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authorAndrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>2009-03-16 13:26:38 +1100
committerAndrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>2009-04-14 14:19:39 +1000
commit927a8b330435b4c959ad851e32b83d97a6e3001b (patch)
treed8132fa21f60ae83ed7e19d6b07a8345071ed271 /libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c
parent786447dea021f97a44582009bf33e28d972dacb4 (diff)
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Move libcli/auth to the top level
Diffstat (limited to 'libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c')
-rw-r--r--libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c595
1 files changed, 595 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c b/libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c6118c6568
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,595 @@
+/*
+ Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+ SMB parameters and setup
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1998
+ Modified by Jeremy Allison 1995.
+ Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 1995-2000.
+ Copyright (C) Luke Kennethc Casson Leighton 1996-2000.
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2002-2003
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "system/time.h"
+#include "auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp.h"
+#include "auth/ntlmssp/msrpc_parse.h"
+#include "../lib/crypto/crypto.h"
+#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+
+/*
+ This implements the X/Open SMB password encryption
+ It takes a password ('unix' string), a 8 byte "crypt key"
+ and puts 24 bytes of encrypted password into p24
+
+ Returns false if password must have been truncated to create LM hash
+*/
+bool SMBencrypt(const char *passwd, const uint8_t *c8, uint8_t p24[24])
+{
+ bool ret;
+ uint8_t p21[21];
+
+ memset(p21,'\0',21);
+ ret = E_deshash(passwd, p21);
+
+ SMBOWFencrypt(p21, c8, p24);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100,("SMBencrypt: lm#, challenge, response\n"));
+ dump_data(100, p21, 16);
+ dump_data(100, c8, 8);
+ dump_data(100, p24, 24);
+#endif
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Creates the MD4 Hash of the users password in NT UNICODE.
+ * @param passwd password in 'unix' charset.
+ * @param p16 return password hashed with md4, caller allocated 16 byte buffer
+ */
+
+bool E_md4hash(const char *passwd, uint8_t p16[16])
+{
+ size_t len;
+ smb_ucs2_t *wpwd;
+ bool ret;
+
+ ret = push_ucs2_talloc(NULL, &wpwd, passwd, &len);
+ if (!ret || len < 2) {
+ /* We don't want to return fixed data, as most callers
+ * don't check */
+ mdfour(p16, (const uint8_t *)passwd, strlen(passwd));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ len -= 2;
+ mdfour(p16, (const uint8_t *)wpwd, len);
+
+ talloc_free(wpwd);
+ return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Creates the DES forward-only Hash of the users password in DOS ASCII charset
+ * @param passwd password in 'unix' charset.
+ * @param p16 return password hashed with DES, caller allocated 16 byte buffer
+ * @return false if password was > 14 characters, and therefore may be incorrect, otherwise true
+ * @note p16 is filled in regardless
+ */
+
+bool E_deshash(const char *passwd, uint8_t p16[16])
+{
+ bool ret = true;
+ char dospwd[256];
+ ZERO_STRUCT(dospwd);
+
+ /* Password must be converted to DOS charset - null terminated, uppercase. */
+ push_string(dospwd, passwd, sizeof(dospwd), STR_ASCII|STR_UPPER|STR_TERMINATE);
+
+ /* Only the first 14 chars are considered, password need not be null terminated. */
+ E_P16((const uint8_t *)dospwd, p16);
+
+ if (strlen(dospwd) > 14) {
+ ret = false;
+ }
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(dospwd);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Does both the NTLMv2 owfs of a user's password */
+bool ntv2_owf_gen(const uint8_t owf[16],
+ const char *user_in, const char *domain_in,
+ bool upper_case_domain, /* Transform the domain into UPPER case */
+ uint8_t kr_buf[16])
+{
+ smb_ucs2_t *user;
+ smb_ucs2_t *domain;
+ size_t user_byte_len;
+ size_t domain_byte_len;
+ bool ret;
+
+ HMACMD5Context ctx;
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_init("ntv2_owf_gen for %s\\%s", domain_in, user_in);
+
+ if (!mem_ctx) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (!user_in) {
+ user_in = "";
+ }
+
+ if (!domain_in) {
+ domain_in = "";
+ }
+
+ user_in = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, user_in);
+ if (user_in == NULL) {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (upper_case_domain) {
+ domain_in = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, domain_in);
+ if (domain_in == NULL) {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = push_ucs2_talloc(mem_ctx, &user, user_in, &user_byte_len );
+ if (!ret) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("push_uss2_talloc() for user returned -1 (probably talloc() failure)\n"));
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ ret = push_ucs2_talloc(mem_ctx, &domain, domain_in, &domain_byte_len);
+ if (!ret) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("push_ucs2_talloc() for domain returned -1 (probably talloc() failure)\n"));
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ SMB_ASSERT(user_byte_len >= 2);
+ SMB_ASSERT(domain_byte_len >= 2);
+
+ /* We don't want null termination */
+ user_byte_len = user_byte_len - 2;
+ domain_byte_len = domain_byte_len - 2;
+
+ hmac_md5_init_limK_to_64(owf, 16, &ctx);
+ hmac_md5_update((const void *)user, user_byte_len, &ctx);
+ hmac_md5_update((const void *)domain, domain_byte_len, &ctx);
+ hmac_md5_final(kr_buf, &ctx);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100, ("ntv2_owf_gen: user, domain, owfkey, kr\n"));
+ dump_data(100, (const void *)user, user_byte_len);
+ dump_data(100, (const void *)domain, domain_byte_len);
+ dump_data(100, owf, 16);
+ dump_data(100, kr_buf, 16);
+#endif
+
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return true;
+}
+
+/* Does the des encryption from the NT or LM MD4 hash. */
+void SMBOWFencrypt(const uint8_t passwd[16], const uint8_t *c8, uint8_t p24[24])
+{
+ uint8_t p21[21];
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(p21);
+
+ memcpy(p21, passwd, 16);
+ E_P24(p21, c8, p24);
+}
+
+/* Does the NT MD4 hash then des encryption. */
+
+void SMBNTencrypt(const char *passwd, uint8_t *c8, uint8_t *p24)
+{
+ uint8_t p21[21];
+
+ memset(p21,'\0',21);
+
+ E_md4hash(passwd, p21);
+ SMBOWFencrypt(p21, c8, p24);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100,("SMBNTencrypt: nt#, challenge, response\n"));
+ dump_data(100, p21, 16);
+ dump_data(100, c8, 8);
+ dump_data(100, p24, 24);
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Does the md5 encryption from the Key Response for NTLMv2. */
+void SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2(const uint8_t kr[16],
+ const DATA_BLOB *srv_chal,
+ const DATA_BLOB *smbcli_chal,
+ uint8_t resp_buf[16])
+{
+ HMACMD5Context ctx;
+
+ hmac_md5_init_limK_to_64(kr, 16, &ctx);
+ hmac_md5_update(srv_chal->data, srv_chal->length, &ctx);
+ hmac_md5_update(smbcli_chal->data, smbcli_chal->length, &ctx);
+ hmac_md5_final(resp_buf, &ctx);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100, ("SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2: srv_chal, smbcli_chal, resp_buf\n"));
+ dump_data(100, srv_chal->data, srv_chal->length);
+ dump_data(100, smbcli_chal->data, smbcli_chal->length);
+ dump_data(100, resp_buf, 16);
+#endif
+}
+
+void SMBsesskeygen_ntv2(const uint8_t kr[16],
+ const uint8_t * nt_resp, uint8_t sess_key[16])
+{
+ /* a very nice, 128 bit, variable session key */
+
+ HMACMD5Context ctx;
+
+ hmac_md5_init_limK_to_64(kr, 16, &ctx);
+ hmac_md5_update(nt_resp, 16, &ctx);
+ hmac_md5_final((uint8_t *)sess_key, &ctx);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100, ("SMBsesskeygen_ntv2:\n"));
+ dump_data(100, sess_key, 16);
+#endif
+}
+
+void SMBsesskeygen_ntv1(const uint8_t kr[16], uint8_t sess_key[16])
+{
+ /* yes, this session key does not change - yes, this
+ is a problem - but it is 128 bits */
+
+ mdfour((uint8_t *)sess_key, kr, 16);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100, ("SMBsesskeygen_ntv1:\n"));
+ dump_data(100, sess_key, 16);
+#endif
+}
+
+void SMBsesskeygen_lm_sess_key(const uint8_t lm_hash[16],
+ const uint8_t lm_resp[24], /* only uses 8 */
+ uint8_t sess_key[16])
+{
+ /* Calculate the LM session key (effective length 40 bits,
+ but changes with each session) */
+ uint8_t p24[24];
+ uint8_t partial_lm_hash[14];
+
+ memcpy(partial_lm_hash, lm_hash, 8);
+ memset(partial_lm_hash + 8, 0xbd, 6);
+
+ des_crypt56(p24, lm_resp, partial_lm_hash, 1);
+ des_crypt56(p24+8, lm_resp, partial_lm_hash + 7, 1);
+
+ memcpy(sess_key, p24, 16);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100, ("SMBsesskeygen_lm_sess_key: \n"));
+ dump_data(100, sess_key, 16);
+#endif
+}
+
+DATA_BLOB NTLMv2_generate_names_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const char *hostname,
+ const char *domain)
+{
+ DATA_BLOB names_blob = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 0);
+
+ msrpc_gen(mem_ctx, &names_blob,
+ "aaa",
+ NTLMSSP_NAME_TYPE_DOMAIN, domain,
+ NTLMSSP_NAME_TYPE_SERVER, hostname,
+ 0, "");
+ return names_blob;
+}
+
+static DATA_BLOB NTLMv2_generate_client_data(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const DATA_BLOB *names_blob)
+{
+ uint8_t client_chal[8];
+ DATA_BLOB response = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ uint8_t long_date[8];
+ NTTIME nttime;
+
+ unix_to_nt_time(&nttime, time(NULL));
+
+ generate_random_buffer(client_chal, sizeof(client_chal));
+
+ push_nttime(long_date, 0, nttime);
+
+ /* See http://www.ubiqx.org/cifs/SMB.html#SMB.8.5 */
+
+ msrpc_gen(mem_ctx, &response, "ddbbdb",
+ 0x00000101, /* Header */
+ 0, /* 'Reserved' */
+ long_date, 8, /* Timestamp */
+ client_chal, 8, /* client challenge */
+ 0, /* Unknown */
+ names_blob->data, names_blob->length); /* End of name list */
+
+ return response;
+}
+
+static DATA_BLOB NTLMv2_generate_response(TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
+ const uint8_t ntlm_v2_hash[16],
+ const DATA_BLOB *server_chal,
+ const DATA_BLOB *names_blob)
+{
+ uint8_t ntlmv2_response[16];
+ DATA_BLOB ntlmv2_client_data;
+ DATA_BLOB final_response;
+
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(out_mem_ctx, 0,
+ "NTLMv2_generate_response internal context");
+
+ if (!mem_ctx) {
+ return data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* NTLMv2 */
+ /* generate some data to pass into the response function - including
+ the hostname and domain name of the server */
+ ntlmv2_client_data = NTLMv2_generate_client_data(mem_ctx, names_blob);
+
+ /* Given that data, and the challenge from the server, generate a response */
+ SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2(ntlm_v2_hash, server_chal, &ntlmv2_client_data, ntlmv2_response);
+
+ final_response = data_blob_talloc(out_mem_ctx, NULL, sizeof(ntlmv2_response) + ntlmv2_client_data.length);
+
+ memcpy(final_response.data, ntlmv2_response, sizeof(ntlmv2_response));
+
+ memcpy(final_response.data+sizeof(ntlmv2_response),
+ ntlmv2_client_data.data, ntlmv2_client_data.length);
+
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+
+ return final_response;
+}
+
+static DATA_BLOB LMv2_generate_response(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const uint8_t ntlm_v2_hash[16],
+ const DATA_BLOB *server_chal)
+{
+ uint8_t lmv2_response[16];
+ DATA_BLOB lmv2_client_data = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 8);
+ DATA_BLOB final_response = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL,24);
+
+ /* LMv2 */
+ /* client-supplied random data */
+ generate_random_buffer(lmv2_client_data.data, lmv2_client_data.length);
+
+ /* Given that data, and the challenge from the server, generate a response */
+ SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2(ntlm_v2_hash, server_chal, &lmv2_client_data, lmv2_response);
+ memcpy(final_response.data, lmv2_response, sizeof(lmv2_response));
+
+ /* after the first 16 bytes is the random data we generated above,
+ so the server can verify us with it */
+ memcpy(final_response.data+sizeof(lmv2_response),
+ lmv2_client_data.data, lmv2_client_data.length);
+
+ data_blob_free(&lmv2_client_data);
+
+ return final_response;
+}
+
+bool SMBNTLMv2encrypt_hash(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const char *user, const char *domain, const uint8_t nt_hash[16],
+ const DATA_BLOB *server_chal,
+ const DATA_BLOB *names_blob,
+ DATA_BLOB *lm_response, DATA_BLOB *nt_response,
+ DATA_BLOB *lm_session_key, DATA_BLOB *user_session_key)
+{
+ uint8_t ntlm_v2_hash[16];
+
+ /* We don't use the NT# directly. Instead we use it mashed up with
+ the username and domain.
+ This prevents username swapping during the auth exchange
+ */
+ if (!ntv2_owf_gen(nt_hash, user, domain, true, ntlm_v2_hash)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (nt_response) {
+ *nt_response = NTLMv2_generate_response(mem_ctx,
+ ntlm_v2_hash, server_chal,
+ names_blob);
+ if (user_session_key) {
+ *user_session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
+
+ /* The NTLMv2 calculations also provide a session key, for signing etc later */
+ /* use only the first 16 bytes of nt_response for session key */
+ SMBsesskeygen_ntv2(ntlm_v2_hash, nt_response->data, user_session_key->data);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* LMv2 */
+
+ if (lm_response) {
+ *lm_response = LMv2_generate_response(mem_ctx,
+ ntlm_v2_hash, server_chal);
+ if (lm_session_key) {
+ *lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
+
+ /* The NTLMv2 calculations also provide a session key, for signing etc later */
+ /* use only the first 16 bytes of lm_response for session key */
+ SMBsesskeygen_ntv2(ntlm_v2_hash, lm_response->data, lm_session_key->data);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool SMBNTLMv2encrypt(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const char *user, const char *domain,
+ const char *password,
+ const DATA_BLOB *server_chal,
+ const DATA_BLOB *names_blob,
+ DATA_BLOB *lm_response, DATA_BLOB *nt_response,
+ DATA_BLOB *lm_session_key, DATA_BLOB *user_session_key)
+{
+ uint8_t nt_hash[16];
+ E_md4hash(password, nt_hash);
+
+ return SMBNTLMv2encrypt_hash(mem_ctx,
+ user, domain, nt_hash, server_chal, names_blob,
+ lm_response, nt_response, lm_session_key, user_session_key);
+}
+
+/***********************************************************
+ encode a password buffer with a unicode password. The buffer
+ is filled with random data to make it harder to attack.
+************************************************************/
+bool encode_pw_buffer(uint8_t buffer[516], const char *password, int string_flags)
+{
+ uint8_t new_pw[512];
+ size_t new_pw_len;
+
+ /* the incoming buffer can be any alignment. */
+ string_flags |= STR_NOALIGN;
+
+ new_pw_len = push_string(new_pw,
+ password,
+ sizeof(new_pw), string_flags);
+
+ memcpy(&buffer[512 - new_pw_len], new_pw, new_pw_len);
+
+ generate_random_buffer(buffer, 512 - new_pw_len);
+
+ /*
+ * The length of the new password is in the last 4 bytes of
+ * the data buffer.
+ */
+ SIVAL(buffer, 512, new_pw_len);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(new_pw);
+ return true;
+}
+
+
+/***********************************************************
+ decode a password buffer
+ *new_pw_len is the length in bytes of the possibly mulitbyte
+ returned password including termination.
+************************************************************/
+bool decode_pw_buffer(uint8_t in_buffer[516], char *new_pwrd,
+ int new_pwrd_size, int string_flags)
+{
+ int byte_len=0;
+ ssize_t converted_pw_len;
+
+ /* the incoming buffer can be any alignment. */
+ string_flags |= STR_NOALIGN;
+
+ /*
+ Warning !!! : This function is called from some rpc call.
+ The password IN the buffer may be a UNICODE string.
+ The password IN new_pwrd is an ASCII string
+ If you reuse that code somewhere else check first.
+ */
+
+ /* The length of the new password is in the last 4 bytes of the data buffer. */
+
+ byte_len = IVAL(in_buffer, 512);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ dump_data(100, in_buffer, 516);
+#endif
+
+ /* Password cannot be longer than the size of the password buffer */
+ if ( (byte_len < 0) || (byte_len > 512)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* decode into the return buffer. Buffer length supplied */
+ converted_pw_len = pull_string(new_pwrd, &in_buffer[512 - byte_len], new_pwrd_size,
+ byte_len, string_flags);
+
+ if (converted_pw_len == -1) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100,("decode_pw_buffer: new_pwrd: "));
+ dump_data(100, (const uint8_t *)new_pwrd, converted_pw_len);
+ DEBUG(100,("multibyte len:%d\n", (int)converted_pw_len));
+ DEBUG(100,("original char len:%d\n", byte_len/2));
+#endif
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/***********************************************************
+ encode a password buffer with an already unicode password. The
+ rest of the buffer is filled with random data to make it harder to attack.
+************************************************************/
+bool set_pw_in_buffer(uint8_t buffer[516], DATA_BLOB *password)
+{
+ if (password->length > 512) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&buffer[512 - password->length], password->data, password->length);
+
+ generate_random_buffer(buffer, 512 - password->length);
+
+ /*
+ * The length of the new password is in the last 4 bytes of
+ * the data buffer.
+ */
+ SIVAL(buffer, 512, password->length);
+ return true;
+}
+
+/***********************************************************
+ decode a password buffer
+ *new_pw_size is the length in bytes of the extracted unicode password
+************************************************************/
+bool extract_pw_from_buffer(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ uint8_t in_buffer[516], DATA_BLOB *new_pass)
+{
+ int byte_len=0;
+
+ /* The length of the new password is in the last 4 bytes of the data buffer. */
+
+ byte_len = IVAL(in_buffer, 512);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ dump_data(100, in_buffer, 516);
+#endif
+
+ /* Password cannot be longer than the size of the password buffer */
+ if ( (byte_len < 0) || (byte_len > 512)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ *new_pass = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, &in_buffer[512 - byte_len], byte_len);
+
+ if (!new_pass->data) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}