/* Unix SMB/Netbios implementation. Version 3.0 handle SMBsessionsetup Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1998-2001 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2001 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details. You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. */ #include "includes.h" /**************************************************************************** reply to a session setup command ****************************************************************************/ int reply_sesssetup_and_X(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf,char *outbuf, int length,int bufsize) { int sess_vuid; gid_t gid; uid_t uid; char* full_name; int smb_bufsize; int smb_apasslen = 0; pstring smb_apasswd; int smb_ntpasslen = 0; pstring smb_ntpasswd; pstring user; pstring orig_user; fstring domain; fstring native_os; fstring native_lanman; BOOL guest=False; static BOOL done_sesssetup = False; extern BOOL global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated; extern uint32 global_client_caps; extern int Protocol; extern fstring remote_machine; extern userdom_struct current_user_info; extern int max_send; BOOL doencrypt = global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated; START_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX); *smb_apasswd = *smb_ntpasswd = 0; smb_bufsize = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv2); if (Protocol < PROTOCOL_NT1) { smb_apasslen = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv7); if (smb_apasslen > MAX_PASS_LEN) { return ERROR_DOS(ERRDOS,ERRbuftoosmall); } memcpy(smb_apasswd,smb_buf(inbuf),smb_apasslen); srvstr_pull(inbuf, user, smb_buf(inbuf)+smb_apasslen, sizeof(user), -1, STR_TERMINATE); if (!doencrypt && (lp_security() != SEC_SERVER)) { smb_apasslen = strlen(smb_apasswd); } } else { uint16 passlen1 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv7); uint16 passlen2 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv8); enum remote_arch_types ra_type = get_remote_arch(); char *p = smb_buf(inbuf); if(global_client_caps == 0) global_client_caps = IVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv11); /* client_caps is used as final determination if client is NT or Win95. This is needed to return the correct error codes in some circumstances. */ if(ra_type == RA_WINNT || ra_type == RA_WIN2K || ra_type == RA_WIN95) { if(!(global_client_caps & (CAP_NT_SMBS | CAP_STATUS32))) { set_remote_arch( RA_WIN95); } } if (passlen1 != 24 && passlen2 < 24) doencrypt = False; if (passlen1 > MAX_PASS_LEN) { return ERROR_DOS(ERRDOS,ERRbuftoosmall); } passlen1 = MIN(passlen1, MAX_PASS_LEN); passlen2 = MIN(passlen2, MAX_PASS_LEN); if (!doencrypt) { /* both Win95 and WinNT stuff up the password lengths for non-encrypting systems. Uggh. if passlen1==24 its a win95 system, and its setting the password length incorrectly. Luckily it still works with the default code because Win95 will null terminate the password anyway if passlen1>0 and passlen2>0 then maybe its a NT box and its setting passlen2 to some random value which really stuffs things up. we need to fix that one. */ if (passlen1 > 0 && passlen2 > 0 && passlen2 != 24 && passlen2 != 1) passlen2 = 0; } if (lp_restrict_anonymous()) { /* there seems to be no reason behind the * differences in MS clients formatting * various info like the domain, NativeOS, and * NativeLanMan fields. Win95 in particular * seems to have an extra null byte between * the username and the domain, or the * password length calculation is wrong, which * throws off the string extraction routines * below. This makes the value of domain be * the empty string, which fails the restrict * anonymous check further down. This * compensates for that, and allows browsing * to work in mixed NT and win95 environments * even when restrict anonymous is true. AAB * */ dump_data(100, p, 0x70); DEBUG(9, ("passlen1=%d, passlen2=%d\n", passlen1, passlen2)); if (ra_type == RA_WIN95 && !passlen1 && !passlen2 && p[0] == 0 && p[1] == 0) { DEBUG(0, ("restrict anonymous parameter used in a win95 environment!\n")); DEBUG(0, ("client is win95 and broken passlen1 offset -- attempting fix\n")); DEBUG(0, ("if win95 cilents are having difficulty browsing, you will be unable to use restrict anonymous\n")); passlen1 = 1; } } /* Save the lanman2 password and the NT md4 password. */ smb_apasslen = passlen1; memcpy(smb_apasswd,p,smb_apasslen); smb_ntpasslen = passlen2; memcpy(smb_ntpasswd,p+passlen1,smb_ntpasslen); if (smb_apasslen != 24 || !doencrypt) { /* trim the password */ smb_apasslen = strlen(smb_apasswd); /* wfwg sometimes uses a space instead of a null */ if (strequal(smb_apasswd," ")) { smb_apasslen = 0; *smb_apasswd = 0; } } p += passlen1 + passlen2; p += srvstr_pull(inbuf, user, p, sizeof(user), -1, STR_TERMINATE); p += srvstr_pull(inbuf, domain, p, sizeof(domain), -1, STR_TERMINATE); p += srvstr_pull(inbuf, native_os, p, sizeof(native_os), -1, STR_TERMINATE); p += srvstr_pull(inbuf, native_lanman, p, sizeof(native_lanman), -1, STR_TERMINATE); DEBUG(3,("Domain=[%s] NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s]\n", domain,native_os,native_lanman)); } /* don't allow for weird usernames or domains */ alpha_strcpy(user, user, ". _-$", sizeof(user)); alpha_strcpy(domain, domain, ". _-", sizeof(domain)); if (strstr(user, "..") || strstr(domain,"..")) { return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE); } if (lp_security() == SEC_SHARE) { /* in share level we should ignore any passwords */ smb_ntpasslen = 0; smb_apasslen = 0; guest = True; } DEBUG(3,("sesssetupX:name=[%s]\\[%s]@[%s]\n",user, domain, remote_machine)); if (done_sesssetup && lp_restrict_anonymous()) { /* tests show that even if browsing is done over * already validated connections without a username * and password the domain is still provided, which it * wouldn't be if it was a purely anonymous * connection. So, in order to restrict anonymous, we * only deny connections that have no session * information. If a domain has been provided, then * it's not a purely anonymous connection. AAB */ if (!*user && !*smb_apasswd && !*domain) { DEBUG(0, ("restrict anonymous is True and anonymous connection attempted. Denying access.\n")); END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX); return ERROR_DOS(ERRDOS,ERRnoaccess); } } /* If no username is sent use the guest account */ if (!*user) { pstrcpy(user,lp_guestaccount(-1)); guest = True; } pstrcpy(current_user_info.smb_name,user); reload_services(True); /* * Save the username before mapping. We will use * the original username sent to us for security=server * and security=domain checking. */ pstrcpy( orig_user, user); /* * Always try the "DOMAIN\user" lookup first, as this is the most * specific case. If this fails then try the simple "user" lookup. * But don't do this for guests, as this is always a local user. */ if (!guest) { pstring dom_user; /* Work out who's who */ slprintf(dom_user, sizeof(dom_user) - 1,"%s%s%s", domain, lp_winbind_separator(), user); if (sys_getpwnam(dom_user) != NULL) { pstrcpy(user, dom_user); DEBUG(3,("Using unix username %s\n", dom_user)); } /* * Pass the user through the NT -> unix user mapping * function. */ (void)map_username(user); /* * Do any UNIX username case mangling. */ smb_getpwnam(user, True); } add_session_user(user); if (!guest) { NTSTATUS nt_status; nt_status = pass_check_smb(orig_user, user, domain, remote_machine, (unsigned char *)smb_apasswd, smb_apasslen, (unsigned char *)smb_ntpasswd, smb_ntpasslen); if NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status) { } else if NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER) { if ((lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_USER) || (lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_PASSWORD)) { DEBUG(3,("No such user %s [%s] - using guest account\n",user, domain)); pstrcpy(user,lp_guestaccount(-1)); guest = True; } else { /* Match WinXP and don't give the game away */ return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE); } } else if NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD) { if (lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_PASSWORD) { pstrcpy(user,lp_guestaccount(-1)); DEBUG(3,("Registered username %s for guest access\n",user)); guest = True; } else { /* Match WinXP and don't give the game away */ return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE); } } else { return ERROR_NT(nt_status); } } if (!strequal(user,lp_guestaccount(-1)) && lp_servicenumber(user) < 0) { add_home_service(user,get_user_home_dir(user)); } /* it's ok - setup a reply */ if (Protocol < PROTOCOL_NT1) { set_message(outbuf,3,0,True); } else { char *p; set_message(outbuf,3,0,True); p = smb_buf(outbuf); p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, "Unix", -1, STR_TERMINATE); p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, "Samba", -1, STR_TERMINATE); p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, lp_workgroup(), -1, STR_TERMINATE); set_message_end(outbuf,p); /* perhaps grab OS version here?? */ } /* Set the correct uid in the outgoing and incoming packets We will use this on future requests to determine which user we should become. */ { const struct passwd *pw = smb_getpwnam(user,False); if (!pw) { DEBUG(1,("Username %s is invalid on this system\n",user)); END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX); return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE); } gid = pw->pw_gid; uid = pw->pw_uid; full_name = pw->pw_gecos; } if (guest) SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv2,1); /* register the name and uid as being validated, so further connections to a uid can get through without a password, on the same VC */ sess_vuid = register_vuid(uid,gid,user,orig_user,domain,guest, full_name); if (sess_vuid == -1) { return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE); } SSVAL(outbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid); SSVAL(inbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid); if (!done_sesssetup) max_send = MIN(max_send,smb_bufsize); done_sesssetup = True; END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX); return chain_reply(inbuf,outbuf,length,bufsize); }