/* ldb database module Copyright (C) Simo Sorce 2004 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2005 Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2004 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details. You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. */ /* * Name: ldb * * Component: ldb password_hash module * * Description: correctly update hash values based on changes to sambaPassword and friends * * Author: Andrew Bartlett */ #include "includes.h" #include "libcli/ldap/ldap.h" #include "ldb/include/ldb_errors.h" #include "ldb/include/ldb_private.h" #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_misc.h" #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_samr.h" #include "system/kerberos.h" #include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h" #include "system/time.h" #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h" #include "ads.h" #include "hdb.h" /* If we have decided there is reason to work on this request, then * setup all the password hash types correctly. * * If the administrator doesn't want the sambaPassword stored (set in the * domain and per-account policies) then we must strip that out before * we do the first operation. * * Once this is done (which could update anything at all), we * calculate the password hashes. * * This function must not only update the ntPwdHash, lmPwdHash and * krb5Key fields, it must also atomicly increment the * msDS-KeyVersionNumber. We should be in a transaction, so all this * should be quite safe... * * Finally, if the administrator has requested that a password history * be maintained, then this should also be written out. * */ static int password_hash_handle(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *req, const struct ldb_message *msg) { int ret, old_ret = -1; uint_t pwdProperties, pwdHistoryLength; uint_t userAccountControl; const char *dnsDomain, *realm; const char *sambaPassword; struct samr_Password *sambaLMPwdHistory, *sambaNTPwdHistory; struct samr_Password *lmPwdHash, *ntPwdHash; struct samr_Password *lmOldHash = NULL, *ntOldHash = NULL; struct samr_Password *new_sambaLMPwdHistory, *new_sambaNTPwdHistory; struct samr_Password local_lmNewHash, local_ntNewHash; int sambaLMPwdHistory_len, sambaNTPwdHistory_len; uint_t kvno; struct dom_sid *domain_sid; time_t now = time(NULL); NTTIME now_nt; int i; krb5_error_code krb5_ret; struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context; struct ldb_message_element *attribute; struct ldb_dn *dn = msg->dn; struct ldb_message *msg2; struct ldb_request *search_request = NULL; struct ldb_request *modify_request; struct ldb_request *modified_orig_request; struct ldb_result *res, *dom_res, *old_res; struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses; struct ldb_val computer_val; struct ldb_val person_val; BOOL is_computer; struct ldb_message *modify_msg; const char *domain_expression; const char *old_user_attrs[] = { "lmPwdHash", "ntPwdHash", NULL }; const char *user_attrs[] = { "userAccountControl", "sambaLMPwdHistory", "sambaNTPwdHistory", "ntPwdHash", "objectSid", "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", "objectClass", "userPrincipalName", "samAccountName", NULL }; const char * const domain_attrs[] = { "pwdProperties", "pwdHistoryLength", "dnsDomain", NULL }; TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx; /* Do the original action */ /* If no part of this touches the sambaPassword, then we don't * need to make any changes. For password changes/set there should * be a 'delete' or a 'modify' on this attribute. */ if ((attribute = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "sambaPassword")) == NULL ) { return ldb_next_request(module, req); } mem_ctx = talloc_new(module); if (!mem_ctx) { return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR; } if (req->operation == LDB_REQ_MODIFY) { search_request = talloc(mem_ctx, struct ldb_request); if (!search_request) { talloc_free(mem_ctx); return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR; } /* Look up the old ntPwdHash and lmPwdHash values, so * we can later place these into the password * history */ search_request->operation = LDB_REQ_SEARCH; search_request->op.search.base = dn; search_request->op.search.scope = LDB_SCOPE_BASE; search_request->op.search.tree = ldb_parse_tree(module->ldb, NULL); search_request->op.search.attrs = old_user_attrs; search_request->controls = NULL; old_ret = ldb_next_request(module, search_request); } /* we can't change things untill we copy it */ msg2 = ldb_msg_copy_shallow(mem_ctx, msg); /* look again, this time at the copied attribute */ if (!msg2 || (attribute = ldb_msg_find_element(msg2, "sambaPassword")) == NULL ) { /* Gah? where did it go? Oh well... */ return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR; } /* Wipe out the sambaPassword attribute set, we will handle it in * the second modify. We might not want it written to disk */ if (req->operation == LDB_REQ_ADD) { if (attribute->num_values != 1) { ldb_set_errstring(module, talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "sambaPassword_handle: " "attempted set of multiple sambaPassword attributes on %s rejected", ldb_dn_linearize(mem_ctx, dn))); return LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLAION; } sambaPassword = (const char *)attribute->values[0].data; ldb_msg_remove_attr(msg2, "sambaPassword"); } else if (((attribute->flags & LDB_FLAG_MOD_MASK) == LDB_FLAG_MOD_ADD) || ((attribute->flags & LDB_FLAG_MOD_MASK) == LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE)) { if (attribute->num_values != 1) { return LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLAION; } sambaPassword = (const char *)attribute->values[0].data; ldb_msg_remove_attr(msg2, "sambaPassword"); } else { sambaPassword = NULL; } modified_orig_request = talloc(mem_ctx, struct ldb_request); if (!modified_orig_request) { talloc_free(mem_ctx); return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR; } *modified_orig_request = *req; switch (modified_orig_request->operation) { case LDB_REQ_ADD: modified_orig_request->op.add.message = msg2; break; case LDB_REQ_MODIFY: modified_orig_request->op.mod.message = msg2; break; } /* Send the (modified) request of the original caller down to the database */ ret = ldb_next_request(module, modified_orig_request); if (ret) { return ret; } /* While we do the search first (for the old password hashes), * we don't want to override any error that the modify may * have returned. Now check the error */ if (req->operation == LDB_REQ_MODIFY) { if (old_ret) { talloc_free(mem_ctx); return old_ret; } /* Find out the old passwords details of the user */ old_res = search_request->op.search.res; if (old_res->count != 1) { ldb_set_errstring(module, talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "password_hash_handle: " "(pre) search for %s found %d != 1 objects, for entry we just modified", ldb_dn_linearize(mem_ctx, dn), old_res->count)); /* What happend? The above add/modify worked... */ talloc_free(mem_ctx); return LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT; } lmOldHash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, old_res->msgs[0], "lmPwdHash"); ntOldHash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, old_res->msgs[0], "ntPwdHash"); } /* Start finding out details we need for the second modify. * We do this after the first add/modify because other modules * will have filled in the templates, and we may have had * things like the username (affecting the salt) changed along * with the password. */ /* Now find out what is on the entry after the above add/modify */ search_request = talloc(mem_ctx, struct ldb_request); if (!search_request) { talloc_free(mem_ctx); return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR; } search_request->operation = LDB_REQ_SEARCH; search_request->op.search.base = dn; search_request->op.search.scope = LDB_SCOPE_BASE; search_request->op.search.tree = ldb_parse_tree(module->ldb, NULL); search_request->op.search.attrs = user_attrs; search_request->controls = NULL; ret = ldb_next_request(module, search_request); if (ret) { talloc_free(mem_ctx); return ret; } /* Find out the full details of the user */ res = search_request->op.search.res; if (res->count != 1) { ldb_set_errstring(module, talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "password_hash_handle: " "search for %s found %d != 1 objects, for entry we just added/modified", ldb_dn_linearize(mem_ctx, dn), res->count)); /* What happend? The above add/modify worked... */ talloc_free(mem_ctx); return LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT; } userAccountControl = samdb_result_uint(res->msgs[0], "userAccountControl", 0); sambaLMPwdHistory_len = samdb_result_hashes(mem_ctx, res->msgs[0], "sambaLMPwdHistory", &sambaLMPwdHistory); sambaNTPwdHistory_len = samdb_result_hashes(mem_ctx, res->msgs[0], "sambaNTPwdHistory", &sambaNTPwdHistory); ntPwdHash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, res->msgs[0], "ntPwdHash"); kvno = samdb_result_uint(res->msgs[0], "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0); domain_sid = samdb_result_sid_prefix(mem_ctx, res->msgs[0], "objectSid"); objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(res->msgs[0], "objectClass"); person_val = data_blob_string_const("person"); if (!objectclasses || !ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &person_val)) { /* Not a 'person', so the rest of this doesn't make * sense. How we got a sambaPassword this far I don't * know... */ ldb_set_errstring(module, talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "password_hash_handle: " "attempted set of sambaPassword on non-'person' object %s rejected", ldb_dn_linearize(mem_ctx, dn))); talloc_free(mem_ctx); return LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLAION; } computer_val = data_blob_string_const("computer"); if (ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) { is_computer = True; } else { is_computer = False; } domain_expression = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectSid=%s)(objectClass=domain))", ldap_encode_ndr_dom_sid(mem_ctx, domain_sid)); /* Find the user's domain, then find out the domain password * properties */ ret = ldb_search(module->ldb, NULL, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, domain_expression, domain_attrs, &dom_res); if (ret) { talloc_free(mem_ctx); return ret; } if (dom_res->count != 1) { /* What happend? The user we are modifying must be odd... */ ldb_set_errstring(module, talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "password_hash_handle: " "search for domain %s found %d != 1 objects", dom_sid_string(mem_ctx, domain_sid), dom_res->count)); talloc_free(mem_ctx); return LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT; } pwdProperties = samdb_result_uint(dom_res->msgs[0], "pwdProperties", 0); pwdHistoryLength = samdb_result_uint(dom_res->msgs[0], "pwdHistoryLength", 0); dnsDomain = ldb_msg_find_string(dom_res->msgs[0], "dnsDomain", NULL); realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsDomain); /* Some operations below require kerberos contexts */ if (smb_krb5_init_context(mem_ctx, &smb_krb5_context) != 0) { talloc_free(mem_ctx); return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR; } /* Prepare the modifications to set all the hash/key types */ modify_msg = ldb_msg_new(req); modify_msg->dn = talloc_reference(modify_msg, dn); #define CHECK_RET(x) \ do { \ int check_ret = x; \ if (check_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { \ talloc_free(mem_ctx); \ return check_ret; \ } \ } while(0) /* Setup krb5Key (we want to either delete an existing value, * or replace with a new one). Both the unicode and NT hash * only branches append keys to this multivalued entry. */ CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "krb5Key", LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE)); /* Yay, we can compute new password hashes from the unicode * password */ if (sambaPassword) { Principal *salt_principal; const char *user_principal_name = ldb_msg_find_string(res->msgs[0], "userPrincipalName", NULL); Key *keys; size_t num_keys; /* compute the new nt and lm hashes */ if (E_deshash(sambaPassword, local_lmNewHash.hash)) { lmPwdHash = &local_lmNewHash; } else { lmPwdHash = NULL; } E_md4hash(sambaPassword, local_ntNewHash.hash); ntPwdHash = &local_ntNewHash; CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "ntPwdHash", LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE)); CHECK_RET(samdb_msg_add_hash(module->ldb, req, modify_msg, "ntPwdHash", ntPwdHash)); CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "lmPwdHash", LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE)); if (lmPwdHash) { CHECK_RET(samdb_msg_add_hash(module->ldb, req, modify_msg, "lmPwdHash", lmPwdHash)); } /* Many, many thanks to lukeh@padl.com for this * algorithm, described in his Nov 10 2004 mail to * samba-technical@samba.org */ if (is_computer) { /* Determine a salting principal */ char *samAccountName = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, ldb_msg_find_string(res->msgs[0], "samAccountName", NULL)); char *saltbody; if (!samAccountName) { ldb_set_errstring(module, talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "password_hash_handle: " "generation of new kerberos keys failed: %s is a computer without a samAccountName", ldb_dn_linearize(mem_ctx, dn))); talloc_free(mem_ctx); return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR; } if (samAccountName[strlen(samAccountName)-1] == '$') { samAccountName[strlen(samAccountName)-1] = '\0'; } saltbody = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s.%s", samAccountName, dnsDomain); krb5_ret = krb5_make_principal(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &salt_principal, realm, "host", saltbody, NULL); } else if (user_principal_name) { char *p; user_principal_name = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, user_principal_name); if (!user_principal_name) { talloc_free(mem_ctx); return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR; } else { p = strchr(user_principal_name, '@'); if (p) { p[0] = '\0'; } krb5_ret = krb5_make_principal(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &salt_principal, realm, user_principal_name, NULL); } } else { const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_string(res->msgs[0], "samAccountName", NULL); if (!samAccountName) { ldb_set_errstring(module, talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "password_hash_handle: " "generation of new kerberos keys failed: %s has no samAccountName", ldb_dn_linearize(mem_ctx, dn))); talloc_free(mem_ctx); return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR; } krb5_ret = krb5_make_principal(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &salt_principal, realm, samAccountName, NULL); } if (krb5_ret) { ldb_set_errstring(module, talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "password_hash_handle: " "generation of a saltking principal failed: %s", smb_get_krb5_error_message(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, krb5_ret, mem_ctx))); talloc_free(mem_ctx); return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR; } /* TODO: We may wish to control the encryption types chosen in future */ krb5_ret = hdb_generate_key_set_password(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, salt_principal, sambaPassword, &keys, &num_keys); krb5_free_principal(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, salt_principal); if (krb5_ret) { ldb_set_errstring(module, talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "password_hash_handle: " "generation of new kerberos keys failed: %s", smb_get_krb5_error_message(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, krb5_ret, mem_ctx))); talloc_free(mem_ctx); return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR; } /* Walking */ for (i=0; i < num_keys; i++) { unsigned char *buf; size_t buf_size; size_t len; struct ldb_val val; if (keys[i].key.keytype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) { /* We might end up doing this below: * This ensures we get the unicode * conversion right. This should also * be fixed in the Heimdal libs */ continue; } ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Key, buf, buf_size, &keys[i], &len, krb5_ret); val.data = talloc_memdup(req, buf, len); val.length = len; free(buf); if (!val.data || krb5_ret) { hdb_free_keys (smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, num_keys, keys); talloc_free(mem_ctx); return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR; } ret = ldb_msg_add_value(modify_msg, "krb5Key", &val); if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { hdb_free_keys (smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, num_keys, keys); talloc_free(mem_ctx); return ret; } } hdb_free_keys (smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, num_keys, keys); } /* Possibly kill off the cleartext or store it */ CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "sambaPassword", LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE)); if (sambaPassword && (pwdProperties & DOMAIN_PASSWORD_STORE_CLEARTEXT) && (userAccountControl & UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED)) { CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_string(modify_msg, "sambaPassword", sambaPassword)); } /* Even if we didn't get a sambaPassword, we can still setup * krb5Key from the NT hash. * * This is an append, so it works with the 'continue' in the * unicode loop above, to use Samba's NT hash function, which * is more correct than Heimdal's */ if (ntPwdHash) { unsigned char *buf; size_t buf_size; size_t len; struct ldb_val val; Key key; key.mkvno = 0; key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */ krb5_ret = krb5_keyblock_init(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, ntPwdHash->hash, sizeof(ntPwdHash->hash), &key.key); if (krb5_ret) { return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR; } ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Key, buf, buf_size, &key, &len, krb5_ret); krb5_free_keyblock_contents(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &key.key); val.data = talloc_memdup(req, buf, len); val.length = len; free(buf); if (!val.data || ret) { return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR; } CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_value(modify_msg, "krb5Key", &val)); } /* If the original caller did anything with pwdLastSet then skip this. It could be an incoming samsync */ if ((attribute = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "pwdLastSet")) == NULL ) { /* Update the password last set time */ unix_to_nt_time(&now_nt, now); CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "pwdLastSet", LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE)); CHECK_RET(samdb_msg_add_uint64(module->ldb, mem_ctx, modify_msg, "pwdLastSet", now_nt)); } /* If the original caller did anything with "msDS-KeyVersionNumber" then skip this. It could be an incoming samsync */ if ((attribute = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber")) == NULL ) { if (kvno == 0) { CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE)); CHECK_RET(samdb_msg_add_uint(module->ldb, mem_ctx, modify_msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", kvno + 1)); } else { /* While we should be in a transaction, go one extra * step in the dance for an 'atomic' increment. This * may be of value against remote LDAP servers. (Note * however that Mulitmaster replication stil offers no * such guarantee) */ struct ldb_val old_kvno, new_kvno; old_kvno.data = (uint8_t *)talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%u", kvno); if (!old_kvno.data) { return -1; } old_kvno.length = strlen((char *)old_kvno.data); new_kvno.data = (uint8_t *)talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%u", kvno + 1); if (!new_kvno.data) { return -1; } new_kvno.length = strlen((char *)new_kvno.data); CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", LDB_FLAG_MOD_DELETE)); CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", LDB_FLAG_MOD_ADD)); modify_msg->elements[modify_msg->num_elements - 2].num_values = 1; modify_msg->elements[modify_msg->num_elements - 2].values = &old_kvno; modify_msg->elements[modify_msg->num_elements - 1].num_values = 1; modify_msg->elements[modify_msg->num_elements - 1].values = &new_kvno; } } CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "sambaLMPwdHistory", LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE)); CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_add_empty(modify_msg, "sambaNTPwdHistory", LDB_FLAG_MOD_REPLACE)); /* If we have something to put into the history, or an old * history element to expire, update the history */ if (pwdHistoryLength > 0 && ((sambaNTPwdHistory_len > 0) || (sambaLMPwdHistory_len > 0) || lmOldHash || ntOldHash)) { /* store the password history */ new_sambaLMPwdHistory = talloc_array(mem_ctx, struct samr_Password, pwdHistoryLength); if (!new_sambaLMPwdHistory) { return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR; } new_sambaNTPwdHistory = talloc_array(mem_ctx, struct samr_Password, pwdHistoryLength); if (!new_sambaNTPwdHistory) { return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR; } for (i=0;ildb, mem_ctx, modify_msg, "sambaLMPwdHistory", new_sambaLMPwdHistory, sambaLMPwdHistory_len)); CHECK_RET(samdb_msg_add_hashes(module->ldb, mem_ctx, modify_msg, "sambaNTPwdHistory", new_sambaNTPwdHistory, sambaNTPwdHistory_len)); } /* Too much code above, we should check we got it close to reasonable */ CHECK_RET(ldb_msg_sanity_check(modify_msg)); modify_request = talloc(mem_ctx, struct ldb_request); if (!modify_request) { talloc_free(mem_ctx); return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR; } modify_request->operation = LDB_REQ_MODIFY; modify_request->op.mod.message = modify_msg; modify_request->controls = NULL; ret = ldb_next_request(module, modify_request); talloc_free(mem_ctx); return ret; } /* add_record: do things with the sambaPassword attribute */ static int password_hash_add(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *req) { const struct ldb_message *msg = req->op.add.message; ldb_debug(module->ldb, LDB_DEBUG_TRACE, "password_hash_add_record\n"); if (ldb_dn_is_special(msg->dn)) { /* do not manipulate our control entries */ return ldb_next_request(module, req); } return password_hash_handle(module, req, msg); } /* modify_record: do things with the sambaPassword attribute */ static int password_hash_modify(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *req) { const struct ldb_message *msg = req->op.mod.message; ldb_debug(module->ldb, LDB_DEBUG_TRACE, "password_hash_modify_record\n"); if (ldb_dn_is_special(msg->dn)) { /* do not manipulate our control entries */ return ldb_next_request(module, req); } return password_hash_handle(module, req, msg); } static int password_hash_request(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *req) { switch (req->operation) { case LDB_REQ_ADD: return password_hash_add(module, req); case LDB_REQ_MODIFY: return password_hash_modify(module, req); default: return ldb_next_request(module, req); } } static const struct ldb_module_ops password_hash_ops = { .name = "password_hash", .request = password_hash_request }; /* the init function */ struct ldb_module *password_hash_module_init(struct ldb_context *ldb, int stage, const char *options[]) { struct ldb_module *ctx; if (stage != LDB_MODULES_INIT_STAGE_1) return NULL; ctx = talloc(ldb, struct ldb_module); if (!ctx) return NULL; ctx->private_data = NULL; ctx->ldb = ldb; ctx->prev = ctx->next = NULL; ctx->ops = &password_hash_ops; return ctx; }