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authorAndrew Tridgell <tridge@samba.org>1998-08-10 07:04:53 +0000
committerAndrew Tridgell <tridge@samba.org>1998-08-10 07:04:53 +0000
commitfa88efbbacbbe74b72ddb9e316265de2aab31260 (patch)
treecb523c513382ed2838def1e8469195a4052af997 /source3/auth
parentbad66abfe7c64069b76686563030ca6819fe4cc0 (diff)
downloadsamba-fa88efbbacbbe74b72ddb9e316265de2aab31260.tar.gz
samba-fa88efbbacbbe74b72ddb9e316265de2aab31260.tar.bz2
samba-fa88efbbacbbe74b72ddb9e316265de2aab31260.zip
split the system password checking routines out of smbd/password.c and
into passdb/pass_check.c. This means SWAT no longer needs to link to smbd/password.c (This used to be commit 90d93889d722670cbb517017531264630af759bf)
Diffstat (limited to 'source3/auth')
-rw-r--r--source3/auth/pass_check.c950
1 files changed, 950 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source3/auth/pass_check.c b/source3/auth/pass_check.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b5aa832f48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/source3/auth/pass_check.c
@@ -0,0 +1,950 @@
+/*
+ Unix SMB/Netbios implementation.
+ Version 1.9.
+ Password checking
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1998
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+*/
+
+/* this module is for checking a username/password against a system
+ password database. The SMB encrypted password support is elsewhere */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+extern int DEBUGLEVEL;
+
+/* these are kept here to keep the string_combinations function simple */
+static char this_user[100]="";
+static char this_salt[100]="";
+static char this_crypted[100]="";
+
+
+/****************************************************************************
+update the enhanced security database. Only relevant for OSF1 at the moment.
+****************************************************************************/
+static void update_protected_database(char *user, BOOL result)
+{
+#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
+ struct pr_passwd *mypasswd;
+ time_t starttime;
+
+ mypasswd = getprpwnam (user);
+ starttime = time (NULL);
+
+ if (result) {
+ mypasswd->ufld.fd_slogin = starttime;
+ mypasswd->ufld.fd_nlogins = 0;
+
+ putprpwnam(user,mypasswd);
+ } else {
+ mypasswd->ufld.fd_ulogin = starttime;
+ mypasswd->ufld.fd_nlogins = mypasswd->ufld.fd_nlogins + 1;
+ if (mypasswd->ufld.fd_max_tries != 0 &&
+ mypasswd->ufld.fd_nlogins > mypasswd->ufld.fd_max_tries) {
+ mypasswd->uflg.fg_lock = 0;
+ DEBUG(3,("Account %s is disabled\n", user));
+ }
+ putprpwnam(user ,mypasswd);
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM
+/*******************************************************************
+check on PAM authentication
+********************************************************************/
+
+/* We first need some helper functions */
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+/* Static variables used to communicate between the conversation function
+ * and the server_login function
+ */
+static char *PAM_username;
+static char *PAM_password;
+
+/* PAM conversation function
+ * Here we assume (for now, at least) that echo on means login name, and
+ * echo off means password.
+ */
+static int PAM_conv (int num_msg,
+ const struct pam_message **msg,
+ struct pam_response **resp,
+ void *appdata_ptr) {
+ int replies = 0;
+ struct pam_response *reply = NULL;
+
+ #define COPY_STRING(s) (s) ? strdup(s) : NULL
+
+ reply = malloc(sizeof(struct pam_response) * num_msg);
+ if (!reply) return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+
+ for (replies = 0; replies < num_msg; replies++) {
+ switch (msg[replies]->msg_style) {
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+ reply[replies].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ reply[replies].resp = COPY_STRING(PAM_username);
+ /* PAM frees resp */
+ break;
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+ reply[replies].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ reply[replies].resp = COPY_STRING(PAM_password);
+ /* PAM frees resp */
+ break;
+ case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+ /* fall through */
+ case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+ /* ignore it... */
+ reply[replies].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ reply[replies].resp = NULL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Must be an error of some sort... */
+ free (reply);
+ return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+ }
+ }
+ if (reply) *resp = reply;
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+static struct pam_conv PAM_conversation = {
+ &PAM_conv,
+ NULL
+};
+
+
+static BOOL pam_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
+{
+ pam_handle_t *pamh;
+ int pam_error;
+
+ /* Now use PAM to do authentication. For now, we won't worry about
+ * session logging, only authentication. Bail out if there are any
+ * errors. Since this is a limited protocol, and an even more limited
+ * function within a server speaking this protocol, we can't be as
+ * verbose as would otherwise make sense.
+ * Query: should we be using PAM_SILENT to shut PAM up?
+ */
+ #define PAM_BAIL if (pam_error != PAM_SUCCESS) { \
+ pam_end(pamh, 0); return False; \
+ }
+ PAM_password = password;
+ PAM_username = this_user;
+ pam_error = pam_start("samba", this_user, &PAM_conversation, &pamh);
+ PAM_BAIL;
+/* Setting PAM_SILENT stops generation of error messages to syslog
+ * to enable debugging on Red Hat Linux set:
+ * /etc/pam.d/samba:
+ * auth required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so nullok shadow audit
+ * _OR_ change PAM_SILENT to 0 to force detailed reporting (logging)
+ */
+ pam_error = pam_authenticate(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_BAIL;
+ /* It is not clear to me that account management is the right thing
+ * to do, but it is not clear that it isn't, either. This can be
+ * removed if no account management should be done. Alternately,
+ * put a pam_allow.so entry in /etc/pam.conf for account handling. */
+ pam_error = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_BAIL;
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
+ /* If this point is reached, the user has been authenticated. */
+ return(True);
+}
+#endif
+
+
+#ifdef WITH_AFS
+/*******************************************************************
+check on AFS authentication
+********************************************************************/
+static BOOL afs_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
+{
+ long password_expires = 0;
+ char *reason;
+
+ /* For versions of AFS prior to 3.3, this routine has few arguments, */
+ /* but since I can't find the old documentation... :-) */
+ setpag();
+ if (ka_UserAuthenticateGeneral(KA_USERAUTH_VERSION+KA_USERAUTH_DOSETPAG,
+ this_user,
+ (char *) 0, /* instance */
+ (char *) 0, /* cell */
+ password,
+ 0, /* lifetime, default */
+ &password_expires, /*days 'til it expires */
+ 0, /* spare 2 */
+ &reason) == 0) {
+ return(True);
+ }
+ return(False);
+}
+#endif
+
+
+#ifdef WITH_DFS
+
+/*****************************************************************
+ This new version of the DFS_AUTH code was donated by Karsten Muuss
+ <muuss@or.uni-bonn.de>. It fixes the following problems with the
+ old code :
+
+ - Server credentials may expire
+ - Client credential cache files have wrong owner
+ - purge_context() function is called with invalid argument
+
+ This new code was modified to ensure that on exit the uid/gid is
+ still root, and the original directory is restored. JRA.
+******************************************************************/
+
+sec_login_handle_t my_dce_sec_context;
+int dcelogin_atmost_once = 0;
+
+/*******************************************************************
+check on a DCE/DFS authentication
+********************************************************************/
+static BOOL dfs_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
+{
+ error_status_t err;
+ int err2;
+ int prterr;
+ signed32 expire_time, current_time;
+ boolean32 password_reset;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ sec_passwd_rec_t passwd_rec;
+ sec_login_auth_src_t auth_src = sec_login_auth_src_network;
+ unsigned char dce_errstr[dce_c_error_string_len];
+
+ if (dcelogin_atmost_once) return(False);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT
+ /*
+ * We only go for a DCE login context if the given password
+ * matches that stored in the local password file..
+ * Assumes local passwd file is kept in sync w/ DCE RGY!
+ */
+
+ if (strcmp((char *)crypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted)) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ sec_login_get_current_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok ) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get current context. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_certify_identity(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get current context. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_get_expiration(my_dce_sec_context, &expire_time, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get expiration. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ time(&current_time);
+
+ if (expire_time < (current_time + 60)) {
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ sec_passwd_rec_t *key;
+
+ sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context,
+ (sec_login_passwd_t*)&pw, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok ) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_refresh_identity(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't refresh identity. %s\n",
+ dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_key_mgmt_get_key(rpc_c_authn_dce_secret, NULL,
+ (unsigned char *)pw->pw_name,
+ sec_c_key_version_none,
+ (void**)&key, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get key for %s. %s\n",
+ pw->pw_name, dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_valid_and_cert_ident(my_dce_sec_context, key,
+ &password_reset, &auth_src,
+ &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok ) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't validate and certify identity for %s. %s\n",
+ pw->pw_name, dce_errstr));
+ }
+
+ sec_key_mgmt_free_key(key, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok ) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't free key.\n", dce_errstr));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sec_login_setup_identity((unsigned char *)this_user,
+ sec_login_no_flags,
+ &my_dce_sec_context,
+ &err) == 0) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE Setup Identity for %s failed: %s\n",
+ this_user,dce_errstr));
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context,
+ (sec_login_passwd_t*)&pw, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_purge_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't purge context. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * NB. I'd like to change these to call something like become_user()
+ * instead but currently we don't have a connection
+ * context to become the correct user. This is already
+ * fairly platform specific code however, so I think
+ * this should be ok. I have added code to go
+ * back to being root on error though. JRA.
+ */
+
+ if (setregid(-1, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
+ DEBUG(0,("Can't set egid to %d (%s)\n",
+ pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if (setreuid(-1, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
+ setgid(0);
+ DEBUG(0,("Can't set euid to %d (%s)\n",
+ pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno)));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if (sec_login_setup_identity((unsigned char *)this_user,
+ sec_login_no_flags,
+ &my_dce_sec_context,
+ &err) == 0) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ /* Go back to root, JRA. */
+ setuid(0);
+ setgid(0);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE Setup Identity for %s failed: %s\n",
+ this_user,dce_errstr));
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context,
+ (sec_login_passwd_t*)&pw, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok ) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ /* Go back to root, JRA. */
+ setuid(0);
+ setgid(0);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ passwd_rec.version_number = sec_passwd_c_version_none;
+ passwd_rec.pepper = NULL;
+ passwd_rec.key.key_type = sec_passwd_plain;
+ passwd_rec.key.tagged_union.plain = (idl_char *)password;
+
+ sec_login_validate_identity(my_dce_sec_context,
+ &passwd_rec, &password_reset,
+ &auth_src, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok ) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ /* Go back to root, JRA. */
+ setuid(0);
+ setgid(0);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE Identity Validation failed for principal %s: %s\n",
+ this_user,dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_certify_identity(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ /* Go back to root, JRA. */
+ setuid(0);
+ setgid(0);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE certify identity failed: %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ if (auth_src != sec_login_auth_src_network) {
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE context has no network credentials.\n"));
+ }
+
+ sec_login_set_context(my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE login failed for principal %s, cant set context: %s\n",
+ this_user,dce_errstr));
+
+ sec_login_purge_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+ /* Go back to root, JRA. */
+ setuid(0);
+ setgid(0);
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ sec_login_get_pwent(my_dce_sec_context,
+ (sec_login_passwd_t*)&pw, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get pwent. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ /* Go back to root, JRA. */
+ setuid(0);
+ setgid(0);
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE login succeeded for principal %s on pid %d\n",
+ this_user, getpid()));
+
+ DEBUG(3,("DCE principal: %s\n"
+ " uid: %d\n"
+ " gid: %d\n",
+ pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid));
+ DEBUG(3,(" info: %s\n"
+ " dir: %s\n"
+ " shell: %s\n",
+ pw->pw_gecos, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_shell));
+
+ sec_login_get_expiration(my_dce_sec_context, &expire_time, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ /* Go back to root, JRA. */
+ setuid(0);
+ setgid(0);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE can't get expiration. %s\n", dce_errstr));
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ setuid(0);
+ setgid(0);
+
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE context expires: %s",asctime(localtime(&expire_time))));
+
+ dcelogin_atmost_once = 1;
+ return (True);
+}
+
+void dfs_unlogin(void)
+{
+ error_status_t err;
+ int err2;
+ unsigned char dce_errstr[dce_c_error_string_len];
+
+ sec_login_purge_context(&my_dce_sec_context, &err);
+ if (err != error_status_ok) {
+ dce_error_inq_text(err, dce_errstr, &err2);
+ DEBUG(0,("DCE purge login context failed for server instance %d: %s\n",
+ getpid(), dce_errstr));
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef KRB5_AUTH
+/*******************************************************************
+check on Kerberos authentication
+********************************************************************/
+static BOOL krb5_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
+{
+ krb5_data tgtname = {
+ 0,
+ KRB5_TGS_NAME_SIZE,
+ KRB5_TGS_NAME
+ };
+ krb5_context kcontext;
+ krb5_principal kprinc;
+ krb5_principal server;
+ krb5_creds kcreds;
+ int options = 0;
+ krb5_address **addrs = (krb5_address **)0;
+ krb5_preauthtype *preauth = NULL;
+ krb5_keytab keytab = NULL;
+ krb5_timestamp now;
+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+ int retval;
+ char *name;
+
+ if (retval=krb5_init_context(&kcontext)) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ if (retval = krb5_timeofday(kcontext, &now)) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ if (retval = krb5_cc_default(kcontext, &ccache)) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ if (retval = krb5_parse_name(kcontext, this_user, &kprinc)) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ memset((char *)&kcreds, 0, sizeof(kcreds));
+
+ kcreds.client = kprinc;
+
+ if ((retval = krb5_build_principal_ext(kcontext, &server,
+ krb5_princ_realm(kcontext, kprinc)->length,
+ krb5_princ_realm(kcontext, kprinc)->data,
+ tgtname.length,
+ tgtname.data,
+ krb5_princ_realm(kcontext, kprinc)->length,
+ krb5_princ_realm(kcontext, kprinc)->data,
+ 0))) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ kcreds.server = server;
+
+ retval = krb5_get_in_tkt_with_password(kcontext,
+ options,
+ addrs,
+ NULL,
+ preauth,
+ password,
+ 0,
+ &kcreds,
+ 0);
+
+ if (retval) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ return(True);
+}
+#endif /* KRB5_AUTH */
+
+#ifdef KRB4_AUTH
+/*******************************************************************
+check on Kerberos authentication
+********************************************************************/
+static BOOL krb4_auth(char *this_user,char *password)
+{
+ char realm[REALM_SZ];
+ char tkfile[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+ if (krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1) != KSUCCESS) {
+ (void) safe_strcpy(realm, KRB_REALM, sizeof (realm) - 1);
+ }
+
+ (void) slprintf(tkfile, sizeof(tkfile) - 1, "/tmp/samba_tkt_%d",
+ getpid());
+
+ krb_set_tkt_string(tkfile);
+ if (krb_verify_user(this_user, "", realm,
+ password, 0,
+ "rmcd") == KSUCCESS) {
+ unlink(tkfile);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ unlink(tkfile);
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* KRB4_AUTH */
+
+#ifdef LINUX_BIGCRYPT
+/****************************************************************************
+an enhanced crypt for Linux to handle password longer than 8 characters
+****************************************************************************/
+static int linux_bigcrypt(char *password,char *salt1, char *crypted)
+{
+#define LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS 8
+ char salt[3];
+ int i;
+
+ StrnCpy(salt,salt1,2);
+ crypted +=2;
+
+ for ( i=strlen(password); i > 0; i -= LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS) {
+ char * p = crypt(password,salt) + 2;
+ if (strncmp(p, crypted, LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS) != 0)
+ return(0);
+ password += LINUX_PASSWORD_SEG_CHARS;
+ crypted += strlen(p);
+ }
+
+ return(1);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
+/****************************************************************************
+an enhanced crypt for OSF1
+****************************************************************************/
+static char *osf1_bigcrypt(char *password,char *salt1)
+{
+ static char result[AUTH_MAX_PASSWD_LENGTH] = "";
+ char *p1;
+ char *p2=password;
+ char salt[3];
+ int i;
+ int parts = strlen(password) / AUTH_CLEARTEXT_SEG_CHARS;
+ if (strlen(password)%AUTH_CLEARTEXT_SEG_CHARS) {
+ parts++;
+ }
+
+ StrnCpy(salt,salt1,2);
+ StrnCpy(result,salt1,2);
+
+ for (i=0; i<parts;i++) {
+ p1 = crypt(p2,salt);
+ strncat(result,p1+2,AUTH_MAX_PASSWD_LENGTH-strlen(p1+2)-1);
+ StrnCpy(salt,&result[2+i*AUTH_CIPHERTEXT_SEG_CHARS],2);
+ p2 += AUTH_CLEARTEXT_SEG_CHARS;
+ }
+
+ return(result);
+}
+#endif
+
+
+/****************************************************************************
+apply a function to upper/lower case combinations
+of a string and return true if one of them returns true.
+try all combinations with N uppercase letters.
+offset is the first char to try and change (start with 0)
+it assumes the string starts lowercased
+****************************************************************************/
+static BOOL string_combinations2(char *s,int offset,BOOL (*fn)(char *),int N)
+{
+ int len = strlen(s);
+ int i;
+
+#ifdef PASSWORD_LENGTH
+ len = MIN(len,PASSWORD_LENGTH);
+#endif
+
+ if (N <= 0 || offset >= len) {
+ return(fn(s));
+ }
+
+ for (i=offset;i<(len-(N-1));i++) {
+ char c = s[i];
+ if (!islower(c)) continue;
+ s[i] = toupper(c);
+ if (string_combinations2(s,i+1,fn,N-1))
+ return(True);
+ s[i] = c;
+ }
+ return(False);
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+apply a function to upper/lower case combinations
+of a string and return true if one of them returns true.
+try all combinations with up to N uppercase letters.
+offset is the first char to try and change (start with 0)
+it assumes the string starts lowercased
+****************************************************************************/
+static BOOL string_combinations(char *s,BOOL (*fn)(char *),int N)
+{
+ int n;
+ for (n=1;n<=N;n++)
+ if (string_combinations2(s,0,fn,n)) return(True);
+ return(False);
+}
+
+
+/****************************************************************************
+core of password checking routine
+****************************************************************************/
+static BOOL password_check(char *password)
+{
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM
+ /* This falls through if the password check fails
+ - if HAVE_CRYPT is not defined this causes an error msg
+ saying Warning - no crypt available
+ - if HAVE_CRYPT is defined this is a potential security hole
+ as it may authenticate via the crypt call when PAM
+ settings say it should fail.
+ if (pam_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
+ Hence we make a direct return to avoid a second chance!!!
+ */
+ return (pam_auth(this_user,password));
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_AFS
+ if (afs_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_DFS
+ if (dfs_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef KRB5_AUTH
+ if (krb5_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef KRB4_AUTH
+ if (krb4_auth(this_user,password)) return(True);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
+ {
+ BOOL ret = (strcmp(osf1_bigcrypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted) == 0);
+ if(!ret) {
+ DEBUG(2,("OSF1_ENH_SEC failed. Trying normal crypt.\n"));
+ ret = (strcmp((char *)crypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted) == 0);
+ }
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef ULTRIX_AUTH
+ return (strcmp((char *)crypt16(password, this_salt ),this_crypted) == 0);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef LINUX_BIGCRYPT
+ return(linux_bigcrypt(password,this_salt,this_crypted));
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_BIGCRYPT
+ return(strcmp(bigcrypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted) == 0);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CRYPT
+ DEBUG(1,("Warning - no crypt available\n"));
+ return(False);
+#else
+ return(strcmp((char *)crypt(password,this_salt),this_crypted) == 0);
+#endif
+}
+
+
+
+/****************************************************************************
+check if a username/password is OK
+the function pointer fn() points to a function to call when a successful
+match is found and is used to update the encrypted password file
+return True on correct match, False otherwise
+****************************************************************************/
+BOOL pass_check(char *user,char *password, int pwlen, struct passwd *pwd,
+ BOOL (*fn)(char *, char *))
+{
+ pstring pass2;
+ int level = lp_passwordlevel();
+ struct passwd *pass;
+
+ if (password) password[pwlen] = 0;
+
+#if DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100,("checking user=[%s] pass=[%s]\n",user,password));
+#endif
+
+ if (!password) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ if (((!*password) || (!pwlen)) && !lp_null_passwords()) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ if (pwd && !user) {
+ pass = (struct passwd *) pwd;
+ user = pass->pw_name;
+ } else {
+ pass = Get_Pwnam(user,True);
+ }
+
+
+ DEBUG(4,("Checking password for user %s (l=%d)\n",user,pwlen));
+
+ if (!pass) {
+ DEBUG(3,("Couldn't find user %s\n",user));
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
+ {
+ struct spwd *spass;
+
+ /* many shadow systems require you to be root to get
+ the password, in most cases this should already be
+ the case when this function is called, except
+ perhaps for IPC password changing requests */
+
+ spass = getspnam(pass->pw_name);
+ if (spass && spass->sp_pwdp) {
+ pass->pw_passwd = spass->sp_pwdp;
+ }
+ }
+#elif defined(IA_UINFO)
+ {
+ /* Need to get password with SVR4.2's ia_ functions
+ instead of get{sp,pw}ent functions. Required by
+ UnixWare 2.x, tested on version
+ 2.1. (tangent@cyberport.com) */
+ uinfo_t uinfo;
+ if (ia_openinfo(pass->pw_name, &uinfo) != -1) {
+ ia_get_logpwd(uinfo, &(pass->pw_passwd));
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETPRPWNAM
+ {
+ struct pr_passwd *pr_pw = getprpwnam(pass->pw_name);
+ if (pr_pw && pr_pw->ufld.fd_encrypt)
+ pass->pw_passwd = pr_pw->ufld.fd_encrypt;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OSF1_ENH_SEC
+ {
+ struct pr_passwd *mypasswd;
+ DEBUG(5,("Checking password for user %s in OSF1_ENH_SEC\n",
+ user));
+ mypasswd = getprpwnam (user);
+ if (mypasswd) {
+ fstrcpy(pass->pw_name,mypasswd->ufld.fd_name);
+ fstrcpy(pass->pw_passwd,mypasswd->ufld.fd_encrypt);
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(5,("No entry for user %s in protected database !\n",
+ user));
+ return(False);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef ULTRIX_AUTH
+ {
+ AUTHORIZATION *ap = getauthuid(pass->pw_uid);
+ if (ap) {
+ fstrcpy(pass->pw_passwd, ap->a_password);
+ endauthent();
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* extract relevant info */
+ fstrcpy(this_user,pass->pw_name);
+ fstrcpy(this_salt,pass->pw_passwd);
+ /* crypt on some platforms (HPUX in particular)
+ won't work with more than 2 salt characters. */
+ this_salt[2] = 0;
+
+ fstrcpy(this_crypted,pass->pw_passwd);
+
+ if (!*this_crypted) {
+ if (!lp_null_passwords()) {
+ DEBUG(2,("Disallowing %s with null password\n",
+ this_user));
+ return(False);
+ }
+ if (!*password) {
+ DEBUG(3,("Allowing access to %s with null password\n",
+ this_user));
+ return(True);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* try it as it came to us */
+ if (password_check(password)) {
+ update_protected_database(user,True);
+ if (fn) fn(user,password);
+ return(True);
+ }
+
+ /* if the password was given to us with mixed case then we don't
+ need to proceed as we know it hasn't been case modified by the
+ client */
+ if (strhasupper(password) && strhaslower(password)) {
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ /* make a copy of it */
+ StrnCpy(pass2,password,sizeof(pstring)-1);
+
+ /* try all lowercase */
+ strlower(password);
+ if (password_check(password)) {
+ update_protected_database(user,True);
+ if (fn) fn(user,password);
+ return(True);
+ }
+
+ /* give up? */
+ if (level < 1) {
+ update_protected_database(user,False);
+
+ /* restore it */
+ fstrcpy(password,pass2);
+
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ /* last chance - all combinations of up to level chars upper! */
+ strlower(password);
+
+ if (string_combinations(password,password_check,level)) {
+ update_protected_database(user,True);
+ if (fn) fn(user,password);
+ return(True);
+ }
+
+ update_protected_database(user,False);
+
+ /* restore it */
+ fstrcpy(password,pass2);
+
+ return(False);
+}