Partly based on the work by mimir (Rafal Szczesniak

<mimir@diament.ists.pwr.wroc.pl>) this patch allows samba to correctly
enumerate its trusted domains - by exaimining the keys in the secrets.tdb file.

This patch has been tested with both NT4 and rpcclient/wbinfo, and adds
some extra functionality to talloc and rpc_parse to allow it to deal with
already unicode strings.

Finally, this cleans up some const warnings that were in net_rpc.c by pushing
another dash of const into the rpc client code.

Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 0bdd94cb992b40942aaf2e5e0efd2868b4686296)

15 files changed, 406 insertions, 68 deletions

diff --git a/source3/auth/auth_domain.c b/source3/auth/auth_domain.c
index af353ef812..a77bbeade3 100644
--- a/source3/auth/auth_domain.c
+++ b/source3/auth/auth_domain.c
@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ static NTSTATUS check_trustdomain_security(const struct auth_context *auth_conte
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * Get the machine account password for the trusted domain
+	 * Get the trusted account password for the trusted domain
 	 * No need to become_root() as secrets_init() is done at startup.
 	 */
 
diff --git a/source3/include/includes.h b/source3/include/includes.h
index 5da1c1d997..1dfebcea78 100644
--- a/source3/include/includes.h
+++ b/source3/include/includes.h
@@ -696,6 +696,7 @@ extern int errno;
 #include "dlinklist.h"
 #include "../tdb/tdb.h"
 #include "../tdb/spinlock.h"
+#include "../tdb/tdbutil.h"
 #include "talloc.h"
 #include "ads.h"
 #include "interfaces.h"
diff --git a/source3/include/rpc_lsa.h b/source3/include/rpc_lsa.h
index ccdce6f263..ceb0e17d5c 100644
--- a/source3/include/rpc_lsa.h
+++ b/source3/include/rpc_lsa.h
@@ -278,8 +278,8 @@ typedef struct lsa_r_query_info
 typedef struct lsa_enum_trust_dom_info
 {
 	POLICY_HND pol; /* policy handle */
-    uint32 enum_context; /* enumeration context handle */
-    uint32 preferred_len; /* preferred maximum length */
+	uint32 enum_context; /* enumeration context handle */
+	uint32 preferred_len; /* preferred maximum length */
 
 } LSA_Q_ENUM_TRUST_DOM;
 
diff --git a/source3/include/secrets.h b/source3/include/secrets.h
index 69ab4f6c8d..3d7e2aa97e 100644
--- a/source3/include/secrets.h
+++ b/source3/include/secrets.h
@@ -48,12 +48,26 @@ struct machine_acct_pass {
 	time_t mod_time;
 };
 
-/* structure for storing trusted domain password */
+/*
+ * storage structure for trusted domain
+ */
 struct trusted_dom_pass {
-	int pass_len;
-	fstring pass;
+	size_t uni_name_len;
+	smb_ucs2_t uni_name[32]; /* unicode domain name */
+	size_t pass_len;
+	fstring pass;		/* trust relationship's password */
 	time_t mod_time;
-	DOM_SID domain_sid; /* remote domain's sid */
+	DOM_SID domain_sid;	/* remote domain's sid */
 };
 
+/*
+ * trusted domain entry/entries returned by secrets_get_trusted_domains
+ * (used in _lsa_enum_trust_dom call)
+ */
+typedef struct trustdom {
+	smb_ucs2_t *name;
+	DOM_SID sid;
+} TRUSTDOM;
+
+
 #endif /* _SECRETS_H */
diff --git a/source3/lib/talloc.c b/source3/lib/talloc.c
index 6ac784a929..b50e451b95 100644
--- a/source3/lib/talloc.c
+++ b/source3/lib/talloc.c
@@ -287,6 +287,15 @@ char *talloc_strdup(TALLOC_CTX *t, const char *p)
 		return NULL;
 }
 
+/** strdup_w with a talloc */
+smb_ucs2_t *talloc_strdup_w(TALLOC_CTX *t, const smb_ucs2_t *p)
+{
+	if (p)
+		return talloc_memdup(t, p, (strlen_w(p) + 1) * sizeof(smb_ucs2_t));
+	else
+		return NULL;
+}
+
 /**
  * Perform string formatting, and return a pointer to newly allocated
  * memory holding the result, inside a memory pool.
diff --git a/source3/lib/util_unistr.c b/source3/lib/util_unistr.c
index a1cff26169..ba02819bdc 100644
--- a/source3/lib/util_unistr.c
+++ b/source3/lib/util_unistr.c
@@ -775,3 +775,44 @@ int unistrcpy(uint16 *dst, uint16 *src)
 
 	return num_wchars;
 }
+
+/**
+ * Samba ucs2 type to UNISTR2 conversion
+ *
+ * @param ctx Talloc context to create the dst strcture (if null) and the 
+ *            contents of the unicode string.
+ * @param dst UNISTR2 destination. If equals null, then it's allocated.
+ * @param src smb_ucs2_t source.
+ * @param max_len maximum number of unicode characters to copy. If equals
+ *        null, then null-termination of src is taken
+ *
+ * @return copied UNISTR2 destination
+ **/
+UNISTR2* ucs2_to_unistr2(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, UNISTR2* dst, smb_ucs2_t* src)
+{
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (!src) return NULL;
+	len = strlen_w(src);
+	
+	/* allocate UNISTR2 destination if not given */
+	if (!dst) {
+		dst = (UNISTR2*) talloc(ctx, sizeof(UNISTR2));
+		if (!dst) return NULL;
+	}
+	if (!dst->buffer) {
+		dst->buffer = (uint16*) talloc(ctx, sizeof(uint16) * (len + 1));
+		if (!dst->buffer) return NULL;
+	}
+	
+	/* set UNISTR2 parameters */
+	dst->uni_max_len = len + 1;
+	dst->undoc = 0;
+	dst->uni_str_len = len;
+	
+	/* copy the actual unicode string */
+	strncpy_w(dst->buffer, src, dst->uni_max_len);
+	
+	return dst;
+};
+
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/cli_samr.c b/source3/libsmb/cli_samr.c
index 85a7375f99..f3560ede5d 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/cli_samr.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/cli_samr.c
@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_samr_lookup_rids(struct cli_state *cli, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 
 NTSTATUS cli_samr_lookup_names(struct cli_state *cli, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, 
                                POLICY_HND *domain_pol, uint32 flags,
-                               uint32 num_names, char **names,
+                               uint32 num_names, const char **names,
                                uint32 *num_rids, uint32 **rids,
                                uint32 **rid_types)
 {
diff --git a/source3/passdb/secrets.c b/source3/passdb/secrets.c
index b3507a1392..073317824b 100644
--- a/source3/passdb/secrets.c
+++ b/source3/passdb/secrets.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 /* 
    Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
    Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-2001
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett      2002
    
    This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
    it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -124,9 +125,13 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_sid(char *domain, DOM_SID *sid)
 }
 
 
-/************************************************************************
-form a key for fetching the machine trust account password
-************************************************************************/
+/**
+ * Form a key for fetching the machine trust account password
+ *
+ * @param domain domain name
+ *
+ * @return stored password's key
+ **/
 char *trust_keystr(char *domain)
 {
 	static fstring keystr;
@@ -141,7 +146,7 @@ char *trust_keystr(char *domain)
 /**
  * Form a key for fetching a trusted domain password
  *
- * @param domain domain name
+ * @param domain trusted domain name
  *
  * @return stored password's key
  **/
@@ -194,21 +199,23 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(char *domain, uint8 ret_pwd[16],
  Routine to get account password to trusted domain
 ************************************************************************/
 BOOL secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(char *domain, char** pwd,
-				DOM_SID *sid, time_t *pass_last_set_time)
+					   DOM_SID *sid, time_t *pass_last_set_time)
 {
 	struct trusted_dom_pass *pass;
 	size_t size;
 
+	/* fetching trusted domain password structure */
 	if (!(pass = secrets_fetch(trustdom_keystr(domain), &size))) {
 		DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n"));
 		return False;
 	}
-	
+
 	if (size != sizeof(*pass)) {
 		DEBUG(0, ("secrets were of incorrect size!\n"));
 		return False;
 	}
-	
+
+	/* the trust's password */	
 	if (pwd) {
 		*pwd = strdup(pass->pass);
 		if (!*pwd) {
@@ -216,9 +223,12 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(char *domain, char** pwd,
 		}
 	}
 
+	/* last change time */
 	if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass->mod_time;
 
+	/* domain sid */
 	memcpy(&sid, &(pass->domain_sid), sizeof(sid));
+	
 	SAFE_FREE(pass);
 	
 	return True;
@@ -247,19 +257,30 @@ BOOL secrets_store_trust_account_password(char *domain, uint8 new_pwd[16])
  * @return true if succeeded
  **/
 
-BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(char* domain, char* pwd,
+BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(char* domain, smb_ucs2_t *uni_dom_name,
+					   size_t uni_name_len, char* pwd,
 					   DOM_SID sid)
 {
 	struct trusted_dom_pass pass;
 	ZERO_STRUCT(pass);
 
+	/* unicode domain name and its length */
+	if (!uni_dom_name)
+		return False;
+		
+	strncpy_w(pass.uni_name, uni_dom_name, sizeof(pass.uni_name) - 1);
+	pass.uni_name_len = uni_name_len;
+
+	/* last change time */
 	pass.mod_time = time(NULL);
 
+	/* password of the trust */
 	pass.pass_len = strlen(pwd);
 	fstrcpy(pass.pass, pwd);
 
+	/* domain sid */
 	memcpy(&(pass.domain_sid), &sid, sizeof(sid));
-	
+
 	return secrets_store(trustdom_keystr(domain), (void *)&pass, sizeof(pass));
 }
 
@@ -357,3 +378,100 @@ BOOL secrets_store_ldap_pw(char* dn, char* pw)
 	return secrets_store(key, pw, strlen(pw));
 }
 
+
+/**
+ * The linked list is allocated on the supplied talloc context, caller gets to destory
+ * when done.
+ *
+ * @param start_idx starting index, eg. we can start fetching
+ *	  at third or sixth trusted domain entry
+ * @param num_domains number of domain entries to fetch at one call
+ *
+ * @return list of trusted domains structs (unicode name, sid and password)
+ **/ 
+
+NTSTATUS secrets_get_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX* ctx, int start_idx, int max_num_domains, int *num_domains, TRUSTDOM ***domains)
+{
+	TDB_LIST_NODE *keys, *k;
+	TRUSTDOM *dom = NULL;
+	char *pattern;
+	uint32 idx = 0;
+	size_t size;
+	struct trusted_dom_pass *pass;
+
+	secrets_init();
+
+	*num_domains = 0;
+
+	/* generate searching pattern */
+	if (!(pattern = talloc_asprintf(ctx, "%s/*", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS))) {
+		DEBUG(0, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: talloc_asprintf() failed!\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: looking for %d domains, starting at index %d\n", 
+		  max_num_domains, start_idx));
+
+	*domains = talloc_zero(ctx, sizeof(**domains)*max_num_domains);
+
+	/* fetching trusted domains' data and collecting them in a list */
+	keys = tdb_search_keys(tdb, pattern);
+
+	/* searching for keys in sectrets db -- way to go ... */
+	for (k = keys; k; k = k->next) {
+		char *secrets_key;
+		
+		/* important: ensure null-termination of the key string */
+		secrets_key = strndup(k->node_key.dptr, k->node_key.dsize);
+		if (!secrets_key) {
+			DEBUG(0, ("strndup failed!\n"));
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+				
+		pass = secrets_fetch(secrets_key, &size);
+		
+		if (size != sizeof(*pass)) {
+			DEBUG(2, ("Secrets record %s is invalid!\n", secrets_key));
+			SAFE_FREE(pass);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		SAFE_FREE(secrets_key);
+
+		if (idx >= start_idx && idx < start_idx + max_num_domains) {
+			dom = talloc_zero(ctx, sizeof(*dom));
+			if (!dom) {
+				/* free returned tdb record */
+				SAFE_FREE(pass);
+				
+				return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+			}
+			
+				/* copy domain sid */
+			SMB_ASSERT(sizeof(dom->sid) == sizeof(pass->domain_sid));
+			memcpy(&(dom->sid), &(pass->domain_sid), sizeof(dom->sid));
+			
+				/* copy unicode domain name */
+			dom->name = talloc_strdup_w(ctx, pass->uni_name);
+			
+			(*domains)[*num_domains] = dom;
+
+			(*num_domains)++;
+			
+		}
+		
+		idx++;
+		
+		/* free returned tdb record */
+		SAFE_FREE(pass);
+	}
+	
+	DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: got %d of %d domains\n", 
+		  *num_domains, max_num_domains));
+
+	/* free the results of searching the keys */
+	tdb_search_list_free(keys);
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
diff --git a/source3/rpc_parse/parse_lsa.c b/source3/rpc_parse/parse_lsa.c
index 91b54b9c83..415737ebfb 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_parse/parse_lsa.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_parse/parse_lsa.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
  *  Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell              1992-1997,
  *  Copyright (C) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton 1996-1997,
  *  Copyright (C) Paul Ashton                       1997.
+ *  Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett                   2002.
  *  
  *  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -523,40 +524,63 @@ BOOL lsa_io_q_enum_trust_dom(char *desc, LSA_Q_ENUM_TRUST_DOM *q_e,
  Inits an LSA_R_ENUM_TRUST_DOM structure.
 ********************************************************************/
 
-void init_r_enum_trust_dom(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, LSA_R_ENUM_TRUST_DOM *r_e, uint32 enum_context, 
-			   char *domain_name, DOM_SID *domain_sid,
-                           NTSTATUS status)
+void init_r_enum_trust_dom(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, LSA_R_ENUM_TRUST_DOM *r_e, uint32 enum_context,
+			   uint32 requested_num_domains, uint32 num_domains, TRUSTDOM **td)
 {
+	int i;
+
         DEBUG(5, ("init_r_enum_trust_dom\n"));
 	
         r_e->enum_context = enum_context;
-	
-        if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
-                int len_domain_name = strlen(domain_name) + 1;
-		
-                r_e->num_domains  = 1;
-                r_e->ptr_enum_domains = 1;
-                r_e->num_domains2 = 1;
-		
-		if (!(r_e->hdr_domain_name = (UNIHDR2 *)talloc(ctx,sizeof(UNIHDR2))))
-			return;
+	r_e->num_domains = 0;
+	r_e->ptr_enum_domains = 0;
+	r_e->num_domains2 = 0;
+
+	if (num_domains == 0) {
+		r_e->status = NT_STATUS_NO_MORE_ENTRIES;
 
-		if (!(r_e->uni_domain_name = (UNISTR2 *)talloc(ctx,sizeof(UNISTR2))))
+	} else {
+		/* 
+		 * allocating empty arrays of unicode headers, strings
+		 * and sids of enumerated trusted domains
+		 */
+		if (!(r_e->hdr_domain_name = (UNIHDR2 *)talloc(ctx,sizeof(UNIHDR2) * num_domains))) {
+			r_e->status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
 			return;
+		}
+		
+		if (!(r_e->uni_domain_name = (UNISTR2 *)talloc(ctx,sizeof(UNISTR2) * num_domains))) {
+			r_e->status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+			return;
+		}
 
-		if (!(r_e->domain_sid = (DOM_SID2 *)talloc(ctx,sizeof(DOM_SID2))))
+		if (!(r_e->domain_sid = (DOM_SID2 *)talloc(ctx,sizeof(DOM_SID2) * num_domains))) {
+			r_e->status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
 			return;
+		}
+		
+		r_e->num_domains = num_domains;
+		r_e->num_domains2 = num_domains;
+		
+		for (i = 0; i < num_domains; i++) {
+			
+			/* don't know what actually is this for */
+			r_e->ptr_enum_domains = 1;
+			
+			init_uni_hdr2(&r_e->hdr_domain_name[i], strlen_w((td[i])->name));
+			init_dom_sid2(&r_e->domain_sid[i], &(td[i])->sid);
+			
+			init_unistr2_w(ctx, &r_e->uni_domain_name[i], (td[i])->name);
+			
+		};
+
+		if (num_domains < requested_num_domains) {
+			r_e->status = NT_STATUS_NO_MORE_ENTRIES;
+		} else {
+			r_e->status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+		}
+	}
 
-		init_uni_hdr2(&r_e->hdr_domain_name[0], len_domain_name);
-		init_unistr2 (&r_e->uni_domain_name[0], domain_name, 
-			      len_domain_name);
-		init_dom_sid2(&r_e->domain_sid[0], domain_sid);
-        } else {
-                r_e->num_domains = 0;
-                r_e->ptr_enum_domains = 0;
-        }
-	
-        r_e->status = status;
 }
 
 /*******************************************************************
@@ -603,7 +627,7 @@ BOOL lsa_io_r_enum_trust_dom(char *desc, LSA_R_ENUM_TRUST_DOM *r_e,
 		
 		for (i = 0; i < num_domains; i++) {
 			if(!smb_io_unistr2 ("", &r_e->uni_domain_name[i],
-					    r_e->hdr_domain_name[i].buffer, 
+					    r_e->hdr_domain_name[i].buffer,
 					    ps, depth))
 				return False;
 			if(!smb_io_dom_sid2("", &r_e->domain_sid[i], ps, 
diff --git a/source3/rpc_parse/parse_misc.c b/source3/rpc_parse/parse_misc.c
index 73f285e320..f326681c64 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_parse/parse_misc.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_parse/parse_misc.c
@@ -916,6 +916,51 @@ void init_unistr2(UNISTR2 *str, const char *buf, size_t len)
 	rpcstr_push((char *)str->buffer, buf, len, STR_TERMINATE);
 }
 
+/** 
+ *  Inits a UNISTR2 structure.
+ *  @param  ctx talloc context to allocate string on
+ *  @param  str pointer to string to create
+ *  @param  buf UCS2 null-terminated buffer to init from
+*/
+
+void init_unistr2_w(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, UNISTR2 *str, const smb_ucs2_t *buf)
+{
+	uint32 len = strlen_w(buf);
+	uint32 max_len = len;
+	uint32 alloc_len;
+
+	ZERO_STRUCTP(str);
+
+	/* set up string lengths. */
+	str->uni_max_len = len;
+	str->undoc       = 0;
+	str->uni_str_len = len;
+
+	if (max_len < MAX_UNISTRLEN)
+		max_len = MAX_UNISTRLEN;
+
+	alloc_len = (max_len + 1) * sizeof(uint16);
+
+	str->buffer = (uint16 *)talloc_zero(ctx, alloc_len);
+	if ((str->buffer == NULL) && (alloc_len > 0))
+	{
+		smb_panic("init_unistr2_w: malloc fail\n");
+		return;
+	}
+	
+	/*
+	 * don't move this test above ! The UNISTR2 must be initialized !!!
+	 * jfm, 7/7/2001.
+	 */
+	if (buf==NULL)
+		return;
+	
+	/* Yes, this is a strncpy( foo, bar, strlen(bar)) - but as
+           long as the buffer above is talloc()ed correctly then this
+           is the correct thing to do */
+	strncpy_w(str->buffer, buf, len + 1);
+}
+
 /*******************************************************************
  Inits a UNISTR2 structure from a UNISTR
 ********************************************************************/
diff --git a/source3/rpc_parse/parse_samr.c b/source3/rpc_parse/parse_samr.c
index 4edc0678af..b8a558665f 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_parse/parse_samr.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_parse/parse_samr.c
@@ -4535,7 +4535,7 @@ inits a SAMR_Q_LOOKUP_NAMES structure.
 
 NTSTATUS init_samr_q_lookup_names(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, SAMR_Q_LOOKUP_NAMES * q_u,
 			      POLICY_HND *pol, uint32 flags,
-			      uint32 num_names, char **name)
+			      uint32 num_names, const char **name)
 {
 	uint32 i;
 
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa.c
index fcd4be0212..3914556e88 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa.c
@@ -105,8 +105,10 @@ static BOOL api_lsa_enum_trust_dom(pipes_struct *p)
 	if(!lsa_io_q_enum_trust_dom("", &q_u, data, 0))
 		return False;
 
+	/* get required trusted domains information */
 	r_u.status = _lsa_enum_trust_dom(p, &q_u, &r_u);
 
+	/* prepare the response */
 	if(!lsa_io_r_enum_trust_dom("", &r_u, rdata, 0))
 		return False;
 
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c
index 84ab44bc30..c564323803 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_lsa_nt.c
@@ -416,14 +416,18 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_open_policy(pipes_struct *p, LSA_Q_OPEN_POL *q_u, LSA_R_OPEN_POL *
 
 /***************************************************************************
  _lsa_enum_trust_dom - this needs fixing to do more than return NULL ! JRA.
+ ufff, done :)  mimir
  ***************************************************************************/
 
 NTSTATUS _lsa_enum_trust_dom(pipes_struct *p, LSA_Q_ENUM_TRUST_DOM *q_u, LSA_R_ENUM_TRUST_DOM *r_u)
 {
 	struct lsa_info *info;
-	uint32 enum_context = 0;
-	char *dom_name = NULL;
-	DOM_SID *dom_sid = NULL;
+	uint32 enum_context = q_u->enum_context;
+	/* it's set to 10 as a "our" preferred length */
+	uint32 max_num_domains = q_u->preferred_len < 10 ? q_u->preferred_len : 10;
+	TRUSTDOM **trust_doms;
+	uint32 num_domains;
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
 
 	if (!find_policy_by_hnd(p, &q_u->pol, (void **)&info))
 		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE;
@@ -432,9 +436,13 @@ NTSTATUS _lsa_enum_trust_dom(pipes_struct *p, LSA_Q_ENUM_TRUST_DOM *q_u, LSA_R_E
 	if (!(info->access & POLICY_VIEW_LOCAL_INFORMATION))
 		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
 
-	/* set up the LSA QUERY INFO response */
-	init_r_enum_trust_dom(p->mem_ctx, r_u, enum_context, dom_name, dom_sid,
-	      dom_name != NULL ? NT_STATUS_OK : NT_STATUS_NO_MORE_ENTRIES);
+	nt_status = secrets_get_trusted_domains(p->mem_ctx, enum_context, max_num_domains, &num_domains, &trust_doms);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		return nt_status;
+	}
+
+	/* set up the lsa_enum_trust_dom response */
+	init_r_enum_trust_dom(p->mem_ctx, r_u, enum_context, max_num_domains, num_domains, trust_doms);
 
 	return r_u->status;
 }
diff --git a/source3/tdb/tdbutil.c b/source3/tdb/tdbutil.c
index bc39082f63..92a5a9d37f 100644
--- a/source3/tdb/tdbutil.c
+++ b/source3/tdb/tdbutil.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 */
 
 #include "includes.h"
+#include <fnmatch.h>
 
 /* these are little tdb utility functions that are meant to make
    dealing with a tdb database a little less cumbersome in Samba */
@@ -524,3 +525,74 @@ int tdb_traverse_delete_fn(TDB_CONTEXT *the_tdb, TDB_DATA key, TDB_DATA dbuf,
 {
     return tdb_delete(the_tdb, key);
 }
+
+
+
+/**
+ * Search across the whole tdb for keys that match the given pattern
+ * return the result as a list of keys
+ *
+ * @param tdb pointer to opened tdb file context
+ * @param pattern searching pattern used by fnmatch(3) functions
+ *
+ * @return list of keys found by looking up with given pattern
+ **/
+TDB_LIST_NODE *tdb_search_keys(TDB_CONTEXT *tdb, const char* pattern)
+{
+	TDB_DATA key, next;
+	TDB_LIST_NODE *list = NULL;
+	TDB_LIST_NODE *rec = NULL;
+	TDB_LIST_NODE *tmp = NULL;
+	
+	for (key = tdb_firstkey(tdb); key.dptr; key = next) {
+		/* duplicate key string to ensure null-termination */
+		char *key_str = (char*) strndup(key.dptr, key.dsize);
+		if (!key_str) {
+			DEBUG(0, ("tdb_search_keys: strndup() failed!\n"));
+			smb_panic("strndup failed!\n");
+		}
+		
+		DEBUG(18, ("checking %s for match to pattern %s\n", key_str, pattern));
+		
+		next = tdb_nextkey(tdb, key);
+
+		/* do the pattern checking */
+		if (fnmatch(pattern, key_str, 0) == 0) {
+			rec = (TDB_LIST_NODE*) malloc(sizeof(*rec));
+			ZERO_STRUCTP(rec);
+
+			rec->node_key = key;
+	
+			DLIST_ADD_END(list, rec, tmp);
+		
+			DEBUG(18, ("checking %s matched pattern %s\n", key_str, pattern));
+		} else {
+			free(key.dptr);
+		}
+		
+		/* free duplicated key string */
+		free(key_str);
+	}
+	
+	return list;
+
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * Free the list returned by tdb_search_keys
+ *
+ * @param node list of results found by tdb_search_keys
+ **/
+void tdb_search_list_free(TDB_LIST_NODE* node)
+{
+	TDB_LIST_NODE *next_node;
+	
+	while (node) {
+		next_node = node->next;
+		SAFE_FREE(node);
+		node = next_node;
+	};
+};
+
+
diff --git a/source3/utils/net_rpc.c b/source3/utils/net_rpc.c
index 2aca3f0485..315c2de030 100644
--- a/source3/utils/net_rpc.c
+++ b/source3/utils/net_rpc.c
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ static NTSTATUS rpc_user_del_internals(const DOM_SID *domain_sid,
 		uint32 flags = 0x000003e8; /* Unknown */
 
 		result = cli_samr_lookup_names(cli, mem_ctx, &domain_pol,
-					       flags, 1, (char **) &argv[0],
+					       flags, 1, &argv[0],
 					       &num_rids, &user_rids,
 					       &name_types);
 
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ rpc_user_info_internals(const DOM_SID *domain_sid, struct cli_state *cli,
 	/* Get handle on user */
 
 	result = cli_samr_lookup_names(cli, mem_ctx, &domain_pol,
-				       flags, 1, (char **) &argv[0],
+				       flags, 1, &argv[0],
 				       &num_rids, &rids, &name_types);
 
 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) goto done;
@@ -874,7 +874,7 @@ static NTSTATUS rpc_trustdom_add_internals(const DOM_SID *domain_sid, struct cli
 
 	if (argc != 1) {
 		d_printf("Usage: net rpc trustdom add <domain_name>\n");
-		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
 	}
 
 	/* 
@@ -985,6 +985,12 @@ static int rpc_trustdom_establish(int argc, const char **argv) {
 	 * Connect to \\server\ipc$ as 'our domain' account with password
 	 */
 
+	if (argc != 1) {
+		d_printf("Usage: net rpc trustdom add <domain_name>\n");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+
 	domain_name = smb_xstrdup(argv[0]);
 	strupper(domain_name);
 	
@@ -1061,10 +1067,8 @@ static int rpc_trustdom_establish(int argc, const char **argv) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 
-	if (cli->nt_pipe_fnum) {
+	if (cli->nt_pipe_fnum)
 		cli_nt_session_close(cli);
-		talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
-	}
 
 
 	/*
@@ -1104,6 +1108,17 @@ static int rpc_trustdom_establish(int argc, const char **argv) {
 	   but I still don't know if it's _really_ necessary */
 			
 	/*
+	 * Store the password in secrets db
+	 */
+
+	if (!secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(domain_name, wks_info.uni_lan_grp.buffer,
+						   wks_info.uni_lan_grp.uni_str_len, opt_password,
+						   domain_sid)) {
+		DEBUG(0, ("Storing password for trusted domain failed.\n"));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	
+	/*
 	 * Close the pipes and clean up
 	 */
 	 
@@ -1116,20 +1131,9 @@ static int rpc_trustdom_establish(int argc, const char **argv) {
 
 	if (cli->nt_pipe_fnum)
 		cli_nt_session_close(cli);
-
-	talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
 	 
+	talloc_destroy(mem_ctx);
 	 
-	/*
-	 * Store the password in secrets db
-	 */
-
-	if (!secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(domain_name, opt_password,
-						   domain_sid)) {
-		DEBUG(0, ("Storing password for trusted domain failed.\n"));
-		return -1;
-	}
-	
 	DEBUG(0, ("Success!\n"));
 	return 0;
 }