/* Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. Database Glue between Samba and the KDC Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009 Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details. You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */ #include "includes.h" #include "system/time.h" #include "../libds/common/flags.h" #include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h" #include "librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h" #include "libcli/security/security.h" #include "auth/auth.h" #include "auth/credentials/credentials.h" #include "auth/auth_sam.h" #include "../lib/util/util_ldb.h" #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h" #include "dsdb/common/util.h" #include "librpc/ndr/libndr.h" #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h" #include "librpc/gen_ndr/lsa.h" #include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h" #include "param/param.h" #include "../lib/crypto/md4.h" #include "system/kerberos.h" #include <hdb.h> #include "kdc/samba_kdc.h" #include "kdc/db-glue.h" enum samba_kdc_ent_type { SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY }; enum trust_direction { UNKNOWN = 0, INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND, OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND }; static const char *trust_attrs[] = { "trustPartner", "trustAuthIncoming", "trustAuthOutgoing", "whenCreated", "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes", "trustAttributes", "trustDirection", "trustType", NULL }; static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val) { const char *tmp; const char *gentime; struct tm tm; gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL); if (!gentime) return default_val; tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm); if (tmp == NULL) { return default_val; } return timegm(&tm); } static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, int userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type) { HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0); /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */ flags.immutable = 1; /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */ flags.invalid = 1; flags.renewable = 1; /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */ flags.server = 1; /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */ if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) { if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) { flags.client = 1; } flags.invalid = 0; } if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) { if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) { flags.client = 1; } flags.invalid = 0; } if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) { if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) { flags.client = 1; } flags.invalid = 0; } if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) { if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) { flags.client = 1; } flags.invalid = 0; } /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */ if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) { flags.client = 0; } if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) { flags.invalid = 1; } /* if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) { flags.invalid = 1; } */ /* UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent */ if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) { flags.invalid = 1; } /* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */ /* if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) { flags.invalid = 1; } */ if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) { flags.require_hwauth = 1; } if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) { flags.ok_as_delegate = 1; } if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) { flags.forwardable = 1; flags.proxiable = 1; } if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) { flags.require_preauth = 0; } else { flags.require_preauth = 1; } return flags; } static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p) { hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = p->entry_ex; free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry); return 0; } static void samba_kdc_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) { /* this function is called only from hdb_free_entry(). * Make sure we neutralize the destructor or we will * get a double free later when hdb_free_entry() will * try to call free_hdb_entry() */ talloc_set_destructor(entry_ex->ctx, NULL); /* now proceed to free the talloc part */ talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx); } static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct ldb_message *msg, unsigned int userAccountControl, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) { krb5_error_code ret = 0; enum ndr_err_code ndr_err; struct samr_Password *hash; const struct ldb_val *sc_val; struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb; struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL; bool newer_keys = false; struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb; struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL; struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL; uint16_t i; uint16_t allocated_keys = 0; entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL; entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0; entry_ex->entry.kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0); /* Get keys from the db */ hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd"); sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials"); /* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */ if (hash) { allocated_keys++; } /* supplementalCredentials if present */ if (sc_val) { ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob); if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length); ret = EINVAL; goto out; } if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) { NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb); ret = EINVAL; goto out; } for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) { if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) { scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i]; if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) { scpk = NULL; continue; } newer_keys = true; break; } else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) { scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i]; if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) { scpk = NULL; } /* * we don't break here in hope to find * a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package */ } } } /* * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element * of supplementalCredentials */ if (scpk) { DATA_BLOB blob; blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data); if (!blob.data) { ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */ ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob); if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { ret = EINVAL; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob"); krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob"); goto out; } if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) { ret = EINVAL; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4"); krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4"); goto out; } if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) { ret = EINVAL; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3"); krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3"); goto out; } if (_pkb.version == 4) { pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4; allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys; } else if (_pkb.version == 3) { pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3; allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys; } } if (allocated_keys == 0) { /* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */ return 0; } /* allocate space to decode into */ entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0; entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key)); if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } if (hash && !(userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY)) { Key key; key.mkvno = 0; key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */ ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context, ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, hash->hash, sizeof(hash->hash), &key.key); if (ret) { goto out; } entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key; entry_ex->entry.keys.len++; } if (pkb4) { for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) { bool use = true; Key key; if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue; if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) { switch (pkb4->keys[i].keytype) { case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC: case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5: break; default: use = false; break; } } if (!use) continue; key.mkvno = 0; key.salt = NULL; if (pkb4->salt.string) { DATA_BLOB salt; salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string); key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt)); if (key.salt == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt; ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length); if (ret) { free(key.salt); key.salt = NULL; goto out; } } /* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */ ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context, pkb4->keys[i].keytype, pkb4->keys[i].value->data, pkb4->keys[i].value->length, &key.key); if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) { DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n", pkb4->keys[i].keytype)); ret = 0; continue; } if (ret) { if (key.salt) { free_Salt(key.salt); free(key.salt); key.salt = NULL; } goto out; } entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key; entry_ex->entry.keys.len++; } } else if (pkb3) { for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) { bool use = true; Key key; if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue; if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) { switch (pkb3->keys[i].keytype) { case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC: case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5: break; default: use = false; break; } } if (!use) continue; key.mkvno = 0; key.salt = NULL; if (pkb3->salt.string) { DATA_BLOB salt; salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string); key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt)); if (key.salt == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt; ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length); if (ret) { free(key.salt); key.salt = NULL; goto out; } } ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context, pkb3->keys[i].keytype, pkb3->keys[i].value->data, pkb3->keys[i].value->length, &key.key); if (ret) { if (key.salt) { free_Salt(key.salt); free(key.salt); key.salt = NULL; } goto out; } entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key; entry_ex->entry.keys.len++; } } out: if (ret != 0) { entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0; } if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) { free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val); entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL; } return ret; } /* * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry. */ static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type, struct ldb_dn *realm_dn, struct ldb_message *msg, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) { struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx; unsigned int userAccountControl; unsigned int i; krb5_error_code ret = 0; krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE; char *realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lp_realm(lp_ctx)); struct samba_kdc_entry *p; NTTIME acct_expiry; NTSTATUS status; uint32_t rid; struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses; struct ldb_val computer_val; const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL); computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer"); computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data); if (!samAccountName) { ret = ENOENT; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present"); goto out; } objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass"); if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) { is_computer = TRUE; } memset(entry_ex, 0, sizeof(*entry_ex)); if (!realm) { ret = ENOMEM; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_strdup: out of memory"); goto out; } p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry); if (!p) { ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx; p->entry_ex = entry_ex; p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn); if (!p->realm_dn) { ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor); /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */ memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry)); entry_ex->ctx = p; entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry; userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0); entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal))); if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) { krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, realm, samAccountName, NULL); } else { ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal); if (ret) { krb5_clear_error_message(context); goto out; } /* While we have copied the client principal, tests * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to * replace the client principal's realm with the one * we determine from our records */ /* this has to be with malloc() */ krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm); } /* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */ entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type); /* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by * default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password * by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with * their probably patheticly insecure password) */ if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server && lp_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) { if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) { entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0; } } { /* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use * of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional * DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure * we must return */ /* use 'whenCreated' */ entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0); /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */ krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal, realm, "kadmin", NULL); entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event)); if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory"); goto out; } /* use 'whenChanged' */ entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0); /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */ krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal, realm, "kadmin", NULL); } /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by * virtue of being that particular RID */ status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { ret = EINVAL; goto out; } if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) { entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL; entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL; entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0; entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1; /* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as * 'change password', as otherwise we could get into * trouble, and not enforce the password expirty. * Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */ if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER && principal->name.name_string.len == 2 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "kadmin") == 0) && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], "changepw") == 0) && lp_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)) { entry_ex->entry.flags.change_pw = 1; } entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0; entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1; entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1; } else if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) { /* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a * client (ie password login), not when used as a server */ /* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client, * it could bypass the password restrictions */ entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0; entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL; entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL; } else { NTTIME must_change_time = samdb_result_force_password_change(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, realm_dn, msg); if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) { entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL; } else { entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end)); if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } *entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time); } acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg); if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) { entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL; } else { entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end)); if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } *entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry); } } entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL; entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL; entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL; entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL; /* Get keys from the db */ ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, p, msg, userAccountControl, entry_ex); if (ret) { /* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */ goto out; } entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes))); if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) { krb5_clear_error_message(context); ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len; entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int)); if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) { krb5_clear_error_message(context); ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) { entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype; } p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg); out: if (ret != 0) { /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */ hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex); } else { talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx); } return ret; } /* * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry. */ static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal, enum trust_direction direction, struct ldb_dn *realm_dn, struct ldb_message *msg, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) { struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx; const char *dnsdomain; char *realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lp_realm(lp_ctx)); DATA_BLOB password_utf16; struct samr_Password password_hash; const struct ldb_val *password_val; struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob; struct samba_kdc_entry *p; enum ndr_err_code ndr_err; int ret, trust_direction_flags; unsigned int i; p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry); if (!p) { ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx; p->entry_ex = entry_ex; p->realm_dn = realm_dn; talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor); /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */ memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry)); entry_ex->ctx = p; entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry; /* use 'whenCreated' */ entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0); /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */ krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal, realm, "kadmin", NULL); entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL; trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0); if (direction == INBOUND) { password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming"); } else { /* OUTBOUND */ dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL); /* replace realm */ talloc_free(realm); realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain); password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing"); } if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) { ret = ENOENT; goto out; } ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob); if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { ret = EINVAL; goto out; } entry_ex->entry.kvno = -1; for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) { if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) { entry_ex->entry.kvno = password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.version.version; } } for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) { if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) { password_utf16 = data_blob_const(password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password, password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size); /* In the future, generate all sorts of * hashes, but for now we can't safely convert * the random strings windows uses into * utf8 */ /* but as it is utf16 already, we can get the NT password/arcfour-hmac-md5 key */ mdfour(password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length); break; } else if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) { password_hash = password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password; break; } } if (i < password_blob.count) { Key key; /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */ entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(1, sizeof(Key)); key.mkvno = 0; key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */ if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context, ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, password_hash.hash, sizeof(password_hash.hash), &key.key); entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key; entry_ex->entry.keys.len++; } entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal))); ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal); if (ret) { krb5_clear_error_message(context); goto out; } /* While we have copied the client principal, tests * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to * replace the client principal's realm with the one * we determine from our records */ krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm); entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0); entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1; entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0; entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1; entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1; entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL; entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL; entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL; entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL; entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes))); if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) { krb5_clear_error_message(context); ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len; entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int)); if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) { krb5_clear_error_message(context); ret = ENOMEM; goto out; } for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) { entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype; } p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg); out: if (ret != 0) { /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */ hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex); } else { talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx); } return ret; } static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const char *realm, struct ldb_dn *realm_dn, struct ldb_message **pmsg) { int lret; krb5_error_code ret; char *filter = NULL; const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs; struct ldb_result *res = NULL; filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=trustedDomain)(|(flatname=%s)(trustPartner=%s)))", realm, realm); if (!filter) { ret = ENOMEM; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory"); return ret; } lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &res, ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx), LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs, "%s", filter); if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) { DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search for %s: %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx))); return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } else if (res->count == 0 || res->count > 1) { DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for %s: got %d\n", filter, res->count)); talloc_free(res); return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res->msgs); *pmsg = res->msgs[0]; talloc_free(res); return 0; } static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal, const char **attrs, struct ldb_dn **realm_dn, struct ldb_message **msg) { NTSTATUS nt_status; char *principal_string; krb5_error_code ret; ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs, realm_dn, msg); free(principal_string); if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) { return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) { return ENOMEM; } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { return EINVAL; } return ret; } static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) { struct ldb_dn *realm_dn; krb5_error_code ret; struct ldb_message *msg = NULL; ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, realm_dn, msg, entry_ex); return ret; } static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) { struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx; krb5_error_code ret; struct ldb_message *msg = NULL; struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb); const char *realm; krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL; if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2 || (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) { /* Not a krbtgt */ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */ if (lp_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm) && lp_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1])) { /* us */ /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm, * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary * krbtgt */ int lret; char *realm_fixed; lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, &msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, krbtgt_attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN, "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))"); if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) { krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB!"); krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB!"); return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) { krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)); krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)); return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } realm_fixed = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lp_realm(lp_ctx)); if (!realm_fixed) { ret = ENOMEM; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "strupper_talloc: out of memory"); return ret; } ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &alloc_principal); if (ret) { return ret; } free(alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]); alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1] = strdup(realm_fixed); talloc_free(realm_fixed); if (!alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]) { ret = ENOMEM; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: strdup() failed!"); return ret; } principal = alloc_principal; ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, realm_dn, msg, entry_ex); if (ret != 0) { krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed"); } return ret; } else { enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN; /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */ if (strcasecmp(lp_realm(lp_ctx), principal->realm) == 0) { /* look for inbound trust */ direction = INBOUND; realm = principal->name.name_string.val[1]; } if (strcasecmp(lp_realm(lp_ctx), principal->name.name_string.val[1]) == 0) { /* look for outbound trust */ direction = OUTBOUND; realm = principal->realm; } /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */ ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, realm, realm_dn, &msg); if (ret != 0) { krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB"); krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB"); return ret; } ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, direction, realm_dn, msg, entry_ex); if (ret != 0) { krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed"); } return ret; /* we should lookup trusted domains */ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } } static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal, const char **attrs, struct ldb_dn **realm_dn, struct ldb_message **msg) { krb5_error_code ret; const char *realm; if (principal->name.name_string.len >= 2) { /* 'normal server' case */ int ldb_ret; NTSTATUS nt_status; struct ldb_dn *user_dn; char *principal_string; ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &principal_string); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } /* At this point we may find the host is known to be * in a different realm, so we should generate a * referral instead */ nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, principal_string, &user_dn, realm_dn); free(principal_string); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE, attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN, "(objectClass=*)"); if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } } else { int lret; char *filter = NULL; char *short_princ; /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */ *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb); realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal); /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referall */ ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &short_princ); if (ret != 0) { krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal"); krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal"); return ret; } lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg, *realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN, "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))", ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ)); free(short_princ); if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) { DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a entry for %s\n", filter)); return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) { DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for for %s - %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb))); return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } } return 0; } static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) { krb5_error_code ret; struct ldb_dn *realm_dn; struct ldb_message *msg; ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER, realm_dn, msg, entry_ex); if (ret != 0) { krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed"); } return ret; } krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal, unsigned flags, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) { krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context"); if (!mem_ctx) { ret = ENOMEM; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!"); return ret; } if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) { ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, entry_ex); if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done; } if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) { /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */ ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, entry_ex); if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done; /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */ ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, entry_ex); if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done; } if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) { ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, entry_ex); if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done; } done: talloc_free(mem_ctx); return ret; } struct samba_kdc_seq { unsigned int index; unsigned int count; struct ldb_message **msgs; struct ldb_dn *realm_dn; }; static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, hdb_entry_ex *entry) { krb5_error_code ret; struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx; TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx; hdb_entry_ex entry_ex; memset(&entry_ex, '\0', sizeof(entry_ex)); if (!priv) { return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context"); if (!mem_ctx) { ret = ENOMEM; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!"); return ret; } if (priv->index < priv->count) { ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, NULL, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY, priv->realm_dn, priv->msgs[priv->index++], entry); } else { ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } if (ret != 0) { TALLOC_FREE(priv); kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL; } else { talloc_free(mem_ctx); } return ret; } krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, hdb_entry_ex *entry) { struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb; struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx; char *realm; struct ldb_result *res = NULL; krb5_error_code ret; TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx; int lret; if (priv) { TALLOC_FREE(priv); kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL; } priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq); if (!priv) { ret = ENOMEM; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory"); return ret; } priv->index = 0; priv->msgs = NULL; priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx); priv->count = 0; mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context"); if (!mem_ctx) { ret = ENOMEM; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!"); return ret; } ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm); if (ret != 0) { TALLOC_FREE(priv); return ret; } lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res, priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs, "(objectClass=user)"); if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) { TALLOC_FREE(priv); return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; } priv->count = res->count; priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs); talloc_free(res); kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv; ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry); if (ret != 0) { TALLOC_FREE(priv); kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL; } else { talloc_free(mem_ctx); } return ret; } krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, hdb_entry_ex *entry) { return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry); } /* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal * * This is currently a very nasty hack - allowing only delegation to itself. * * This is shared between the constrained delegation and S4U2Self code. */ krb5_error_code samba_kdc_check_identical_client_and_server(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, hdb_entry_ex *entry, krb5_const_principal target_principal) { krb5_error_code ret; krb5_principal enterprise_prinicpal = NULL; struct ldb_dn *realm_dn; struct ldb_message *msg; struct dom_sid *orig_sid; struct dom_sid *target_sid; struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry); const char *delegation_check_attrs[] = { "objectSid", NULL }; TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation"); if (!mem_ctx) { ret = ENOMEM; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!"); return ret; } if (target_principal->name.name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) { /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */ if (target_principal->name.name_string.len != 1) { ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation: request for delegation to enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components", target_principal->name.name_string.len); talloc_free(mem_ctx); return ret; } ret = krb5_parse_name(context, target_principal->name.name_string.val[0], &enterprise_prinicpal); if (ret) { talloc_free(mem_ctx); return ret; } target_principal = enterprise_prinicpal; } ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, target_principal, delegation_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg); krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_prinicpal); if (ret != 0) { talloc_free(mem_ctx); return ret; } orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid"); target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"); /* Allow delegation to the same principal, even if by a different * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID * comparison */ if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) { talloc_free(mem_ctx); return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; } talloc_free(mem_ctx); return ret; } /* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same * SID */ krb5_error_code samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context, struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx, hdb_entry_ex *entry, krb5_const_principal certificate_principal) { krb5_error_code ret; struct ldb_dn *realm_dn; struct ldb_message *msg; struct dom_sid *orig_sid; struct dom_sid *target_sid; struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry); const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = { "objectSid", NULL }; TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match"); if (!mem_ctx) { ret = ENOMEM; krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!"); return ret; } ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, certificate_principal, ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg); if (ret != 0) { talloc_free(mem_ctx); return ret; } orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid"); target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"); /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID * comparison */ if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) { talloc_free(mem_ctx); return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH; } talloc_free(mem_ctx); return ret; }