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authorLuke Leighton <lkcl@samba.org>2000-01-03 19:19:48 +0000
committerLuke Leighton <lkcl@samba.org>2000-01-03 19:19:48 +0000
commitfbd17c8dafeefac788f4bc1c41045726825f513f (patch)
tree93aea0a144e9f649d32d7340e12ec9965aab6825 /source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe_srv.c
parent632b4f806eae15e319b8f62caef5d25634cf720c (diff)
downloadsamba-fbd17c8dafeefac788f4bc1c41045726825f513f.tar.gz
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samba-fbd17c8dafeefac788f4bc1c41045726825f513f.zip
simple mods to add msrpc pipe redirection. default behaviour: fall back
to using internal msrpc code in smbd. (This used to be commit 8976e26d46cb991710bc77463f7f928ac00dd4d8)
Diffstat (limited to 'source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe_srv.c')
-rw-r--r--source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe_srv.c1077
1 files changed, 1077 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe_srv.c b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe_srv.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..236558ba70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe_srv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1077 @@
+/*
+ * Unix SMB/Netbios implementation.
+ * Version 1.9.
+ * RPC Pipe client / server routines
+ * Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1998
+ * Copyright (C) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton 1996-1998,
+ * Copyright (C) Paul Ashton 1997-1998.
+ * Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 1999.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+ */
+
+/* this module apparently provides an implementation of DCE/RPC over a
+ * named pipe (IPC$ connection using SMBtrans). details of DCE/RPC
+ * documentation are available (in on-line form) from the X-Open group.
+ *
+ * this module should provide a level of abstraction between SMB
+ * and DCE/RPC, while minimising the amount of mallocs, unnecessary
+ * data copies, and network traffic.
+ *
+ * in this version, which takes a "let's learn what's going on and
+ * get something running" approach, there is additional network
+ * traffic generated, but the code should be easier to understand...
+ *
+ * ... if you read the docs. or stare at packets for weeks on end.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "nterr.h"
+
+extern int DEBUGLEVEL;
+
+static void NTLMSSPcalc_p( pipes_struct *p, unsigned char *data, int len)
+{
+ unsigned char *hash = p->ntlmssp_hash;
+ unsigned char index_i = hash[256];
+ unsigned char index_j = hash[257];
+ int ind;
+
+ for( ind = 0; ind < len; ind++) {
+ unsigned char tc;
+ unsigned char t;
+
+ index_i++;
+ index_j += hash[index_i];
+
+ tc = hash[index_i];
+ hash[index_i] = hash[index_j];
+ hash[index_j] = tc;
+
+ t = hash[index_i] + hash[index_j];
+ data[ind] = data[ind] ^ hash[t];
+ }
+
+ hash[256] = index_i;
+ hash[257] = index_j;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************
+ Generate the next PDU to be returned from the data in p->rdata.
+ We cheat here as this function doesn't handle the special auth
+ footers of the authenticated bind response reply.
+ ********************************************************************/
+
+BOOL create_next_pdu(pipes_struct *p)
+{
+ RPC_HDR_RESP hdr_resp;
+ BOOL auth_verify = IS_BITS_SET_ALL(p->ntlmssp_chal_flags, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN);
+ BOOL auth_seal = IS_BITS_SET_ALL(p->ntlmssp_chal_flags, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL);
+ uint32 data_len;
+ uint32 data_space_available;
+ uint32 data_len_left;
+ prs_struct outgoing_pdu;
+ char *data;
+ char *data_from;
+ uint32 data_pos;
+
+ memset((char *)&hdr_resp, '\0', sizeof(hdr_resp));
+
+ /* Change the incoming request header to a response. */
+ p->hdr.pkt_type = RPC_RESPONSE;
+
+ /* Set up rpc header flags. */
+ if (p->data_sent_length == 0)
+ p->hdr.flags = RPC_FLG_FIRST;
+ else
+ p->hdr.flags = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Work out how much we can fit in a sigle PDU.
+ */
+
+ data_space_available = sizeof(p->current_pdu) - RPC_HEADER_LEN - RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN;
+ if(p->ntlmssp_auth_validated)
+ data_space_available -= (RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN + RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN);
+
+ /*
+ * The amount we send is the minimum of the available
+ * space and the amount left to send.
+ */
+
+ data_len_left = prs_offset(&p->rdata) - p->data_sent_length;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure there really is data left to send.
+ */
+
+ if(!data_len_left) {
+ DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu: no data left to send !\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ data_len = MIN(data_len_left, data_space_available);
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the alloc hint. This should be the data left to
+ * send.
+ */
+
+ hdr_resp.alloc_hint = data_len_left;
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the header lengths.
+ */
+
+ if (p->ntlmssp_auth_validated) {
+ p->hdr.frag_len = RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN + data_len +
+ RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN + RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN;
+ p->hdr.auth_len = RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN;
+ } else {
+ p->hdr.frag_len = RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN + data_len;
+ p->hdr.auth_len = 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Work out if this PDU will be the last.
+ */
+
+ if(p->data_sent_length + data_len >= prs_offset(&p->rdata))
+ p->hdr.flags |= RPC_FLG_LAST;
+
+ /*
+ * Init the parse struct to point at the outgoing
+ * data.
+ */
+
+ prs_init( &outgoing_pdu, 0, 4, MARSHALL);
+ prs_give_memory( &outgoing_pdu, (char *)p->current_pdu, sizeof(p->current_pdu), False);
+
+ /* Store the header in the data stream. */
+ if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("hdr", &p->hdr, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu: failed to marshall RPC_HDR.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_resp("resp", &hdr_resp, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_RESP.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ /* Store the current offset. */
+ data_pos = prs_offset(&outgoing_pdu);
+
+ /* Copy the data into the PDU. */
+ data_from = prs_data_p(&p->rdata) + p->data_sent_length;
+
+ if(!prs_append_data(&outgoing_pdu, data_from, data_len)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu: failed to copy %u bytes of data.\n", (unsigned int)data_len));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set data to point to where we copied the data into.
+ */
+
+ data = prs_data_p(&outgoing_pdu) + data_pos;
+
+ if (p->hdr.auth_len > 0) {
+ uint32 crc32 = 0;
+
+ DEBUG(5,("create_next_pdu: sign: %s seal: %s data %d auth %d\n",
+ BOOLSTR(auth_verify), BOOLSTR(auth_seal), data_len, p->hdr.auth_len));
+
+ if (auth_seal) {
+ crc32 = crc32_calc_buffer(data, data_len);
+ NTLMSSPcalc_p(p, (uchar*)data, data_len);
+ }
+
+ if (auth_seal || auth_verify) {
+ RPC_HDR_AUTH auth_info;
+
+ init_rpc_hdr_auth(&auth_info, NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE, NTLMSSP_AUTH_LEVEL,
+ (auth_verify ? RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN : 0), (auth_verify ? 1 : 0));
+ if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("hdr_auth", &auth_info, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_AUTH.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (auth_verify) {
+ RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK ntlmssp_chk;
+ char *auth_data = prs_data_p(&outgoing_pdu);
+
+ p->ntlmssp_seq_num++;
+ init_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chk(&ntlmssp_chk, NTLMSSP_SIGN_VERSION,
+ crc32, p->ntlmssp_seq_num++);
+ auth_data = prs_data_p(&outgoing_pdu) + prs_offset(&outgoing_pdu) + 4;
+ if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chk("auth_sign", &ntlmssp_chk, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu: failed to marshall RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+ NTLMSSPcalc_p(p, (uchar*)auth_data, RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN - 4);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Setup the counts for this PDU.
+ */
+
+ p->data_sent_length += data_len;
+ p->current_pdu_len = p->hdr.frag_len;
+ p->current_pdu_sent = 0;
+
+ return True;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************
+ Process an NTLMSSP authentication response.
+ If this function succeeds, the user has been authenticated
+ and their domain, name and calling workstation stored in
+ the pipe struct.
+ The initial challenge is stored in p->challenge.
+ *******************************************************************/
+
+static BOOL api_pipe_ntlmssp_verify(pipes_struct *p, RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_RESP *ntlmssp_resp)
+{
+ uchar lm_owf[24];
+ uchar nt_owf[24];
+ fstring user_name;
+ fstring unix_user_name;
+ fstring domain;
+ fstring wks;
+ BOOL guest_user = False;
+ struct smb_passwd *smb_pass = NULL;
+ struct passwd *pass = NULL;
+ uchar null_smb_passwd[16];
+ uchar *smb_passwd_ptr = NULL;
+
+ DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_ntlmssp_verify: checking user details\n"));
+
+ memset(p->user_name, '\0', sizeof(p->user_name));
+ memset(p->unix_user_name, '\0', sizeof(p->unix_user_name));
+ memset(p->domain, '\0', sizeof(p->domain));
+ memset(p->wks, '\0', sizeof(p->wks));
+
+ /*
+ * Setup an empty password for a guest user.
+ */
+
+ memset(null_smb_passwd,0,16);
+
+ /*
+ * We always negotiate UNICODE.
+ */
+
+ if (IS_BITS_SET_ALL(p->ntlmssp_chal_flags, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE)) {
+ fstrcpy(user_name, dos_unistrn2((uint16*)ntlmssp_resp->user, ntlmssp_resp->hdr_usr.str_str_len/2));
+ fstrcpy(domain, dos_unistrn2((uint16*)ntlmssp_resp->domain, ntlmssp_resp->hdr_domain.str_str_len/2));
+ fstrcpy(wks, dos_unistrn2((uint16*)ntlmssp_resp->wks, ntlmssp_resp->hdr_wks.str_str_len/2));
+ } else {
+ fstrcpy(user_name, ntlmssp_resp->user);
+ fstrcpy(domain, ntlmssp_resp->domain);
+ fstrcpy(wks, ntlmssp_resp->wks);
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(5,("user: %s domain: %s wks: %s\n", user_name, domain, wks));
+
+ memcpy(lm_owf, ntlmssp_resp->lm_resp, sizeof(lm_owf));
+ memcpy(nt_owf, ntlmssp_resp->nt_resp, sizeof(nt_owf));
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
+ DEBUG(100,("lm, nt owfs, chal\n"));
+ dump_data(100, (char *)lm_owf, sizeof(lm_owf));
+ dump_data(100, (char *)nt_owf, sizeof(nt_owf));
+ dump_data(100, (char *)p->challenge, 8);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Allow guest access. Patch from Shirish Kalele <kalele@veritas.com>.
+ */
+
+ if((strlen(user_name) == 0) && (ntlmssp_resp->hdr_lm_resp.str_str_len==0) &&
+ (ntlmssp_resp->hdr_nt_resp.str_str_len==0)) {
+
+ guest_user = True;
+
+ fstrcpy(unix_user_name, lp_guestaccount(-1));
+ DEBUG(100,("Null user in NTLMSSP verification. Using guest = %s\n", unix_user_name));
+
+ smb_passwd_ptr = null_smb_passwd;
+
+ } else {
+
+ /*
+ * Pass the user through the NT -> unix user mapping
+ * function.
+ */
+
+ fstrcpy(unix_user_name, user_name);
+ (void)map_username(unix_user_name);
+
+ /*
+ * Do the length checking only if user is not NULL.
+ */
+
+ if (ntlmssp_resp->hdr_lm_resp.str_str_len == 0)
+ return False;
+ if (ntlmssp_resp->hdr_nt_resp.str_str_len == 0)
+ return False;
+ if (ntlmssp_resp->hdr_usr.str_str_len == 0)
+ return False;
+ if (ntlmssp_resp->hdr_domain.str_str_len == 0)
+ return False;
+ if (ntlmssp_resp->hdr_wks.str_str_len == 0)
+ return False;
+
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Find the user in the unix password db.
+ */
+
+ if(!(pass = Get_Pwnam(unix_user_name,True))) {
+ DEBUG(1,("Couldn't find user '%s' in UNIX password database.\n",unix_user_name));
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ if(!guest_user) {
+
+ become_root(True);
+
+ if(!(p->ntlmssp_auth_validated = pass_check_smb(unix_user_name, domain,
+ (uchar*)p->challenge, lm_owf, nt_owf, NULL))) {
+ DEBUG(1,("api_pipe_ntlmssp_verify: User %s\\%s from machine %s \
+failed authentication on named pipe %s.\n", domain, unix_user_name, wks, p->name ));
+ unbecome_root(True);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if(!(smb_pass = getsmbpwnam(unix_user_name))) {
+ DEBUG(1,("api_pipe_ntlmssp_verify: Cannot find user %s in smb passwd database.\n",
+ unix_user_name));
+ unbecome_root(True);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ unbecome_root(True);
+
+ if (smb_pass == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(1,("api_pipe_ntlmssp_verify: Couldn't find user '%s' in smb_passwd file.\n",
+ unix_user_name));
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ /* Quit if the account was disabled. */
+ if((smb_pass->acct_ctrl & ACB_DISABLED) || !smb_pass->smb_passwd) {
+ DEBUG(1,("Account for user '%s' was disabled.\n", unix_user_name));
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ if(!smb_pass->smb_nt_passwd) {
+ DEBUG(1,("Account for user '%s' has no NT password hash.\n", unix_user_name));
+ return(False);
+ }
+
+ smb_passwd_ptr = smb_pass->smb_passwd;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the sign/seal data.
+ */
+
+ {
+ uchar p24[24];
+ NTLMSSPOWFencrypt(smb_passwd_ptr, lm_owf, p24);
+ {
+ unsigned char j = 0;
+ int ind;
+
+ unsigned char k2[8];
+
+ memcpy(k2, p24, 5);
+ k2[5] = 0xe5;
+ k2[6] = 0x38;
+ k2[7] = 0xb0;
+
+ for (ind = 0; ind < 256; ind++)
+ p->ntlmssp_hash[ind] = (unsigned char)ind;
+
+ for( ind = 0; ind < 256; ind++) {
+ unsigned char tc;
+
+ j += (p->ntlmssp_hash[ind] + k2[ind%8]);
+
+ tc = p->ntlmssp_hash[ind];
+ p->ntlmssp_hash[ind] = p->ntlmssp_hash[j];
+ p->ntlmssp_hash[j] = tc;
+ }
+
+ p->ntlmssp_hash[256] = 0;
+ p->ntlmssp_hash[257] = 0;
+ }
+/* NTLMSSPhash(p->ntlmssp_hash, p24); */
+ p->ntlmssp_seq_num = 0;
+
+ }
+
+ fstrcpy(p->user_name, user_name);
+ fstrcpy(p->unix_user_name, unix_user_name);
+ fstrcpy(p->domain, domain);
+ fstrcpy(p->wks, wks);
+
+ /*
+ * Store the UNIX credential data (uid/gid pair) in the pipe structure.
+ */
+
+ p->uid = pass->pw_uid;
+ p->gid = pass->pw_gid;
+
+ p->ntlmssp_auth_validated = True;
+ return True;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************
+ The switch table for the pipe names and the functions to handle them.
+ *******************************************************************/
+
+struct api_cmd
+{
+ char * pipe_clnt_name;
+ char * pipe_srv_name;
+ BOOL (*fn) (pipes_struct *, prs_struct *);
+};
+
+static struct api_cmd api_fd_commands[] =
+{
+ { "lsarpc", "lsass", api_ntlsa_rpc },
+ { "samr", "lsass", api_samr_rpc },
+ { "srvsvc", "ntsvcs", api_srvsvc_rpc },
+ { "wkssvc", "ntsvcs", api_wkssvc_rpc },
+ { "NETLOGON", "lsass", api_netlog_rpc },
+#if DISABLED_IN_2_0
+ { "winreg", "winreg", api_reg_rpc },
+#endif
+ { NULL, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+/*******************************************************************
+ This is the client reply to our challenge for an authenticated
+ bind request. The challenge we sent is in p->challenge.
+*******************************************************************/
+
+static BOOL api_pipe_bind_auth_resp(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *pd)
+{
+ RPC_HDR_AUTHA autha_info;
+ RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER auth_verifier;
+ RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_RESP ntlmssp_resp;
+
+ DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_bind_auth_resp: decode request. %d\n", __LINE__));
+
+ if (p->hdr.auth_len == 0) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth_resp: No auth field sent !\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Decode the authentication verifier response.
+ */
+
+ if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_autha("", &autha_info, pd, 0)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth_resp: unmarshall of RPC_HDR_AUTHA failed.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if (autha_info.auth_type != NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE || autha_info.auth_level != NTLMSSP_AUTH_LEVEL) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth_resp: incorrect auth type (%d) or level (%d).\n",
+ (int)autha_info.auth_type, (int)autha_info.auth_level ));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_verifier("", &auth_verifier, pd, 0)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth_resp: unmarshall of RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER failed.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure this is a NTLMSSP_AUTH packet type.
+ */
+
+ if (!rpc_auth_verifier_chk(&auth_verifier, "NTLMSSP", NTLMSSP_AUTH)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth_resp: rpc_auth_verifier_chk failed.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_resp("", &ntlmssp_resp, pd, 0)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth_resp: Failed to unmarshall RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_RESP.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The following call actually checks the challenge/response data.
+ * for correctness against the given DOMAIN\user name.
+ */
+
+ if (!api_pipe_ntlmssp_verify(p, &ntlmssp_resp))
+ return False;
+
+ return True;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************
+ Marshall a bind_nak pdu.
+*******************************************************************/
+
+static BOOL setup_bind_nak(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *pd)
+{
+ prs_struct outgoing_rpc;
+ RPC_HDR nak_hdr;
+ uint16 zero = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Marshall directly into the outgoing PDU space. We
+ * must do this as we need to set to the bind response
+ * header and are never sending more than one PDU here.
+ */
+
+ prs_init( &outgoing_rpc, 0, 4, MARSHALL);
+ prs_give_memory( &outgoing_rpc, (char *)p->current_pdu, sizeof(p->current_pdu), False);
+
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize a bind_nak header.
+ */
+
+ init_rpc_hdr(&nak_hdr, RPC_BINDNACK, RPC_FLG_FIRST | RPC_FLG_LAST,
+ p->hdr.call_id, RPC_HEADER_LEN + sizeof(uint16), 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Marshall the header into the outgoing PDU.
+ */
+
+ if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("", &nak_hdr, &outgoing_rpc, 0)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("setup_bind_nak: marshalling of RPC_HDR failed.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now add the reject reason.
+ */
+
+ if(!prs_uint16("reject code", &outgoing_rpc, 0, &zero))
+ return False;
+
+ p->data_sent_length = 0;
+ p->current_pdu_len = prs_offset(&outgoing_rpc);
+ p->current_pdu_sent = 0;
+
+ return True;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************
+ Respond to a pipe bind request.
+*******************************************************************/
+
+static BOOL api_pipe_bind_req(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *pd)
+{
+ RPC_HDR_BA hdr_ba;
+ RPC_HDR_RB hdr_rb;
+ RPC_HDR_AUTH auth_info;
+ uint16 assoc_gid;
+ fstring ack_pipe_name;
+ prs_struct out_hdr_ba;
+ prs_struct out_auth;
+ prs_struct outgoing_rpc;
+ int i = 0;
+ int auth_len = 0;
+
+ p->ntlmssp_auth_requested = False;
+
+ DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_bind_req: decode request. %d\n", __LINE__));
+
+ /*
+ * Try and find the correct pipe name to ensure
+ * that this is a pipe name we support.
+ */
+
+ for (i = 0; api_fd_commands[i].pipe_clnt_name; i++) {
+ if (strequal(api_fd_commands[i].pipe_clnt_name, p->name) &&
+ api_fd_commands[i].fn != NULL) {
+ DEBUG(3,("api_pipe_bind_req: \\PIPE\\%s -> \\PIPE\\%s\n",
+ api_fd_commands[i].pipe_clnt_name,
+ api_fd_commands[i].pipe_srv_name));
+ fstrcpy(p->pipe_srv_name, api_fd_commands[i].pipe_srv_name);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (api_fd_commands[i].fn == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(3,("api_pipe_bind_req: Unknown pipe name %s in bind request.\n",
+ p->name ));
+ if(!setup_bind_nak(p, pd))
+ return False;
+ return True;
+ }
+
+ /* decode the bind request */
+ if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_rb("", &hdr_rb, pd, 0)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: unable to unmarshall RPC_HDR_RB struct.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check if this is an authenticated request.
+ */
+
+ if (p->hdr.auth_len != 0) {
+ RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER auth_verifier;
+ RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_NEG ntlmssp_neg;
+
+ /*
+ * Decode the authentication verifier.
+ */
+
+ if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("", &auth_info, pd, 0)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: unable to unmarshall RPC_HDR_AUTH struct.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We only support NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE requests.
+ */
+
+ if(auth_info.auth_type != NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: unknown auth type %x requested.\n",
+ auth_info.auth_type ));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_verifier("", &auth_verifier, pd, 0)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: unable to unmarshall RPC_HDR_AUTH struct.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if(!strequal(auth_verifier.signature, "NTLMSSP")) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: auth_verifier.signature != NTLMSSP\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if(auth_verifier.msg_type != NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: auth_verifier.msg_type (%d) != NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE\n",
+ auth_verifier.msg_type));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_neg("", &ntlmssp_neg, pd, 0)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: Failed to unmarshall RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_NEG.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ p->ntlmssp_chal_flags = SMBD_NTLMSSP_NEG_FLAGS;
+ p->ntlmssp_auth_requested = True;
+ }
+
+ /* name has to be \PIPE\xxxxx */
+ fstrcpy(ack_pipe_name, "\\PIPE\\");
+ fstrcat(ack_pipe_name, p->pipe_srv_name);
+
+ DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_bind_req: make response. %d\n", __LINE__));
+
+ /*
+ * Marshall directly into the outgoing PDU space. We
+ * must do this as we need to set to the bind response
+ * header and are never sending more than one PDU here.
+ */
+
+ prs_init( &outgoing_rpc, 0, 4, MARSHALL);
+ prs_give_memory( &outgoing_rpc, (char *)p->current_pdu, sizeof(p->current_pdu), False);
+
+ /*
+ * Setup the memory to marshall the ba header, and the
+ * auth footers.
+ */
+
+ if(!prs_init(&out_hdr_ba, 1024, 4, MARSHALL)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: malloc out_hdr_ba failed.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if(!prs_init(&out_auth, 1024, 4, MARSHALL)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("pi_pipe_bind_req: malloc out_auth failed.\n"));
+ prs_mem_free(&out_hdr_ba);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if (p->ntlmssp_auth_requested)
+ assoc_gid = 0x7a77;
+ else
+ assoc_gid = hdr_rb.bba.assoc_gid;
+
+ /*
+ * Create the bind response struct.
+ */
+
+ init_rpc_hdr_ba(&hdr_ba,
+ hdr_rb.bba.max_tsize,
+ hdr_rb.bba.max_rsize,
+ assoc_gid,
+ ack_pipe_name,
+ 0x1, 0x0, 0x0,
+ &hdr_rb.transfer);
+
+ /*
+ * and marshall it.
+ */
+
+ if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_ba("", &hdr_ba, &out_hdr_ba, 0)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: marshalling of RPC_HDR_BA failed.\n"));
+ goto err_exit;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now the authentication.
+ */
+
+ if (p->ntlmssp_auth_requested) {
+ RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER auth_verifier;
+ RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHAL ntlmssp_chal;
+
+ generate_random_buffer(p->challenge, 8, False);
+
+ /*** Authentication info ***/
+
+ init_rpc_hdr_auth(&auth_info, NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE, NTLMSSP_AUTH_LEVEL, RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN, 1);
+ if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("", &auth_info, &out_auth, 0)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: marshalling of RPC_HDR_AUTH failed.\n"));
+ goto err_exit;
+ }
+
+ /*** NTLMSSP verifier ***/
+
+ init_rpc_auth_verifier(&auth_verifier, "NTLMSSP", NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE);
+ if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_verifier("", &auth_verifier, &out_auth, 0)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: marshalling of RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER failed.\n"));
+ goto err_exit;
+ }
+
+ /* NTLMSSP challenge ***/
+
+ init_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chal(&ntlmssp_chal, p->ntlmssp_chal_flags, p->challenge);
+ if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chal("", &ntlmssp_chal, &out_auth, 0)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: marshalling of RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHAL failed.\n"));
+ goto err_exit;
+ }
+
+ /* Auth len in the rpc header doesn't include auth_header. */
+ auth_len = prs_offset(&out_auth) - RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the header, now we know the length.
+ */
+
+ init_rpc_hdr(&p->hdr, RPC_BINDACK, RPC_FLG_FIRST | RPC_FLG_LAST,
+ p->hdr.call_id,
+ RPC_HEADER_LEN + prs_offset(&out_hdr_ba) + prs_offset(&out_auth),
+ auth_len);
+
+ /*
+ * Marshall the header into the outgoing PDU.
+ */
+
+ if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("", &p->hdr, &outgoing_rpc, 0)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("pi_pipe_bind_req: marshalling of RPC_HDR failed.\n"));
+ goto err_exit;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now add the RPC_HDR_BA and any auth needed.
+ */
+
+ if(!prs_append_prs_data( &outgoing_rpc, &out_hdr_ba)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: append of RPC_HDR_BA failed.\n"));
+ goto err_exit;
+ }
+
+ if(p->ntlmssp_auth_requested && !prs_append_prs_data( &outgoing_rpc, &out_auth)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: append of auth info failed.\n"));
+ goto err_exit;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Setup the lengths for the initial reply.
+ */
+
+ p->data_sent_length = 0;
+ p->current_pdu_len = prs_offset(&outgoing_rpc);
+ p->current_pdu_sent = 0;
+
+ prs_mem_free(&out_hdr_ba);
+ prs_mem_free(&out_auth);
+
+ return True;
+
+ err_exit:
+
+ prs_mem_free(&out_hdr_ba);
+ prs_mem_free(&out_auth);
+ return False;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Deal with sign & seal processing on an RPC request.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static BOOL api_pipe_auth_process(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in)
+{
+ /*
+ * We always negotiate the following two bits....
+ */
+ BOOL auth_verify = IS_BITS_SET_ALL(p->ntlmssp_chal_flags, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN);
+ BOOL auth_seal = IS_BITS_SET_ALL(p->ntlmssp_chal_flags, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL);
+ int data_len;
+ int auth_len;
+ uint32 old_offset;
+ uint32 crc32 = 0;
+
+ auth_len = p->hdr.auth_len;
+
+ if ((auth_len != RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN) && auth_verify) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_auth_process: Incorrect auth_len %d.\n", auth_len ));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The following is that length of the data we must verify or unseal.
+ * This doesn't include the RPC headers or the auth_len or the RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN
+ * preceeding the auth_data.
+ */
+
+ data_len = p->hdr.frag_len - RPC_HEADER_LEN - RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN -
+ (auth_verify ? RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN : 0) - auth_len;
+
+ DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_auth_process: sign: %s seal: %s data %d auth %d\n",
+ BOOLSTR(auth_verify), BOOLSTR(auth_seal), data_len, auth_len));
+
+ if (auth_seal) {
+ char *data = prs_data_p(rpc_in) + RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN;
+ NTLMSSPcalc_p(p, (uchar*)data, data_len);
+ crc32 = crc32_calc_buffer(data, data_len);
+ }
+
+ old_offset = prs_offset(rpc_in);
+
+ if (auth_seal || auth_verify) {
+ RPC_HDR_AUTH auth_info;
+
+ if(!prs_set_offset(rpc_in, old_offset + data_len)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_auth_process: cannot move offset to %u.\n",
+ (unsigned int)old_offset + data_len ));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("hdr_auth", &auth_info, rpc_in, 0)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_auth_process: failed to unmarshall RPC_HDR_AUTH.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (auth_verify) {
+ RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK ntlmssp_chk;
+ char *req_data = prs_data_p(rpc_in) + prs_offset(rpc_in) + 4;
+
+ DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_auth_process: auth %d\n", prs_offset(rpc_in) + 4));
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure we have RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN - 4 more bytes in the
+ * incoming buffer.
+ */
+ if(prs_mem_get(rpc_in, RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN - 4) == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_auth_process: missing %d bytes in buffer.\n",
+ RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN - 4 ));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ NTLMSSPcalc_p(p, (uchar*)req_data, RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN - 4);
+ if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chk("auth_sign", &ntlmssp_chk, rpc_in, 0)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_auth_process: failed to unmarshall RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if (!rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chk(&ntlmssp_chk, crc32, p->ntlmssp_seq_num)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_auth_process: NTLMSSP check failed.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Return the current pointer to the data offset.
+ */
+
+ if(!prs_set_offset(rpc_in, old_offset)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_auth_process: failed to set offset back to %u\n",
+ (unsigned int)old_offset ));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ return True;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Find the correct RPC function to call for this request.
+ If the pipe is authenticated then become the correct UNIX user
+ before doing the call.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static BOOL api_pipe_request(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+ BOOL ret = False;
+ BOOL changed_user_id = False;
+
+ if (p->ntlmssp_auth_validated) {
+ if (!api_pipe_auth_process(p, rpc_in))
+ return False;
+
+ if(!become_authenticated_pipe_user(p))
+ return False;
+
+ changed_user_id = True;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; api_fd_commands[i].pipe_clnt_name; i++) {
+ if (strequal(api_fd_commands[i].pipe_clnt_name, p->name) &&
+ api_fd_commands[i].fn != NULL) {
+ DEBUG(3,("Doing \\PIPE\\%s\n", api_fd_commands[i].pipe_clnt_name));
+ ret = api_fd_commands[i].fn(p, rpc_in);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(changed_user_id)
+ unbecome_authenticated_pipe_user(p);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ This function is the entry point to processing a DCE/RPC request.
+ All the data for the request (including RPC headers and authentication
+ verifiers) must be linearized in the input_data buffer, with a length
+ of data_len.
+
+ The output is placed into the pipes_struct, and handed back to the
+ client on demand.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL rpc_command(pipes_struct *p, char *input_data, int data_len)
+{
+ prs_struct rpc_in;
+ BOOL reply = False;
+
+ if (input_data == NULL)
+ return False;
+
+ prs_init(&rpc_in, 0, 4, UNMARSHALL);
+
+ /*
+ * Hand the data to the prs_struct, but don't let
+ * it own it.
+ */
+ prs_give_memory( &rpc_in, input_data, (uint32)data_len, False);
+
+ /* Unmarshall the rpc header */
+ if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("", &p->hdr, &rpc_in, 0)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("rpc_command: failed to unmarshall RPC_HDR.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the response data buffer.
+ */
+
+ if(!pipe_init_outgoing_data(p)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("rpc_command: failed to unmarshall RPC_HDR.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ switch (p->hdr.pkt_type) {
+ case RPC_BIND:
+ reply = api_pipe_bind_req(p, &rpc_in);
+ break;
+ case RPC_REQUEST:
+ if (p->ntlmssp_auth_requested && !p->ntlmssp_auth_validated) {
+ /* authentication _was_ requested
+ and it failed. sorry, no deal!
+ */
+ DEBUG(0,("rpc_command: RPC request received on pipe %s where \
+authentication failed. Denying the request.\n", p->name));
+ reply = False;
+ } else {
+ /* read the RPC request header */
+ if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_req("req", &p->hdr_req, &rpc_in, 0)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("rpc_command: failed to unmarshall RPC_HDR_REQ.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+ reply = api_pipe_request(p, &rpc_in);
+ }
+ break;
+ case RPC_BINDRESP: /* not the real name! */
+ reply = api_pipe_bind_auth_resp(p, &rpc_in);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!reply)
+ DEBUG(3,("rpc_command: DCE/RPC fault should be sent here\n"));
+
+ return reply;
+}
+
+
+/*******************************************************************
+ Calls the underlying RPC function for a named pipe.
+ ********************************************************************/
+
+BOOL api_rpcTNP(pipes_struct *p, char *rpc_name, struct api_struct *api_rpc_cmds,
+ prs_struct *rpc_in)
+{
+ int fn_num;
+
+ /* interpret the command */
+ DEBUG(4,("api_rpcTNP: %s op 0x%x - ", rpc_name, p->hdr_req.opnum));
+
+ for (fn_num = 0; api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].name; fn_num++) {
+ if (api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].opnum == p->hdr_req.opnum && api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].fn != NULL) {
+ DEBUG(3,("api_rpc_command: %s\n", api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].name));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].name == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(4, ("unknown\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ /* do the actual command */
+ if(!api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].fn(p->vuid, rpc_in, &p->rdata)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("api_rpcTNP: %s: failed.\n", rpc_name));
+ prs_mem_free(&p->rdata);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(5,("api_rpcTNP: called %s successfully\n", rpc_name));
+
+ return True;
+}