r9415: Remove old kerberos code (including salt guessing code) that has only

caused me pain (and covourty warnings).

Simply gensec_gssapi to assume the properties of lorikeet-heimdal,
rather than having #ifdef around critical features.  This simplifies
the code rather a lot.

Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 11156f556db678c3d325fe5ced5e41a76ed6a3f1)

3 files changed, 8 insertions, 713 deletions

diff --git a/source4/auth/gensec/gensec_gssapi.c b/source4/auth/gensec/gensec_gssapi.c
index 183e3f201b..b68bfbdb36 100644
--- a/source4/auth/gensec/gensec_gssapi.c
+++ b/source4/auth/gensec/gensec_gssapi.c
@@ -128,14 +128,6 @@ static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_start(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
 
 	talloc_set_destructor(gensec_gssapi_state, gensec_gssapi_destory); 
 
-	if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY) {
-#ifndef HAVE_GSSKRB5_GET_INITIATOR_SUBKEY
-		/* GSSAPI won't give us the session keys, without the
-		 * right hooks.  This is critical when requested, so
-		 * fail outright. */
-		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
-#endif
-	}
 	if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN) {
 		gensec_gssapi_state->want_flags |= GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG;
 	}
@@ -143,13 +135,7 @@ static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_start(struct gensec_security *gensec_security)
 		gensec_gssapi_state->want_flags |= GSS_C_CONF_FLAG;
 	}
 	if (gensec_security->want_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_DCE_STYLE) {
-#ifndef GSS_C_DCE_STYLE
-		/* GSSAPI DCE_STYLE is critical when requested, so
-		 * fail outright */
-		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
-#else
 		gensec_gssapi_state->want_flags |= GSS_C_DCE_STYLE;
-#endif
 	}
 
 	gensec_gssapi_state->gss_oid = gss_mech_krb5;
@@ -678,12 +664,16 @@ static BOOL gensec_gssapi_have_feature(struct gensec_security *gensec_security,
 		return gensec_gssapi_state->got_flags & GSS_C_CONF_FLAG;
 	}
 	if (feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY) {
-#ifdef HAVE_GSSKRB5_GET_INITIATOR_SUBKEY
 		if ((gensec_gssapi_state->gss_oid->length == gss_mech_krb5->length)
 		    && (memcmp(gensec_gssapi_state->gss_oid->elements, gss_mech_krb5->elements, gensec_gssapi_state->gss_oid->length) == 0)) {
 			return True;
 		}
-#endif 
+	}
+	if (feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_DCE_STYLE) {
+		return True;
+	}
+	if (feature & GENSEC_FEATURE_ASYNC_REPLIES) {
+		return True;
 	}
 	return False;
 }
@@ -698,7 +688,6 @@ static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_session_key(struct gensec_security *gensec_securit
 		return NT_STATUS_OK;
 	}
 
-#ifdef HAVE_GSSKRB5_GET_INITIATOR_SUBKEY
 	/* Ensure we only call this for GSSAPI/krb5, otherwise things could get very ugly */
 	if ((gensec_gssapi_state->gss_oid->length == gss_mech_krb5->length)
 	    && (memcmp(gensec_gssapi_state->gss_oid->elements, gss_mech_krb5->elements, 
@@ -723,7 +712,6 @@ static NTSTATUS gensec_gssapi_session_key(struct gensec_security *gensec_securit
 		}
 		return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;
 	}
-#endif
 	
 	DEBUG(1, ("NO session key for this mech\n"));
 	return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;
diff --git a/source4/auth/kerberos/clikrb5.c b/source4/auth/kerberos/clikrb5.c
index 51638af2c9..7a43498773 100644
--- a/source4/auth/kerberos/clikrb5.c
+++ b/source4/auth/kerberos/clikrb5.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@
 #endif
 
 #if defined(HAVE_KRB5_PRINCIPAL2SALT) && defined(HAVE_KRB5_USE_ENCTYPE) && defined(HAVE_KRB5_STRING_TO_KEY) && defined(HAVE_KRB5_ENCRYPT_BLOCK)
- int create_kerberos_key_from_string_direct(krb5_context context,
+ int create_kerberos_key_from_string(krb5_context context,
 					krb5_principal host_princ,
 					krb5_data *password,
 					krb5_keyblock *key,
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@
 	return ret;
 }
 #elif defined(HAVE_KRB5_GET_PW_SALT) && defined(HAVE_KRB5_STRING_TO_KEY_SALT)
- int create_kerberos_key_from_string_direct(krb5_context context,
+ int create_kerberos_key_from_string(krb5_context context,
 					krb5_principal host_princ,
 					krb5_data *password,
 					krb5_keyblock *key,
@@ -118,27 +118,6 @@
 #error UNKNOWN_CREATE_KEY_FUNCTIONS
 #endif
 
- int create_kerberos_key_from_string(krb5_context context,
-					krb5_principal host_princ,
-					krb5_data *password,
-					krb5_keyblock *key,
-					krb5_enctype enctype)
-{
-	krb5_principal salt_princ = NULL;
-	int ret;
-	/*
-	 * Check if we've determined that the KDC is salting keys for this
-	 * principal/enctype in a non-obvious way.  If it is, try to match
-	 * its behavior.
-	 */
-	salt_princ = kerberos_fetch_salt_princ_for_host_princ(context, host_princ, enctype);
-	ret = create_kerberos_key_from_string_direct(context, salt_princ ? salt_princ : host_princ, password, key, enctype);
-	if (salt_princ) {
-		krb5_free_principal(context, salt_princ);
-	}
-	return ret;
-}
-
 #if defined(HAVE_KRB5_GET_PERMITTED_ENCTYPES)
  krb5_error_code get_kerberos_allowed_etypes(krb5_context context, 
 					    krb5_enctype **enctypes)
diff --git a/source4/auth/kerberos/kerberos.c b/source4/auth/kerberos/kerberos.c
index 8c82ae780e..31e0c71c55 100644
--- a/source4/auth/kerberos/kerberos.c
+++ b/source4/auth/kerberos/kerberos.c
@@ -167,677 +167,5 @@ kerb_prompter(krb5_context ctx, void *data,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/*
-  simulate a kinit, putting the tgt in the given credentials cache. 
-  If cache_name == NULL place in default cache location.
-
-  Orignally by remus@snapserver.com
-*/
-int kerberos_kinit_password(const char *principal,
-			    const char *password,
-			    int time_offset,
-			    time_t *expire_time,
-			    const char *cache_name,
-			    time_t *kdc_time)
-{
-	int code;
-	krb5_context ctx = NULL;
-	krb5_ccache cc = NULL;
-
-	if ((code = krb5_init_context(&ctx)))
-		return code;
-
-	if (time_offset != 0) {
-		krb5_set_real_time(ctx, time(NULL) + time_offset, 0);
-	}
-	
-	if ((code = krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, cache_name ?
-				    cache_name : krb5_cc_default_name(ctx), &cc))) {
-		krb5_free_context(ctx);
-		return code;
-	}
-
-	code = kerberos_kinit_password_cc(ctx, cc, principal, password, expire_time, kdc_time);
-	
-	krb5_cc_close(ctx, cc);
-	krb5_free_context(ctx);
-
-	return code;
-}
-
-/* run kinit to setup our ccache */
-int ads_kinit_password(struct ads_struct *ads)
-{
-	char *s;
-	int ret;
-
-	if (asprintf(&s, "%s@%s", ads->auth.user_name, ads->auth.realm) == -1) {
-		return KRB5_CC_NOMEM;
-	}
-
-	if (!ads->auth.password) {
-		return KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD;
-	}
-	
-	ret = kerberos_kinit_password(s, ads->auth.password, ads->auth.time_offset,
-			&ads->auth.expire, NULL, NULL);
-
-	if (ret) {
-		DEBUG(0,("kerberos_kinit_password %s failed: %s\n", 
-			 s, error_message(ret)));
-	}
-	free(s);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-int ads_kdestroy(const char *cc_name)
-{
-	krb5_error_code code;
-	krb5_context ctx = NULL;
-	krb5_ccache cc = NULL;
-
-	if ((code = krb5_init_context (&ctx))) {
-		DEBUG(3, ("ads_kdestroy: kdb5_init_context failed: %s\n", 
-			error_message(code)));
-		return code;
-	}
-  
-	if (!cc_name) {
-		if ((code = krb5_cc_default(ctx, &cc))) {
-			krb5_free_context(ctx);
-			return code;
-		}
-	} else {
-		if ((code = krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, cc_name, &cc))) {
-			DEBUG(3, ("ads_kdestroy: krb5_cc_resolve failed: %s\n",
-				  error_message(code)));
-			krb5_free_context(ctx);
-			return code;
-		}
-	}
-
-	if ((code = krb5_cc_destroy (ctx, cc))) {
-		DEBUG(3, ("ads_kdestroy: krb5_cc_destroy failed: %s\n", 
-			error_message(code)));
-	}
-
-	krb5_free_context (ctx);
-	return code;
-}
-
-/************************************************************************
- Routine to fetch the salting principal for a service.  Active
- Directory may use a non-obvious principal name to generate the salt
- when it determines the key to use for encrypting tickets for a service,
- and hopefully we detected that when we joined the domain.
- ************************************************************************/
-
-static char *kerberos_secrets_fetch_salting_principal(const char *service, int enctype)
-{
-	char *ret = NULL;
-
-#if 0
-	asprintf(&key, "%s/%s/enctype=%d", SECRETS_SALTING_PRINCIPAL, service, enctype);
-	if (!key) {
-		return NULL;
-	}
-	ret = (char *)secrets_fetch(key, NULL);
-	SAFE_FREE(key);
-#endif
-	return ret;
-}
-
-/************************************************************************
- Routine to get the salting principal for this service.  Active
- Directory may use a non-obvious principal name to generate the salt
- when it determines the key to use for encrypting tickets for a service,
- and hopefully we detected that when we joined the domain.
- Caller must free if return is not null.
- ************************************************************************/
-
-krb5_principal kerberos_fetch_salt_princ_for_host_princ(krb5_context context,
-							krb5_principal host_princ,
-							int enctype)
-{
-	char *unparsed_name = NULL, *salt_princ_s = NULL;
-	krb5_principal ret_princ = NULL;
-
-	if (krb5_unparse_name(context, host_princ, &unparsed_name) != 0) {
-		return (krb5_principal)NULL;
-	}
-
-	if ((salt_princ_s = kerberos_secrets_fetch_salting_principal(unparsed_name, enctype)) == NULL) {
-		krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, unparsed_name);
-		return (krb5_principal)NULL;
-	}
-
-	if (krb5_parse_name(context, salt_princ_s, &ret_princ) != 0) {
-		krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, unparsed_name);
-		SAFE_FREE(salt_princ_s);
-		return (krb5_principal)NULL;
-	}
-	krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, unparsed_name);
-	SAFE_FREE(salt_princ_s);
-	return ret_princ;
-}
-
-/************************************************************************
- Routine to set the salting principal for this service.  Active
- Directory may use a non-obvious principal name to generate the salt
- when it determines the key to use for encrypting tickets for a service,
- and hopefully we detected that when we joined the domain.
- Setting principal to NULL deletes this entry.
- ************************************************************************/
-
- BOOL kerberos_secrets_store_salting_principal(const char *service,
-					      int enctype,
-					      const char *principal)
-{
-	char *key = NULL;
-	BOOL ret = False;
-	krb5_context context = NULL;
-	krb5_principal princ = NULL;
-	char *princ_s = NULL;
-	char *unparsed_name = NULL;
-
-	krb5_init_context(&context);
-	if (!context) {
-		return False;
-	}
-	if (strchr_m(service, '@')) {
-		asprintf(&princ_s, "%s", service);
-	} else {
-		asprintf(&princ_s, "%s@%s", service, lp_realm());
-	}
-
-	if (krb5_parse_name(context, princ_s, &princ) != 0) {
-		goto out;
-		
-	}
-	if (krb5_unparse_name(context, princ, &unparsed_name) != 0) {
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	asprintf(&key, "%s/%s/enctype=%d", SECRETS_SALTING_PRINCIPAL, unparsed_name, enctype);
-	if (!key)  {
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-#if 0
-	if ((principal != NULL) && (strlen(principal) > 0)) {
-		ret = secrets_store(key, principal, strlen(principal) + 1);
-	} else {
-		ret = secrets_delete(key);
-	}
-#endif 
-
- out:
-
-	SAFE_FREE(key);
-	SAFE_FREE(princ_s);
-
-	if (unparsed_name) {
-		krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, unparsed_name);
-	}
-	if (context) {
-		krb5_free_context(context);
-	}
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
-/************************************************************************
- Routine to get initial credentials as a service ticket for the local machine.
- Returns a buffer initialized with krb5_mk_req_extended.
- ************************************************************************/
-
-static krb5_error_code get_service_ticket(krb5_context ctx,
-					krb5_ccache ccache,
-					const char *service_principal,
-					int enctype,
-					krb5_data *p_outbuf)
-{
-	krb5_creds creds, *new_creds = NULL;
-	char *service_s = NULL;
-	char *machine_account = NULL, *password = NULL;
-	krb5_data in_data;
-	krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
-	krb5_error_code err = 0;
-
-	ZERO_STRUCT(creds);
-
-	asprintf(&machine_account, "%s$@%s", lp_netbios_name(), lp_realm());
-	if (machine_account == NULL) {
-		goto out;
-	}
-	password = secrets_fetch_machine_password(lp_workgroup());
-	if (password == NULL) {
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if ((err = kerberos_kinit_password(machine_account, password, 0, NULL, LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME, NULL)) != 0) {
-		DEBUG(0,("get_service_ticket: kerberos_kinit_password %s@%s failed: %s\n", 
-			machine_account,
-			lp_realm(),
-			error_message(err)));
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	/* Ok - the above call has gotten a TGT. Now we need to get a service
-	   ticket to ourselves. */
-
-	/* Set up the enctype and client and server principal fields for krb5_get_credentials. */
-	kerberos_set_creds_enctype(&creds, enctype);
-
-	if ((err = krb5_cc_get_principal(ctx, ccache, &creds.client))) {
-		DEBUG(3, ("get_service_ticket: krb5_cc_get_principal failed: %s\n", 
-			error_message(err)));
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	if (strchr_m(service_principal, '@')) {
-		asprintf(&service_s, "%s", service_principal);
-	} else {
-		asprintf(&service_s, "%s@%s", service_principal, lp_realm());
-	}
-
-	if ((err = krb5_parse_name(ctx, service_s, &creds.server))) {
-		DEBUG(0,("get_service_ticket: krb5_parse_name %s failed: %s\n", 
-			service_s, error_message(err)));
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	if ((err = krb5_get_credentials(ctx, 0, ccache, &creds, &new_creds))) {
-		DEBUG(5,("get_service_ticket: krb5_get_credentials for %s enctype %d failed: %s\n", 
-			service_s, enctype, error_message(err)));
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	memset(&in_data, '\0', sizeof(in_data));
-	if ((err = krb5_mk_req_extended(ctx, &auth_context, 0, &in_data,
-			new_creds, p_outbuf)) != 0) {
-		DEBUG(0,("get_service_ticket: krb5_mk_req_extended failed: %s\n", 
-			error_message(err)));
-		goto out;
-	}
-
- out:
-
-	if (auth_context) {
-		krb5_auth_con_free(ctx, auth_context);
-	}
-	if (new_creds) {
-		krb5_free_creds(ctx, new_creds);
-	}
-	if (creds.server) {
-		krb5_free_principal(ctx, creds.server);
-	}
-	if (creds.client) {
-		krb5_free_principal(ctx, creds.client);
-	}
-
-	SAFE_FREE(service_s);
-	SAFE_FREE(password);
-	SAFE_FREE(machine_account);
-	return err;
-}
-
-/************************************************************************
- Check if the machine password can be used in conjunction with the salting_principal
- to generate a key which will successfully decrypt the AP_REQ already
- gotten as a message to the local machine.
- ************************************************************************/
-
-static BOOL verify_service_password(krb5_context ctx,
-				    int enctype,
-				    const char *salting_principal,
-				    krb5_data *in_data)
-{
-	BOOL ret = False;
-	krb5_principal salting_kprinc = NULL;
-	krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL;
-	krb5_keyblock key;
-	krb5_data passdata;
-	char *salting_s = NULL;
-	char *password = NULL;
-	krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
-	krb5_error_code err;
-
-	memset(&passdata, '\0', sizeof(passdata));
-	memset(&key, '\0', sizeof(key));
-
-	password = secrets_fetch_machine_password(lp_workgroup());
-	if (password == NULL) {
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	if (strchr_m(salting_principal, '@')) {
-		asprintf(&salting_s, "%s", salting_principal);
-	} else {
-		asprintf(&salting_s, "%s@%s", salting_principal, lp_realm());
-	}
-
-	if ((err = krb5_parse_name(ctx, salting_s, &salting_kprinc))) {
-		DEBUG(0,("verify_service_password: krb5_parse_name %s failed: %s\n", 
-			salting_s, error_message(err)));
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	passdata.length = strlen(password);
-	passdata.data = (char*)password;
-	if ((err = create_kerberos_key_from_string_direct(ctx, salting_kprinc, &passdata, &key, enctype))) {
-		DEBUG(0,("verify_service_password: create_kerberos_key_from_string %d failed: %s\n",
-			enctype, error_message(err)));
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	if ((err = krb5_auth_con_init(ctx, &auth_context)) != 0) {
-		DEBUG(0,("verify_service_password: krb5_auth_con_init failed %s\n", error_message(err)));
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	if ((err = krb5_auth_con_setuseruserkey(ctx, auth_context, &key)) != 0) {
-		DEBUG(0,("verify_service_password: krb5_auth_con_setuseruserkey failed %s\n", error_message(err)));
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	if (!(err = krb5_rd_req(ctx, &auth_context, in_data, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ticket))) {
-		DEBUG(10,("verify_service_password: decrypted message with enctype %u salt %s!\n",
-				(unsigned int)enctype, salting_s));
-		ret = True;
-	}
-
- out:
-
-	memset(&passdata, 0, sizeof(passdata));
-	krb5_free_keyblock_contents(ctx, &key);
-	if (ticket != NULL) {
-		krb5_free_ticket(ctx, ticket);
-	}
-	if (salting_kprinc) {
-		krb5_free_principal(ctx, salting_kprinc);
-	}
-	SAFE_FREE(salting_s);
-	SAFE_FREE(password);
-	return ret;
-}
 
-/************************************************************************
- *
- * From the current draft of kerberos-clarifications:
- *
- *     It is not possible to reliably generate a user's key given a pass
- *     phrase without contacting the KDC, since it will not be known
- *     whether alternate salt or parameter values are required.
- *
- * And because our server has a password, we have this exact problem.  We
- * make multiple guesses as to which principal name provides the salt which
- * the KDC is using.
- *
- ************************************************************************/
-
-static void kerberos_derive_salting_principal_for_enctype(const char *service_principal,
-							  krb5_context ctx,
-							  krb5_ccache ccache,
-							  krb5_enctype enctype,
-							  krb5_enctype *enctypes)
-{
-	char *salting_principals[3] = {NULL, NULL, NULL}, *second_principal = NULL;
-	krb5_error_code err = 0;
-	krb5_data outbuf;
-	int i, j;
-
-	memset(&outbuf, '\0', sizeof(outbuf));
-
-	/* Check that the service_principal is useful. */
-	if ((service_principal == NULL) || (strlen(service_principal) == 0)) {
-		return;
-	}
-
-	/* Generate our first guess -- the principal as-given. */
-	asprintf(&salting_principals[0], "%s", service_principal);
-	if ((salting_principals[0] == NULL) || (strlen(salting_principals[0]) == 0)) {
-		return;
-	}
-
-	/* Generate our second guess -- the computer's principal, as Win2k3. */
-	asprintf(&second_principal, "host/%s.%s", lp_netbios_name(), lp_realm());
-	if (second_principal != NULL) {
-		strlower_m(second_principal);
-		asprintf(&salting_principals[1], "%s@%s", second_principal, lp_realm());
-		SAFE_FREE(second_principal);
-	}
-	if ((salting_principals[1] == NULL) || (strlen(salting_principals[1]) == 0)) {
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	/* Generate our third guess -- the computer's principal, as Win2k. */
-	asprintf(&second_principal, "HOST/%s", lp_netbios_name());
-	if (second_principal != NULL) {
-		strlower_m(second_principal + 5);
-		asprintf(&salting_principals[2], "%s@%s",
-			second_principal, lp_realm());
-		SAFE_FREE(second_principal);
-	}
-	if ((salting_principals[2] == NULL) || (strlen(salting_principals[2]) == 0)) {
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	/* Get a service ticket for ourselves into our memory ccache. */
-	/* This will commonly fail if there is no principal by that name (and we're trying
-	   many names). So don't print a debug 0 error. */
-
-	if ((err = get_service_ticket(ctx, ccache, service_principal, enctype, &outbuf)) != 0) {
-		DEBUG(3, ("verify_service_password: get_service_ticket failed: %s\n", 
-			error_message(err)));
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	/* At this point we have a message to ourselves, salted only the KDC knows how. We
-	   have to work out what that salting is. */
-
-	/* Try and find the correct salting principal. */
-	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(salting_principals) / sizeof(salting_principals[i]); i++) {
-		if (verify_service_password(ctx, enctype, salting_principals[i], &outbuf)) {
-			break;
-		}
-	}
-
-	/* If we failed to get a match, return. */
-	if (i >= sizeof(salting_principals) / sizeof(salting_principals[i])) {
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	/* If we succeeded, store the principal for use for all enctypes which
-	 * share the same cipher and string-to-key function.  Doing this here
-	 * allows servers which just pass a keytab to krb5_rd_req() to work
-	 * correctly. */
-	for (j = 0; enctypes[j] != 0; j++) {
-		if (enctype != enctypes[j]) {
-			/* If this enctype isn't compatible with the one which
-			 * we used, skip it. */
-
-			if (!kerberos_compatible_enctypes(ctx, enctypes[j], enctype))
-				continue;
-		}
-		/* If the principal which gives us the proper salt is the one
-		 * which we would normally guess, don't bother noting anything
-		 * in the secrets tdb. */
-		if (strcmp(service_principal, salting_principals[i]) != 0) {
-			kerberos_secrets_store_salting_principal(service_principal,
-								enctypes[j],
-								salting_principals[i]);
-		}
-	}
-
- out :
-
-	kerberos_free_data_contents(ctx, &outbuf);
-	SAFE_FREE(salting_principals[0]);
-	SAFE_FREE(salting_principals[1]);
-	SAFE_FREE(salting_principals[2]);
-	SAFE_FREE(second_principal);
-}
-
-/************************************************************************
- Go through all the possible enctypes for this principal.
- ************************************************************************/
-
-static void kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(krb5_context context,
-					krb5_ccache ccache,
-					krb5_enctype *enctypes,
-					char *service_principal)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	/* Try for each enctype separately, because the rules are
-	 * different for different enctypes. */
-	for (i = 0; enctypes[i] != 0; i++) {
-		/* Delete secrets entry first. */
-		kerberos_secrets_store_salting_principal(service_principal, 0, NULL);
-#ifdef ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC
-		if (enctypes[i] == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
-			/* Of course this'll always work, so just save
-			 * ourselves the effort. */
-			continue;
-		}
-#endif
-		/* Try to figure out what's going on with this
-		 * principal. */
-		kerberos_derive_salting_principal_for_enctype(service_principal,
-								context,
-								ccache,
-								enctypes[i],
-								enctypes);
-	}
-}
-
-/************************************************************************
- Wrapper function for the above.
- ************************************************************************/
-
-BOOL kerberos_derive_salting_principal(char *service_principal)
-{
-	krb5_context context = NULL;
-	krb5_enctype *enctypes = NULL;
-	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
-	krb5_error_code ret = 0;
-
-	initialize_krb5_error_table();
-	if ((ret = krb5_init_context(&context)) != 0) {
-		DEBUG(1,("kerberos_derive_cifs_salting_principals: krb5_init_context failed. %s\n",
-			error_message(ret)));
-		return False;
-	}
-	if ((ret = get_kerberos_allowed_etypes(context, &enctypes)) != 0) {
-		DEBUG(1,("kerberos_derive_cifs_salting_principals: get_kerberos_allowed_etypes failed. %s\n",
-			error_message(ret)));
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	if ((ret = krb5_cc_resolve(context, LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME, &ccache)) != 0) {
-		DEBUG(3, ("get_service_ticket: krb5_cc_resolve for %s failed: %s\n", 
-			LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME, error_message(ret)));
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service_principal);
-
-  out: 
-	if (enctypes) {
-		free_kerberos_etypes(context, enctypes);
-	}
-	if (ccache) {
-		krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache);
-	}
-	if (context) {
-		krb5_free_context(context);
-	}
-
-	return ret ? False : True;
-}
-
-/************************************************************************
- Core function to try and determine what salt is being used for any keytab
- keys.
- ************************************************************************/
-
-BOOL kerberos_derive_cifs_salting_principals(void)
-{
-	fstring my_fqdn;
-	char *service = NULL;
-	krb5_context context = NULL;
-	krb5_enctype *enctypes = NULL;
-	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
-	krb5_error_code ret = 0;
-	BOOL retval = False;
-
-	initialize_krb5_error_table();
-	if ((ret = krb5_init_context(&context)) != 0) {
-		DEBUG(1,("kerberos_derive_cifs_salting_principals: krb5_init_context failed. %s\n",
-			error_message(ret)));
-		return False;
-	}
-	if ((ret = get_kerberos_allowed_etypes(context, &enctypes)) != 0) {
-		DEBUG(1,("kerberos_derive_cifs_salting_principals: get_kerberos_allowed_etypes failed. %s\n",
-			error_message(ret)));
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	if ((ret = krb5_cc_resolve(context, LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME, &ccache)) != 0) {
-		DEBUG(3, ("get_service_ticket: krb5_cc_resolve for %s failed: %s\n", 
-			LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME, error_message(ret)));
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	if (asprintf(&service, "%s$", lp_netbios_name()) != -1) {
-		strlower_m(service);
-		kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
-		SAFE_FREE(service);
-	}
-	if (asprintf(&service, "cifs/%s", lp_netbios_name()) != -1) {
-		strlower_m(service);
-		kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
-		SAFE_FREE(service);
-	}
-	if (asprintf(&service, "host/%s", lp_netbios_name()) != -1) {
-		strlower_m(service);
-		kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
-		SAFE_FREE(service);
-	}
-	if (asprintf(&service, "cifs/%s.%s", lp_netbios_name(), lp_realm()) != -1) {
-		strlower_m(service);
-		kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
-		SAFE_FREE(service);
-	}
-	if (asprintf(&service, "host/%s.%s", lp_netbios_name(), lp_realm()) != -1) {
-		strlower_m(service);
-		kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
-		SAFE_FREE(service);
-	}
-	name_to_fqdn(my_fqdn, lp_netbios_name());
-	if (asprintf(&service, "cifs/%s", my_fqdn) != -1) {
-		strlower_m(service);
-		kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
-		SAFE_FREE(service);
-	}
-	if (asprintf(&service, "host/%s", my_fqdn) != -1) {
-		strlower_m(service);
-		kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
-		SAFE_FREE(service);
-	}
-
-	retval = True;
-
-  out: 
-	if (enctypes) {
-		free_kerberos_etypes(context, enctypes);
-	}
-	if (ccache) {
-		krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache);
-	}
-	if (context) {
-		krb5_free_context(context);
-	}
-	return retval;
-}
 #endif