path: root/source3/smbd/sesssetup.c

/* 
   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
   handle SMBsessionsetup
   Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1998-2001
   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett      2001
   Copyright (C) Jim McDonough <jmcd@us.ibm.com> 2002
   Copyright (C) Luke Howard          2003

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
   (at your option) any later version.
   
   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
   GNU General Public License for more details.
   
   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
   along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
   Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
*/

#include "includes.h"

uint32 global_client_caps = 0;

static struct auth_ntlmssp_state *global_ntlmssp_state;

/*
  on a logon error possibly map the error to success if "map to guest"
  is set approriately
*/
static NTSTATUS do_map_to_guest(NTSTATUS status, auth_serversupplied_info **server_info,
				const char *user, const char *domain)
{
	if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
		if ((lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_USER) || 
		    (lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_PASSWORD)) {
			DEBUG(3,("No such user %s [%s] - using guest account\n",
				 user, domain));
			status = make_server_info_guest(server_info);
		}
	}

	if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD)) {
		if (lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_PASSWORD) {
			DEBUG(3,("Registered username %s for guest access\n",user));
			status = make_server_info_guest(server_info);
		}
	}

	return status;
}

/****************************************************************************
 Add the standard 'Samba' signature to the end of the session setup.
****************************************************************************/

static int add_signature(char *outbuf, char *p)
{
	char *start = p;
	fstring lanman;

	fstr_sprintf( lanman, "Samba %s", SAMBA_VERSION_STRING);

	p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, "Unix", -1, STR_TERMINATE);
	p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, lanman, -1, STR_TERMINATE);
	p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, lp_workgroup(), -1, STR_TERMINATE);

	return PTR_DIFF(p, start);
}

/****************************************************************************
 Send a security blob via a session setup reply.
****************************************************************************/

static BOOL reply_sesssetup_blob(connection_struct *conn, char *outbuf,
				 DATA_BLOB blob, NTSTATUS nt_status)
{
	char *p;

	set_message(outbuf,4,0,True);

	nt_status = nt_status_squash(nt_status);
	SIVAL(outbuf, smb_rcls, NT_STATUS_V(nt_status));
	SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv0, 0xFF); /* no chaining possible */
	SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv3, blob.length);
	p = smb_buf(outbuf);

	/* should we cap this? */
	memcpy(p, blob.data, blob.length);
	p += blob.length;

	p += add_signature( outbuf, p );

	set_message_end(outbuf,p);

	return send_smb(smbd_server_fd(),outbuf);
}

/****************************************************************************
 Do a 'guest' logon, getting back the 
****************************************************************************/

static NTSTATUS check_guest_password(auth_serversupplied_info **server_info) 
{
	struct auth_context *auth_context;
	auth_usersupplied_info *user_info = NULL;
	
	NTSTATUS nt_status;
	unsigned char chal[8];

	ZERO_STRUCT(chal);

	DEBUG(3,("Got anonymous request\n"));

	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status = make_auth_context_fixed(&auth_context, chal))) {
		return nt_status;
	}

	if (!make_user_info_guest(&user_info)) {
		(auth_context->free)(&auth_context);
		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
	}
	
	nt_status = auth_context->check_ntlm_password(auth_context, user_info, server_info);
	(auth_context->free)(&auth_context);
	free_user_info(&user_info);
	return nt_status;
}


#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
/****************************************************************************
reply to a session setup spnego negotiate packet for kerberos
****************************************************************************/
static int reply_spnego_kerberos(connection_struct *conn, 
				 char *inbuf, char *outbuf,
				 int length, int bufsize,
				 DATA_BLOB *secblob)
{
	DATA_BLOB ticket;
	char *client, *p, *domain;
	fstring netbios_domain_name;
	const struct passwd *pw;
	char *user;
	int sess_vuid;
	NTSTATUS ret;
	DATA_BLOB auth_data;
	DATA_BLOB ap_rep, ap_rep_wrapped, response;
	auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL;
	DATA_BLOB session_key;
	uint8 tok_id[2];
	BOOL foreign = False;
	DATA_BLOB nullblob = data_blob(NULL, 0);

	ZERO_STRUCT(ticket);
	ZERO_STRUCT(auth_data);
	ZERO_STRUCT(ap_rep);
	ZERO_STRUCT(ap_rep_wrapped);
	ZERO_STRUCT(response);

	if (!spnego_parse_krb5_wrap(*secblob, &ticket, tok_id)) {
		return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
	}

	ret = ads_verify_ticket(lp_realm(), &ticket, &client, &auth_data, &ap_rep, &session_key);

	data_blob_free(&ticket);

	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
		DEBUG(1,("Failed to verify incoming ticket!\n"));	
		return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
	}

	data_blob_free(&auth_data);

	DEBUG(3,("Ticket name is [%s]\n", client));

	p = strchr_m(client, '@');
	if (!p) {
		DEBUG(3,("Doesn't look like a valid principal\n"));
		data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
		SAFE_FREE(client);
		return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
	}

	*p = 0;
	if (!strequal(p+1, lp_realm())) {
		DEBUG(3,("Ticket for foreign realm %s@%s\n", client, p+1));
		if (!lp_allow_trusted_domains()) {
			data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
			SAFE_FREE(client);
			return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
		}
		foreign = True;
	}

	/* this gives a fully qualified user name (ie. with full realm).
	   that leads to very long usernames, but what else can we do? */

	domain = p+1;

	{
		/* If we have winbind running, we can (and must) shorten the
		   username by using the short netbios name. Otherwise we will
		   have inconsistent user names. With Kerberos, we get the
		   fully qualified realm, with ntlmssp we get the short
		   name. And even w2k3 does use ntlmssp if you for example
		   connect to an ip address. */

		struct winbindd_request wb_request;
		struct winbindd_response wb_response;
		NSS_STATUS wb_result;

		ZERO_STRUCT(wb_request);
		ZERO_STRUCT(wb_response);

		DEBUG(10, ("Mapping [%s] to short name\n", domain));

		fstrcpy(wb_request.domain_name, domain);

		wb_result = winbindd_request(WINBINDD_DOMAIN_INFO,
					     &wb_request, &wb_response);

		if (wb_result == NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS) {

			fstrcpy(netbios_domain_name,
				wb_response.data.domain_info.name);
			domain = netbios_domain_name;

			DEBUG(10, ("Mapped to [%s]\n", domain));
		} else {
			DEBUG(3, ("Could not find short name -- winbind "
				  "not running?\n"));
		}
	}

	asprintf(&user, "%s%c%s", domain, *lp_winbind_separator(), client);
	
	pw = smb_getpwnam( user );
	
	if (!pw) {
		DEBUG(1,("Username %s is invalid on this system\n",user));
		SAFE_FREE(user);
		SAFE_FREE(client);
		data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
		return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
	}

	/* setup the string used by %U */
	
	sub_set_smb_name(pw->pw_name);
	reload_services(True);
	
	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret = make_server_info_pw(&server_info,pw))) {
		DEBUG(1,("make_server_info_from_pw failed!\n"));
		SAFE_FREE(user);
		SAFE_FREE(client);
		data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
		return ERROR_NT(ret);
	}

	/* register_vuid keeps the server info */
	sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nullblob, client);

	SAFE_FREE(user);
	SAFE_FREE(client);

	if (sess_vuid == -1) {
		ret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
	} else {
		set_message(outbuf,4,0,True);
		SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv3, 0);
			
		if (server_info->guest) {
			SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv2,1);
		}
		
		SSVAL(outbuf, smb_uid, sess_vuid);

		if (!server_info->guest) {
			/* We need to start the signing engine
			 * here but a W2K client sends the old
			 * "BSRSPYL " signature instead of the
			 * correct one. Subsequent packets will
			 * be correct.
			 */
		       	srv_check_sign_mac(inbuf);
		}
	}

        /* wrap that up in a nice GSS-API wrapping */
	if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
		ap_rep_wrapped = spnego_gen_krb5_wrap(ap_rep, TOK_ID_KRB_AP_REP);
	} else {
		ap_rep_wrapped = data_blob(NULL, 0);
	}
	response = spnego_gen_auth_response(&ap_rep_wrapped, ret, OID_KERBEROS5_OLD);
	reply_sesssetup_blob(conn, outbuf, response, ret);

	data_blob_free(&ap_rep);
	data_blob_free(&ap_rep_wrapped);
	data_blob_free(&response);

	return -1; /* already replied */
}
#endif

/****************************************************************************
 Send a session setup reply, wrapped in SPNEGO.
 Get vuid and check first.
 End the NTLMSSP exchange context if we are OK/complete fail
***************************************************************************/

static BOOL reply_spnego_ntlmssp(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf, char *outbuf,
				 AUTH_NTLMSSP_STATE **auth_ntlmssp_state,
				 DATA_BLOB *ntlmssp_blob, NTSTATUS nt_status) 
{
	BOOL ret;
	DATA_BLOB response;
	struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL;

	if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
		server_info = (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->server_info;
	} else {
		nt_status = do_map_to_guest(nt_status, 
					    &server_info, 
					    (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->user, 
					    (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->domain);
	}

	if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
		int sess_vuid;
		DATA_BLOB nullblob = data_blob(NULL, 0);
		DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob((*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->session_key.data, (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->session_key.length);

		/* register_vuid keeps the server info */
		sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nullblob, (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->user);
		(*auth_ntlmssp_state)->server_info = NULL;

		if (sess_vuid == -1) {
			nt_status = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
		} else {
			
			set_message(outbuf,4,0,True);
			SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv3, 0);
			
			if (server_info->guest) {
				SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv2,1);
			}
			
			SSVAL(outbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);

			if (!server_info->guest) {
				/* We need to start the signing engine
				 * here but a W2K client sends the old
				 * "BSRSPYL " signature instead of the
				 * correct one. Subsequent packets will
				 * be correct.
				 */
			       	srv_check_sign_mac(inbuf);
			}
		}
	}

        response = spnego_gen_auth_response(ntlmssp_blob, nt_status, OID_NTLMSSP);
	ret = reply_sesssetup_blob(conn, outbuf, response, nt_status);
	data_blob_free(&response);

	/* NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED from our NTLMSSP code tells us,
	   and the other end, that we are not finished yet. */

	if (!ret || !NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
		auth_ntlmssp_end(auth_ntlmssp_state);
	}

	return ret;
}

/****************************************************************************
 Reply to a session setup spnego negotiate packet.
****************************************************************************/

static int reply_spnego_negotiate(connection_struct *conn, 
				  char *inbuf,
				  char *outbuf,
				  int length, int bufsize,
				  DATA_BLOB blob1)
{
	char *OIDs[ASN1_MAX_OIDS];
	DATA_BLOB secblob;
	int i;
	DATA_BLOB chal;
	BOOL got_kerberos = False;
	NTSTATUS nt_status;

	/* parse out the OIDs and the first sec blob */
	if (!parse_negTokenTarg(blob1, OIDs, &secblob)) {
		return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
	}

	/* only look at the first OID for determining the mechToken --
	   accoirding to RFC2478, we should choose the one we want 
	   and renegotiate, but i smell a client bug here..  
	   
	   Problem observed when connecting to a member (samba box) 
	   of an AD domain as a user in a Samba domain.  Samba member 
	   server sent back krb5/mskrb5/ntlmssp as mechtypes, but the 
	   client (2ksp3) replied with ntlmssp/mskrb5/krb5 and an 
	   NTLMSSP mechtoken.                 --jerry              */
	
	if (strcmp(OID_KERBEROS5, OIDs[0]) == 0 ||
	    strcmp(OID_KERBEROS5_OLD, OIDs[0]) == 0) {
		got_kerberos = True;
	}
		
	for (i=0;OIDs[i];i++) {
		DEBUG(3,("Got OID %s\n", OIDs[i]));
		free(OIDs[i]);
	}
	DEBUG(3,("Got secblob of size %lu\n", (unsigned long)secblob.length));

#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
	if (got_kerberos && (SEC_ADS == lp_security())) {
		int ret = reply_spnego_kerberos(conn, inbuf, outbuf, 
						length, bufsize, &secblob);
		data_blob_free(&secblob);
		return ret;
	}
#endif

	if (global_ntlmssp_state) {
		auth_ntlmssp_end(&global_ntlmssp_state);
	}

	nt_status = auth_ntlmssp_start(&global_ntlmssp_state);
	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
		return ERROR_NT(nt_status);
	}

	nt_status = auth_ntlmssp_update(global_ntlmssp_state, 
					secblob, &chal);

	data_blob_free(&secblob);

	reply_spnego_ntlmssp(conn, inbuf, outbuf, &global_ntlmssp_state,
			     &chal, nt_status);
		
	data_blob_free(&chal);

	/* already replied */
	return -1;
}
	
/****************************************************************************
 Reply to a session setup spnego auth packet.
****************************************************************************/

static int reply_spnego_auth(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf, char *outbuf,
			     int length, int bufsize,
			     DATA_BLOB blob1)
{
	DATA_BLOB auth, auth_reply;
	NTSTATUS nt_status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;

	if (!spnego_parse_auth(blob1, &auth)) {
#if 0
		file_save("auth.dat", blob1.data, blob1.length);
#endif
		return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
	}
	
	if (!global_ntlmssp_state) {
		/* auth before negotiatiate? */
		return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
	}
	
	nt_status = auth_ntlmssp_update(global_ntlmssp_state, 
						auth, &auth_reply);

	data_blob_free(&auth);

	reply_spnego_ntlmssp(conn, inbuf, outbuf, &global_ntlmssp_state,
			     &auth_reply, nt_status);
		
	data_blob_free(&auth_reply);

	/* and tell smbd that we have already replied to this packet */
	return -1;
}

/****************************************************************************
 Reply to a session setup command.
****************************************************************************/

static int reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf,
					char *outbuf,
					int length,int bufsize)
{
	uint8 *p;
	DATA_BLOB blob1;
	int ret;
	size_t bufrem;
	fstring native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain;
	char *p2;
	uint16 data_blob_len = SVAL(inbuf, smb_vwv7);
	enum remote_arch_types ra_type = get_remote_arch();

	DEBUG(3,("Doing spnego session setup\n"));

	if (global_client_caps == 0) {
		global_client_caps = IVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv10);

		if (!(global_client_caps & CAP_STATUS32)) {
			remove_from_common_flags2(FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES);
		}

	}
		
	p = (uint8 *)smb_buf(inbuf);

	if (data_blob_len == 0) {
		/* an invalid request */
		return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
	}

	bufrem = smb_bufrem(inbuf, p);
	/* pull the spnego blob */
	blob1 = data_blob(p, MIN(bufrem, data_blob_len));

#if 0
	file_save("negotiate.dat", blob1.data, blob1.length);
#endif

	p2 = inbuf + smb_vwv13 + data_blob_len;
	p2 += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_os, p2, sizeof(native_os), STR_TERMINATE);
	p2 += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_lanman, p2, sizeof(native_lanman), STR_TERMINATE);
	p2 += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, primary_domain, p2, sizeof(primary_domain), STR_TERMINATE);
	DEBUG(3,("NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s] PrimaryDomain=[%s]\n", 
		native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain));

	if ( ra_type == RA_WIN2K ) {
		/* Windows 2003 doesn't set the native lanman string, 
		   but does set primary domain which is a bug I think */
			   
		if ( !strlen(native_lanman) )
			ra_lanman_string( primary_domain );
		else
			ra_lanman_string( native_lanman );
	}
		
	if (blob1.data[0] == ASN1_APPLICATION(0)) {
		/* its a negTokenTarg packet */
		ret = reply_spnego_negotiate(conn, inbuf, outbuf, length, bufsize, blob1);
		data_blob_free(&blob1);
		return ret;
	}

	if (blob1.data[0] == ASN1_CONTEXT(1)) {
		/* its a auth packet */
		ret = reply_spnego_auth(conn, inbuf, outbuf, length, bufsize, blob1);
		data_blob_free(&blob1);
		return ret;
	}

	/* what sort of packet is this? */
	DEBUG(1,("Unknown packet in reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego\n"));

	data_blob_free(&blob1);

	return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
}

/****************************************************************************
 On new VC == 0, shutdown *all* old connections and users.
 It seems that only NT4.x does this. At W2K and above (XP etc.).
 a new session setup with VC==0 is ignored.
****************************************************************************/

static void setup_new_vc_session(void)
{
	DEBUG(2,("setup_new_vc_session: New VC == 0, if NT4.x compatible we would close all old resources.\n"));
#if 0
	conn_close_all();
	invalidate_all_vuids();
#endif
}

/****************************************************************************
 Reply to a session setup command.
****************************************************************************/

int reply_sesssetup_and_X(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf,char *outbuf,
			  int length,int bufsize)
{
	int sess_vuid;
	int   smb_bufsize;    
	DATA_BLOB lm_resp;
	DATA_BLOB nt_resp;
	DATA_BLOB plaintext_password;
	fstring user;
	fstring sub_user; /* Sainitised username for substituion */
	fstring domain;
	fstring native_os;
	fstring native_lanman;
	fstring primary_domain;
	static BOOL done_sesssetup = False;
	extern BOOL global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;
	extern BOOL global_spnego_negotiated;
	extern int Protocol;
	extern int max_send;

	auth_usersupplied_info *user_info = NULL;
	extern struct auth_context *negprot_global_auth_context;
	auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL;

	NTSTATUS nt_status;

	BOOL doencrypt = global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated;

	DATA_BLOB session_key;
	
	START_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);

	ZERO_STRUCT(lm_resp);
	ZERO_STRUCT(nt_resp);
	ZERO_STRUCT(plaintext_password);

	DEBUG(3,("wct=%d flg2=0x%x\n", CVAL(inbuf, smb_wct), SVAL(inbuf, smb_flg2)));

	/* a SPNEGO session setup has 12 command words, whereas a normal
	   NT1 session setup has 13. See the cifs spec. */
	if (CVAL(inbuf, smb_wct) == 12 &&
	    (SVAL(inbuf, smb_flg2) & FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY)) {
		if (!global_spnego_negotiated) {
			DEBUG(0,("reply_sesssetup_and_X:  Rejecting attempt at SPNEGO session setup when it was not negoitiated.\n"));
			return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL);
		}

		if (SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv4) == 0) {
			setup_new_vc_session();
		}
		return reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego(conn, inbuf, outbuf, length, bufsize);
	}

	smb_bufsize = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv2);

	if (Protocol < PROTOCOL_NT1) {
		uint16 passlen1 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv7);
		if ((passlen1 > MAX_PASS_LEN) || (passlen1 > smb_bufrem(inbuf, smb_buf(inbuf)))) {
			return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
		}

		if (doencrypt) {
			lm_resp = data_blob(smb_buf(inbuf), passlen1);
		} else {
			plaintext_password = data_blob(smb_buf(inbuf), passlen1+1);
			/* Ensure null termination */
			plaintext_password.data[passlen1] = 0;
		}

		srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, user, smb_buf(inbuf)+passlen1, sizeof(user), STR_TERMINATE);
		*domain = 0;

	} else {
		uint16 passlen1 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv7);
		uint16 passlen2 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv8);
		enum remote_arch_types ra_type = get_remote_arch();
		char *p = smb_buf(inbuf);    
		char *save_p = smb_buf(inbuf);
		uint16 byte_count;
			

		if(global_client_caps == 0) {
			global_client_caps = IVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv11);
		
			if (!(global_client_caps & CAP_STATUS32)) {
				remove_from_common_flags2(FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES);
			}

			/* client_caps is used as final determination if client is NT or Win95. 
			   This is needed to return the correct error codes in some
			   circumstances.
			*/
		
			if(ra_type == RA_WINNT || ra_type == RA_WIN2K || ra_type == RA_WIN95) {
				if(!(global_client_caps & (CAP_NT_SMBS | CAP_STATUS32))) {
					set_remote_arch( RA_WIN95);
				}
			}
		}

		if (!doencrypt) {
			/* both Win95 and WinNT stuff up the password lengths for
			   non-encrypting systems. Uggh. 
			   
			   if passlen1==24 its a win95 system, and its setting the
			   password length incorrectly. Luckily it still works with the
			   default code because Win95 will null terminate the password
			   anyway 
			   
			   if passlen1>0 and passlen2>0 then maybe its a NT box and its
			   setting passlen2 to some random value which really stuffs
			   things up. we need to fix that one.  */
			
			if (passlen1 > 0 && passlen2 > 0 && passlen2 != 24 && passlen2 != 1)
				passlen2 = 0;
		}
		
		/* check for nasty tricks */
		if (passlen1 > MAX_PASS_LEN || passlen1 > smb_bufrem(inbuf, p)) {
			return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
		}

		if (passlen2 > MAX_PASS_LEN || passlen2 > smb_bufrem(inbuf, p+passlen1)) {
			return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
		}

		/* Save the lanman2 password and the NT md4 password. */
		
		if ((doencrypt) && (passlen1 != 0) && (passlen1 != 24)) {
			doencrypt = False;
		}

		if (doencrypt) {
			lm_resp = data_blob(p, passlen1);
			nt_resp = data_blob(p+passlen1, passlen2);
		} else {
			pstring pass;
			BOOL unic=SVAL(inbuf, smb_flg2) & FLAGS2_UNICODE_STRINGS;

			if ((ra_type == RA_WINNT) && (passlen2 == 0) && unic && passlen1) {
				/* NT4.0 stuffs up plaintext unicode password lengths... */
				srvstr_pull(inbuf, pass, smb_buf(inbuf) + 1,
					sizeof(pass), passlen1, STR_TERMINATE);
			} else {
				srvstr_pull(inbuf, pass, smb_buf(inbuf), 
					sizeof(pass),  unic ? passlen2 : passlen1, 
					STR_TERMINATE);
			}
			plaintext_password = data_blob(pass, strlen(pass)+1);
		}
		
		p += passlen1 + passlen2;
		p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, user, p, sizeof(user), STR_TERMINATE);
		p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, domain, p, sizeof(domain), STR_TERMINATE);
		p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_os, p, sizeof(native_os), STR_TERMINATE);
		p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_lanman, p, sizeof(native_lanman), STR_TERMINATE);

		/* not documented or decoded by Ethereal but there is one more string 
		   in the extra bytes which is the same as the PrimaryDomain when using 
		   extended security.  Windows NT 4 and 2003 use this string to store 
		   the native lanman string. Windows 9x does not include a string here 
		   at all so we have to check if we have any extra bytes left */
		
		byte_count = SVAL(inbuf, smb_vwv13);
		if ( PTR_DIFF(p, save_p) < byte_count)
			p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, primary_domain, p, sizeof(primary_domain), STR_TERMINATE);
		else 
			fstrcpy( primary_domain, "null" );

		DEBUG(3,("Domain=[%s]  NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s] PrimaryDomain=[%s]\n",
			 domain, native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain));

		if ( ra_type == RA_WIN2K ) {
			if ( strlen(native_lanman) == 0 )
				ra_lanman_string( primary_domain );
			else
				ra_lanman_string( native_lanman );
		}

	}

	if (SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv4) == 0) {
		setup_new_vc_session();
	}

	DEBUG(3,("sesssetupX:name=[%s]\\[%s]@[%s]\n", domain, user, get_remote_machine_name()));

	if (*user) {
		if (global_spnego_negotiated) {
			
			/* This has to be here, because this is a perfectly valid behaviour for guest logons :-( */
			
			DEBUG(0,("reply_sesssetup_and_X:  Rejecting attempt at 'normal' session setup after negotiating spnego.\n"));
			return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL);
		}
		fstrcpy(sub_user, user);

		/* setup the string used by %U */
		sub_set_smb_name(user);
	} else {
		fstrcpy(sub_user, lp_guestaccount());
	}

	sub_set_smb_name(sub_user);

	reload_services(True);
	
	if (lp_security() == SEC_SHARE) {
		/* in share level we should ignore any passwords */

		data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
		data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
		data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);

		map_username(sub_user);
		add_session_user(sub_user);
		/* Then force it to null for the benfit of the code below */
		*user = 0;
	}
	
	if (!*user) {

		nt_status = check_guest_password(&server_info);

	} else if (doencrypt) {
		if (!negprot_global_auth_context) {
			DEBUG(0, ("reply_sesssetup_and_X:  Attempted encrypted session setup without negprot denied!\n"));
			return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
		}
		nt_status = make_user_info_for_reply_enc(&user_info, user, domain,
		                                         lm_resp, nt_resp);
		if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
			nt_status = negprot_global_auth_context->check_ntlm_password(negprot_global_auth_context, 
										     user_info, 
										     &server_info);
		}
	} else {
		struct auth_context *plaintext_auth_context = NULL;
		const uint8 *chal;
		if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status = make_auth_context_subsystem(&plaintext_auth_context))) {
			chal = plaintext_auth_context->get_ntlm_challenge(plaintext_auth_context);
			
			if (!make_user_info_for_reply(&user_info, 
						      user, domain, chal,
						      plaintext_password)) {
				nt_status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
			}
		
			if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
				nt_status = plaintext_auth_context->check_ntlm_password(plaintext_auth_context, 
											user_info, 
											&server_info); 
				
				(plaintext_auth_context->free)(&plaintext_auth_context);
			}
		}
	}

	free_user_info(&user_info);
	
	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
		nt_status = do_map_to_guest(nt_status, &server_info, user, domain);
	}
	
	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
		data_blob_free(&nt_resp);
		data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
		data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
		return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(nt_status));
	}

	if (server_info->nt_session_key.data) {
		session_key = data_blob(server_info->nt_session_key.data, server_info->nt_session_key.length);
	} else if (server_info->lm_session_key.length >= 8 && lm_resp.length == 24) {
		session_key = data_blob(NULL, 16);
		SMBsesskeygen_lmv1(server_info->lm_session_key.data, lm_resp.data, 
				   session_key.data);
	}

	data_blob_free(&lm_resp);
	data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password);
	
	/* it's ok - setup a reply */
	set_message(outbuf,3,0,True);
	if (Protocol >= PROTOCOL_NT1) {
		char *p = smb_buf( outbuf );
		p += add_signature( outbuf, p );
		set_message_end( outbuf, p );
		/* perhaps grab OS version here?? */
	}
	
	if (server_info->guest) {
		SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv2,1);
	}

	/* register the name and uid as being validated, so further connections
	   to a uid can get through without a password, on the same VC */

	/* register_vuid keeps the server info */
	sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nt_resp, sub_user);
	data_blob_free(&nt_resp);

	if (sess_vuid == -1) {
		return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE);
	}

 	if (!server_info->guest && !srv_check_sign_mac(inbuf)) {
		exit_server("reply_sesssetup_and_X: bad smb signature");
	}

	SSVAL(outbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
	SSVAL(inbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid);
	
	if (!done_sesssetup)
		max_send = MIN(max_send,smb_bufsize);
	
	done_sesssetup = True;
	
	END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX);
	return chain_reply(inbuf,outbuf,length,bufsize);
}