Merge branch 'master' of ssh://git.samba.org/data/git/samba into regsrv

Conflicts:
	source4/lib/registry/ldb.c
	source4/rpc_server/winreg/rpc_winreg.c

1 files changed, 1558 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/source4/kdc/hdb-samba4.c b/source4/kdc/hdb-samba4.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b6a48e79d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/source4/kdc/hdb-samba4.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1558 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2001, 2003, PADL Software Pty Ltd.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. Neither the name of PADL Software  nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY PADL SOFTWARE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL PADL SOFTWARE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "system/time.h"
+#include "dsdb/common/flags.h"
+#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h"
+#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb_errors.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h"
+#include "auth/auth.h"
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
+#include "auth/auth_sam.h"
+#include "../lib/util/util_ldb.h"
+#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
+#include "librpc/ndr/libndr.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/lsa.h"
+#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+#include "param/param.h"
+#include "events/events.h"
+#include "kdc/kdc.h"
+#include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
+
+enum hdb_ldb_ent_type 
+{ HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_SERVER, 
+  HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
+
+enum trust_direction {
+	UNKNOWN = 0,
+	INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND, 
+	OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
+};
+
+static const char *realm_ref_attrs[] = {
+	"nCName", 
+	"dnsRoot", 
+	NULL
+};
+
+static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
+	"trustPartner",
+	"trustAuthIncoming",
+	"trustAuthOutgoing",
+	"whenCreated",
+	"msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
+	"trustAttributes",
+	"trustDirection",
+	"trustType",
+	NULL
+};
+
+static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val)
+{
+    const char *tmp;
+    const char *gentime;
+    struct tm tm;
+
+    gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
+    if (!gentime)
+	return default_val;
+
+    tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
+    if (tmp == NULL) {
+	    return default_val;
+    }
+
+    return timegm(&tm);
+}
+
+static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, int userAccountControl, enum hdb_ldb_ent_type ent_type) 
+{
+	HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
+
+	/* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
+	flags.immutable = 1;
+
+	/* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
+	flags.invalid = 1;
+
+	flags.renewable = 1;
+
+	/* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
+	flags.server = 1;
+
+	/* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
+	if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
+		if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
+			flags.client = 1;
+		}
+		flags.invalid = 0;
+	}
+	
+	if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
+		if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
+			flags.client = 1;
+		}
+		flags.invalid = 0;
+	}
+	if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
+		if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
+			flags.client = 1;
+		}
+		flags.invalid = 0;
+	}
+	if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
+		if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
+			flags.client = 1;
+		}
+		flags.invalid = 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
+	if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
+		flags.client = 0;
+	}
+	if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
+		flags.invalid = 1;
+	}
+/*
+	if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
+		flags.invalid = 1;
+	}
+*/
+/*
+	UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
+*/
+	if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
+		flags.invalid = 1;
+	}
+
+/* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in LDB_message2entry() */
+
+/*
+	if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
+		flags.invalid = 1;
+	}
+*/
+	if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
+		flags.require_hwauth = 1;
+	}
+	if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
+		flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
+	}	
+	if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
+		flags.forwardable = 1;
+		flags.proxiable = 1;
+	}
+
+	if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
+		flags.require_preauth = 0;
+	} else {
+		flags.require_preauth = 1;
+
+	}
+	return flags;
+}
+
+static int hdb_ldb_destructor(struct hdb_ldb_private *private)
+{
+    hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = private->entry_ex;
+    free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void hdb_ldb_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+	talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx);
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
+					      struct smb_iconv_convenience *iconv_convenience,
+					      TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					      struct ldb_message *msg,
+					      unsigned int userAccountControl,
+					      hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+	krb5_error_code ret = 0;
+	enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
+	struct samr_Password *hash;
+	const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
+	struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
+	struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
+	bool newer_keys = false;
+	struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
+	struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL;
+	struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
+	uint32_t i;
+	uint32_t allocated_keys = 0;
+
+	entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
+	entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
+
+	entry_ex->entry.kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
+
+	/* Get keys from the db */
+
+	hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
+	sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
+
+	/* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
+	if (hash) {
+		allocated_keys++;
+	}
+
+	/* supplementalCredentials if present */
+	if (sc_val) {
+		ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, iconv_convenience, &scb,
+						   (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
+		if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+			dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
+			ret = EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
+			NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
+			ret = EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
+			if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
+				scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
+				if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
+					scpk = NULL;
+					continue;
+				}
+				newer_keys = true;
+				break;
+			} else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
+				scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
+				if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
+					scpk = NULL;
+				}
+				/*
+				 * we don't break here in hope to find
+				 * a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package
+				 */
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element
+	 * of supplementalCredentials
+	 */
+	if (scpk) {
+		DATA_BLOB blob;
+
+		blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
+		if (!blob.data) {
+			ret = ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		/* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
+		ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, iconv_convenience, &_pkb,
+					       (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
+		if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+			krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
+			krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
+			ret = EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) {
+			krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
+			krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
+			ret = EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) {
+			krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
+			krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
+			ret = EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (_pkb.version == 4) {
+			pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
+			allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys;
+		} else if (_pkb.version == 3) {
+			pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3;
+			allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (allocated_keys == 0) {
+		/* oh, no password.  Apparently (comment in
+		 * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
+		 * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* allocate space to decode into */
+	entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
+	entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key));
+	if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
+		ret = ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (hash && !(userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY)) {
+		Key key;
+
+		key.mkvno = 0;
+		key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
+
+		ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
+					 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5,
+					 hash->hash, sizeof(hash->hash), 
+					 &key.key);
+		if (ret) {
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
+		entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
+	}
+
+	if (pkb4) {
+		for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) {
+			bool use = true;
+			Key key;
+
+			if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue;
+
+			if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
+				switch (pkb4->keys[i].keytype) {
+				case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
+				case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
+					break;
+				default:
+					use = false;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+
+			if (!use) continue;
+
+			key.mkvno = 0;
+			key.salt = NULL;
+
+			if (pkb4->salt.string) {
+				DATA_BLOB salt;
+
+				salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string);
+
+				key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
+				if (key.salt == NULL) {
+					ret = ENOMEM;
+					goto out;
+				}
+
+				key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
+
+				ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
+				if (ret) {
+					free(key.salt);
+					key.salt = NULL;
+					goto out;
+				}
+			}
+
+			/* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */
+
+			ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
+						 pkb4->keys[i].keytype,
+						 pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
+						 pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
+						 &key.key);
+			if (ret) {
+				if (key.salt) {
+					free_Salt(key.salt);
+					free(key.salt);
+					key.salt = NULL;
+				}
+				goto out;
+			}
+
+			entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
+			entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
+		}
+	} else if (pkb3) {
+		for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) {
+			bool use = true;
+			Key key;
+
+			if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue;
+
+			if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
+				switch (pkb3->keys[i].keytype) {
+				case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
+				case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
+					break;
+				default:
+					use = false;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+
+			if (!use) continue;
+
+			key.mkvno = 0;
+			key.salt = NULL;
+
+			if (pkb3->salt.string) {
+				DATA_BLOB salt;
+
+				salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string);
+
+				key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
+				if (key.salt == NULL) {
+					ret = ENOMEM;
+					goto out;
+				}
+
+				key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
+
+				ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
+				if (ret) {
+					free(key.salt);
+					key.salt = NULL;
+					goto out;
+				}
+			}
+
+			ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
+						 pkb3->keys[i].keytype,
+						 pkb3->keys[i].value->data,
+						 pkb3->keys[i].value->length,
+						 &key.key);
+			if (ret) {
+				if (key.salt) {
+					free_Salt(key.salt);
+					free(key.salt);
+					key.salt = NULL;
+				}
+				goto out;
+			}
+
+			entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
+			entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
+	}
+	if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
+		free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
+		entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
+ */
+static krb5_error_code LDB_message2entry(krb5_context context, HDB *db, 
+					 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
+					 enum hdb_ldb_ent_type ent_type, 
+					 struct ldb_message *msg,
+					 struct ldb_message *realm_ref_msg,
+					 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+	unsigned int userAccountControl;
+	int i;
+	krb5_error_code ret = 0;
+	krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
+	const char *dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(realm_ref_msg, "dnsRoot", NULL);
+	char *realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
+	struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = ldb_get_opaque((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, "loadparm");
+	struct ldb_dn *domain_dn = samdb_result_dn((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
+							mem_ctx,
+							realm_ref_msg,
+							"nCName",
+							ldb_dn_new(mem_ctx, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, NULL));
+
+	struct hdb_ldb_private *private;
+	NTTIME acct_expiry;
+
+	struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
+	struct ldb_val computer_val;
+	computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer");
+	computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data);
+	
+	objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
+	
+	if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
+		is_computer = TRUE;
+	}
+
+	memset(entry_ex, 0, sizeof(*entry_ex));
+
+	if (!realm) {
+		krb5_set_error_string(context, "talloc_strdup: out of memory");
+		ret = ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+			
+	private = talloc(mem_ctx, struct hdb_ldb_private);
+	if (!private) {
+		ret = ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	private->entry_ex = entry_ex;
+	private->iconv_convenience = lp_iconv_convenience(lp_ctx);
+	private->netbios_name = lp_netbios_name(lp_ctx);
+
+	talloc_set_destructor(private, hdb_ldb_destructor);
+
+	entry_ex->ctx = private;
+	entry_ex->free_entry = hdb_ldb_free_entry;
+
+	userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
+
+	
+	entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
+	if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
+		const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
+		if (!samAccountName) {
+			krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
+			ret = ENOENT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
+		krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, realm, samAccountName, NULL);
+	} else {
+		char *strdup_realm;
+		ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
+		if (ret) {
+			krb5_clear_error_string(context);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		/* While we have copied the client principal, tests
+		 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
+		 * the client-specified realm.  This code attempts to
+		 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
+		 * we determine from our records */
+		
+		/* this has to be with malloc() */
+		strdup_realm = strdup(realm);
+		if (!strdup_realm) {
+			ret = ENOMEM;
+			krb5_clear_error_string(context);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		free(*krb5_princ_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal));
+		krb5_princ_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, &strdup_realm);
+	}
+
+	entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
+
+	if (ent_type == HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT) {
+		entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
+		entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
+		entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
+		entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
+	}
+
+	if (lp_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
+		if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
+			entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* use 'whenCreated' */
+	entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
+	/* use '???' */
+	entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal = NULL;
+
+	entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event));
+	if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
+		krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory");
+		ret = ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* use 'whenChanged' */
+	entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
+	/* use '???' */
+	entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal = NULL;
+
+	entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
+
+	acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
+	if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
+		entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
+	} else {
+		entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end));
+		if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) {
+			ret = ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		*entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
+	}
+
+	if (ent_type != HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT) {
+		NTTIME must_change_time
+			= samdb_result_force_password_change((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, mem_ctx, 
+							     domain_dn, msg);
+		if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
+			entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
+		} else {
+			entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end));
+			if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) {
+				ret = ENOMEM;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			*entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
+		}
+	} else {
+		entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
+	}
+			
+	entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
+
+	entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
+
+	entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
+
+	/* Get keys from the db */
+	ret = LDB_message2entry_keys(context, private->iconv_convenience, private, msg, userAccountControl, entry_ex);
+	if (ret) {
+		/* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
+	if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
+		krb5_clear_error_string(context);
+		ret = ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
+	entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
+	if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
+		krb5_clear_error_string(context);
+		ret = ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
+		entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
+	}
+
+
+	private->msg = talloc_steal(private, msg);
+	private->realm_ref_msg = talloc_steal(private, realm_ref_msg);
+	private->samdb = (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db;
+	
+out:
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		/* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
+		hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
+	} else {
+		talloc_steal(db, entry_ex->ctx);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
+ */
+static krb5_error_code LDB_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context, HDB *db, 
+					       struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+					       TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
+					       enum trust_direction direction,
+					       struct ldb_message *msg,
+					       hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+	
+	const char *dnsdomain;
+	char *realm;
+	char *strdup_realm;
+	DATA_BLOB password_utf16;
+	struct samr_Password password_hash;
+	const struct ldb_val *password_val;
+	struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
+	struct hdb_ldb_private *private;
+
+	enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
+	int i, ret, trust_direction_flags;
+
+	private = talloc(mem_ctx, struct hdb_ldb_private);
+	if (!private) {
+		ret = ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	private->entry_ex = entry_ex;
+	private->iconv_convenience = lp_iconv_convenience(lp_ctx);
+	private->netbios_name = lp_netbios_name(lp_ctx);
+
+	talloc_set_destructor(private, hdb_ldb_destructor);
+
+	entry_ex->ctx = private;
+	entry_ex->free_entry = hdb_ldb_free_entry;
+
+	/* use 'whenCreated' */
+	entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
+	/* use '???' */
+	entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal = NULL;
+
+	entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
+
+	trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
+
+	if (direction == INBOUND) {
+		realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lp_realm(lp_ctx));
+		password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
+
+	} else { /* OUTBOUND */
+		dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
+		realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
+		password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
+	}
+
+	if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
+		ret = ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, private->iconv_convenience, &password_blob,
+					   (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
+	if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+		ret = EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	entry_ex->entry.kvno = -1;
+	for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
+		if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
+			entry_ex->entry.kvno = password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.version.version;
+		}
+	}
+
+	for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
+		if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
+			password_utf16 = data_blob_const(password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
+							 password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
+			/* In the future, generate all sorts of
+			 * hashes, but for now we can't safely convert
+			 * the random strings windows uses into
+			 * utf8 */
+
+			/* but as it is utf16 already, we can get the NT password/arcfour-hmac-md5 key */
+			mdfour(password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
+			break;
+		} else if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
+			password_hash = password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
+	entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
+
+	if (i < password_blob.count) {
+		Key key;
+		/* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
+		entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(1, sizeof(Key));
+
+		key.mkvno = 0;
+		key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
+
+		if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
+			ret = ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		
+		ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
+					 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5,
+					 password_hash.hash, sizeof(password_hash.hash), 
+					 &key.key);
+		
+		entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
+		entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
+	}
+		
+	entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
+
+	ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
+	if (ret) {
+		krb5_clear_error_string(context);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	
+	/* While we have copied the client principal, tests
+	 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
+	 * the client-specified realm.  This code attempts to
+	 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
+	 * we determine from our records */
+	
+	/* this has to be with malloc() */
+	strdup_realm = strdup(realm);
+	if (!strdup_realm) {
+		ret = ENOMEM;
+		krb5_clear_error_string(context);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	free(*krb5_princ_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal));
+	krb5_princ_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, &strdup_realm);
+	
+	entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
+	entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
+	entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
+	entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
+	entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
+
+	entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
+			
+	entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
+
+	entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
+
+	entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
+
+	entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
+	if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
+		krb5_clear_error_string(context);
+		ret = ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
+	entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
+	if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
+		krb5_clear_error_string(context);
+		ret = ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
+		entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
+	}
+
+
+	private->msg = talloc_steal(private, msg);
+	private->realm_ref_msg = NULL;
+	private->samdb = (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db;
+	
+out:
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		/* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
+		hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
+	} else {
+		talloc_steal(db, entry_ex->ctx);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_lookup_principal(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx, 					
+					    TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					    krb5_const_principal principal,
+					    enum hdb_ldb_ent_type ent_type,
+					    struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
+					    struct ldb_message ***pmsg)
+{
+	krb5_error_code ret;
+	int lret;
+	char *filter = NULL;
+	const char * const *princ_attrs = user_attrs;
+
+	char *short_princ;
+	char *short_princ_talloc;
+
+	struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
+
+	ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,  KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &short_princ);
+
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
+		krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	short_princ_talloc = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, short_princ);
+	free(short_princ);
+	if (!short_princ_talloc) {
+		krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_lookup_principal: talloc_strdup() failed!");
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	switch (ent_type) {
+	case HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT:
+	case HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_TRUST:
+	case HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY:
+		/* Can't happen */
+		return EINVAL;
+	case HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT:
+		filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))", 
+					 KRB5_TGS_NAME);
+		break;
+	case HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_SERVER:
+		filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))", 
+					 short_princ_talloc);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (!filter) {
+		krb5_set_error_string(context, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &res, realm_dn,
+			  LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, princ_attrs, "%s", filter);
+	if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search for %s: %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx)));
+		return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+	} else if (res->count == 0 || res->count > 1) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for %s: got %d\n", filter, res->count));
+		talloc_free(res);
+		return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+	}
+	talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res->msgs);
+	*pmsg = res->msgs;
+	talloc_free(res);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx, 					
+					TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					const char *realm,
+					struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
+					struct ldb_message ***pmsg)
+{
+	int lret;
+	char *filter = NULL;
+	const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
+
+	struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
+	filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=trustedDomain)(|(flatname=%s)(trustPartner=%s)))", realm, realm);
+
+	if (!filter) {
+		krb5_set_error_string(context, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &res,
+			  ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx),
+			  LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs, "%s", filter);
+	if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search for %s: %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx)));
+		return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+	} else if (res->count == 0 || res->count > 1) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for %s: got %d\n", filter, res->count));
+		talloc_free(res);
+		return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+	}
+	talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res->msgs);
+	*pmsg = res->msgs;
+	talloc_free(res);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_lookup_realm(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx, 
+					TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					const char *realm,
+					struct ldb_message ***pmsg)
+{
+ 	int ret;
+	struct ldb_result *cross_ref_res;
+	struct ldb_dn *partitions_basedn = samdb_partitions_dn(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx);
+
+	ret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &cross_ref_res,
+			partitions_basedn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, realm_ref_attrs,
+			"(&(&(|(&(dnsRoot=%s)(nETBIOSName=*))(nETBIOSName=%s))(objectclass=crossRef))(ncName=*))",
+			realm, realm);
+
+	if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search to lookup realm(%s): %s\n", realm, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx)));
+		talloc_free(cross_ref_res);
+		return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+	} else if (cross_ref_res->count == 0 || cross_ref_res->count > 1) {
+		DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for realm %s: got %d\n", realm, cross_ref_res->count));
+		talloc_free(cross_ref_res);
+		return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+	}
+
+	if (pmsg) {
+		*pmsg = cross_ref_res->msgs;
+		talloc_steal(mem_ctx, cross_ref_res->msgs);
+	}
+	talloc_free(cross_ref_res);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_open(krb5_context context, HDB *db, int flags, mode_t mode)
+{
+	if (db->hdb_master_key_set) {
+		krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_open: use of a master key incompatible with LDB\n");
+		krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_open: use of a master key incompatible with LDB\n");
+		return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+	}		
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_close(krb5_context context, HDB *db)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_lock(krb5_context context, HDB *db, int operation)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_unlock(krb5_context context, HDB *db)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_rename(krb5_context context, HDB *db, const char *new_name)
+{
+	return HDB_ERR_DB_INUSE;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch_client(krb5_context context, HDB *db, 
+					TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, 
+					krb5_const_principal principal,
+					unsigned flags,
+					hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+	char *principal_string;
+	krb5_error_code ret;
+	struct ldb_message **msg = NULL;
+	struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msg = NULL;
+
+	ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string);
+	
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		return ret;
+	}
+	
+	nt_status = sam_get_results_principal((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
+					      mem_ctx, principal_string, 
+					      &msg, &realm_ref_msg);
+	free(principal_string);
+	if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
+		return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+	} else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
+		return ENOMEM;
+	} else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		return EINVAL;
+	}
+	
+	ret = LDB_message2entry(context, db, mem_ctx, 
+				principal, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
+				msg[0], realm_ref_msg[0], entry_ex);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context, HDB *db, 
+					TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, 
+					krb5_const_principal principal,
+					unsigned flags,
+					hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+	krb5_error_code ret;
+	struct ldb_message **msg = NULL;
+	struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msg_1 = NULL;
+	struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msg_2 = NULL;
+	struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
+	const char *realm;
+
+	krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL;
+	if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2
+	    || (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
+		/* Not a krbtgt */
+		return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+	}
+
+	/* krbtgt case.  Either us or a trusted realm */
+
+	if ((LDB_lookup_realm(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
+			      mem_ctx, principal->realm, &realm_ref_msg_1) == 0)
+	    && (LDB_lookup_realm(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
+				 mem_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1], &realm_ref_msg_2) == 0)
+	    && (ldb_dn_compare(realm_ref_msg_1[0]->dn, realm_ref_msg_1[0]->dn) == 0)) {
+		/* us */		
+ 		/* Cludge, cludge cludge.  If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
+ 		 * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
+ 		 * krbtgt */
+ 		
+ 		const char *dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(realm_ref_msg_1[0], "dnsRoot", NULL);
+ 		char *realm_fixed = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
+ 		if (!realm_fixed) {
+ 			krb5_set_error_string(context, "strupper_talloc: out of memory");
+ 			return ENOMEM;
+ 		}
+ 		
+ 		ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &alloc_principal);
+ 		if (ret) {
+ 			return ret;
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		free(alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
+		alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1] = strdup(realm_fixed);
+ 		talloc_free(realm_fixed);
+ 		if (!alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]) {
+ 			krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_fetch: strdup() failed!");
+ 			return ENOMEM;
+ 		}
+ 		principal = alloc_principal;
+		realm_dn = samdb_result_dn((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, mem_ctx, realm_ref_msg_1[0], "nCName", NULL);
+		
+		ret = LDB_lookup_principal(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, 
+					   mem_ctx, 
+					   principal, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, realm_dn, &msg);
+		
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
+			krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
+			return ret;
+		}
+		
+		ret = LDB_message2entry(context, db, mem_ctx, 
+					principal, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, 
+					msg[0], realm_ref_msg_1[0], entry_ex);
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");	
+		}
+		return ret;
+
+	} else {
+		enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
+
+		struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = talloc_get_type(ldb_get_opaque(db->hdb_db, "loadparm"), struct loadparm_context);
+		/* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
+
+		if (strcasecmp(lp_realm(lp_ctx), principal->realm) == 0) {
+			/* look for inbound trust */
+			direction = INBOUND;
+			realm = principal->name.name_string.val[1];
+		}
+
+		if (strcasecmp(lp_realm(lp_ctx), principal->name.name_string.val[1]) == 0) {
+			/* look for outbound trust */
+			direction = OUTBOUND;
+			realm = principal->realm;
+		}
+
+		/* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
+		
+		ret = LDB_lookup_trust(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, 
+				       mem_ctx, 
+				       realm, realm_dn, &msg);
+		
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
+			krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
+			return ret;
+		}
+		
+		ret = LDB_trust_message2entry(context, db, lp_ctx, mem_ctx, 
+					      principal, direction, 
+					      msg[0], entry_ex);
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: trust_message2entry failed");	
+		}
+		return ret;
+
+		
+		/* we should lookup trusted domains */
+		return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+	}
+
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch_server(krb5_context context, HDB *db, 
+					TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, 
+					krb5_const_principal principal,
+					unsigned flags,
+					hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+	krb5_error_code ret;
+	const char *realm;
+	struct ldb_message **msg = NULL;
+	struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msg = NULL;
+	struct ldb_dn *partitions_basedn = samdb_partitions_dn(db->hdb_db, mem_ctx);
+	if (principal->name.name_string.len >= 2) {
+		/* 'normal server' case */
+		int ldb_ret;
+		NTSTATUS nt_status;
+		struct ldb_dn *user_dn, *domain_dn;
+		char *principal_string;
+		
+		ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, 
+					      KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, 
+					      &principal_string);
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			return ret;
+		}
+		
+		/* At this point we may find the host is known to be
+		 * in a different realm, so we should generate a
+		 * referral instead */
+		nt_status = crack_service_principal_name((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
+							 mem_ctx, principal_string, 
+							 &user_dn, &domain_dn);
+		free(principal_string);
+		
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+			return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+		}
+		
+		ldb_ret = gendb_search_dn((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
+					  mem_ctx, user_dn, &msg, user_attrs);
+		
+		if (ldb_ret != 1) {
+			return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+		}
+		
+		ldb_ret = gendb_search((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
+				       mem_ctx, partitions_basedn, &realm_ref_msg, realm_ref_attrs, 
+				       "ncName=%s", ldb_dn_get_linearized(domain_dn));
+		
+		if (ldb_ret != 1) {
+			return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+		}
+		
+	} else {
+		struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
+		/* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
+
+		realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
+		
+		ret = LDB_lookup_realm(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, 
+				       mem_ctx, realm, &realm_ref_msg);
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+		}
+		
+		realm_dn = samdb_result_dn((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, mem_ctx, realm_ref_msg[0], "nCName", NULL);
+		
+		ret = LDB_lookup_principal(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, 
+					   mem_ctx, 
+					   principal, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_SERVER, realm_dn, &msg);
+		
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			return ret;
+		}
+	}
+
+	ret = LDB_message2entry(context, db, mem_ctx, 
+				principal, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
+				msg[0], realm_ref_msg[0], entry_ex);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: message2entry failed");	
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+			
+static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch(krb5_context context, HDB *db, 
+				 krb5_const_principal principal,
+				 unsigned flags,
+				 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+	krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(db, 0, "LDB_fetch context");
+
+	if (!mem_ctx) {
+		krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
+		ret = LDB_fetch_client(context, db, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
+		if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
+	}
+	if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
+		/* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
+		ret = LDB_fetch_krbtgt(context, db, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
+		if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
+
+		/* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
+		ret = LDB_fetch_server(context, db, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
+		if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
+	}
+	if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
+		ret = LDB_fetch_krbtgt(context, db, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
+		if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
+	}
+
+done:
+	talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_store(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry_ex *entry)
+{
+	return HDB_ERR_DB_INUSE;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_remove(krb5_context context, HDB *db, krb5_const_principal principal)
+{
+	return HDB_ERR_DB_INUSE;
+}
+
+struct hdb_ldb_seq {
+	struct ldb_context *ctx;
+	int index;
+	int count;
+	struct ldb_message **msgs;
+	struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msgs;
+};
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_seq(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry_ex *entry)
+{
+	krb5_error_code ret;
+	struct hdb_ldb_seq *priv = (struct hdb_ldb_seq *)db->hdb_dbc;
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
+	hdb_entry_ex entry_ex;
+	memset(&entry_ex, '\0', sizeof(entry_ex));
+
+	if (!priv) {
+		return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+	}
+
+	mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "LDB_seq context");
+
+	if (!mem_ctx) {
+		krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (priv->index < priv->count) {
+		ret = LDB_message2entry(context, db, mem_ctx, 
+					NULL, HDB_SAMBA4_ENT_TYPE_ANY, 
+					priv->msgs[priv->index++], 
+					priv->realm_ref_msgs[0], entry);
+	} else {
+		ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+	}
+
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		talloc_free(priv);
+		db->hdb_dbc = NULL;
+	} else {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_firstkey(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags,
+					hdb_entry_ex *entry)
+{
+	struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db;
+	struct hdb_ldb_seq *priv = (struct hdb_ldb_seq *)db->hdb_dbc;
+	char *realm;
+	struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = NULL;
+	struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
+	struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msgs = NULL;
+	krb5_error_code ret;
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
+	int lret;
+
+	if (priv) {
+		talloc_free(priv);
+		db->hdb_dbc = NULL;
+	}
+
+	priv = (struct hdb_ldb_seq *) talloc(db, struct hdb_ldb_seq);
+	if (!priv) {
+		krb5_set_error_string(context, "talloc: out of memory");
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	priv->ctx = ldb_ctx;
+	priv->index = 0;
+	priv->msgs = NULL;
+	priv->realm_ref_msgs = NULL;
+	priv->count = 0;
+
+	mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "LDB_firstkey context");
+
+	if (!mem_ctx) {
+		krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
+		return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		talloc_free(priv);
+		return ret;
+	}
+		
+	ret = LDB_lookup_realm(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, 
+			       mem_ctx, realm, &realm_ref_msgs);
+
+	free(realm);
+
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		talloc_free(priv);
+		krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_firstkey: could not find realm\n");
+		return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+	}
+
+	realm_dn = samdb_result_dn((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, mem_ctx, realm_ref_msgs[0], "nCName", NULL);
+
+	priv->realm_ref_msgs = talloc_steal(priv, realm_ref_msgs);
+
+	lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
+			  realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
+			  "(objectClass=user)");
+
+	if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+		talloc_free(priv);
+		return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+	}
+
+	priv->count = res->count;
+	priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
+	talloc_free(res);
+
+	db->hdb_dbc = priv;
+
+	ret = LDB_seq(context, db, flags, entry);
+
+	if (ret != 0) {
+    		talloc_free(priv);
+		db->hdb_dbc = NULL;
+	} else {
+		talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_nextkey(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags,
+				   hdb_entry_ex *entry)
+{
+	return LDB_seq(context, db, flags, entry);
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code LDB_destroy(krb5_context context, HDB *db)
+{
+	talloc_free(db);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* This interface is to be called by the KDC, which is expecting Samba
+ * calling conventions.  It is also called by a wrapper
+ * (hdb_ldb_create) from the kpasswdd -> krb5 -> keytab_hdb -> hdb
+ * code */
+
+NTSTATUS kdc_hdb_samba4_create(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, 
+			    struct event_context *ev_ctx, 
+			    struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+			    krb5_context context, struct HDB **db, const char *arg)
+{
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+	struct auth_session_info *session_info;
+	*db = talloc(mem_ctx, HDB);
+	if (!*db) {
+		krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory");
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	(*db)->hdb_master_key_set = 0;
+	(*db)->hdb_db = NULL;
+
+	nt_status = auth_system_session_info(*db, lp_ctx, &session_info);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		return nt_status;
+	}
+	
+	/* The idea here is very simple.  Using Kerberos to
+	 * authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is higly likely to
+	 * be circular.
+	 *
+	 * In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL
+	 * certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP
+	*/
+	
+	cli_credentials_set_kerberos_state(session_info->credentials, 
+					   CRED_DONT_USE_KERBEROS);
+
+	/* Setup the link to LDB */
+	(*db)->hdb_db = samdb_connect(*db, ev_ctx, lp_ctx, session_info);
+	if ((*db)->hdb_db == NULL) {
+		DEBUG(1, ("hdb_ldb_create: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!"));
+		return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
+	}
+
+	(*db)->hdb_dbc = NULL;
+	(*db)->hdb_open = LDB_open;
+	(*db)->hdb_close = LDB_close;
+	(*db)->hdb_fetch = LDB_fetch;
+	(*db)->hdb_store = LDB_store;
+	(*db)->hdb_remove = LDB_remove;
+	(*db)->hdb_firstkey = LDB_firstkey;
+	(*db)->hdb_nextkey = LDB_nextkey;
+	(*db)->hdb_lock = LDB_lock;
+	(*db)->hdb_unlock = LDB_unlock;
+	(*db)->hdb_rename = LDB_rename;
+	/* we don't implement these, as we are not a lockable database */
+	(*db)->hdb__get = NULL;
+	(*db)->hdb__put = NULL;
+	/* kadmin should not be used for deletes - use other tools instead */
+	(*db)->hdb__del = NULL;
+	(*db)->hdb_destroy = LDB_destroy;
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+krb5_error_code hdb_samba4_create(krb5_context context, struct HDB **db, const char *arg)
+{
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+	/* The global kdc_mem_ctx and kdc_lp_ctx, Disgusting, ugly hack, but it means one less private hook */
+	nt_status = kdc_hdb_samba4_create(kdc_mem_ctx, event_context_find(kdc_mem_ctx), kdc_lp_ctx, 
+					  context, db, arg);
+
+	if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return EINVAL;
+}