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authorBenjamin Franzke <benjaminfranzke@googlemail.com>2012-11-12 10:37:23 +0100
committerBenjamin Franzke <benjaminfranzke@googlemail.com>2012-11-12 10:37:23 +0100
commit565fbb75729138607c75c9ddcaca385402d67944 (patch)
tree78dc67b79c891dcd5c953cc929b489accb930c68 /rules
parent7e23cb0e2a2ad82cddf354ee0d3c2773b99b4d02 (diff)
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Prisoners Dilemma: Add parameter description to modules
Diffstat (limited to 'rules')
-rw-r--r--rules/always_coorporate.pl2
-rw-r--r--rules/always_defect.pl2
-rw-r--r--rules/gradual_killer.pl2
-rw-r--r--rules/grudger.pl2
-rw-r--r--rules/hard_tit4tat.pl2
-rw-r--r--rules/mistrust_tit4tat.pl2
-rw-r--r--rules/naive_prober.pl2
-rw-r--r--rules/pavlov.pl3
-rw-r--r--rules/periodically_ddc.pl3
-rw-r--r--rules/periodically_ssz.pl3
-rw-r--r--rules/random_choice.pl3
-rw-r--r--rules/tit42tat.pl2
-rw-r--r--rules/tit4tat.pl2
13 files changed, 30 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/rules/always_coorporate.pl b/rules/always_coorporate.pl
index e6094df..c6646a3 100644
--- a/rules/always_coorporate.pl
+++ b/rules/always_coorporate.pl
@@ -1 +1,3 @@
+% Syntax: always_coorporate(+history, -choice, +state_in, -state_out)
+
always_coorporate(_, c, _, _).
diff --git a/rules/always_defect.pl b/rules/always_defect.pl
index f9fd91d..aea4bd6 100644
--- a/rules/always_defect.pl
+++ b/rules/always_defect.pl
@@ -1 +1,3 @@
+% Syntax: always_defect(+history, -choice, +state_in, -state_out)
+
always_defect(_, d, _, _).
diff --git a/rules/gradual_killer.pl b/rules/gradual_killer.pl
index 599ef3e..c40eeb9 100644
--- a/rules/gradual_killer.pl
+++ b/rules/gradual_killer.pl
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
% If the opponent has defected in rounds 6 and 7, than the Gradual Killer
% keeps defecting forever, otherwise he keeps cooperation forever.
+% Syntax: gradual_killer(+history, -choice, +state_in, -state_out)
+
gradual_killer(_, d, [], [1]).
gradual_killer(_, d, [1], [2]).
gradual_killer(_, d, [2], [3]).
diff --git a/rules/grudger.pl b/rules/grudger.pl
index 76f9629..7d8eb88 100644
--- a/rules/grudger.pl
+++ b/rules/grudger.pl
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
% that move defects forever (he does not forgive).
% http://euler.fd.cvut.cz/predmety/game_theory/lecture_repeat.pdf
+% Syntax: grudger(+history, -choice, +state_in, -state_out)
+
grudger([], c, _, _).
grudger([d|_], d, _, _).
grudger([c|Tail], Decision, _, _) :- grudger(Tail, Decision, _, _).
diff --git a/rules/hard_tit4tat.pl b/rules/hard_tit4tat.pl
index 8efc124..6ba56e6 100644
--- a/rules/hard_tit4tat.pl
+++ b/rules/hard_tit4tat.pl
@@ -2,5 +2,7 @@
% Cooperates unless the opponent has defected
% at least once in the last two rounds.
+% Syntax: hard_tit4tat(+history, -choice, +state_in, -state_out)
+
hard_tit4tat([A,B|_],d,_,_):-(A=d;B=d),!.
hard_tit4tat(_,c,_,_).
diff --git a/rules/mistrust_tit4tat.pl b/rules/mistrust_tit4tat.pl
index 5e80c02..3ebfce9 100644
--- a/rules/mistrust_tit4tat.pl
+++ b/rules/mistrust_tit4tat.pl
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
% Mistrust Tit for Tat:
% In the first round it defects, than it plays opponent’s move.
+% Syntax: mistrust_tit4tat(+history, -choice, +state_in, -state_out)
+
% Use opponents last decision
mistrust_tit4tat([Last|_],Last,_,_).
% Fallback to defect if history is empty.
diff --git a/rules/naive_prober.pl b/rules/naive_prober.pl
index df2bcf5..72debd3 100644
--- a/rules/naive_prober.pl
+++ b/rules/naive_prober.pl
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
% Like Tit for Tat, but sometimes, after the opponent has cooperated, it
% defects (e.g. at random, in one of ten rounds in average).
+% Syntax: naive_prober(+history, -choice, +state_in, -state_out)
+
naive_prober([d|_],d,_,_).
% but only for for 90% if coorporated
naive_prober([c|_],Choice,_,_):-random(Number), (Number < 0.1 -> Choice=d; Choice=c).
diff --git a/rules/pavlov.pl b/rules/pavlov.pl
index 0da8011..5fe3702 100644
--- a/rules/pavlov.pl
+++ b/rules/pavlov.pl
@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
% Pavlov:
% Cooperates if and only if both players opted for the
% same choice in the previous move, otherwise it defects.
+
+% Syntax: pavlov(+history, -choice, +state_in, -state_out)
+
pavlov([], c, _, c):-!.
pavlov([Choice|_], c, Choice, c):-!.
pavlov(_, d, _, d).
diff --git a/rules/periodically_ddc.pl b/rules/periodically_ddc.pl
index 897986d..e76f5ab 100644
--- a/rules/periodically_ddc.pl
+++ b/rules/periodically_ddc.pl
@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
% Plays periodically: Defect–Defect–Coop.
+%
+% Syntax: periodically_ddc(+history, -choice, +state_in, -state_out)
+
periodically_ddc(_, d, [], [1]).
periodically_ddc(_, d, [1], [2]).
periodically_ddc(_, c, [2], []).
diff --git a/rules/periodically_ssz.pl b/rules/periodically_ssz.pl
index 21cb017..bfcb8d7 100644
--- a/rules/periodically_ssz.pl
+++ b/rules/periodically_ssz.pl
@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
% Plays periodically: Coop-Coop-Defect
+
+% Syntax: periodically_ssz(+history, -choice, +state_in, -state_out)
+
periodically_ssz(_, c, [], [1]).
periodically_ssz(_, c, [1], [2]).
periodically_ssz(_, d, [2], []).
diff --git a/rules/random_choice.pl b/rules/random_choice.pl
index 3bd4a91..8075afb 100644
--- a/rules/random_choice.pl
+++ b/rules/random_choice.pl
@@ -1,2 +1,5 @@
+
+% Syntax: random_choice(+history, -choice, +state_in, -state_out)
+
random_choice(_, Choice, _, _) :-
random(Number), (Number < 0.5 -> Choice=c ; Choice=d).
diff --git a/rules/tit42tat.pl b/rules/tit42tat.pl
index 281bc4d..1e66062 100644
--- a/rules/tit42tat.pl
+++ b/rules/tit42tat.pl
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
% Select distraction only if opponents both last decision were to distract.
% See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tit_for_tat#Tit_for_two_tats
+% Syntax: tit42tat(+history, -choice, +state_in, -state_out)
+
tit42tat([d,d|_],d,_,_):-!.
tit42tat(_,c,_,_).
diff --git a/rules/tit4tat.pl b/rules/tit4tat.pl
index 2fe0a8f..cacbe16 100644
--- a/rules/tit4tat.pl
+++ b/rules/tit4tat.pl
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
% move (if the opponent defects in some round, Tit for Tat will defect in the
% following one; to cooperation it responds with cooperation).
+% Syntax: tit4tat(+history, -choice, +state_in, -state_out)
+
% Use opponents last decision
tit4tat([Last|_],Last,_,_).
% Fallback to coorporate if history is empty.