Fresh meat in trusted domains code:

 - packing/unpacking utility functions for trusted domain
   password struct; can be used to prepare buffer to store
   in secrets.tdb or (soon) passdb backend
 - similiar functions for DOM_SID
 - respectively modified secrets_(fetch|store) routines
 - new auth mapping code utilising introduced is_trusted_domain
   function
 - added tdb (un)packing of single bytes



Rafal
(This used to be commit 5281ee7e84421b9be746aed2f1718ceaf2a2fe3d)

4 files changed, 201 insertions, 59 deletions

diff --git a/source3/auth/auth_util.c b/source3/auth/auth_util.c
index 7d85153bd0..a6ad2b883b 100644
--- a/source3/auth/auth_util.c
+++ b/source3/auth/auth_util.c
@@ -227,27 +227,13 @@ NTSTATUS make_user_info_map(auth_usersupplied_info **user_info,
 
 		domain = client_domain;
 
-		if ((smb_name) && (*smb_name)) { /* Don't do this for guests */
-			char *user = NULL;
-			if (asprintf(&user, "%s%s%s", 
-				 client_domain, lp_winbind_separator(), 
-				 smb_name) < 0) {
-				DEBUG(0, ("make_user_info_map: asprintf() failed!\n"));
-				return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
-			}
-
-			DEBUG(5, ("make_user_info_map: testing for user %s\n", user));
-			
-			if (Get_Pwnam(user) == NULL) {
-				DEBUG(5, ("make_user_info_map: test for user %s failed\n", user));
-				domain = lp_workgroup();
-				DEBUG(5, ("make_user_info_map: trusted domain %s doesn't appear to exist, using %s\n", 
-					  client_domain, domain));
-			} else {
-				DEBUG(5, ("make_user_info_map: using trusted domain %s\n", domain));
-			}
-			SAFE_FREE(user);
+		if (is_trusted_domain(domain)) {
+			return make_user_info(user_info, smb_name, internal_username,
+			                      client_domain, domain, wksta_name,
+			                      lm_pwd, nt_pwd, plaintext, ntlmssp_flags,
+			                      encrypted);
 		}
+
 	} else {
 		domain = lp_workgroup();
 	}
diff --git a/source3/include/secrets.h b/source3/include/secrets.h
index 183b29d7a8..07faf28d43 100644
--- a/source3/include/secrets.h
+++ b/source3/include/secrets.h
@@ -57,14 +57,14 @@ struct machine_acct_pass {
 /*
  * storage structure for trusted domain
  */
-struct trusted_dom_pass {
+typedef struct trusted_dom_pass {
 	size_t uni_name_len;
 	smb_ucs2_t uni_name[32]; /* unicode domain name */
 	size_t pass_len;
 	fstring pass;		/* trust relationship's password */
 	time_t mod_time;
 	DOM_SID domain_sid;	/* remote domain's sid */
-};
+} TRUSTED_DOM_PASS;
 
 /*
  * trusted domain entry/entries returned by secrets_get_trusted_domains
diff --git a/source3/passdb/secrets.c b/source3/passdb/secrets.c
index 2b944a9941..4b0913a624 100644
--- a/source3/passdb/secrets.c
+++ b/source3/passdb/secrets.c
@@ -265,38 +265,44 @@ BOOL secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 ret_pwd[16],
 ************************************************************************/
 
 BOOL secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(const char *domain, char** pwd,
-					   DOM_SID *sid, time_t *pass_last_set_time)
+                                           DOM_SID *sid, time_t *pass_last_set_time)
 {
-	struct trusted_dom_pass *pass;
+	struct trusted_dom_pass pass;
 	size_t size;
+	
+	/* unpacking structures */
+	char* pass_buf;
+	int pass_len = 0;
+
+	ZERO_STRUCT(pass);
 
 	/* fetching trusted domain password structure */
-	if (!(pass = secrets_fetch(trustdom_keystr(domain), &size))) {
+	if (!(pass_buf = secrets_fetch(trustdom_keystr(domain), &size))) {
 		DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n"));
 		return False;
 	}
 
-	if (size != sizeof(*pass)) {
-		DEBUG(0, ("secrets were of incorrect size!\n"));
+	/* unpack trusted domain password */
+	pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(pass_buf, size, &pass);
+	if (pass_len != size) {
+		DEBUG(5, ("Invalid secrets size. Unpacked data doesn't match trusted_dom_pass structure.\n"));
 		return False;
 	}
-
+			
 	/* the trust's password */	
 	if (pwd) {
-		*pwd = strdup(pass->pass);
+		*pwd = strdup(pass.pass);
 		if (!*pwd) {
 			return False;
 		}
 	}
 
 	/* last change time */
-	if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass->mod_time;
+	if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass.mod_time;
 
 	/* domain sid */
-	memcpy(&sid, &(pass->domain_sid), sizeof(sid));
-	
-	SAFE_FREE(pass);
-	
+	sid_copy(sid, &pass.domain_sid);
+		
 	return True;
 }
 
@@ -315,7 +321,7 @@ BOOL secrets_store_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 new_pwd[16])
 }
 
 /**
- * Routine to set the password for trusted domain
+ * Routine to store the password for trusted domain
  *
  * @param domain remote domain name
  * @param pwd plain text password of trust relationship
@@ -325,12 +331,17 @@ BOOL secrets_store_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 new_pwd[16])
  **/
 
 BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, smb_ucs2_t *uni_dom_name,
-					   size_t uni_name_len, const char* pwd,
-					   DOM_SID sid)
-{
+                                           size_t uni_name_len, const char* pwd,
+                                           DOM_SID sid)
+{	
+	/* packing structures */
+	pstring pass_buf;
+	int pass_len = 0;
+	int pass_buf_len = sizeof(pass_buf);
+	
 	struct trusted_dom_pass pass;
 	ZERO_STRUCT(pass);
-
+	
 	/* unicode domain name and its length */
 	if (!uni_dom_name)
 		return False;
@@ -346,9 +357,11 @@ BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, smb_ucs2_t *uni_d
 	fstrcpy(pass.pass, pwd);
 
 	/* domain sid */
-	memcpy(&(pass.domain_sid), &sid, sizeof(sid));
+	sid_copy(&pass.domain_sid, &sid);
+	
+	pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack(pass_buf, pass_buf_len, &pass);
 
-	return secrets_store(trustdom_keystr(domain), (void *)&pass, sizeof(pass));
+	return secrets_store(trustdom_keystr(domain), (void *)&pass_buf, pass_len);
 }
 
 /************************************************************************
@@ -475,9 +488,10 @@ NTSTATUS secrets_get_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX* ctx, int* enum_ctx, unsigned in
 	char *pattern;
 	unsigned int start_idx;
 	uint32 idx = 0;
-	size_t size;
+	size_t size, packed_size = 0;
 	fstring dom_name;
-	struct trusted_dom_pass *pass;
+	char *packed_pass;
+	struct trusted_dom_pass *pass = talloc_zero(ctx, sizeof(struct trusted_dom_pass));
 	NTSTATUS status;
 
 	if (!secrets_init()) return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
@@ -505,7 +519,7 @@ NTSTATUS secrets_get_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX* ctx, int* enum_ctx, unsigned in
 	 */
 	status = NT_STATUS_NO_MORE_ENTRIES;
 
-	/* searching for keys in sectrets db -- way to go ... */
+	/* searching for keys in secrets db -- way to go ... */
 	for (k = keys; k; k = k->next) {
 		char *secrets_key;
 		
@@ -516,14 +530,20 @@ NTSTATUS secrets_get_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX* ctx, int* enum_ctx, unsigned in
 			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
 		}
 				
-		pass = secrets_fetch(secrets_key, &size);
-		
-		if (size != sizeof(*pass)) {
+		packed_pass = secrets_fetch(secrets_key, &size);
+		packed_size = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(packed_pass, size, pass);
+
+		if (size != packed_size) {
 			DEBUG(2, ("Secrets record %s is invalid!\n", secrets_key));
 			SAFE_FREE(pass);
-			continue;
+			if (size) SAFE_FREE(packed_pass);
+
+			return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
 		}
 		
+		/* packed representation isn't needed anymore */
+		SAFE_FREE(packed_pass);
+		
 		pull_ucs2_fstring(dom_name, pass->uni_name);
 		DEBUG(18, ("Fetched secret record num %d.\nDomain name: %s, SID: %s\n",
 			   idx, dom_name, sid_string_static(&pass->domain_sid)));
@@ -569,10 +589,7 @@ NTSTATUS secrets_get_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX* ctx, int* enum_ctx, unsigned in
 				   start_idx, max_num_domains));
 		}
 		
-		idx++;
-		
-		/* free returned tdb record */
-		SAFE_FREE(pass);
+		idx++;		
 	}
 	
 	DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: got %d domains\n", *num_domains));
diff --git a/source3/tdb/tdbutil.c b/source3/tdb/tdbutil.c
index 0d8f6128cc..b153d442bd 100644
--- a/source3/tdb/tdbutil.c
+++ b/source3/tdb/tdbutil.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static void gotalarm_sig(void)
 static TDB_DATA make_tdb_data(const char *dptr, size_t dsize)
 {
 	TDB_DATA ret;
-	ret.dptr = dptr;
+	ret.dptr = smb_xstrdup(dptr);
 	ret.dsize = dsize;
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -387,6 +387,7 @@ BOOL tdb_change_uint32_atomic(TDB_CONTEXT *tdb, const char *keystr, uint32 *oldv
 size_t tdb_pack(char *buf, int bufsize, const char *fmt, ...)
 {
 	va_list ap;
+	uint8 bt;
 	uint16 w;
 	uint32 d;
 	int i;
@@ -402,40 +403,46 @@ size_t tdb_pack(char *buf, int bufsize, const char *fmt, ...)
 
 	while (*fmt) {
 		switch ((c = *fmt++)) {
-		case 'w':
+		case 'b': /* unsigned 8-bit integer */
+			len = 1;
+			bt = (uint8)va_arg(ap, int);
+			if (bufsize >= len)
+				SSVAL(buf, 0, bt);
+			break;
+		case 'w': /* unsigned 16-bit integer */
 			len = 2;
 			w = (uint16)va_arg(ap, int);
 			if (bufsize >= len)
 				SSVAL(buf, 0, w);
 			break;
-		case 'd':
+		case 'd': /* signed 32-bit integer (standard int in most systems) */
 			len = 4;
 			d = va_arg(ap, uint32);
 			if (bufsize >= len)
 				SIVAL(buf, 0, d);
 			break;
-		case 'p':
+		case 'p': /* pointer */
 			len = 4;
 			p = va_arg(ap, void *);
 			d = p?1:0;
 			if (bufsize >= len)
 				SIVAL(buf, 0, d);
 			break;
-		case 'P':
+		case 'P': /* null-terminated string */
 			s = va_arg(ap,char *);
 			w = strlen(s);
 			len = w + 1;
 			if (bufsize >= len)
 				memcpy(buf, s, len);
 			break;
-		case 'f':
+		case 'f': /* null-terminated string */
 			s = va_arg(ap,char *);
 			w = strlen(s);
 			len = w + 1;
 			if (bufsize >= len)
 				memcpy(buf, s, len);
 			break;
-		case 'B':
+		case 'B': /* fixed-length string */
 			i = va_arg(ap, int);
 			s = va_arg(ap, char *);
 			len = 4+i;
@@ -471,6 +478,7 @@ size_t tdb_pack(char *buf, int bufsize, const char *fmt, ...)
 int tdb_unpack(char *buf, int bufsize, const char *fmt, ...)
 {
 	va_list ap;
+	uint8 *bt;
 	uint16 *w;
 	uint32 *d;
 	int len;
@@ -486,6 +494,13 @@ int tdb_unpack(char *buf, int bufsize, const char *fmt, ...)
 	
 	while (*fmt) {
 		switch ((c=*fmt++)) {
+		case 'b':
+			len = 1;
+			bt = va_arg(ap, uint8 *);
+			if (bufsize < len)
+				goto no_space;
+			*bt = SVAL(buf, 0);
+			break;
 		case 'w':
 			len = 2;
 			w = va_arg(ap, uint16 *);
@@ -563,6 +578,130 @@ int tdb_unpack(char *buf, int bufsize, const char *fmt, ...)
 	return -1;
 }
 
+
+/**
+ * Pack SID passed by pointer
+ *
+ * @param pack_buf pointer to buffer which is to be filled with packed data
+ * @param bufsize size of packing buffer
+ * @param sid pointer to sid to be packed
+ *
+ * @return length of the packed representation of the whole structure
+ **/
+size_t tdb_sid_pack(char* pack_buf, int bufsize, DOM_SID* sid)
+{
+	int idx;
+	size_t len = 0;
+	
+	if (!sid || !pack_buf) return -1;
+	
+	len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "bb", sid->sid_rev_num,
+	                sid->num_auths);
+	
+	for (idx = 0; idx < 6; idx++) {
+		len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "b", sid->id_auth[idx]);
+	}
+	
+	for (idx = 0; idx < MAXSUBAUTHS; idx++) {
+		len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "d", sid->sub_auths[idx]);
+	}
+	
+	return len;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Unpack SID into a pointer
+ *
+ * @param pack_buf pointer to buffer with packed representation
+ * @param bufsize size of the buffer
+ * @param sid pointer to sid structure to be filled with unpacked data
+ *
+ * @return size of structure unpacked from buffer
+ **/
+size_t tdb_sid_unpack(char* pack_buf, int bufsize, DOM_SID* sid)
+{
+	int idx, len = 0;
+	
+	if (!sid || !pack_buf) return -1;
+
+	len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "bb",
+	                  &sid->sid_rev_num, &sid->num_auths);
+			  
+	for (idx = 0; idx < 6; idx++) {
+		len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "b", &sid->id_auth[idx]);
+	}
+	
+	for (idx = 0; idx < MAXSUBAUTHS; idx++) {
+		len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "d", &sid->sub_auths[idx]);
+	}
+	
+	return len;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Pack TRUSTED_DOM_PASS passed by pointer
+ *
+ * @param pack_buf pointer to buffer which is to be filled with packed data
+ * @param bufsize size of the buffer
+ * @param pass pointer to trusted domain password to be packed
+ *
+ * @return length of the packed representation of the whole structure
+ **/
+size_t tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack(char* pack_buf, int bufsize, TRUSTED_DOM_PASS* pass)
+{
+	int idx, len = 0;
+	
+	if (!pack_buf || !pass) return -1;
+	
+	/* packing unicode domain name and password */
+	len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "d", pass->uni_name_len);
+	
+	for (idx = 0; idx < 32; idx++)
+		len +=  tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "w", pass->uni_name[idx]);
+	
+	len += tdb_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "dPd", pass->pass_len,
+	                     pass->pass, pass->mod_time);
+
+	/* packing SID structure */
+	len += tdb_sid_pack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, &pass->domain_sid);
+
+	return len;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Unpack TRUSTED_DOM_PASS passed by pointer
+ *
+ * @param pack_buf pointer to buffer with packed representation
+ * @param bufsize size of the buffer
+ * @param pass pointer to trusted domain password to be filled with unpacked data
+ *
+ * @return size of structure unpacked from buffer
+ **/
+size_t tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(char* pack_buf, int bufsize, TRUSTED_DOM_PASS* pass)
+{
+	int idx, len = 0;
+	
+	if (!pack_buf || !pass) return -1;
+
+	/* unpack unicode domain name and plaintext password */
+	len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf, bufsize - len, "d", &pass->uni_name_len);
+	
+	for (idx = 0; idx < 32; idx++)
+		len +=  tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "w", &pass->uni_name[idx]);
+
+	len += tdb_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, "dPd", &pass->pass_len, &pass->pass,
+	                  &pass->mod_time);
+	
+	/* unpack domain sid */
+	len += tdb_sid_unpack(pack_buf + len, bufsize - len, &pass->domain_sid);
+	
+	return len;	
+}
+
+
 /****************************************************************************
  Log tdb messages via DEBUG().
 ****************************************************************************/