summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/source4/kdc
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorAndrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>2008-08-26 16:26:08 +1000
committerAndrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>2008-08-26 16:26:08 +1000
commitf08786686c0bf2440e35ce29b8e0b1a2f116fe3a (patch)
treefd7ac6f7cd8528c550952731347f03397c70df77 /source4/kdc
parentb5a3f45f645204bcc3d6caa47993b7839c8e4c99 (diff)
parent4eba234a7352094e1640e8ff9d80a20f8d4705a3 (diff)
downloadsamba-f08786686c0bf2440e35ce29b8e0b1a2f116fe3a.tar.gz
samba-f08786686c0bf2440e35ce29b8e0b1a2f116fe3a.tar.bz2
samba-f08786686c0bf2440e35ce29b8e0b1a2f116fe3a.zip
Merge branch 'v4-0-test' of ssh://git.samba.org/data/git/samba into pac-verify
(This used to be commit b706708210a05d6f10474a3cd2bbc550704d4356)
Diffstat (limited to 'source4/kdc')
-rw-r--r--source4/kdc/hdb-ldb.c339
-rw-r--r--source4/kdc/pac-glue.c24
2 files changed, 323 insertions, 40 deletions
diff --git a/source4/kdc/hdb-ldb.c b/source4/kdc/hdb-ldb.c
index 8f8ce3074b..ef3a0bcb8a 100644
--- a/source4/kdc/hdb-ldb.c
+++ b/source4/kdc/hdb-ldb.c
@@ -45,14 +45,22 @@
#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
#include "librpc/ndr/libndr.h"
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/lsa.h"
#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
#include "param/param.h"
#include "events/events.h"
#include "kdc/kdc.h"
+#include "lib/crypto/md4.h"
enum hdb_ldb_ent_type
{ HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
- HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
+ HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
+
+enum trust_direction {
+ UNKNOWN = 0,
+ INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
+ OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
+};
static const char *realm_ref_attrs[] = {
"nCName",
@@ -60,6 +68,18 @@ static const char *realm_ref_attrs[] = {
NULL
};
+static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
+ "trustPartner",
+ "trustAuthIncoming",
+ "trustAuthOutgoing",
+ "whenCreated",
+ "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
+ "trustAttributes",
+ "trustDirection",
+ "trustType",
+ NULL
+};
+
static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val)
{
const char *tmp;
@@ -675,6 +695,187 @@ out:
return ret;
}
+/*
+ * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
+ */
+static krb5_error_code LDB_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
+ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
+ enum trust_direction direction,
+ struct ldb_message *msg,
+ hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
+{
+
+ const char *dnsdomain;
+ char *realm;
+ char *strdup_realm;
+ DATA_BLOB password_utf16;
+ struct samr_Password password_hash;
+ const struct ldb_val *password_val;
+ struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
+ struct hdb_ldb_private *private;
+
+ enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
+ int i, ret, trust_direction_flags;
+
+ private = talloc(mem_ctx, struct hdb_ldb_private);
+ if (!private) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ private->entry_ex = entry_ex;
+ private->iconv_convenience = lp_iconv_convenience(lp_ctx);
+ private->netbios_name = lp_netbios_name(lp_ctx);
+
+ talloc_set_destructor(private, hdb_ldb_destrutor);
+
+ entry_ex->ctx = private;
+ entry_ex->free_entry = hdb_ldb_free_entry;
+
+ /* use 'whenCreated' */
+ entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
+ /* use '???' */
+ entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal = NULL;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
+
+ trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
+
+ if (direction == INBOUND) {
+ realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lp_realm(lp_ctx));
+ password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
+
+ } else { /* OUTBOUND */
+ dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
+ realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
+ password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
+ }
+
+ if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
+ ret = ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(password_val, mem_ctx, private->iconv_convenience, &password_blob,
+ (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
+ if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
+ password_utf16 = data_blob_const(password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
+ password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
+ /* In the future, generate all sorts of
+ * hashes, but for now we can't safely convert
+ * the random strings windows uses into
+ * utf8 */
+
+ /* but as it is utf16 already, we can get the NT password/arcfour-hmac-md5 key */
+ mdfour(password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
+ break;
+ } else if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
+ password_hash = password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
+
+ if (i < password_blob.count) {
+ Key key;
+ /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(1, sizeof(Key));
+
+ key.mkvno = 0;
+ key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
+
+ if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
+ ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5,
+ password_hash.hash, sizeof(password_hash.hash),
+ &key.key);
+
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
+ entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
+ }
+
+ ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
+ if (ret) {
+ krb5_clear_error_string(context);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
+ * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
+ * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
+ * replace the client principal's realm with the one
+ * we determine from our records */
+
+ /* this has to be with malloc() */
+ strdup_realm = strdup(realm);
+ if (!strdup_realm) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ krb5_clear_error_string(context);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ free(*krb5_princ_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal));
+ krb5_princ_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, &strdup_realm);
+
+ entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
+ entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
+
+ entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
+ if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
+ krb5_clear_error_string(context);
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
+ entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
+ if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
+ krb5_clear_error_string(context);
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
+ entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
+ }
+
+
+ private->msg = talloc_steal(private, msg);
+ private->realm_ref_msg = NULL;
+ private->samdb = (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db;
+
+out:
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
+ hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
+ } else {
+ talloc_steal(db, entry_ex->ctx);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+
+}
+
static krb5_error_code LDB_lookup_principal(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_const_principal principal,
@@ -709,8 +910,7 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_lookup_principal(krb5_context context, struct ldb_con
switch (ent_type) {
case HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT:
- /* Can't happen */
- return EINVAL;
+ case HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_TRUST:
case HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_ANY:
/* Can't happen */
return EINVAL;
@@ -745,6 +945,40 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_lookup_principal(krb5_context context, struct ldb_con
return 0;
}
+static krb5_error_code LDB_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const char *realm,
+ struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
+ struct ldb_message ***pmsg)
+{
+ int lret;
+ char *filter = NULL;
+ const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
+
+ struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
+ filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=trustedDomain)(|(flatname=%s)(trustPartner=%s)))", realm, realm);
+
+ if (!filter) {
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx), LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, filter, attrs, &res);
+
+ if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search for %s: %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx)));
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ } else if (res->count == 0 || res->count > 1) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for %s: got %d\n", filter, res->count));
+ talloc_free(res);
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ }
+ talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res->msgs);
+ *pmsg = res->msgs;
+ talloc_free(res);
+ return 0;
+}
+
static krb5_error_code LDB_lookup_realm(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *realm,
@@ -853,8 +1087,10 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
{
krb5_error_code ret;
struct ldb_message **msg = NULL;
- struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msg = NULL;
+ struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msg_1 = NULL;
+ struct ldb_message **realm_ref_msg_2 = NULL;
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
+ const char *realm;
krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL;
if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2
@@ -864,14 +1100,18 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
}
/* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
+
if ((LDB_lookup_realm(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
- mem_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1], &realm_ref_msg) == 0)) {
+ mem_ctx, principal->realm, &realm_ref_msg_1) == 0)
+ && (LDB_lookup_realm(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
+ mem_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1], &realm_ref_msg_2) == 0)
+ && (ldb_dn_compare(realm_ref_msg_1[0]->dn, realm_ref_msg_1[0]->dn) == 0)) {
/* us */
/* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
* is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
- * krgtgt */
+ * krbtgt */
- const char *dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(realm_ref_msg[0], "dnsRoot", NULL);
+ const char *dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(realm_ref_msg_1[0], "dnsRoot", NULL);
char *realm_fixed = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
if (!realm_fixed) {
krb5_set_error_string(context, "strupper_talloc: out of memory");
@@ -891,31 +1131,69 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
return ENOMEM;
}
principal = alloc_principal;
- realm_dn = samdb_result_dn((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, mem_ctx, realm_ref_msg[0], "nCName", NULL);
+ realm_dn = samdb_result_dn((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, mem_ctx, realm_ref_msg_1[0], "nCName", NULL);
+
+ ret = LDB_lookup_principal(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
+ mem_ctx,
+ principal, HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, realm_dn, &msg);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = LDB_message2entry(context, db, mem_ctx,
+ principal, HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
+ msg[0], realm_ref_msg_1[0], entry_ex);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: message2entry failed");
+ }
+ return ret;
+
} else {
- /* we should lookup trusted domains */
- return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
- }
+ enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
- realm_dn = samdb_result_dn((struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db, mem_ctx, realm_ref_msg[0], "nCName", NULL);
-
- ret = LDB_lookup_principal(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
- mem_ctx,
- principal, HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, realm_dn, &msg);
-
- if (ret != 0) {
- krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
- krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
+ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = talloc_get_type(ldb_get_opaque(db->hdb_db, "loadparm"), struct loadparm_context);
+ /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
+
+ if (strcasecmp(lp_realm(lp_ctx), principal->realm) == 0) {
+ /* look for inbound trust */
+ direction = INBOUND;
+ realm = principal->name.name_string.val[1];
+ }
+
+ if (strcasecmp(lp_realm(lp_ctx), principal->name.name_string.val[1]) == 0) {
+ /* look for outbound trust */
+ direction = OUTBOUND;
+ realm = principal->realm;
+ }
+
+ /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
+
+ ret = LDB_lookup_trust(context, (struct ldb_context *)db->hdb_db,
+ mem_ctx,
+ realm, realm_dn, &msg);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
+ krb5_set_error_string(context, "LDB_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = LDB_trust_message2entry(context, db, lp_ctx, mem_ctx,
+ principal, direction,
+ msg[0], entry_ex);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: message2entry failed");
+ }
return ret;
- }
- ret = LDB_message2entry(context, db, mem_ctx,
- principal, HDB_LDB_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
- msg[0], realm_ref_msg[0], entry_ex);
- if (ret != 0) {
- krb5_warnx(context, "LDB_fetch: message2entry failed");
+
+ /* we should lookup trusted domains */
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
}
- return ret;
+
}
static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch_server(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
@@ -1022,10 +1300,13 @@ static krb5_error_code LDB_fetch(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
}
if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
- ret = LDB_fetch_server(context, db, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
- if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
+ /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
ret = LDB_fetch_krbtgt(context, db, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
+
+ /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
+ ret = LDB_fetch_server(context, db, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
+ if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
}
if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
ret = LDB_fetch_krbtgt(context, db, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
diff --git a/source4/kdc/pac-glue.c b/source4/kdc/pac-glue.c
index cab1446ff3..bee271eaa9 100644
--- a/source4/kdc/pac-glue.c
+++ b/source4/kdc/pac-glue.c
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static krb5_error_code make_pac(krb5_context context,
struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info,
krb5_pac *pac)
{
- struct PAC_LOGON_INFO_CTR logon_info;
+ union PAC_INFO info;
struct netr_SamInfo3 *info3;
krb5_data pac_data;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ static krb5_error_code make_pac(krb5_context context,
DATA_BLOB pac_out;
krb5_error_code ret;
- ZERO_STRUCT(logon_info);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(info);
nt_status = auth_convert_server_info_saminfo3(mem_ctx, server_info, &info3);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
@@ -67,15 +67,16 @@ static krb5_error_code make_pac(krb5_context context,
return EINVAL;
}
- logon_info.info = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct PAC_LOGON_INFO);
+ info.logon_info.info = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct PAC_LOGON_INFO);
if (!mem_ctx) {
return ENOMEM;
}
- logon_info.info->info3 = *info3;
+ info.logon_info.info->info3 = *info3;
- ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(&pac_out, mem_ctx, iconv_convenience, &logon_info,
- (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_LOGON_INFO_CTR);
+ ndr_err = ndr_push_union_blob(&pac_out, mem_ctx, iconv_convenience, &info,
+ PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO,
+ (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_INFO);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
DEBUG(1, ("PAC (presig) push failed: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
@@ -162,7 +163,7 @@ krb5_error_code samba_kdc_reget_pac(void *priv, krb5_context context,
krb5_data k5pac_in;
DATA_BLOB pac_in;
- struct PAC_LOGON_INFO_CTR logon_info;
+ union PAC_INFO info;
union netr_Validation validation;
struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info_out;
@@ -191,9 +192,10 @@ krb5_error_code samba_kdc_reget_pac(void *priv, krb5_context context,
return ENOMEM;
}
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&pac_in, mem_ctx, private->iconv_convenience, &logon_info,
- (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_PAC_LOGON_INFO_CTR);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err) || !logon_info.info) {
+ ndr_err = ndr_pull_union_blob(&pac_in, mem_ctx, private->iconv_convenience, &info,
+ PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO,
+ (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_PAC_INFO);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err) || !info.logon_info.info) {
nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
DEBUG(0,("can't parse the PAC LOGON_INFO: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
@@ -201,7 +203,7 @@ krb5_error_code samba_kdc_reget_pac(void *priv, krb5_context context,
}
/* Pull this right into the normal auth sysstem structures */
- validation.sam3 = &logon_info.info->info3;
+ validation.sam3 = &info.logon_info.info->info3;
nt_status = make_server_info_netlogon_validation(mem_ctx,
"",
3, &validation,