sc = open_schannel_session_store(mem_ctx); if (!tdb_sc) { TALLOC_FREE(keystr); TALLOC_FREE(value.dptr); return False; } ret = (tdb_store_bystring(tdb_sc, keystr, value, TDB_REPLACE) == 0 ? True : False); DEBUG(3,("secrets_store_schannel_session_info: stored schannel info with key %s\n", keystr )); tdb_close(tdb_sc); TALLOC_FREE(keystr); TALLOC_FREE(value.dptr); return ret; } /****************************************************************************** Restore the schannel state on a client reconnect. Note we must be root here. *******************************************************************************/ bool secrets_restore_schannel_session_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const char *remote_machine, struct dcinfo **ppdc) { TDB_CONTEXT *tdb_sc = NULL; TDB_DATA value; unsigned char *pseed_chal = NULL; unsigned char *pclnt_chal = NULL; unsigned char *psrv_chal = NULL; unsigned char *psess_key = NULL; unsigned char *pmach_pw = NULL; uint32 l1, l2, l3, l4, l5; int ret; struct dcinfo *pdc = NULL; char *keystr = talloc_asprintf_strupper_m(mem_ctx, "%s/%s", SECRETS_SCHANNEL_STATE, remote_machine); *ppdc = NULL; if (!keystr) { return False; } tdb_sc = open_schannel_session_store(mem_ctx); if (!tdb_sc) { TALLOC_FREE(keystr); return False; } value = tdb_fetch_bystring(tdb_sc, keystr); if (!value.dptr) { DEBUG(0,("secrets_restore_schannel_session_info: Failed to find entry with key %s\n", keystr )); tdb_close(tdb_sc); return False; } pdc = TALLOC_ZERO_P(mem_ctx, struct dcinfo); /* Retrieve the record. */ ret = tdb_unpack(value.dptr, value.dsize, "dBBBBBfff", &pdc->sequence, &l1, &pseed_chal, &l2, &pclnt_chal, &l3, &psrv_chal, &l4, &psess_key, &l5, &pmach_pw, &pdc->mach_acct, &pdc->remote_machine, &pdc->domain); if (ret == -1 || l1 != 8 || l2 != 8 || l3 != 8 || l4 != 16 || l5 != 16) { /* Bad record - delete it. */ tdb_delete_bystring(tdb_sc, keystr); tdb_close(tdb_sc); TALLOC_FREE(keystr); TALLOC_FREE(pdc); SAFE_FREE(pseed_chal); SAFE_FREE(pclnt_chal); SAFE_FREE(psrv_chal); SAFE_FREE(psess_key); SAFE_FREE(pmach_pw); SAFE_FREE(value.dptr); return False; } tdb_close(tdb_sc); memcpy(pdc->seed_chal.data, pseed_chal, 8); memcpy(pdc->clnt_chal.data, pclnt_chal, 8); memcpy(pdc->srv_chal.data, psrv_chal, 8); memcpy(pdc->sess_key, psess_key, 16); memcpy(pdc->mach_pw, pmach_pw, 16); /* We know these are true so didn't bother to store them. */ pdc->challenge_sent = True; pdc->authenticated = True; DEBUG(3,("secrets_restore_schannel_session_info: restored schannel info key %s\n", keystr )); SAFE_FREE(pseed_chal); SAFE_FREE(pclnt_chal); SAFE_FREE(psrv_chal); SAFE_FREE(psess_key); SAFE_FREE(pmach_pw); TALLOC_FREE(keystr); SAFE_FREE(value.dptr); *ppdc = pdc; return True; } bool secrets_store_generic(const char *owner, const char *key, const char *secret) { char *tdbkey = NULL; bool ret; if (asprintf(&tdbkey, "SECRETS/GENERIC/%s/%s", owner, key) < 0) { DEBUG(0, ("asprintf failed!\n")); return False; } ret = secrets_store(tdbkey, secret, strlen(secret)+1); SAFE_FREE(tdbkey); return ret; } /******************************************************************* Find the ldap password. ******************************************************************/ char *secrets_fetch_generic(const char *owner, const char *key) { char *secret = NULL; char *tdbkey = NULL; if (( ! owner) || ( ! key)) { DEBUG(1, ("Invalid Paramters")); return NULL; } if (asprintf(&tdbkey, "SECRETS/GENERIC/%s/%s", owner, key) < 0) { DEBUG(0, ("Out of memory!\n")); return NULL; } secret = (char *)secrets_fetch(tdbkey, NULL); SAFE_FREE(tdbkey); return secret; }