/* Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. kerberos utility library Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2001 Copyright (C) Remus Koos 2001 Copyright (C) Luke Howard 2003 Copyright (C) Guenther Deschner 2003 Copyright (C) Jim McDonough (jmcd@us.ibm.com) 2003 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details. You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. */ #include "includes.h" #include "system/kerberos.h" #include "libcli/auth/kerberos.h" #include "asn_1.h" #include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h" #include "secrets.h" #ifdef HAVE_KRB5 #if !defined(HAVE_KRB5_PRINC_COMPONENT) const krb5_data *krb5_princ_component(krb5_context, krb5_principal, int ); #endif static DATA_BLOB unwrap_pac(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB *auth_data) { DATA_BLOB out; DATA_BLOB pac_contents = data_blob(NULL, 0); struct asn1_data data; int data_type; if (!auth_data->length) { return data_blob(NULL, 0); } asn1_load(&data, *auth_data); asn1_start_tag(&data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0)); asn1_start_tag(&data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0)); asn1_start_tag(&data, ASN1_CONTEXT(0)); asn1_read_Integer(&data, &data_type); asn1_end_tag(&data); asn1_start_tag(&data, ASN1_CONTEXT(1)); asn1_read_OctetString(&data, &pac_contents); asn1_end_tag(&data); asn1_end_tag(&data); asn1_end_tag(&data); asn1_free(&data); out = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, pac_contents.data, pac_contents.length); data_blob_free(&pac_contents); return out; } /********************************************************************************** Try to verify a ticket using the system keytab... the system keytab has kvno -1 entries, so it's more like what microsoft does... see comment in utils/net_ads.c in the ads_keytab_add_entry function for details. ***********************************************************************************/ static krb5_error_code ads_keytab_verify_ticket(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_context context, krb5_auth_context auth_context, const char *service, const DATA_BLOB *ticket, krb5_data *p_packet, krb5_ticket **pp_tkt, krb5_keyblock *keyblock) { krb5_error_code ret = 0; BOOL auth_ok = False; krb5_keytab keytab = NULL; char *my_fqdn; fstring my_name; fstring my_Fqdn, my_NAME; char *p_fqdn; char *host_princ_s[18]; krb5_principal host_princ; int i; ret = krb5_kt_default(context, &keytab); if (ret) { DEBUG(1, ("ads_keytab_verify_ticket: krb5_kt_default failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret))); goto out; } /* Generate the list of principal names which we expect clients might * want to use for authenticating to the file service. */ fstrcpy(my_name, lp_netbios_name()); strlower_m(my_name); fstrcpy(my_NAME, lp_netbios_name()); strupper_m(my_NAME); my_fqdn = name_to_fqdn(mem_ctx, lp_netbios_name()); strlower_m(my_fqdn); p_fqdn = strchr_m(my_fqdn, '.'); fstrcpy(my_Fqdn, my_NAME); if (p_fqdn) { fstrcat(my_Fqdn, p_fqdn); } asprintf(&host_princ_s[0], "%s$@%s", my_name, lp_realm()); asprintf(&host_princ_s[1], "%s$@%s", my_NAME, lp_realm()); asprintf(&host_princ_s[2], "host/%s@%s", my_name, lp_realm()); asprintf(&host_princ_s[3], "host/%s@%s", my_NAME, lp_realm()); asprintf(&host_princ_s[4], "host/%s@%s", my_fqdn, lp_realm()); asprintf(&host_princ_s[5], "host/%s@%s", my_Fqdn, lp_realm()); asprintf(&host_princ_s[6], "HOST/%s@%s", my_name, lp_realm()); asprintf(&host_princ_s[7], "HOST/%s@%s", my_NAME, lp_realm()); asprintf(&host_princ_s[8], "HOST/%s@%s", my_fqdn, lp_realm()); asprintf(&host_princ_s[9], "HOST/%s@%s", my_Fqdn, lp_realm()); asprintf(&host_princ_s[10], "%s/%s@%s", service, my_name, lp_realm()); asprintf(&host_princ_s[11], "%s/%s@%s", service, my_NAME, lp_realm()); asprintf(&host_princ_s[12], "%s/%s@%s", service, my_fqdn, lp_realm()); asprintf(&host_princ_s[13], "%s/%s@%s", service, my_Fqdn, lp_realm()); asprintf(&host_princ_s[14], "%s/%s@%s", strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, service), my_name, lp_realm()); asprintf(&host_princ_s[15], "%s/%s@%s", strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, service), my_NAME, lp_realm()); asprintf(&host_princ_s[16], "%s/%s@%s", strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, service), my_fqdn, lp_realm()); asprintf(&host_princ_s[17], "%s/%s@%s", strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, service), my_Fqdn, lp_realm()); /* Now try to verify the ticket using the key associated with each of * the principals which we think clients will expect us to be * participating as. */ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(host_princ_s) / sizeof(host_princ_s[0]); i++) { host_princ = NULL; ret = krb5_parse_name(context, host_princ_s[i], &host_princ); if (ret) { DEBUG(1, ("ads_keytab_verify_ticket: krb5_parse_name(%s) failed (%s)\n", host_princ_s[i], error_message(ret))); goto out; } p_packet->length = ticket->length; p_packet->data = (krb5_pointer)ticket->data; *pp_tkt = NULL; ret = krb5_rd_req(context, &auth_context, p_packet, host_princ, keytab, NULL, pp_tkt); krb5_free_principal(context, host_princ); if (ret) { DEBUG(0, ("krb5_rd_req(%s) failed: %s\n", host_princ_s[i], error_message(ret))); } else { DEBUG(10,("krb5_rd_req succeeded for principal %s\n", host_princ_s[i])); auth_ok = True; break; } } for (i = 0; i < sizeof(host_princ_s) / sizeof(host_princ_s[0]); i++) { SAFE_FREE(host_princ_s[i]); } out: if (keytab) { krb5_kt_close(context, keytab); } return ret; } /********************************************************************************** Try to verify a ticket using the secrets.tdb. ***********************************************************************************/ static krb5_error_code ads_secrets_verify_ticket(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_context context, krb5_auth_context auth_context, krb5_principal host_princ, const DATA_BLOB *ticket, krb5_data *p_packet, krb5_ticket **pp_tkt, krb5_keyblock *keyblock) { krb5_error_code ret = 0; krb5_data password; krb5_enctype *enctypes = NULL; int i; const struct ldb_val *password_v; struct ldb_wrap *ldb; int ldb_ret; struct ldb_message **msgs; const char *base_dn = SECRETS_PRIMARY_DOMAIN_DN; const char *attrs[] = { "secret", NULL }; ZERO_STRUCTP(keyblock); /* Local secrets are stored in secrets.ldb */ ldb = secrets_db_connect(mem_ctx); if (!ldb) { return ENOENT; } /* search for the secret record */ ldb_ret = samdb_search(ldb, mem_ctx, base_dn, &msgs, attrs, "(&(realm=%s)(objectclass=primaryDomain))", lp_realm()); if (ldb_ret == 0) { DEBUG(1, ("Could not find domain join record for %s\n", lp_realm())); return ENOENT; } else if (ldb_ret != 1) { DEBUG(1, ("Found %d records matching cn=%s under DN %s\n", ldb_ret, lp_realm(), base_dn)); return ENOENT; } password_v = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msgs[0], "secret"); password.data = password_v->data; password.length = password_v->length; /* CIFS doesn't use addresses in tickets. This would break NAT. JRA */ if ((ret = get_kerberos_allowed_etypes(context, &enctypes))) { DEBUG(1,("ads_secrets_verify_ticket: krb5_get_permitted_enctypes failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret))); goto out; } p_packet->length = ticket->length; p_packet->data = (krb5_pointer)ticket->data; ret = KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE; /* We need to setup a auth context with each possible encoding type in turn. */ for (i=0;enctypes[i];i++) { krb5_error_code our_ret; our_ret = create_kerberos_key_from_string(context, host_princ, &password, keyblock, enctypes[i]); if (our_ret) { ret = our_ret; continue; } krb5_auth_con_setuseruserkey(context, auth_context, keyblock); our_ret = krb5_rd_req(context, &auth_context, p_packet, NULL, NULL, NULL, pp_tkt); if (!our_ret) { DEBUG(10,("ads_secrets_verify_ticket: enc type [%u] decrypted message !\n", (unsigned int)enctypes[i] )); ret = our_ret; break; } krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, keyblock); DEBUG((our_ret != KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE) ? 3 : 10, ("ads_secrets_verify_ticket: enc type [%u] failed to decrypt with error %s\n", (unsigned int)enctypes[i], error_message(our_ret))); if (our_ret != KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE) { ret = our_ret; } } out: free_kerberos_etypes(context, enctypes); return ret; } /********************************************************************************** Verify an incoming ticket and parse out the principal name and authorization_data if available. ***********************************************************************************/ NTSTATUS ads_verify_ticket(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_context context, krb5_auth_context auth_context, const char *realm, const char *service, const DATA_BLOB *ticket, char **principal, DATA_BLOB *auth_data, DATA_BLOB *ap_rep, krb5_keyblock *keyblock) { NTSTATUS sret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE; krb5_data packet; krb5_ticket *tkt = NULL; krb5_rcache rcache = NULL; int ret; krb5_principal host_princ = NULL; char *host_princ_s = NULL; BOOL got_replay_mutex = False; char *malloc_principal; ZERO_STRUCT(packet); ZERO_STRUCTP(auth_data); ZERO_STRUCTP(ap_rep); /* This whole process is far more complex than I would like. We have to go through all this to allow us to store the secret internally, instead of using /etc/krb5.keytab */ asprintf(&host_princ_s, "%s$", lp_netbios_name()); strlower_m(host_princ_s); ret = krb5_parse_name(context, host_princ_s, &host_princ); if (ret) { DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_parse_name(%s) failed (%s)\n", host_princ_s, error_message(ret))); goto out; } /* Lock a mutex surrounding the replay as there is no locking in the MIT krb5 * code surrounding the replay cache... */ if (!grab_server_mutex("replay cache mutex")) { DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: unable to protect replay cache with mutex.\n")); goto out; } got_replay_mutex = True; /* * JRA. We must set the rcache here. This will prevent replay attacks. */ ret = krb5_get_server_rcache(context, krb5_princ_component(context, host_princ, 0), &rcache); if (ret) { DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_get_server_rcache failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret))); goto out; } ret = krb5_auth_con_setrcache(context, auth_context, rcache); if (ret) { DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_auth_con_setrcache failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret))); goto out; } ret = ads_keytab_verify_ticket(mem_ctx, context, auth_context, service, ticket, &packet, &tkt, keyblock); if (ret) { DEBUG(10, ("ads_secrets_verify_ticket: using host principal: [%s]\n", host_princ_s)); ret = ads_secrets_verify_ticket(mem_ctx, context, auth_context, host_princ, ticket, &packet, &tkt, keyblock); } release_server_mutex(); got_replay_mutex = False; if (ret) { DEBUG(3,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_rd_req with auth failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret))); goto out; } ret = krb5_mk_rep(context, auth_context, &packet); if (ret) { DEBUG(3,("ads_verify_ticket: Failed to generate mutual authentication reply (%s)\n", error_message(ret))); goto out; } *ap_rep = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, packet.data, packet.length); SAFE_FREE(packet.data); packet.length = 0; #if 0 file_save("/tmp/ticket.dat", ticket->data, ticket->length); #endif *auth_data = get_auth_data_from_tkt(mem_ctx, tkt); *auth_data = unwrap_pac(mem_ctx, auth_data); #if 0 if (tkt->enc_part2) { file_save("/tmp/authdata.dat", tkt->enc_part2->authorization_data[0]->contents, tkt->enc_part2->authorization_data[0]->length); } #endif if ((ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, get_principal_from_tkt(tkt), &malloc_principal))) { DEBUG(3,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_unparse_name failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret))); sret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE; goto out; } *principal = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, malloc_principal); SAFE_FREE(malloc_principal); if (!principal) { DEBUG(3,("ads_verify_ticket: talloc_strdup() failed\n")); sret = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; goto out; } sret = NT_STATUS_OK; out: if (got_replay_mutex) { release_server_mutex(); } if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(sret)) { data_blob_free(auth_data); } if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(sret)) { data_blob_free(ap_rep); } if (host_princ) { krb5_free_principal(context, host_princ); } if (tkt != NULL) { krb5_free_ticket(context, tkt); } SAFE_FREE(host_princ_s); return sret; } #endif /* HAVE_KRB5 */