diff options
author | Andrew Tridgell <tridge@samba.org> | 2010-03-05 22:46:44 +1100 |
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committer | Andrew Tridgell <tridge@samba.org> | 2010-03-05 23:07:32 +1100 |
commit | f7c97c8597a2ac375983909c26027abde060edb4 (patch) | |
tree | cc65009035a96703757930af2d3aeb324b94dd20 /source4/ntvfs/posix/pvfs_sys.c | |
parent | f3c738f8193665a80835471f6754a66b20725afa (diff) | |
download | samba-f7c97c8597a2ac375983909c26027abde060edb4.tar.gz samba-f7c97c8597a2ac375983909c26027abde060edb4.tar.bz2 samba-f7c97c8597a2ac375983909c26027abde060edb4.zip |
s4-pvfs: use O_FOLLOW one level at a time for security overrides
To prevent symlink attacks we need to use O_NOFOLLOW one level at a
time when processing a root security override
Diffstat (limited to 'source4/ntvfs/posix/pvfs_sys.c')
-rw-r--r-- | source4/ntvfs/posix/pvfs_sys.c | 394 |
1 files changed, 357 insertions, 37 deletions
diff --git a/source4/ntvfs/posix/pvfs_sys.c b/source4/ntvfs/posix/pvfs_sys.c index 9dfe6eef1a..5265e25007 100644 --- a/source4/ntvfs/posix/pvfs_sys.c +++ b/source4/ntvfs/posix/pvfs_sys.c @@ -29,23 +29,209 @@ has already been checked. The wrappers will override a EACCES result by gaining root privileges if the 'pvfs:perm override' is set on the share (it is enabled by default) + + Careful use of O_NOFOLLOW and O_DIRECTORY is used to prevent + security attacks via symlinks + */ + + +struct pvfs_sys_ctx { + struct pvfs_state *pvfs; + void *privs; + const char *old_wd; + struct stat st_orig; +}; + +/* + return to original directory when context is destroyed + */ +static int pvfs_sys_pushdir_destructor(struct pvfs_sys_ctx *ctx) +{ + struct stat st; + + if (ctx->old_wd == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + if (chdir(ctx->old_wd) != 0) { + smb_panic("Failed to restore working directory"); + } + if (stat(".", &st) != 0) { + smb_panic("Failed to stat working directory"); + } + if (st.st_ino != ctx->st_orig.st_ino || + st.st_dev != ctx->st_orig.st_dev) { + smb_panic("Working directory changed during call"); + } + + return 0; +} + + +/* + chdir() to the directory part of a pathname, but disallow any + component with a symlink + + Note that we can't use O_NOFOLLOW on the whole path as that only + prevents links in the final component of the path + */ +static int pvfs_sys_chdir_nosymlink(struct pvfs_sys_ctx *ctx, const char *pathname) +{ + char *p, *path; + size_t base_len = strlen(ctx->pvfs->base_directory); + + /* don't check for symlinks in the base directory of the share */ + if (strncmp(ctx->pvfs->base_directory, pathname, base_len) == 0 && + pathname[base_len] == '/') { + if (chdir(ctx->pvfs->base_directory) != 0) { + return -1; + } + pathname += base_len + 1; + } + + path = talloc_strdup(ctx, pathname); + if (path == NULL) { + return -1; + } + while ((p = strchr(path, '/'))) { + int fd; + struct stat st1, st2; + *p = 0; + fd = open(path, O_NOFOLLOW | O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY); + if (fd == -1) { + return -1; + } + if (chdir(path) != 0) { + close(fd); + return -1; + } + if (stat(".", &st1) != 0 || + fstat(fd, &st2) != 0) { + close(fd); + return -1; + } + close(fd); + if (st1.st_ino != st2.st_ino || + st1.st_dev != st2.st_dev) { + DEBUG(0,(__location__ ": Inode changed during chdir in '%s' - symlink attack?", + pathname)); + return -1; + } + path = p + 1; + } + + return 0; +} + + +/* + become root, and change directory to the directory component of a + path. Return a talloc context which when freed will move us back + to the original directory, and return us to the original uid + + change the pathname argument to contain just the base component of + the path + + return NULL on error, which could include an attempt to subvert + security using symlink tricks */ +static struct pvfs_sys_ctx *pvfs_sys_pushdir(struct pvfs_state *pvfs, + const char **pathname) +{ + struct pvfs_sys_ctx *ctx; + char *cwd, *p, *dirname; + int ret; + + ctx = talloc_zero(pvfs, struct pvfs_sys_ctx); + if (ctx == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + ctx->pvfs = pvfs; + ctx->privs = root_privileges(); + if (ctx->privs == NULL) { + talloc_free(ctx); + return NULL; + } + + talloc_steal(ctx, ctx->privs); + + if (!pathname) { + /* no pathname needed */ + return ctx; + } + + p = strrchr(*pathname, '/'); + if (p == NULL) { + /* we don't need to change directory */ + return ctx; + } + + /* we keep the old st around, so we can tell that + we have come back to the right directory */ + if (stat(".", &ctx->st_orig) != 0) { + talloc_free(ctx); + return NULL; + } + + cwd = get_current_dir_name(); + if (cwd == NULL) { + talloc_free(ctx); + return NULL; + } + ctx->old_wd = talloc_strdup(ctx, cwd); + if (ctx->old_wd == NULL) { + free(cwd); + talloc_free(ctx); + return NULL; + } + + dirname = talloc_strndup(ctx, *pathname, (p - *pathname)); + if (dirname == NULL) { + talloc_free(ctx); + return NULL; + } + + ret = pvfs_sys_chdir_nosymlink(ctx, *pathname); + if (ret == -1) { + talloc_free(ctx); + return NULL; + } + + talloc_set_destructor(ctx, pvfs_sys_pushdir_destructor); + + /* return the basename as the filename that should be operated on */ + (*pathname) = talloc_strdup(ctx, p+1); + if (! *pathname) { + talloc_free(ctx); + return NULL; + } + + return ctx; +} /* chown a file that we created with a root privileges override */ -static int pvfs_sys_fchown(struct pvfs_state *pvfs, void *privs, int fd) +static int pvfs_sys_fchown(struct pvfs_state *pvfs, struct pvfs_sys_ctx *ctx, int fd) { - return fchown(fd, root_privileges_original_uid(privs), -1); + return fchown(fd, root_privileges_original_uid(ctx->privs), -1); } /* chown a directory that we created with a root privileges override */ -static int pvfs_sys_chown(struct pvfs_state *pvfs, void *privs, const char *name) +static int pvfs_sys_chown(struct pvfs_state *pvfs, struct pvfs_sys_ctx *ctx, const char *name) { - return chown(name, root_privileges_original_uid(privs), -1); + /* to avoid symlink hacks, we need to use fchown() on a directory fd */ + int ret, fd; + fd = open(name, O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_RDONLY); + if (fd == -1) { + return -1; + } + ret = pvfs_sys_fchown(pvfs, ctx, fd); + close(fd); + return ret; } @@ -55,7 +241,7 @@ static int pvfs_sys_chown(struct pvfs_state *pvfs, void *privs, const char *name int pvfs_sys_open(struct pvfs_state *pvfs, const char *filename, int flags, mode_t mode) { int fd, ret; - void *privs; + struct pvfs_sys_ctx *ctx; int saved_errno, orig_errno; int retries = 5; @@ -69,12 +255,14 @@ int pvfs_sys_open(struct pvfs_state *pvfs, const char *filename, int flags, mode } saved_errno = errno; - privs = root_privileges(); + ctx = pvfs_sys_pushdir(pvfs, &filename); + if (ctx == NULL) { + errno = saved_errno; + return -1; + } /* don't allow permission overrides to follow links */ -#ifdef O_NOFOLLOW flags |= O_NOFOLLOW; -#endif /* if O_CREAT was specified and O_EXCL was not specified @@ -89,35 +277,35 @@ int pvfs_sys_open(struct pvfs_state *pvfs, const char *filename, int flags, mode with anything other than ENOENT, then we return the open result, with the original errno */ if (fd == -1 && errno != ENOENT) { - talloc_free(privs); + talloc_free(ctx); errno = saved_errno; return -1; } if (fd != -1) { /* the file already existed and we opened it */ - talloc_free(privs); + talloc_free(ctx); errno = orig_errno; return fd; } fd = open(filename, flags | O_EXCL, mode); if (fd == -1 && errno != EEXIST) { - talloc_free(privs); + talloc_free(ctx); errno = saved_errno; return -1; } if (fd != -1) { /* we created the file, we need to set the right ownership on it */ - ret = pvfs_sys_fchown(pvfs, privs, fd); + ret = pvfs_sys_fchown(pvfs, ctx, fd); if (ret == -1) { close(fd); unlink(filename); - talloc_free(privs); + talloc_free(ctx); errno = saved_errno; return -1; } - talloc_free(privs); + talloc_free(ctx); errno = orig_errno; return fd; } @@ -128,31 +316,31 @@ int pvfs_sys_open(struct pvfs_state *pvfs, const char *filename, int flags, mode goto try_again; } - talloc_free(privs); + talloc_free(ctx); errno = saved_errno; return -1; } fd = open(filename, flags, mode); if (fd == -1) { - talloc_free(privs); + talloc_free(ctx); errno = saved_errno; return -1; } /* if we have created a file then fchown it */ if (flags & O_CREAT) { - ret = pvfs_sys_fchown(pvfs, privs, fd); + ret = pvfs_sys_fchown(pvfs, ctx, fd); if (ret == -1) { close(fd); unlink(filename); - talloc_free(privs); + talloc_free(ctx); errno = saved_errno; return -1; } } - talloc_free(privs); + talloc_free(ctx); return fd; } @@ -163,7 +351,7 @@ int pvfs_sys_open(struct pvfs_state *pvfs, const char *filename, int flags, mode int pvfs_sys_unlink(struct pvfs_state *pvfs, const char *filename) { int ret; - void *privs; + struct pvfs_sys_ctx *ctx; int saved_errno, orig_errno; orig_errno = errno; @@ -177,27 +365,42 @@ int pvfs_sys_unlink(struct pvfs_state *pvfs, const char *filename) saved_errno = errno; - privs = root_privileges(); + ctx = pvfs_sys_pushdir(pvfs, &filename); + if (ctx == NULL) { + errno = saved_errno; + return -1; + } + ret = unlink(filename); if (ret == -1) { errno = saved_errno; - talloc_free(privs); + talloc_free(ctx); return -1; } errno = orig_errno; - talloc_free(privs); + talloc_free(ctx); return ret; } +static bool contains_symlink(const char *path) +{ + int fd = open(path, O_NOFOLLOW | O_RDONLY); + if (fd != -1) { + close(fd); + return false; + } + return (errno == ELOOP); +} + /* wrap rename for system override */ int pvfs_sys_rename(struct pvfs_state *pvfs, const char *name1, const char *name2) { int ret; - void *privs; + struct pvfs_sys_ctx *ctx; int saved_errno, orig_errno; orig_errno = errno; @@ -211,16 +414,47 @@ int pvfs_sys_rename(struct pvfs_state *pvfs, const char *name1, const char *name saved_errno = errno; - privs = root_privileges(); + ctx = pvfs_sys_pushdir(pvfs, &name1); + if (ctx == NULL) { + errno = saved_errno; + return -1; + } + + /* we need the destination as an absolute path */ + if (name2[0] != '/') { + name2 = talloc_asprintf(ctx, "%s/%s", ctx->old_wd, name2); + if (name2 == NULL) { + errno = saved_errno; + talloc_free(ctx); + return -1; + } + } + + /* make sure the destination isn't a symlink beforehand */ + if (contains_symlink(name2)) { + errno = saved_errno; + talloc_free(ctx); + return -1; + } + ret = rename(name1, name2); if (ret == -1) { errno = saved_errno; - talloc_free(privs); + talloc_free(ctx); + return -1; + } + + /* make sure the destination isn't a symlink afterwards */ + if (contains_symlink(name2)) { + DEBUG(0,(__location__ ": Possible symlink attack in rename to '%s' - unlinking\n", name2)); + unlink(name2); + errno = saved_errno; + talloc_free(ctx); return -1; } errno = orig_errno; - talloc_free(privs); + talloc_free(ctx); return ret; } @@ -231,7 +465,7 @@ int pvfs_sys_rename(struct pvfs_state *pvfs, const char *name1, const char *name int pvfs_sys_mkdir(struct pvfs_state *pvfs, const char *dirname, mode_t mode) { int ret; - void *privs; + struct pvfs_sys_ctx *ctx; int saved_errno, orig_errno; orig_errno = errno; @@ -244,24 +478,28 @@ int pvfs_sys_mkdir(struct pvfs_state *pvfs, const char *dirname, mode_t mode) } saved_errno = errno; - privs = root_privileges(); + ctx = pvfs_sys_pushdir(pvfs, &dirname); + if (ctx == NULL) { + errno = saved_errno; + return -1; + } ret = mkdir(dirname, mode); if (ret == -1) { - talloc_free(privs); + talloc_free(ctx); errno = saved_errno; return -1; } - ret = pvfs_sys_chown(pvfs, privs, dirname); + ret = pvfs_sys_chown(pvfs, ctx, dirname); if (ret == -1) { rmdir(dirname); - talloc_free(privs); + talloc_free(ctx); errno = saved_errno; return -1; } - talloc_free(privs); + talloc_free(ctx); return ret; } @@ -272,7 +510,7 @@ int pvfs_sys_mkdir(struct pvfs_state *pvfs, const char *dirname, mode_t mode) int pvfs_sys_rmdir(struct pvfs_state *pvfs, const char *dirname) { int ret; - void *privs; + struct pvfs_sys_ctx *ctx; int saved_errno, orig_errno; orig_errno = errno; @@ -286,15 +524,97 @@ int pvfs_sys_rmdir(struct pvfs_state *pvfs, const char *dirname) saved_errno = errno; - privs = root_privileges(); + ctx = pvfs_sys_pushdir(pvfs, &dirname); + if (ctx == NULL) { + errno = saved_errno; + return -1; + } + ret = rmdir(dirname); if (ret == -1) { errno = saved_errno; - talloc_free(privs); + talloc_free(ctx); + return -1; + } + + errno = orig_errno; + talloc_free(ctx); + return ret; +} + +/* + wrap fchmod for system override +*/ +int pvfs_sys_fchmod(struct pvfs_state *pvfs, int fd, mode_t mode) +{ + int ret; + struct pvfs_sys_ctx *ctx; + int saved_errno, orig_errno; + + orig_errno = errno; + + ret = fchmod(fd, mode); + if (ret != -1 || + !(pvfs->flags & PVFS_FLAG_PERM_OVERRIDE) || + errno != EACCES) { + return ret; + } + + saved_errno = errno; + + ctx = pvfs_sys_pushdir(pvfs, NULL); + if (ctx == NULL) { + errno = saved_errno; + return -1; + } + + ret = fchmod(fd, mode); + if (ret == -1) { + errno = saved_errno; + talloc_free(ctx); + return -1; + } + + errno = orig_errno; + talloc_free(ctx); + return ret; +} + + +/* + wrap chmod for system override +*/ +int pvfs_sys_chmod(struct pvfs_state *pvfs, const char *filename, mode_t mode) +{ + int ret; + struct pvfs_sys_ctx *ctx; + int saved_errno, orig_errno; + + orig_errno = errno; + + ret = chmod(filename, mode); + if (ret != -1 || + !(pvfs->flags & PVFS_FLAG_PERM_OVERRIDE) || + errno != EACCES) { + return ret; + } + + saved_errno = errno; + + ctx = pvfs_sys_pushdir(pvfs, &filename); + if (ctx == NULL) { + errno = saved_errno; + return -1; + } + + ret = chmod(filename, mode); + if (ret == -1) { + errno = saved_errno; + talloc_free(ctx); return -1; } errno = orig_errno; - talloc_free(privs); + talloc_free(ctx); return ret; } |