/* Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. PAC Glue between Samba and the KDC Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2005-2009 Copyright (C) Simo Sorce 2010 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details. You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with this program. If not, see . */ #include "includes.h" #include "../libds/common/flags.h" #include #include "auth/auth.h" #include "auth/auth_sam_reply.h" #include "kdc/kdc-glue.h" #include "kdc/pac-glue.h" #include "param/param.h" #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_krb5pac.h" #include "libcli/security/security.h" #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h" #include "auth/kerberos/pac_utils.h" static NTSTATUS samba_get_logon_info_pac_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct auth_user_info_dc *info, DATA_BLOB *pac_data) { struct netr_SamInfo3 *info3; union PAC_INFO pac_info; enum ndr_err_code ndr_err; NTSTATUS nt_status; ZERO_STRUCT(pac_info); nt_status = auth_convert_user_info_dc_saminfo3(mem_ctx, info, &info3); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { DEBUG(1, ("Getting Samba info failed: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status))); return nt_status; } pac_info.logon_info.info = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct PAC_LOGON_INFO); if (!pac_info.logon_info.info) { return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } pac_info.logon_info.info->info3 = *info3; ndr_err = ndr_push_union_blob(pac_data, mem_ctx, &pac_info, PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO, (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_INFO); if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err); DEBUG(1, ("PAC (presig) push failed: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status))); return nt_status; } return NT_STATUS_OK; } krb5_error_code samba_make_krb5_pac(krb5_context context, DATA_BLOB *pac_blob, DATA_BLOB *deleg_blob, krb5_pac *pac) { krb5_data pac_data; krb5_data deleg_data; krb5_error_code ret; /* The user account may be set not to want the PAC */ if (!pac_blob) { return 0; } ret = krb5_data_copy(&pac_data, pac_blob->data, pac_blob->length); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } ZERO_STRUCT(deleg_data); if (deleg_blob) { ret = krb5_data_copy(&deleg_data, deleg_blob->data, deleg_blob->length); if (ret != 0) { krb5_data_free(&pac_data); return ret; } } ret = krb5_pac_init(context, pac); if (ret != 0) { krb5_data_free(&pac_data); krb5_data_free(&deleg_data); return ret; } ret = krb5_pac_add_buffer(context, *pac, PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO, &pac_data); krb5_data_free(&pac_data); if (ret != 0) { krb5_data_free(&deleg_data); return ret; } if (deleg_blob) { ret = krb5_pac_add_buffer(context, *pac, PAC_TYPE_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION, &deleg_data); krb5_data_free(&deleg_data); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } } return ret; } bool samba_princ_needs_pac(struct hdb_entry_ex *princ) { struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(princ->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry); uint32_t userAccountControl; /* The service account may be set not to want the PAC */ userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(p->msg, "userAccountControl", 0); if (userAccountControl & UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) { return false; } return true; } /* Was the krbtgt in this DB (ie, should we check the incoming signature) and was it an RODC */ int samba_krbtgt_is_in_db(struct hdb_entry_ex *princ, bool *is_in_db, bool *is_untrusted) { NTSTATUS status; struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(princ->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry); int rodc_krbtgt_number, trust_direction; uint32_t rid; TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_new(NULL); if (!mem_ctx) { return ENOMEM; } trust_direction = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(p->msg, "trustDirection", 0); if (trust_direction != 0) { /* Domain trust - we cannot check the sig, but we trust it for a correct PAC This is exactly where we should flag for SID validation when we do inter-foreest trusts */ talloc_free(mem_ctx); *is_untrusted = false; *is_in_db = false; return 0; } /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by * virtue of being that particular RID */ status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { talloc_free(mem_ctx); return EINVAL; } rodc_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(p->msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1); if (p->kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number == 0) { if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) { *is_untrusted = false; *is_in_db = true; talloc_free(mem_ctx); return 0; } else if (rodc_krbtgt_number != -1) { *is_in_db = true; *is_untrusted = true; talloc_free(mem_ctx); return 0; } } else if ((rid != DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) && (rodc_krbtgt_number == p->kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number)) { talloc_free(mem_ctx); *is_untrusted = false; *is_in_db = true; return 0; } else if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) { /* krbtgt viewed from an RODC */ talloc_free(mem_ctx); *is_untrusted = false; *is_in_db = false; return 0; } /* Another RODC */ talloc_free(mem_ctx); *is_untrusted = true; *is_in_db = false; return 0; } NTSTATUS samba_kdc_get_pac_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct hdb_entry_ex *client, DATA_BLOB **_pac_blob) { struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(client->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry); struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc; DATA_BLOB *pac_blob; NTSTATUS nt_status; /* The user account may be set not to want the PAC */ if ( ! samba_princ_needs_pac(client)) { *_pac_blob = NULL; return NT_STATUS_OK; } pac_blob = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB); if (!pac_blob) { return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } nt_status = authsam_make_user_info_dc(mem_ctx, p->kdc_db_ctx->samdb, lpcfg_netbios_name(p->kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx), lpcfg_sam_name(p->kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx), p->realm_dn, p->msg, data_blob(NULL, 0), data_blob(NULL, 0), &user_info_dc); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { DEBUG(0, ("Getting user info for PAC failed: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status))); return nt_status; } nt_status = samba_get_logon_info_pac_blob(mem_ctx, user_info_dc, pac_blob); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { DEBUG(0, ("Building PAC failed: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status))); return nt_status; } *_pac_blob = pac_blob; return NT_STATUS_OK; } NTSTATUS samba_kdc_update_pac_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_context context, const krb5_pac pac, DATA_BLOB *pac_blob, struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *pac_srv_sig, struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *pac_kdc_sig) { struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc; krb5_error_code ret; NTSTATUS nt_status; ret = kerberos_pac_to_user_info_dc(mem_ctx, pac, context, &user_info_dc, pac_srv_sig, pac_kdc_sig); if (ret) { return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; } nt_status = samba_get_logon_info_pac_blob(mem_ctx, user_info_dc, pac_blob); return nt_status; } NTSTATUS samba_kdc_update_delegation_info_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_context context, const krb5_pac pac, const krb5_principal server_principal, const krb5_principal proxy_principal, DATA_BLOB *new_blob) { krb5_data old_data; DATA_BLOB old_blob; krb5_error_code ret; NTSTATUS nt_status; enum ndr_err_code ndr_err; union PAC_INFO info; struct PAC_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION _d; struct PAC_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION *d = NULL; char *server = NULL; char *proxy = NULL; uint32_t i; TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx); if (tmp_ctx == NULL) { return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } ret = krb5_pac_get_buffer(context, pac, PAC_TYPE_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION, &old_data); if (ret == ENOENT) { ZERO_STRUCT(old_data); } else if (ret) { talloc_free(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; } old_blob.length = old_data.length; old_blob.data = (uint8_t *)old_data.data; ZERO_STRUCT(info); if (old_blob.length > 0) { ndr_err = ndr_pull_union_blob(&old_blob, mem_ctx, &info, PAC_TYPE_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_PAC_INFO); if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { krb5_data_free(&old_data); nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err); DEBUG(0,("can't parse the PAC LOGON_INFO: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status))); talloc_free(tmp_ctx); return nt_status; } } else { ZERO_STRUCT(_d); info.constrained_delegation.info = &_d; } krb5_data_free(&old_data); ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, server_principal, &server); if (ret) { talloc_free(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; } ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, proxy_principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &proxy); if (ret) { SAFE_FREE(server); talloc_free(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; } d = info.constrained_delegation.info; i = d->num_transited_services; d->proxy_target.string = server; d->transited_services = talloc_realloc(mem_ctx, d->transited_services, struct lsa_String, i + 1); d->transited_services[i].string = proxy; d->num_transited_services = i + 1; ndr_err = ndr_push_union_blob(new_blob, mem_ctx, &info, PAC_TYPE_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION, (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_INFO); SAFE_FREE(server); SAFE_FREE(proxy); if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { krb5_data_free(&old_data); nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err); DEBUG(0,("can't parse the PAC LOGON_INFO: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status))); talloc_free(tmp_ctx); return nt_status; } talloc_free(tmp_ctx); return NT_STATUS_OK; } /* this function allocates 'data' using malloc. * The caller is responsible for freeing it */ void samba_kdc_build_edata_reply(NTSTATUS nt_status, DATA_BLOB *e_data) { PA_DATA pa; unsigned char *buf; size_t len; krb5_error_code ret = 0; if (!e_data) return; pa.padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_PW_SALT; pa.padata_value.length = 12; pa.padata_value.data = malloc(pa.padata_value.length); if (!pa.padata_value.data) { e_data->length = 0; e_data->data = NULL; return; } SIVAL(pa.padata_value.data, 0, NT_STATUS_V(nt_status)); SIVAL(pa.padata_value.data, 4, 0); SIVAL(pa.padata_value.data, 8, 1); ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_DATA, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret); free(pa.padata_value.data); e_data->data = buf; e_data->length = len; return; } /* function to map policy errors */ krb5_error_code samba_kdc_map_policy_err(NTSTATUS nt_status) { krb5_error_code ret; if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_MUST_CHANGE)) ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED; else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_EXPIRED)) ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED; else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_EXPIRED)) ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED; else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED)) ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED; else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_INVALID_LOGON_HOURS)) ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED; else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT)) ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED; else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_INVALID_WORKSTATION)) ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; else ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; return ret; } /* Given a kdc entry, consult the account_ok routine in auth/auth_sam.c * for consistency */ NTSTATUS samba_kdc_check_client_access(struct samba_kdc_entry *kdc_entry, const char *client_name, const char *workstation, bool password_change) { TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx; NTSTATUS nt_status; tmp_ctx = talloc_named(NULL, 0, "samba_kdc_check_client_access"); if (!tmp_ctx) { return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } /* we allow all kinds of trusts here */ nt_status = authsam_account_ok(tmp_ctx, kdc_entry->kdc_db_ctx->samdb, MSV1_0_ALLOW_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT | MSV1_0_ALLOW_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT, kdc_entry->realm_dn, kdc_entry->msg, workstation, client_name, true, password_change); talloc_free(tmp_ctx); return nt_status; } int kdc_check_pac(krb5_context context, DATA_BLOB srv_sig, struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *kdc_sig, hdb_entry_ex *ent) { krb5_enctype etype; int ret; krb5_keyblock keyblock; Key *key; if (kdc_sig->type == CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5) { etype = ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5; } else { ret = krb5_cksumtype_to_enctype(context, kdc_sig->type, &etype); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } } #if HDB_ENCTYPE2KEY_TAKES_KEYSET ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &ent->entry, NULL, etype, &key); #else ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &ent->entry, etype, &key); #endif if (ret != 0) { return ret; } keyblock = key->key; return check_pac_checksum(srv_sig, kdc_sig, context, &keyblock); }